UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

July 6, 2010

Mr. R. M. Krich
Vice President, Nuclear Licensing
Tennessee Valley Authority
3R Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

SUBJECT: WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT REGARDING THE COMPLETION TIME FOR THE INOPERABLE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR(S) (TAC NO. ME2985)

Dear Mr. Krich:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 84 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1. This amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated November 30, 2009.

The amendment revises the emergency diesel generator (DG) Completion Time for inoperable DGs in TS 3.8.1, "AC Sources Operating." Specifically, the proposed change will revise the Completion Time from 14 days to 72 hours for restoring one or more inoperable DG(s) in one train to an operable status. The proposed amendment is being requested because of the potential completion and startup of the WBN Unit 2.

A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,

John G. Lamb, Senior Project Manager
Watts Bar Special Projects Branch
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-390

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 84 to NPF-90
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: Distribution via Listserv

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DOCKET NO. 50-390

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 84
License No. NPF-90

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by the Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated November 30, 2009, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in Title 10 *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 84 , and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. TVA shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance, and shall be implemented after the issuance of the facility operating license for WBN Unit 2 and prior to WBN Unit 2 entry into Mode 4, "Hot Shutdown."

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Stephen Campbell, Chief
Watts Bar Special Projects Branch
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to License No. NPF-90
and the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: July 6, 2010

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 84

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-90

DOCKET NO. 50-390

Replace page 3 of Operating License No. NPF-90 with the attached page 3.

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE	INSERT
3.8-1	3.8-1
3.8-2	3.8-2
3.8-2a	3.8-2a*
3.8-3	3.8-3
3.8-4	3.8-4
3.8-5	3.8-5

*A blank (overleaf) page (back of page 3.8-2a) is included to maintain document completeness.

(4) TVA, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess, and use in amounts as required, any byproduct, source or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis, instrument calibration, or other activity associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and

(5) TVA, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility.

C. This license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect, and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below.

(1) Maximum Power Level

TVA is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of 3459 megawatts thermal.

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A as revised through Amendment No. 84 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. TVA shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

(3) Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) (Section 18.2 of SER Supplements 5 and 15)

Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, TVA shall accomplish the necessary activities, provide acceptable responses, and implement all proposed corrective actions related to having the Watts Bar Unit 1 SPDS operational.

(4) Vehicle Bomb Control Program (Section 13.6.9 of SSER 20)

During the period of the exemption granted in paragraph 2.D.(3) of this license, in implementing the power ascension phase of the approved initial test program, TVA shall not exceed 50% power until the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(c)(7) and (8) are fully implemented. TVA shall submit a letter under oath or affirmation when the requirements of 73.55(c)(7) and (8) have been fully implemented.

3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating

LCO 3.8.1 The following AC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution System; and

b. Four diesel generators (DGs) capable of supplying the onsite Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution System.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS

----------NOTE----------
LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to DGs.

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One offsite circuit inoperable.	A.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for OPERABLE offsite circuit.	1 hour AND Once per 8 hours thereafter
	AND	
	A.2 Declare required feature(s) with no offsite power available inoperable when its redundant required feature(s) is inoperable.	24 hours from discovery of no offsite power to one train concurrent with inoperability of redundant required feature(s)
	AND	

(continued)

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. (continued)	A.3 Restore offsite circuit to OPERABLE status.	72 hours AND 6 days from discovery of failure to meet LCO

(continued)

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
B. One or more DG(s) in Train A inoperable. OR One or more DG(s) in Train B inoperable.	B.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for the offsite circuits. AND	1 hour AND Once per 8 hours thereafter
	B.2 Declare required feature(s) supported by the inoperable DG(s) inoperable when its required redundant feature(s) is inoperable. AND	4 hours from discovery of Condition B concurrent with inoperability of redundant required feature(s)
	B.3.1 Determine OPERABLE DG(s) are not inoperable due to common cause failure. OR	24 hours
	B.3.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2 for OPERABLE DG(s). AND	24 hours

(continued)

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CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
B. (continued)	B.4 Restore required DG(s) to OPERABLE status.	72 hours AND 6 days from discovery of failure to meet LCO
C. Two offsite circuits inoperable.	C.1 Declare required feature(s) inoperable when its redundant required feature(s) is inoperable.	12 hours from discovery of Condition C concurrent with inoperability of redundant required features
	AND	
	C.2 Restore one offsite circuit to OPERABLE status.	24 hours

(continued)

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
D. One offsite circuit inoperable. AND One or more required DG(s) in Train A inoperable. OR One or more required DG(s) in Train B inoperable.	----------NOTE---------- Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems - Operating," when Condition D is entered with no AC power source to any train. ---------- D.1 Restore offsite circuit to OPERABLE status. OR D.2 Restore required DG(s) to OPERABLE status.	 12 hours 12 hours
E. One or more required DG(s) in Train A inoperable. AND One or more required DG(s) in Train B inoperable.	E.1 Restore required DGs in Train A to OPERABLE status. OR E.2 Restore required DGs in Train B to OPERABLE status	2 hours 2 hours
F. Required Action and Associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, C, D, or E not met.	F.1 Be in MODE 3. AND F.2 Be in MODE 5.	6 hours 36 hours

(continued)

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
G. Two offsite circuits inoperable. AND One or more required DG(s) in Train A inoperable. OR One or more required DG(s) in Train B inoperable.	G.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3.	Immediately
H. One offsite circuit inoperable. AND One or more required DG(s) in Train A inoperable. AND One or more required DG(s) in Train B inoperable.	H.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3.	Immediately

UNITED STATES
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 84 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-90

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

DOCKET NO. 50-390

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated November 30, 2009 (Agencywide Document Management Systems Accession No. ML093640790), Tennessee Valley Authority requested an amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN), Unit 1 and Appendix A, Technical Specifications (TSs), of the Facility Operating License. The proposed changes would revise the emergency diesel generator (DG) Completion Time for inoperable DGs in TS 3.8.1, "AC Sources Operating." Specifically, the proposed change will revise the Completion Time from 14 days to 72 hours for restoring one or more inoperable DG(s) in one train to an operable status. The amendment was requested because of the potential completion and startup of the WBN Unit 2. This amendment will be implemented after the issuance of the facility operating license for WBN Unit 2 and prior to Unit 2 entry into Mode 4, "Hot Shutdown."

The reason for the change is that the original risk informed justification for the 14-day Completion Time will no longer be valid if WBN Unit 2 receives its operating license. The original 14-day Completion Time was based on operation of WBN Unit 1 as a single unit.

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff applied the below listed regulatory requirements in its review of this application.

General Design Criterion (GDC) 17, "Electric power systems" of Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants" to Title10, Part 50, of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (CFR) requires, in part, that nuclear power plants have onsite and offsite electric power systems to permit the functioning of structures, systems, and components that are important to safety. The onsite system is required to have sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform its safety function, assuming a single failure. The offsite power system is required to be supplied by two physically independent circuits that are designed and located so as to minimize, to the extent practical, the likelihood of their simultaneous failure under operating and postulated accident and environmental conditions. In addition, this criterion requires provisions to minimize

the probability of losing electric power from the remaining electric power supplies as a result of loss of power from the unit, the offsite transmission network, or the onsite power supplies.

GDC-18, "Inspection and testing of electric power systems" requires that electric power systems that are important to safety must be designed to permit appropriate periodic inspection and testing to assess the continuity of the systems and the conditions of their components.

Title 10 CFR 50.36, "Technical Specifications" requires a licensee's TSs to establish limiting conditions for operation (LCOs), which include Completion Times (CT) or Allowed Outage Times (AOTs) for equipment that is required for safe operation of the facility.

Title 10 CFR 50.65, "Requirements for monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear power plants" requires that preventive maintenance activities must not reduce the overall availability of the systems, structures and components. It also requires that before performing maintenance activities, the licensee shall assess and manage the increase in risk that may result from the proposed maintenance activities.

Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.93 (Revision 3), "Availability of Electric Power Sources" provides guidance with respect to operating restrictions (i.e., AOTs) if the number of available alternate current (AC) sources is less than that required by the TS LCO. In particular, this guide prescribes a maximum AOT of 72 hours for an inoperable onsite or offsite AC source.

RG 1.9 (Revision 3), "Selection, Design, Qualification, and Testing of Emergency Diesel-Generator Units Used As Class 1E Onsite Electric Power Systems At Nuclear Power Plants."

NUREG-1431, "Standard Technical Specifications Westinghouse Plants."

Generic Letter (GL) 84-15, "Proposed Staff Actions to Improve and Maintain Diesel Generator Reliability."

3.0 BACKGROUND

As described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and TVA's application dated November 30, 2009, WBN Units 1 and 2 are equipped with four Class 1E, DG sets to provide onsite emergency AC power to essential safety systems in the event of a loss of offsite power, degraded voltage on the 6.9 kilo Volt (kV) shutdown boards and/or safety injections signal. The DGs power system is divided into two redundant loads and each load group is composed of two power trains (train 1A and 2A; train 1B and 2B) and supplies power to all safety-related plant loads of both units. There are four 6.9 kV shutdown boards that are arranged electrically into four power trains (two per unit) with two boards associated with each load group in each unit. The load group comprising load group A is located in the WBN Unit 1 area, and those of load group B are located in the WBN Unit 2 area. Two DGs in the same train are required to mitigate a design bases event. Separate standby DG(s) are provided for each shutdown board to provide power when the offsite power is not available. Each DG set is complete with its own air starting system, fuel supply system, and automatic control circuitry. The DGs are designed, installed and tested to requirements that are necessary to ensure their availability. Each DG set consists of two diesel engines directly connected to a common 6.9 kV, 60 Hertz, 3-phase,

AC generator in tandem arrangement; that is, each set consists of two diesel engines with a generator between them connected together to form a common shaft. The normal operating speed of the DG is 900 rotations per minutes. The generator sets are physically separated and electrically isolated from each other. Each DG has a continuous rating of 4400 kilo Watt (kW) (5500 kilo Volt Ampere (KVA)) and short-time (2 hour) 4840 KW (6050 KVA). The four DGs were originally sized to supply the loads of WBN Units 1 and 2. The DGs are also designed to operate in parallel with the normal offsite power source for test and exercise purposes.

The DGs are sized, installed and applied (voltage, frequency limits, and the starting and loading reliability) in accordance with the requirements of RG 1.9, Revision 3, and IEEE Standard 387-1984, "Criteria for Diesel Generator Units Applied as Standby Power Supplies for Nuclear Power Stations." Additional information regarding the design of the WBN Unit 1 electrical system is contained in Chapter 8, "Electric Power," of the FSAR. WBN Unit 1 Technical Specifications are proposed to be amended to modify conditions and associated actions to TS 3.8.1. This proposed amendment is being requested in anticipation of the completion and startup of WBN Unit 2, and will revise the COMPLETION TIME for the WBN DGs from 14 days to 72 hours. Specifically, the change eliminates TS 3.8.1 Condition B and the associated required actions and CTs and re-letters the conditions described in existing Condition C from:

"C. Two required DGs in Train A inoperable.

Or

Two required DGs in Train B inoperable."

to:

"B. One or more DG(s) in Train A inoperable.

Or

One or more DG(s) in Train B inoperable."

The elimination of TS 3.8.1, Condition B, for the condition of one required DG inoperable effectively changes the Required Action and associated CT to restore the DG to operable status from 14 days to 72 hours. Also, the maximum CT for restoration of one required DG is effectively changed from "17 days from discovery of failure to meet LCO" to "6 days from discovery of failure to meet LCO." Because of the elimination of TS 3.8.1, Condition B, subsequent conditions and required actions are relabeled. As a result of the changes made to existing Condition C, administrative and editorial changes also are made to Required Actions C.2, C.3.1, C.3.2, and C.4 to maintain consistency with the revised condition statement.

The CTs for existing TS 3.8.1 Required Actions C.3.1 and C.3.2 (new Required Actions B.3.1 and B.3.2) are proposed to be increased from 12 hours to 24 hours. In addition, the note to Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.8.1 which states, "The C-S DG may be substituted for any of the required DGs," is deleted. In the application dated November 30, 2009, TVA provided Attachments 1, 2, 3, and 4 showing the marked and clean pages of the TS 3.8.1. Attachments 1 and 2 respectively show the proposed changes (marked pages) to TS 3.8.1. Attachment 3 of the license amendment request shows the clean pages of the revised TS 3.8.1.

4.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

On July 1, 2002 (ML021840595), the NRC issued Amendment No. 39 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 that changed TS LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources Operating," CT to restore an inoperable DG to operable status from 72 hours to 14 days. The NRC staff's acceptance of the proposed change from 72 hours to 14 days was based on the cross-train interconnection capability of DGs to ensure that two DGs were available for contingency purposes to power one train of safe shutdown loads for a design-basis event during the extended maintenance outage. TVA provided information and schematics regarding the capabilities of the DGs and onsite electrical system in its letter dated April 1, 2002 (ML021050113), indicating various breaker alignments that showed that DGs 1A-A and 2A-A could be cross-connected to power safe shutdown boards 1B-B and 2B-B. Similarly, DGs 1B-B and 2B-B could be cross-connected to power safe shutdown boards 1A-A and 2A-A. The NRC staff wanted to ensure the capability and cross-train alignment of the remaining DGs in the event of a loss of offsite power and assuming a failure of an additional DG during the extended 14-day maintenance outage for its acceptance of the extended AOT.

In its letter dated November 30, 2009, TVA is now requesting a change in the AOT from 14 days to 72 hours because the basis for the CT of WBN Unit 1 TS 3.8.1 Required Action B.4 of 14 days CT will no longer be valid if WBN Unit 2 receives its operating license and enters Mode 4. The risk-informed justification for the 14-day CT was based on operation of a WBN Unit 1 as single unit that will no longer be applicable if WBN Unit 2 goes into operation. The four DGs at WBN will support operation of both WBN Unit 1 and Unit 2.

TVA has proposed to revise the Required Action CT from 14 days to 72 hours for the condition of one DG with either Train A or Train B inoperable to be consistent with the Required Action CT that existed for this condition prior to the issuance of Amendment No. 39. The proposed changes from 14 days to 72 hour completion time is consistent with the CT provided for restoring one DG to operable status provided in TS 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating," as given in NUREG-1431, "Standard Technical Specifications Westinghouse Plants." The restoration of one or more inoperable DG(s) in a single train within 72 hours compared to 14 days represents a more restrictive specification for plant operation, and is therefore more conservative than the 14-day outage time allowed for a DG. The NRC staff finds the proposed change is acceptable since it is consistent with the recommendations of NUREG 1431 and RG 1.93.

In the WBN Unit 1 TS, the CTs for TS 3.8.1 Required Actions B.3.1,B.3.2, C.3.1, and C.3.2 were established at 12 hours in License Amendment No. 39. The 12-hour CT to determine that the remaining operable DGs were not subject to a common cause failure or to perform the applicable surveillance to establish operability supported the probabilistic risk analysis for the expansion of the CT from 72 hours to 14 days for an inoperable DG. TVA is requesting in this amendment to eliminate the dependency on the risk informed justification.

TVA also has proposed to increase the CT for Required Actions C.3.1 and C.3.2 (new Required Actions B.3.1 and B.3.2) from 12 hours to 24 hours. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431 and GL 84-15, "Proposed Staff Actions to Improve and Maintain Diesel Generator Reliability." Appendix A of GL 84-15 established a 24-hour CT for performing the applicable surveillance to establish the operability of the other DG in the event of an inoperable DG. Required Action C.3.1 provides an allowance to avoid unnecessary testing of OPERABLE DG(s). If it can be determined that the cause of the inoperable DG does not exist on the OPERABLE SG, SR 3.8.1.2 does not have to be performed. If the cause of inoperability exists on other DG(s), the other DG(s) would be

declared inoperable upon discovery and new Condition E of LCO 3.8.1 would be entered. If the cause of the initial inoperable DG(s) cannot be confirmed not to exist on the remaining DG(s), performance of SR 3.8.1.2 suffices to provide assurance of continued OPERABILITY of that DG train. The proposed increase from 12 hours to 24 hours in CTs for existing TS 3.8.1 for the new Required Actions B.3.1 and B.3.2 are acceptable because the proposed changes meet 10 CFR 50.36 requirements and are consistent with the guidance of NUREG-1431 and GL 84-15. Therefore, the NRC staff finds the changes acceptable.

The provisions of the note that allow the Common Station (C-S) DG to be substituted for any required DG are only applicable if the C-S DG is electrically connected in place of another DG and has satisfied all applicable surveillance requirements. TVA states that the C-S DG at WBN has not been maintained and, therefore, at this time it cannot satisfy the provisions of the note that allow the C-S DG to be substituted for any required DG. Therefore, TVA has proposed to remove the note to LCO 3.8.1 associated with use of the C-S DG. This change represents a reduction in operational flexibility, but does not impact the overall functional requirements regarding operation of the DGs. Therefore, the NRC staff finds this change acceptable.

The NRC staff concludes that a reduction of the AOT for an inoperable DG from the current 14 days to 72 hours is more restrictive for plant operation and therefore more conservative than the 14-day outage time allowed for a DG. Furthermore, the proposed changes are consistent with the recommendations of NUREG 1431 and RG 1.93. The NRC staff also concludes that the above proposed changes do not affect WBN Unit 1 compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36 and GDC 17 for the onsite ac power sources. Based on the above discussion, the NRC staff finds that there is reasonable assurance that safe plant conditions will continue to be maintained; therefore, the proposed changes are acceptable.

5.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Tennessee State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (75 FR 10830). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

7.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors: P. Gill,
P. Sahay
G. Waig.

Date: July 6, 2010

Mr. R. M. Krich
Vice President, Nuclear Licensing
Tennessee Valley Authority
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SUBJECT: WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT REGARDING THE COMPLETION TIME FOR THE INOPERABLE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR(S) (TAC NO. ME2985)

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A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

John G. Lamb, Senior Project Manager
Watts Bar Special Projects Branch
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-390

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 84 to NPF-90
2. Safety Evaluation

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NRC Distribution: See next page

ADAMS Accession No. ML101390154 ***via memorandum**

OFFICE	NRR/LPWB/PM	NRR/LPWB/LA	DE/EEEB/BC	DIRS/ITSB/BC	OGC-NLO	NRR/LPWB/BC
NAME	JLamb	BClayton	GWilson*	RElliott	DRoth	SCampbell (PMilano for)
DATE	05/25/10	05/25/10	05/07/10	06/11/10	06/18/10	07/06/10

OFFICIAL AGENCY RECORD

Letter to R. M. Krich from John G. Lamb dated July 6, 2010

SUBJECT: WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT REGARDING THE COMPLETION TIME FOR THE INOPERABLE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR(S) (TAC NO. ME2985)

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