

EDO Principal Correspondence Control

FROM: DUE: / /

EDO CONTROL: G20100305
DOC DT: 04/30/10
FINAL REPLY:

Peter Carkhuff

TO:

Commission

FOR SIGNATURE OF :

** GRN **

CRC NO: 10-0221

DESC:

National Security Workforce
(EDATS: SECY-2010-0271)

ROUTING:

Borchardt
Virgilio
Mallett
Ash
Mamish
Burns/Rothschild
Bagley, OEDO

DATE: 05/14/10

ASSIGNED TO:

CONTACT:

NSIR

Wiggins

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS:

For Appropriate Action.

Template: SECY-017

E-RIDS: SECY-01

EDATS

Electronic Document and Action Tracking System

EDATS Number: SECY-2010-0271

Source: SECY

General Information

Assigned To: NSIR

OEDO Due Date: NONE

Other Assignees:

SECY Due Date: NONE

Subject: National Security Workforce

Description:

CC Routing: NONE

ADAMS Accession Numbers - Incoming: NONE

Response/Package: NONE

Other Information

Cross Reference Number: G20100305, LTR-10-0221

Staff Initiated: NO

Related Task:

Recurring Item: NO

File Routing: EDATS

Agency Lesson Learned: NO

OEDO Monthly Report Item: NO

Process Information

Action Type: Appropriate Action

Priority: Medium

Sensitivity: None

Signature Level: No Signature Required

Urgency: NO

Approval Level: No Approval Required

OEDO Concurrence: NO

OCM Concurrence: NO

OCA Concurrence: NO

Special Instructions: For Appropriate Action.

Document Information

Originator Name: Peter Carkhuff

Date of Incoming: 4/30/2010

Originating Organization: Citizens

Document Received by SECY Date: 5/14/2010

Addressee: The Commission

Date Response Requested by Originator: NONE

Incoming Task Received: E-mail

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL TICKET

Date Printed: May 13, 2010 13:43

PAPER NUMBER: LTR-10-0221 **LOGGING DATE:** 05/13/2010
ACTION OFFICE: EDO

AUTHOR: Peter Charkhuff
AFFILIATION:
ADDRESSEE: Commission Resource
SUBJECT: National security workforce

ACTION: Appropriate
DISTRIBUTION:

LETTER DATE: 04/30/2010
ACKNOWLEDGED No
SPECIAL HANDLING:

NOTES:
FILE LOCATION: ADAMS

DATE DUE: **DATE SIGNED:**

EDO --G20100305

Bozin, Sunny

From: Herr, Linda
Sent: Monday, May 03, 2010 11:22 AM
To: Bozin, Sunny
Subject: FW: National Security Workforce

Sunny:

Here's one for appropriate action.

Thanks,
Linda

From: CMROSTENDORFF Resource
Sent: Friday, April 30, 2010 4:04 PM
To: Herr, Linda
Subject: FW: National Security Workforce

From: Peter [mailto:cincinnatiussc@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, April 30, 2010 10:28 AM
To: CMRSVINICKI Resource; CMRAPOSTOLAKIS Resource; CMRMAGWOOD Resource; CMROSTENDORFF Resource
Subject: National Security Workforce

Dear Commissioners:

I am appealing to you for help.

Any assistance, leads or ideas concerning the equipping, training and positioning of a National Security Workforce as outlined below would be very much appreciated.

Thank you for your time and consideration.

Sincerely,

Peter

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609-812-1577

Hardening Fortress America: At Our Nation's Service
Published on 04/07/10

by Peter H. Carkhuff

Cincinnatiussc@yahoo.com

According to a 2008 report of the National Science and Technology Council, which coordinates science and technology policy within the Executive Office of the President, the ability of government to quickly and decisively respond to and recover from an RDD or IND incident is key to national resiliency. Importantly, the council noted that being prepared to recover from these incidents may even provide an element of deterrence if the adversary perceives less potential for long-lasting harm.

- from GAO-10-204; COMBATING NUCLEAR TERRORISM – Actions Needed to Better Prepare to Recover from Possible Attacks Using Radiological or Nuclear Materials, March 2010

RECOMMENDATION 11: The United States must build a national security workforce for the 21st century. From the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation and Terrorism's report, THE CLOCK IS TICKING – A Progress Report on America's Preparedness to Prevent Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism October 21, 2009

However, events have shown that the al Qaeda leadership does not choose weapons based on how easy they are to acquire and use, be they conventional or unconventional weapons. They choose them based on the best means of destroying the specific targets that they have in mind.

Al Qaeda's reasoning thus runs counter to analytic convention that equates the ease of acquisition of chemical, biological or radiological weapons with an increasing likelihood of terrorist use – i.e., a terrorist attack employing crude weapons is therefore more likely than an attack using a nuclear or large scale biological weapon. In fact, it is the opposite: If perpetrating a large-scale attack serves as al Qaeda's motivation for possessing WMD, not deterrence value, then the greatest threat is posed by the most effective and simple means of mass destruction, whether these means consist of nuclear, biological, or other forms of asymmetric weapons.

From "Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality? By Rolf Mowatt-Larssen Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, January 2010

Amanpour: Bin Laden still deadly relevant – August 28, 2006, courtesy www.cnn.com

Michael Scheuer, who once headed the CIA's bin Laden unit, says bin Laden has been given permission by a young cleric in Saudi Arabia authorizing al Qaeda to "use nuclear weapons against the United States ... capping the casualties at 10 million."

"He's had an approval, a religious approval for 10 million deaths?" I asked him. "Yes," Scheuer responded. Note: Here Mr. Scheuer is referring to "A Treatise on the Legal Status of using Weapons of Mass Destruction" by Saudi cleric Nasir Bin Hamd Al-Fahd

The threat is real, not imagined. The memory of September 11, 2001 fades slowly into the background. The preparation is lacking. The counter measures have yet to be implemented in any broad, strategic context, on either a National, State or Local level. Life returns to normal, except for those who have taken the time to study both the nature and intent of the hostile threat... And, the question begs, for those of us with the foresight to ask, what are we to do?

The answer, in my estimation, is to start today to prepare for the worst case scenario and go from there.

Further, it is my contention that since 80 to 85 percent of the U.S. infrastructure is owned by the private sector, that it is both a vital necessity as well as the responsibility of the private sector to assist in the preparation, response, mitigation, clean up and recovery efforts to a CBRN attack.

This may require an unprecedented level of cooperation between the public and private sectors not seen since the end of WWII in order to achieve, what I term, the Hardening of Fortress America.

There are what I like to describe as two sides to the WMD coin. The first, and most critical, is the prevention of such an attack. This is achieved via intelligence, both foreign and domestic, surveillance and detection, using an array of assets, from a heightened public awareness, to good old fashioned police work, as well as the latest in technological wizardry to sniff out WMD threats before they can achieve their diabolical ends.

Richard Falkenrath, Deputy Commissioner for Counter Terrorism for the NYPD outlined this challenge and his recommendations quite well at a talk to a think tank in DC last June (1.) Fortunately, up to this point, with a few notable exceptions (the Christmas Day bomber, Fort Hood and Little Rock recruiting stations shootings for example) the Nation's law enforcement, counter terrorism and intelligence efforts have been successful since 2001.

Even so, there needs to be a well thought out "back-up" plan of action in the event that the previously – before 9/11 – unthinkable occurs. Thus, the second side of the WMD coin, short of success on the preventive side, is the response, mitigation, clean up and recovery from an actual attack.

Responding to such an attack, is quite naturally, the role of first responders from the public sector, and this training has been funded by DHS and FEMA, and to a lesser degree, DOD, DOE, EPA and even OSHA. Recipients of such training have included Federal, State, County and Local police, fire and EMS personnel throughout the country, including volunteer organizations.

However, the decontamination, mitigation process, long term clean up and recovery from such an attack has been given scant attention, partially due to the widespread perception of a low probability of such an event. There is also increased competition for more a limited amount of grant monies, resulting in state and local authorities wanting to concentrate their training budgets to programs that can achieve measurable, quantitative results in their daily operations and fortify their communities from recognizable threats, such as natural disasters, man made accidents and the potential for a pandemic outbreak.

Additionally, should such a WMD attack occur, most everyone in the decision making process (the National Response Framework and National Incident Management System – NIMS) seems to agree that private contractors are going to be needed to perform the necessary mitigation, clean up and recovery efforts – yet no one has actually bothered to find out if there are contractors out there that are ready, willing and able to enter a WMD contaminated work zone.

Those contractors are very few and far between. The contractors that are capable via their HAZMAT training and experience to assist in the aftermath of a chemical or biological attack may in fact be very much ill prepared to enter a radiological “hot zone”, or even a “warm zone”, created by the detonation of a radiological dispersal device (RDD), an improvised nuclear device (IND) or an actual nuclear detonation.

There are small and highly skilled teams potentially prepared for such an eventuality working for EG & G, a division of URS, and other specialists employed by a relatively short list of DOE and DOD Prime Contractors, as well as some other less known but equally important Engineering and Construction Management firms. These firms will in all likelihood be asked to be at the forefront of designing remedial work plans for such an eventuality, and may even have fairly well designed scopes of work already in place, alongside DOD consequence management plans, but the actual hands on mitigation and remediation efforts will by necessity be done by outsourced firms or subcontractors.

Over the past few years, I have been asking one basic question to a number of these contractors; OK, we get hit – now what? I have asked this question to professionals such as the president of the largest, independent restoration and environmental remediation contractor in NJ, who answered me by stating, “Pete, if I see something glowing, I gotta’ tell you, I’m going the other way”. This response is typical of most restoration contractors, up to and including the very largest national and international firms.

Should such an attack using WMD take place, especially a RAD event, the contractor(s) that are the most capable and best positioned to respond are going to be the first called, receiving the lions share of both the work and profits. Even more importantly, by having a trained and qualified workforce standing by to provide assistance at a moments notice to the appropriate government authorities, the Nation will go a long way in diminishing the economic and even psychological impact such an attack would be intended to produce. It may even, as the GAO report above states, dissuade the adversary from attacking in the first place.

The current challenge then is in equipping, training and positioning such a qualified workforce.

Rather than reinvent the wheel, and start from scratch (a new start-up firm would take years to get off the ground, and we may very well have only months, not years to prepare – and, as I have recently been informed by a grant writer, a start-up is much less likely to receive funding from DHS than an existing firm), I have been taking this idea to various individuals, organizations and firms, with the hope of either finding a firm that is already in place doing this work of which I can provide assistance to (i.e. revenue growth) or strike up an interest in a firm offering ancillary services.

All my questions and research have brought me to one simple conclusion – the former does not exist; at least, not yet. But it most certainly needs to. During the course of my career, since the attacks of September 11, I keep coming across private sector firms that have various levels of knowledge, experience, size and capabilities, especially in terms of their chemical, and even, biological HAZMAT training and clean up abilities.

As stated earlier, I've also been able to find a number of training programs and centers that train first responders. To date, though, I've only been able to ascertain one entity that can assist in the training of a private sector firm for the decontamination, clean-up and recovery of a WMD attack involving RAD. However, it will only do so if instructed to by the Federal Government.

I am only one man.

I don't carry much weight when I reach out to those individuals and organizations in the know (DOD, DOE, former high level employees of and current policy advisors to, current administrators, and elected officials, i.e. Senators, Congressmen,...etc.). Were I able to elicit the help of some of our Nation's Nuclear experts behind me, I believe I can close this idea of training a National Security Workforce, to the movers and shakers who can help make the idea of Hardening Fortress America a reality.

I truly believe that this is a neglected, yet vital and critical piece of our National Security needs and I also believe that together we can best serve our Nation and help support her in her efforts to face any threat our enemies throw our way. Any assistance in making this idea into a reality would be greatly appreciated. I want to thank you, dear reader, for both your time and your consideration of this endeavor.

1. THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY DEFENDING THE CITY: NYPD'S COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS, RICHARD FALKENRATH, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER FOR COUNTER TERRORISM, NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT TUESDAY, JUNE 23, 2009

Received: from HQCLSTR01.nrc.gov ([148.184.44.79]) by TWMS01.nrc.gov
([148.184.200.145]) with mapi; Fri, 30 Apr 2010 16:04:03 -0400
Content-Type: application/ms-tnef; name="winmail.dat"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
From: CMROSTENDORFF Resource <CMROSTENDORFF.Resource@nrc.gov>
To: "Herr, Linda" <Linda.Herr@nrc.gov>
Date: Fri, 30 Apr 2010 16:04:02 -0400
Subject: FW: National Security Workforce
Thread-Topic: National Security Workforce
Thread-Index: AcrocV3WdzQ3cKqCTOauNV/1uTqRWgALuX4w
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X-MS-TNEF-Correlator:
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