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Subject: AP1000 Response to Request for Additional Information (TR 85)

Westinghouse is submitting responses to NRC requests for additional information (RAI) on Technical Report No. 85. This RAI response is submitted in support of the AP1000 Design Certification Amendment Application (Docket No. 52-006). The information included in this response is generic and is expected to apply to all COL applications referencing the AP1000 Design Certification and the AP1000 Design Certification Amendment Application.

Enclosure 1 provides the response for the following RAI(s):

RAI-TR85-SEB1-10 R4

Questions or requests for additional information related to the content and preparation of this response should be directed to Westinghouse. Please send copies of such questions or requests to the prospective applicants for combined licenses referencing the AP1000 Design Certification. A representative for each applicant is included on the cc: list of this letter.

Very truly yours,

Robert Sisk, Manager
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/Enclosure

1. Response to Request for Additional Information on Technical Report No. 85

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NRO

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ENCLOSURE 1

Response to Request for Additional Information on Technical Report No. 85

AP1000 TECHNICAL REPORT REVIEW

Response to Request For Additional Information (RAI)

RAI Response Number: RAI-TR85-SEB1-10
Revision: 4

Question:

Section 2.4.1 indicates that "Table 2.4-2 shows the reactions at the underside of the basemat for each soil case. These are conservative estimates using the results of the 2D SASSI horizontal analyses..." The following items need to be addressed:

a. What is the technical basis that these results are considered to be conservative?

b. What is the technical basis for combining the M_{xx} EW seismic load with the vertical load by SRSS and similarly for the M_{yy} NS excitation load and the vertical load? (Normally SRSS is applicable to the use of three directional load combination. Since these loads are being used for the NI stability evaluation, normal practice is to utilize the summation of one horizontal load and vertical load, both acting in the worst direction. This would be repeated for the other horizontal load and vertical load.)

c. Footnote 2 of Table 2.4-2 (Page 13 of 83) states that reactions for horizontal input are calculated from the 2D SASSI analyses. Reactions due to vertical input are calculated from the maximum accelerations in 3D ANSYS or SASSI analyses for hard rock (HR), firm rock (FR), upper bound of soft medium soil (UBSM), and soft to medium soil (SM), and from 2D ANSYS analyses for soft rock (SR) and soft soil (SS). Was the 2D ANSYS analyses, referred to here, based on the linear or nonlinear ANSYS analyses? Also, why wasn't one consistent set of analyses (say 2D SASSI) used for both horizontal and vertical input in this evaluation?

Additional Request (Revision 1):

The staff reviewed the RAI response provided in Westinghouse letter dated 10/19/07. Based on the information provided, Westinghouse is requested to address the items listed below.

a. With the changes made to a number of seismic analyses, explain whether the maximum seismic reactions in Table 2.4-2, developed from the 2D SASSI analyses, are still relied upon for any purpose. If so, then explain where they are utilized and why combining the member forces above grade with the inertia forces below grade, using absolute sum, is considered to be conservative.

b. The use of the SRSS or the 100/40/40 combination method is only acceptable for combining the co-directional responses such as Mxx due to NS, EW, and vertical, in order to obtain a combined Mxx. However, it is not clear from TR 85, DCD Section 3.8.5, nor from the RAI response, how the stability calculations are performed once the individual three loads Mxx, Myy, and vertical (each of these already combined by SRSS or 100/40/40 due to the three earthquake inputs) are determined. DCD 3.8.5.5.4, for example, discusses the overturning

evaluation and presents the equation for the factor of safety as the resisting moment divided by the overturning moment. However, this does not explain how the vertical seismic force is considered. The traditional method for evaluating stability (sliding and overturning) of nuclear plant structures in accordance with SRP 3.8.5 is to perform two separate 2-D evaluations, one for the N-S and vertical directions and one for the E-W and vertical directions. Thus, for overturning evaluation as an example, the minimum vertical downward load (deadweight minus upward buoyancy force minus upward vertical seismic force) is considered in calculating the resisting moment and this is then compared to the overturning moment about one horizontal direction (i.e., EW axis); then a similar comparison is made for the same minimum downward vertical load with the overturning moment about the other perpendicular horizontal direction (i.e., NS axis). Westinghouse is requested to clarify if they follow this analytical method for the stability evaluations (sliding and overturning) and document the approach in TR85 and the DCD. If not, then Westinghouse is requested to justify any other alternative method used. Note, with the changes recently made in the various seismic analyses, explain whether the maximum seismic reactions in Table 2.4-2, developed from the 2D SASSI analyses, are still relied upon for use in the stability evaluations performed in Section 2.9 of TR85.

Note: that the issues described above are applicable to all stability evaluations including the new 3D NI20 model using response spectrum analysis with ANSYS, which is used for stability evaluation.

c. With the changes made to a number of seismic analyses, explain whether the results from Table 2.4-2 and footnote 2, developed from the 2D SASSI analyses, are still relied upon for any purpose. If so, then Westinghouse is requested to provide the technical basis for the statement "...different models give consistent results and use of results from different analyses is acceptable."

Additional Request (Revision 2):

In the response for item b of the RAI, Westinghouse indicated that the analysis for stability has been revised to utilize the 3D ANSYS finite element NI20 model using a mode superposition time history analysis (linear with no lift-off). A separate 2D ANSYS lift-off analysis demonstrated that the minor lift-off is negligible. Since the 3D ANSYS NI20 model analysis using three input motions applied simultaneously is utilized for the stability evaluation, the concern raised by the directional combination methods no longer applies. Therefore, this concern has been adequately addressed. However, the RAI response discussed the need to utilize some passive pressure resistance capability of the soil when performing the sliding stability analyses. The passive pressure resistance curve as a function of displacement is based on Reference 1 (Hsai-Yang Fang, "Foundation Engineering Handbook," 1991) given in the RAI response. Westinghouse is requested to provide the complete text in the applicable section or chapter of the referenced book which describes the approach for determining the passive pressure resistance function.

Additional Request (Revision 3):

1. Remove the F_P term in the equations and explain the removal in DCD sections 3.8.5.5.3 and 3.8.5.5.4.
2. Check the reference to Table 3.8.5-2 and clarify the reference in the second paragraph of the revised DCD markup in the RAI response.
3. Check DCD Table 3.8.5-2 for use of zero passive pressure and explain or justify use.

Additional Request (Revision 4):

a) The staff reviewed the response provided in Westinghouse letter dated September 22, 2009 and found that insufficient information was provided. In the response, the passive earth pressure was removed from the seismic stability analysis, an explanation was provided why reliance on soil passive pressure is not required for stability evaluation, and related tables were revised in the corresponding subsections of the DCD and TR-85. This information is subject to an audit for its adequacy.

b) As a result of the staff's structural audit conducted during the week of August 10, 2009, the NRC staff requested the justification as to why TR-85 is not identified as Tier 2* since it is referenced in DCD Section 3.8.5 and it contains key details of the design of the foundation. Similarly, justification as to why TR-9 (Containment Vessel Design Adjacent to Large Penetrations) and TR-57 (Nuclear Island: Evaluation of Critical Sections) are not identified as Tier 2* information because they contain key analysis and design information for the containment, and the auxiliary and shield buildings, which are not sufficiently described in the DCD, was not provided. Therefore, the staff requests either that TR-9, TR-57, and TR-85 be identified as Tier 2* information in the DCD, or a justification provided.

Westinghouse Response:

a. The results in Table 2.4-2 are conservative because of the method of combination of member forces and inertia forces below grade. The maximum member forces at grade are translated down to the underside of the basemat with an <u>absolute</u> combination of the effects of the horizontal shear forces and the moments. The horizontal loads on the portion below grade are added <u>absolutely</u> to the sum of the member forces above grade.

b. As described in DCD subsection 3.7.2.6,

> In analyses with the earthquake components applied separately and in the response spectrum and equivalent static analyses, the effect of the three components of earthquake motion are combined using one of the following methods:

- The peak responses due to the three earthquake components from the response spectrum and equivalent static analyses are combined using the square root of the sum of squares (SRSS) method.

- The peak responses due to the three earthquake components are combined directly, using the assumption that when the peak response from one component occurs, the responses from the other two components are 40 percent of the peak (100 percent-40 percent-40 percent method). Combinations of seismic responses from the three earthquake components, together with variations in sign (plus or minus), are considered. This method is used in the nuclear island basemat analyses, the containment vessel analyses and the shield building roof analyses.

In the combination shown in Table 2.4-2, the moment M_{xx} due to input in the NS direction is zero. Thus the SRSS combination combines two components (EW seismic load and vertical load).

c. The 2D ANSYS analyses referred to in Footnote 2 of Table 2.4-2 were based on linear ANSYS analyses. As described in TR85 many analyses have been performed using a variety of models. At the time of the stability evaluation there was not a consistent set available. However, the different models give consistent results and use of results from different analyses is acceptable.

Westinghouse Response (Revision 1):

a. As discussed in RAI-TR85-SEB1-04, part (2), Revision 1, the 2D SASSI reactions (Fx, Fy, and Fz) are used to obtain seismic response factors between the hard rock case to the upper-bound-soft-to-medium (UBSM) soil case, and the soft-to-medium (SM) soil case. These factors were used to adjust the hard rock time history to reflect the seismic response for the other two potential governing soil cases UBSM and SM. The firm rock, soft rock, and soft soil have lower seismic response. Combining the member forces above grade with the inertia forces below grade using absolute sum is conservative since it assumes the structures above grade, and those below grade are in phase (modes closely spaced). Otherwise, one could have used the SRSS method.

b. Westinghouse agrees that the SRSS and 100/40/40 combination method is only acceptable for combining the co-directional responses. When Westinghouse has used this combination method it has been applied only to co-directional responses. The NRC has previously reviewed the acceptable use of the 100/40/40 method as part of the AP600 and the hard rock certification. The NRC in their FSER (NUREG-1793) related to AP1000 hard rock licensing states:

> "As for the suitability of using the 100 percent, 40 percent, 40 percent combination method, the applicant, during audits performed by the staff, provided calculations to

demonstrate that the combination method always gives reasonable results by comparing the results with those from the SRSS combination method. From its review of the design calculations, the staff also finds that the difference between results obtained using the two methods was less than 5 percent which is considered insignificant and, therefore, is acceptable."

The NRC review and audit considered stability, and it is further stated in FSER Section 3.7.2.17:

"... When the equivalent acceleration static analysis method is used, the SRSS method or 100 percent, 40 percent, 40 percent method was used to combine spatial response in conformance with RG 1.92 and consistent with accepted common industry practice. ... Torsional effects and stability against overturning, sliding, and flotation are considered.

When it is necessary to combine co-directional responses, Westinghouse is not using any different methodology that wasn't reviewed and accepted by the NRC previously.

For the seismic stability analysis Westinghouse is using the 3D NI20 model. Time history analyses using ANSYS has been used. This is discussed in RAI-TR85-SEB1-004, part (2). It was not necessary to use the 100 percent, 40 percent, 40 percent method. However, if this method was used the following method would have been used to calculate the co-directional responses:

- The seismic maximum moment about an edge (e.g. column line I) is calculated considering the maximum moment due to the horizontal excitation combined with 40 percent of the moment due to the maximum vertical seismic excitation. (Note that using 100 percent of maximum vertical seismic excitation, and 40 percent of the maximum moment due to horizontal excitation will not control.) This moment is used as the maximum SSE overturning moment in the stability evaluation.
- For sliding 40 percent of the maximum vertical seismic component is considered in the reduction of the normal force in the calculation of the friction force.

Using the maximum time history results a comparison of the stability factors of safety obtained to the 100 percent, 40 percent, 40 percent method to the stability factors of safety obtained from the time history analysis is made. The time history analysis calculates the stability factors of safety at each time step, and the minimum factor of safety used. The coefficient of friction considered is 0.55. This comparison is given in Table RAI-TR85-SEB1-10-01a for sliding in the NS and EW direction, and overturning about the West side of the Shield Building and about column line 11. Also, the comparison is given for the hard rock (HR), upper-bound-soft-to-medium (UBSM) case, and the soft-to medium (SM) case. As seen from this comparison, the 100, 40 percent, 40 percent method is more conservative compared to the time history method for the overturning factors of safety. For sliding partial passive pressure is required to meet the 1.1 limit. To compare the two methods the amount of deflections required to obtain the required passive resistance are compared. This

comparison is given in Table RAI-TR85-SEB1-10-01b. As seen from this comparison the NS deflections are essentially the same, and for the EW deflections the 1 x 0.4 x 0.4 method is conservative (larger deflections).

It is noted that Westinghouse has not used response spectrum analysis to perform the stability evaluation.

Table RAI-TR85-SEB1-10-01a: Factor of Safety Comparisons for 1 x 0.4 x 0.4 and TH Methods

Stability Factors of Safety	1 x 0.4 x 0.4 Method			T.H. Method		
	HR	UBSM	SM	HR	UBSM	SM
Sliding N-S SSE $\mu = 0.55$	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1
Sliding E-W SSE $\mu = 0.55$	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1
Overturning WSB SSE	1.31	1.17	1.17	1.62	1.44	1.46
Overturning Col. 11 SSE	1.78	1.77	1.79	2.06	2.00	1.92

Table RAI-TR85-SEB1-10-01b: Displacement Comparisons for 1 x 0.4 x 0.4 and TH Methods

Units: inches

Stability Factors of Safety	1 x 0.4 x 0.4 Method			T.H. Method		
	HR	UBSM	SM	HR	UBSM	SM
Sliding N-S SSE $\mu = 0.55$	0.11	0.10	0.07	0.12	0.12	0.08
Sliding E-W SSE $\mu = 0.55$	0.10	0.79	0.65	0.09	0.50	0.49

Provided below is a summary of the stability evaluation performed using the 3D NI20 model and ANSYS time history seismic analyses. Three cases are considered: HR, UBSM, and SM. The other three cases firm rock, soft rock, and soft soil do not control the stability evaluation.

Seismic Overturning Stability Evaluation

It is not necessary to consider passive pressure in the overturning evaluation. Therefore, in the calculation of the factor of safety for overturning the resistance moment associated with passive pressure is zero (Mp = 0). In Table RAI-TR85-SEB1-10-02 is given the factors of safety associated with overturning about column lines 11, 1, I and west side of shield building. All of the factors of safety are above the established limit of 1.1.

Table RAI-TR85-SEB1-10-02: Overturning Factors of Safety

Column Line / Wall	HR F.S.	UBSM F.S.	SM F.S.
Column Line 11 (North)	2.06	2.00	1.92
Column Line 1 (South)	1.83	1.79	1.77
Column Line I (East)	1.31	1.18	1.17
West side of Shield Building (West)	1.62	1.44	1.46

Seismic Sliding Evaluation

In the evaluation of sliding different coefficients of friction are considered. They are 0.7, 0.6, and 0.55. Also, it is necessary to rely on passive pressure. Using Case 15 (RAI-TR85-SEB1-35, R1, Table RAI-TR85-SEB1-35-1), and the methodology given in Reference 1 using a soil friction angle of 35°, a relationship between passive pressure and displacement at grade elevation can be defined. This relationship is shown in Figures RAI-TR85-SEB1-10-1 and RAI-TR85-SEB1-10-2 for the first 5 inches of deflection. Curves are given for the North-South and East-West directions. The passive pressure at zero deflection is equal to the at rest pressure. The total passive soil pressure resistance force is 43,500 kips for the North-South direction, and 69,100 kips for the East-West direction. It is noted that to achieve the full passive pressure displacements in excess of 10 inches are required.



Figure RAI-TR85-SEB1-10-1 – Passive Pressure versus Deflection at Grade (North-South Excitation)



Figure RAI-TR85-SEB1-10-2 – Passive Pressure versus Deflection at Grade (East-West Excitation)

During the sliding stability calculation it was determined that the factor of safety for sliding drops below the limit of 1.1 for a very short time if passive pressure is not considered. Plots of the factor of safety (FS) versus time for the hard rock case and the North-South and East-West directions are given in Figures RAI-TR85-SEB1-10-3 and RAI-TR85-SEB1-10-4 using a coefficient of friction of 0.55. As seen from these figures the time at which the factor of safety drops below 1.1 is very short. This is the only time during the seismic event that this occurs. When the passive pressure is considered, the factor of safety remains above the limit of 1.1.

In Tables RAI-TR85-SEB1-10-3 to RAI-TR85-SEB1-10-5 are given a summary of the results for the three coefficient values. Provided is the required passive pressure to maintain the factor of safety equal to or above 1.1. As seen from this summary using a coefficient of friction of 0.55 or higher, deflections less than 0.15 inch for hard rock, less than or equal to 0.5 inch for upper bound soft to medium and soft to medium soil conditions are needed to develop the required amount of passive pressure.

The coefficient of friction is changed from 0.7 to 0.55 for the soils. The coefficient of friction for the waterproofing membrane is also changed from 0.7 to 0.55.



Figure RAI-TR85-SEB1-10-3 - North-South FS without Passive Pressure



Figure RAI-TR85-SEB1-10-4 – East-West FS without Passive Pressure

Table RAI-TR85-SEB1-10-3 - Factors of Safety against Sliding for Hard Rock

Direction	Coefficient of Static Friction	Passive Pressure Resistance Force Required	Displacement at Grade	F.S.
North – South (Xg)	0.70	(1)	0.00 in	1.24
East – West (Yg)	0.70	(1)	0.00 in	1.23
North – South (Xg)	0.60	7,166 kip	0.05 in	1.10
East – West (Yg)	0.60	10,802 kip	0.04 in	1.10
North – South (Xg)	0.55	15,142 kip	0.12 in	1.10
East – West (Yg)	0.55	18,402 kip	0.09 in	1.10

Note (1) - At rest pressure

Table RAI-TR85-SEB1-10-4 - Factors of Safety against Sliding for Upper Bound Soft to Medium

Direction	Coefficient of Static Friction	Passive Pressure Resistance Force Required	Displacement at Grade	F.S.
North – South (Xg)	0.70	(1)	0.00 in	1.28
East – West (Yg)	0.70	11,127 kip	0.05 in	1.10
North – South (Xg)	0.60	6,992 kip	0.05 in	1.10
East – West (Yg)	0.60	25,927 kip	0.16 in	1.10
North – South (Xg)	0.55	14,817 kip	0.12 in	1.10
East – West (Yg)	0.55	33,352 kip	0.50 in	1.10

Note (1) - At rest pressure

Table RAI-TR85-SEB1-10-5 - Factors of Safety against Sliding for Soft to Medium

Direction	Coefficient of Static Friction	Passive Pressure Resistance Force Required	Displacement at Grade	F.S.
North – South (Xg)	0.70	(1)	0.00 in	1.29
East – West (Yg)	0.70	11,627 kip	0.05 in	1.10
North – South (Xg)	0.60	(1)	0.00 in	1.11
East – West (Yg)	0.60	25,977 kip	0.16 in	1.10
North – South (Xg)	0.55	11,092 kip	0.08 in	1.10
East – West (Yg)	0.55	33,202 kip	0.49 in	1.10

Note (1) - At rest pressure

c. The justification of the statement made that "...different models give consistent results and use of results from different analyses is acceptable." Is given in RAI-TR85-SEB1-04, part (2), Revision 1, where it is shown that the reactions obtained using the 2D SASSI seismic response factor applied to the time history response result in conservative reactions when compared to the 3D SASSI analysis results. Therefore, the acceptability of the seismic response factors developed from the 2D SASSI models for use in the seismic stability evaluations is acceptable.

Westinghouse Response (Revision 2):

In the May 4 to 8, 2009 audit, the NRC reviewed the displacements based on the displacement curves given in Reference 1. The displacements given in the Revision 1 response to this RAI is based on the passive pressures defined using the Case 15 soil parameters as defined in RAI-TR85-SEB1-35. As part of the review of RAI-TR85-SEB1-35, the NRC requested Westinghouse to explain why, for sliding stability evaluation, a high passive pressure was used for resistance of the backfill adjacent to the Nuclear Island (NI) rather than a lower bound value based on soil parameters such as those defined by Case 21 (soil parameters defined in RAI-TR85-SEB1-35). Westinghouse stated that a lower bound was used in for the soil properties similar to Case 21. A comparison of geotechnical parameters and lateral earth pressures was given during the audit and is presented in Table RAI-TR85-SEB1-10-6. Presented in Tables RAI-TR85-SEB1-10-7 to RAI-TR85-SEB1-10-12 are the stability results for Case 15 and the

lower bound soil case evaluated. It is noted that the displacements given for Case 15 are slightly different from those given in Revision 1 of this response because the active and dynamic surcharge pressures were slightly modified to be more representative (e.g. dynamic surcharge acting only on one side; active pressure acts below adjacent building foundations). The deflections obtained were discussed. It was stated by Westinghouse that the analysis methodology used was the conservative equivalent static. This will result in large deflections since the seismic loads are considered to be constant and do not reflect the short time duration as shown in Figures RAI-TR85-10-3 and RAI-TR85-10-4. It was requested that Westinghouse perform a more realistic non-linear analysis with sliding friction elements using a 2D ANSYS model.

Westinghouse modified the 2D ANSYS model that was used to study the basemat uplift. This model is described in Subsection 2.4.2 of TR85. This 2D non-linear model is for the East-West direction. There is no need to modify this model for the North-South direction since the NI deflections calculated to maintain a factor of safety of 1.1 is largest in the East-West direction. This model was modified introducing friction elements along the bottom of the basemat that is at the interface of the basemat and soil media.

Direct time integration analysis was performed that is also described in Subsection 2.4.2 of TR85. The three cases that have the lowest factor of safety related to sliding were evaluated. These three cases are HR, UBSM, and SM. The seismic input was increased by 10% so as to maintain the factor of safety against sliding of 1.1. No passive soil resistance is considered in the analyses. The resulting deflections at the base using a coefficient of friction of 0.55 are given in Table RAI-TR85-10-13 for the three cases. As noted above this model did consider vertical uplift in addition to sliding. As seen from this table the Nuclear Island experiences negligible sliding during the seismic event, and no passive soil resistance is necessary from the backfill. This is consistent with the observation made in Revision 1 of this response that:

> *"During the sliding stability calculation it was determined that the factor of safety for sliding drops below the limit of 1.1 for a very short time if passive pressure is not considered. Plots of the factor of safety (FS) versus time for the hard rock case and the North-South and East-West directions are given in Figures RAI-TR85-SEB1-10-3 and RAI-TR85-SEB1-10-4 using a coefficient of friction of 0.55. As seen from these figures the time at which the factor of safety drops below 1.1 is very short."*

Therefore, it can be concluded that the Nuclear Island is stable against sliding, and there is no quality requirement for the backfill material adjacent to the NI (side soil) to remain stable against sliding. Also, as noted in Revision 1 of this response, there is no passive pressure required to maintain stability against overturning.

The factors of safety related to wind and tornado loads have also been revised to remove passive pressure from the calculation of the factor of safety. All of the factors of safety are above the limits established for stability. Changes to the DCD and Technical Report are

reflected below under Design Control Document (DCD) Revision and Technical Report (TR) Revision.

During the review of the response given for RAI-TR85-SEB1-04, it was requested that Westinghouse include in the DCD a description of the evaluations performed for the foundation stability which consists of a summary of the analyses presented in TR85, Rev. 1. This request is reflected in this RAI under the DCD revision section below.

Table RAI-TR85-SEB1-10-6 – Comparison of Geotechnical Parameters and Lateral Earth Pressures

Soil Properties/ Parameters	Case 15 Soil	Case 21 Soil	Lower Bound Soil Evaluated
Total Unit Weight (pcf)	150.0	95.0	122.4
Effective Unit Weight (pcf)	87.6	60.0	60.0
Friction Angle (degrees)	35.0	32.0	35.0
At-Rest Earth Pressure Coefficient (Ko)	0.426	0.470	0.426
Lateral Ko Earth Pressure at Elev. 60.5 (psf)	1,529	1,147	1,064
Full At-Rest Resistance Force (kips)	7,985 (E-W) 5,022 (N-S)	5,957 (E-W) 3,746 (N-S)	5,635 (E-W) 3,544 (N-S)
Passive Earth Pressure Coefficient (Kp)	3.690	3.255	3.690
Lateral Kp Earth Pressure at Elev. 60.5 (psf)	13,229	7,941	9,206
Full Passive Resistance Force (kips)	69,098 (E-W) 43,456 (N-S)	42,244 (E-W) 25,939 (N-S)	48,758 (E-W) 30,664 (N-S)

Table RAI-TR85-SEB1-10-7 – Sliding Factors of Safety with Hard Rock Case 15 Soil Passive Resistance

Direction	Coefficient of Friction	At-Rest Force Applied (kips)	Passive Force Applied (kips)	% of Full Passive Force	Displacement at Grade (inch)	Factor of Safety
North – South	0.70	5,017	N/A	N/A	0.000	1.22
East – West	0.70	7,977	N/A	N/A	0.000	1.24
North – South	0.60	N/A	9,166	21.1	0.065	1.10
East – West	0.60	N/A	10,076	14.6	0.030	1.10
North – South	0.55	N/A	17,116	39.4	0.188	1.10
East – West	0.55	N/A	17,676	25.6	0.082	1.10

Table RAI-TR85-SEB1-10-8 – Sliding Factors of Safety with Upper Bound Soft to Medium Case 15 Soil Passive Resistance

Direction	Coefficient of Friction	At-Rest Force Applied (kips)	Passive Force Applied (kips)	% of Full Passive Force	Displacement at Grade (inch)	Factor of Safety
North – South	0.70	5,017	N/A	N/A	0.000	1.22
East – West	0.70	N/A	10,390	15.0	0.035	1.10
North – South	0.60	N/A	8,910	20.5	0.063	1.10
East – West	0.60	N/A	25,250	36.6	0.145	1.10
North – South	0.55	N/A	16,750	38.5	0.132	1.10
East – West	0.55	N/A	32,610	47.2	0.453	1.10

Table RAI-TR85-SEB1-10-9 – Sliding Factors of Safety with Soft to Medium Case 15 Soil Passive Resistance

Direction	Coefficient of Friction	At-Rest Force Applied (kips)	Passive Force Applied (kips)	% of Full Passive Force	Displacement at Grade (inch)	Factor of Safety
North – South	0.70	5,017	N/A	N/A	0.000	1.27
East – West	0.70	N/A	10,900	15.8	0.042	1.10
North – South	0.60	N/A	5,350	12.3	0.008	1.10
East – West	0.60	N/A	25,300	36.6	0.146	1.10
North – South	0.55	N/A	12,980	29.9	0.099	1.10
East – West	0.55	N/A	32,400	46.9	0.439	1.10

Table RAI-TR85-SEB1-10-10 – Sliding Factors of Safety with Hard Rock Lower Bound Evaluated Soil Passive Resistance

Direction	Coefficient of Friction	At-Rest Force Applied (kips)	Passive Force Applied (kips)	% of Full Passive Force	Displacement at Grade (inch)	Factor of Safety
North – South	0.70	3,544	N/A	N/A	0.000	1.18
East – West	0.70	5,635	N/A	N/A	0.000	1.17
North – South	0.60	N/A	8,200	26.7	0.087	1.10
East – West	0.60	N/A	8,650	17.7	0.052	1.10
North – South	0.55	N/A	16,170	52.7	0.796	1.10
East – West	0.55	N/A	16,250	33.3	0.112	1.10

Table RAI-TR85-SEB1-10-11 – Sliding Factors of Safety with Upper Bound Soft to Medium Lower Bound Evaluated Soil Passive Resistance

Direction	Coefficient of Friction	At-Rest Force Applied (kips)	Passive Force Applied (kips)	% of Full Passive Force	Displacement at Grade (inch)	Factor of Safety
North – South	0.70	3,544	N/A	N/A	0.000	1.18
East – West	0.70	N/A	9,000	18.5	0.055	1.10
North – South	0.60	N/A	8,100	26.4	0.085	1.10
East – West	0.60	N/A	23,900	49.0	0.535	1.10
North – South	0.55	N/A	15,850	51.7	0.711	1.10
East – West	0.55	N/A	31,250	64.1	2.33	1.10

Table RAI-TR85-SEB1-10-12 – Sliding Factors of Safety with Soft to Medium Lower Bound Evaluated Soil Passive Resistance

Direction	Coefficient of Friction	At-Rest Force Applied (kips)	Passive Force Applied (kips)	% of Full Passive Force	Displacement at Grade (inch)	Factor of Safety
North – South	0.70	3,544	N/A	N/A	0.000	1.22
East – West	0.70	N/A	9,500	19.5	0.059	1.10
North – South	0.60	N/A	4,500	14.7	0.031	1.10
East – West	0.60	N/A	23,900	49.0	0.535	1.10
North – South	0.55	N/A	12,100	39.5	0.189	1.10
East – West	0.55	N/A	31,000	63.6	2.24	1.10

Table RAI-TR85-SEB1-10-13 – Seismic Deflections at Bottom of Nuclear Island Basemat due to Sliding (Coefficient of Friction equal to 0.55)

Case	Deflection @ 60.5' El Without buoyant force inches	Deflection @ 60.5' El With buoyant Force Inches
HR	0.003	0.004
UBSM	0.016	0.024
SM	0.030	0.045

Reference:

1. Hsai-Yang Fang, "Foundation Engineering Handbook," Second Edition, 1991, Van Nostrand Reinhold.

Westinghouse Response (Revision 3):

Clarified the safe shut down earthquake sliding equation in DCD section 3.8.5.5.3 removing F_P, F_H, and clarifying the definition for F_D. The M_P term in the equation in DCD section 3.8.5.5.4 is removed. A sentence is added to both sections to explain why those terms are not included. In the second paragraph of DCD section 3.8.5.5.4 the phrase "the static moment balance approach" is removed and replaced by "time history analysis."

The second paragraph of the revised DCD markup for Subsection 3.8.5.5.5 is modified to remove confusion related to passive pressure. The reference to Table 3.8.5-2 in Subsection 3.8.5.5.5 is removed.

Seismic deflections at the bottom of the Nuclear Island Basemat due to sliding (coefficient of friction equal to 0.55) are given for both cases with/without buoyant force in the DCD (buoyant force deflections are added to Table RAI-TR85-SEB1-10-13).

Footnote (3) in DCD Table 3.8.5-2 will be removed to clarify that the values in the table use zero passive pressure. .

Westinghouse Response (Revision 4):

a) The response to Revision 3 of this RAI was discussed with the NRC staff prior to submittal. The response to Revision 3 and the associated DCD revisions provided the changes requested by the staff during these conversations. The responses are supported by the

analyses that support the stability evaluation. It is not practicable to include the information in the supporting analyses in the RAI response or DCD mark-up. Westinghouse will schedule a time for the staff to audit theses analyses.

b) APP-GW-GLR-044 (TR-85), APP-GW-GLR-005 (TR-09), and APP-GW-GLR-045 (TR-57) were prepared to support and inform the NRC of changes to structural design of the AP1000 in the design certification amendment. These changes included completion and design finalization of portions of the structural design. The design completion addressed COL information items by completion of design activities that were not complete at the time of design certification. Design finalization changes to the DCD included changes due to the expansion of the seismic response spectra in the Design Certification amendment and were incorporated in the critical section information in the DCD. These reports were formally transmitted by letter to the NRC and are included on the AP1000 Design Certification docket.

The design basis for the structural design of the AP1000 is documented in calculations and design reports that are available for review and audit. The information included in the DCD should be sufficient to satisfy the guidance of the Standard Review Plan (SRP). The SRP includes guidance that design criteria and design and analysis methods be included in the DCD. The SRP guidance does not include the inclusion of design details in the DCD.

Documents in the DCD currently identified as Tier 2* are codes and standards or are topical reports that provide methods and criteria. Defining the subject documents as Tier 2* would include excessive detail as Tier 2* information. The subject reports include the results of calculations. Because reanalysis may result in small changes in the results these results should not be identified as Tier 2*. Incorporating the subject reports as Tier 2* would require NRC approval for changes at a level of detail that is not appropriate.

If there is specific information in the subject documents that the staff considers to be in the nature of criteria and methods and should be included in the DCD that information should be identified for inclusion in the DCD. Given the justification in the preceding paragraphs Westinghouse will not be incorporating APP-GW-GLR-044 (TR-85), APP-GW-GLR-005 (TR-09), and APP-GW-GLR-045 (TR-57) as Tier 2* information.

Design Control Document (DCD) Revision:

Modify the first sentence in the last paragraph of DCD subsection 3.4.1.1.1.1, Revision 17, to read as follows:

> The waterproof function of the membrane is not safety-related; however, the membrane between the mudmats must transfer horizontal shear forces due to seismic (SSE) loading. This function is seismic Category I. The specific ~~static~~ coefficient of friction between horizontal membrane and concrete is ≥~~0.7~~ 0.55.

Modify the following DCD Revision 17 subsections related to seismic stability.

3.8.5.5.3 Sliding

The factor of safety against sliding of the nuclear island (NI) during a tornado or a design wind is shown in Table 3.8.5-2 and is calculated as follows:

$$F.S. = \frac{F_S}{F_H}$$

where:

F.S. = factor of safety against sliding from tornado or design wind
F_S = shearing or sliding resistance at bottom of basemat
~~F_P = maximum soil passive pressure resistance, neglecting surcharge effect~~
F_H = maximum lateral force due to active soil pressure, including surcharge, and tornado or design wind load

The factor of safety against sliding of the nuclear island during a safe shutdown earthquake is shown in Table 3.8.5-2 and is calculated as follows:

$$F.S. = \frac{F_s}{F_D}$$

where:

F.S. = factor of safety against sliding from a safe shutdown earthquake
F_S = shearing or sliding resistance at bottom of basemat
~~F_P = maximum soil passive pressure resistance, neglecting surcharge effect~~
F_D = ~~maximum dynamic lateral force, including dynamic active earth pressures~~ seismic force from safe shutdown earthquake
~~F_H = maximum lateral force due to all loads except seismic loads~~

The sliding resistance is based on the friction force developed between the basemat and the foundation. The governing friction value in the interface zone is a thin soil layer below the mudmat with an angle of internal friction of 35° giving a static coefficient of friction of ~~0.70~~0.55. The effect of buoyancy due to the water table is included in calculating the sliding resistance. ~~F_P~~ Passive soil pressure resistance is not included in the equations above because passive pressure is not considered for sliding stability. Since there is no passive pressure considered, active and overburden soil pressures are also not considered.

3.8.5.5.4 Overturning

The factor of safety against overturning of the nuclear island during a tornado or a design wind is shown in Table 3.8.5-2 and is calculated as follows:

$$F.S. = \frac{M_R}{M_O}$$

where:

F.S. = factor of safety against overturning from tornado or design wind
M_R = resisting moment
M_O = overturning moment of tornado or design wind

The factor of safety against overturning of the nuclear island during a safe shutdown earthquake is shown in Table 3.8.5-2 and is evaluated using the ~~static moment balance approach~~time history analysis assuming overturning about the edge of the nuclear island at the bottom of the basemat. The factor of safety is defined as follows:

$$F.S. = (M_R \cancel{+ M_P})/(M_O + M_{AO})$$

where:

F.S. = factor of safety against overturning from a safe shutdown earthquake
M_R = nuclear island's resisting moment against overturning
M_O = maximum safe shutdown earthquake induced overturning moment acting on the nuclear island, applied as a static moment
~~M_P = Resistance moment associated with passive pressure~~
M_{AO} = Moment due to lateral forces caused by active and overburden pressures

The resisting moment is equal to the nuclear island dead weight, minus buoyant force from ground water table, multiplied by the distance from the edge of the nuclear island to its center of gravity. The overturning moment is the maximum moment about the same edge from the time history analyses of the nuclear island ~~lumped mass stick~~NI20 model described in subsection 3.7.2 and 3G.2. ~~M_P~~Resistance moment due to passive pressure is not included in the equation above because passive pressure is not considered for overturning stability.

3.8.5.5.5 Seismic Stability Analysis

The factors of safety for sliding and overturning for the SSE are calculated for each soil case for the base reactions in terms of shear and bending moments about column lines 1, 11, I and the west side of the shield building at each time step of the seismic time history. The 2D SASSI reactions (Fx, Fy, and Fz) are used to obtain seismic response factors between the hard rock case to the upper-bound-soft-to-medium (UBSM) soil case, and the soft-to-medium (SM) soil case. These factors were used to adjust the hard rock time history to reflect the

seismic response for the other two potential governing soil cases UBSM and SM. The firm rock, soft rock, and soft soil cases have higher factors of safety against sliding and therefore not considered.

A non-linear analysis with sliding friction elements using a 2D ANSYS model was performed. The 2D ANSYS model that was used to study the basemat uplift (see Subsection 3.8.5.5.6 and Appendix 3G). This 2D non-linear model is for the East-West direction. There is no need to consider the North-South direction since the NI deflections calculated to maintain a factor of safety of 1.1 is largest in the East-West direction. This model was modified introducing friction elements along the bottom of the basemat and soil media interface. Direct time integration analysis was performed with vertical uplift and sliding allowed. The three cases that have the lowest factor of safety related to sliding were evaluated. These three cases are HR, UBSM, and SM. The seismic input was increased by 10% to maintain the factor of safety against sliding of 1.1. No passive soil resistance is considered. The resulting maximum displacement at the base of the NI basemat (EL 60.5') using a coefficient of friction of 0.55 is 0.03" without buoyant force consideration, and 0.045" with buoyant force considered. This is negligible sliding during the seismic event, and no passive soil resistance is necessary from the backfill (side soil). Therefore, it can be concluded that the Nuclear Island is stable against sliding, and there is no quality requirement for the backfill material adjacent to the NI (side soil) to maintain stability against sliding.

The minimum seismic stability factors of safety values are reported in Table 3.8.5-2.

3.8.5.5.~~5~~6 Effect of Nuclear Island Basemat Uplift on Seismic Response

The effects of basemat uplift were evaluated using an east-west lumped-mass stick model of the nuclear island structures supported on a rigid basemat with nonlinear springs. Floor response spectra from safe shutdown earthquake time history analyses, which included basemat uplift, were compared to those from analyses that did not include uplift. The comparisons showed that the effect of basemat uplift on the floor response spectra is not significant.

3.8.7 References

56. Hsai-Yang Fang, "Foundation Engineering Handbook," Second Edition, 1991, Van Nostrand Reinhold.

Table 3.8.5-2

FACTORS OF SAFETY FOR FLOTATION, OVERTURNING AND SLIDING OF NUCLEAR ISLAND STRUCTURES

Environmental Effect	Factor of Safety[1]
Flotation	
High Ground Water Table	3.7
Design Basis Flood	3.5
Sliding	
Design Wind, North-South	~~23.2~~ 14.0
Design Wind, East-West	~~17.4~~ 10.1
Design Basis Tornado, North-South	~~12.8~~ 7.7
Design Basis Tornado, East-West	~~10.6~~ 5.9
Safe Shutdown Earthquake, North-South	~~1.28~~ 1.1[2]
Safe Shutdown Earthquake, East-West	~~1.33~~ 1.1[2]
Overturning	
Design Wind, North-South	51.5
Design Wind, East-West	27.9
Design Basis Tornado, North-South	17.7
Design Basis Tornado, East-West	9.6
Safe Shutdown Earthquake, North-South	~~1.35~~ 1.77
Safe Shutdown Earthquake, East-West	~~1.12~~ 1.17 ~~[3]~~

Note:

1. Factor of safety is calculated for the envelope of the soil and rock sites described in subsection 3.7.1.4.
2. From non-linear sliding analysis using friction elements the horizontal movement is negligible (0.03"without buoyant force consideration, and 0.045" with buoyant force considered). ~~Factor of safety is shown for soils below and adjacent to nuclear island having angle of internal friction of 35 degrees.~~
3. ~~ASCE/SEI 43-05, Reference 42, recognizes that there is considerable margin beyond that given by the moment balance formula and permits a nonlinear rocking analysis. The nonlinear (liftoff allowed) time history analysis described in Appendix 3G.10 showed that the nuclear island basemat uplift effect is insignificant. Further, these analyses were performed for free field seismic ZPA input as high as 0.5g without significant uplift. Therefore the factor of safety against overturning is greater than 1.67 (0.5g/0.3g).~~

APPENDIX 3G NUCLEAR ISLAND SEISMIC ANALYSES

Modify the second paragraph in Section 3.G.1 changing Reference number.

Analyses were performed in accordance with the criteria and methods described in Section 3.7. Section 3G.2 describes the development of the finite element models. Section 3G.3 describes the soil structure interaction analyses of a range of site parameters and the selection of the parameters used in the design analyses. Section 3G.4 describes the fixed base and soil structure interaction dynamic analyses and provides typical results from these dynamic analyses. In Reference ~~36~~ are provided a summary of dynamic and seismic analysis results (i.e., modal model properties, accelerations, displacements response spectra) and the nuclear island liftoff analyses. The seismic analyses of the nuclear island are summarized in a seismic analysis summary report. Deviations from the design due to as-procured or as-built conditions are acceptable based on an evaluation consistent with the methods and procedures of Sections 3.7 and 3.8 provided the following acceptance criteria are met:

3G.5 References

6. APP-GW-GLR-044, "Nuclear Island Basemat and Foundation," Revision 1, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC

PRA Revision:

None

Technical Report (TR) Revision:

~~None~~

The following modifications are Post Revision 1.

Modify the last paragraph of Section 2.4.1, 2D SASSI Analyses to the following:

Table 2.4-2 shows the reactions at the underside of the basemat for each soil case. These are conservative estimates using the results of the 2D SASSI horizontal analyses also used for the member forces in Table 2.4-1. Horizontal loads on the portion below grade are added absolutely to the sum of the member forces above grade. The 2D SASSI reactions (Fx, Fy, and Fz) are used to obtain seismic response factors between the hard rock case to the upper-bound-soft-to-medium (UBSM) soil case, and the soft-to-medium (SM) soil case. These factors were used to adjust the hard rock time history to reflect the seismic response for the other two potential governing soil cases UBSM and SM.

Modify Section 2.9 as follows:

2.9 Nuclear island stability

The factors of safety associated with stability of the nuclear island (NI) are shown in Table 2.9-1 for the following cases:

- Flotation Evaluation for ground water effect and maximum flood effect
- The Nuclear Island to resist overturning during a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE)
- The Nuclear Island to resist sliding during the SSE
- The Nuclear Island to resist overturning during a tornado/wind/hurricane condition
- The Nuclear Island to resist sliding during a tornado/wind/hurricane condition.

~~The factors of safety for sliding and overturning for the SSE are calculated for each soil case for the base reactions in terms of shear and bending moments about column lines 1, 11, I and the west side of the shield building at each time step of the seismic time history. The seismic time history analysis used the ANSYS computer code and the NI20 model.~~ The minimum stability factors of safety values are reported in Table 2.9-1. The method of analysis is as described in subsection 3.8.5.5 of the DCD and the coefficient of friction of 0.55 is used. The governing friction value at the interface zone is a thin soil layer (soil on soil) under the mud mat assumed to have a friction angle of 35 degrees. The Combined License applicant will provide the site specific angle of internal friction for the soil below the foundation. ~~For seismic overturning no passive pressure was considered. For sliding partial passive pressure is considered (less than 35% NS and 48% EW). The relationship between passive pressure and displacement at grade is shown in Figures 2.9-1 and 2.9-2. These curves are based on the methodology given in Reference 10.~~

The factors of safety for sliding and overturning for the SSE are calculated for each soil case for the base reactions in terms of shear and bending moments about column lines 1, 11, I and the west side of the shield building at each time step of the seismic time history. The 2D SASSI reactions (Fx, Fy, and Fz) are used to obtain seismic response factors between the hard rock case to the upper-bound-soft-to-medium (UBSM) soil case, and the soft-to-medium (SM) soil case. These factors were used to adjust the hard rock time history to reflect the seismic response for the other two potential governing soil cases UBSM and SM. The firm rock, soft rock, and soft soil cases have higher factors of safety against sliding and therefore not considered.

The seismic time history analysis used the ANSYS computer code and the NI20 model. The minimum stability factors of safety values are reported in Table 2.9-1. For seismic overturning no passive pressure was considered. For sliding partial passive pressure is considered. Two soil cases are considered for sliding, the soil parameters used for design (friction angle of 35°, and submerged weight of 87.6 pcf), and a lower bound soil density (friction angle of 35°, and submerged weight of 60 pcf). For the design case the amount of passive pressure required to meet the 1.1 factor of safety is 40% for the North-South seismic event, and 47% of the East-West excitation of full passive pressure. For the lower bound case the amount of passive pressure required to meet the 1.1 factor of safety is less than 53% for the North-

South seismic event, and 64% of the East-West excitation of full passive pressure. The relationship between passive pressure and displacement at grade is obtained based on the methodology given in Reference 10. The relationship between passive pressure and displacement at grade is shown in Figures 2.9-1 and 2.9-2. The maximum Nuclear Island displacement of the Nuclear Island at grade to develop the required passive resistance is 0.5" for the design case, and 2.3" for the lower bound case. These deflections are based on conservative equivalent static analysis. This will result in large deflections since the seismic loads are considered to be constant and do not reflect the short time duration that they exist during the seismic event. A more realistic non-linear analysis with sliding friction elements using a 2D ANSYS model was performed. The 2D ANSYS model that was used to study the basemat uplift (see Subsection 2.4.2). This 2D non-linear model is for the East-West direction. There is no need to consider the North-South direction since the NI deflections calculated to maintain a factor of safety of 1.1 is largest in the East West direction. This model was modified introducing friction elements along the bottom of the basemat and soil media interface. Direct time integration analysis was performed with vertical uplift and sliding allowed. The three cases that have the lowest factor of safety related to sliding were evaluated. These three cases are HR, UBSM, and SM. The seismic input was increased by 10% to maintain the factor of safety against sliding of 1.1. No passive soil resistance is considered. The resulting maximum displacement at the base of the NI basemat (EL 60.5') using a coefficient of friction of 0.55 is 0.03" without buoyant force consideration, and 0.045" with buoyant force considered. This is negligible sliding during the seismic event, and no passive soil resistance is necessary from the backfill (side soil). Therefore, it can be concluded that the Nuclear Island is stable against sliding, and there is no quality requirement for the backfill material adjacent to the NI (side soil) to maintain stability against sliding.

Table 2.9-1 – Factors of Safety Related to Stability of AP1000 NI

Load Combination	Sliding		Overturning		Flotation	
	Factor of Safety	Limit	Factor of Safety	Limit	Factor of Safety	Limit
D + H + B + W	Design Wind					
North-South	~~23.2~~14.0	1.5	51.5	1.5	–	–
East –West	~~17.4~~10.1	1.5	27.9	1.5	–	–
D + H + B + W_t	Tornado Condition					
North-South	~~12.8~~7.7	1.1	17.7	1.1	–	–
East –West	~~10.6~~5.9	1.1	9.6	1.1	–	–
D + H + B + W_h	Hurricane Condition					
North-South	~~18.1~~10.3	1.1	31.0	1.1	–	–
East –West	~~14.2~~8.1	1.1	16.7	1.1	–	–
D + H + B + E_S	SSE Event					
North-South	1.1(2)	1.1	–	–	–	–
East-West	1.1(2)	1.1	–	–	–	–
Line 1	–	–	1.77(1)	1.1	–	–
Line 11	–	–	1.~~92~~93(1)	1.1	–	–
Line I	–	–	1.17(1)	1.1	–	–
West Side Shield Bldg	–	–	1.44(1)	1.1	–	–
	Flotation					
D + F	–	–	–	–	3.51	1.1
D + B	–	–	–	–	3.70	1.5

Notes:

(1) No passive pressure is considered.

(2) No passive pressure is considered. From non-linear sliding analysis using friction elements the horizontal movement is negligible (0.03"without buoyant force consideration, and 0.045" with buoyant force considered). ~~Factor of safety for sliding considers that the soils below and adjacent to the nuclear island have an angle of internal friction of 35 degrees. Also, the coefficient of friction for soils below the nuclear island is equal to 0.55. The maximum deflection of the nuclear island needed to develop the required passive pressures are less than 0.15 inch for hard rock, less than or equal to 0.5 inch for upper bound soft to medium (UBSM) and soft to medium (SM) soil conditions. The other soil conditions have smaller deflection requirements than the UBSM and SM cases.~~



Figure 2.9-1 – Passive Pressure versus Deflection at Grade (North-South Excitation)



Figure 2.9-2 – Passive Pressure versus Deflection at Grade (East-West Excitation)

4. REFERENCES

10. HSAI-Yang Fang, "Foundation Engineering Handbook," Second Edition, 1991, Van Nostrand Reinhold.