

In our discussions with representatives of your staff concerning our submittals of July 18, 1980 and August 20, 1981 addressing the waste storage facility at the above referenced facility, questions have arisen concerning the need for criticality monitors. This letter provides the basis for extending the existing exemption of criticality monitoring requirements pursuant to 10 CFR Part 70.24 (a)(1) and condition 13 of License SNM-639 to include the new waste storage cells along with the present hot cells for the purposes of that exemption.

The basis for the present exemption is a June 29, 1973canal ysis with the following conclusions:

- In the event of a criticality the particulate, gaseous and iodine radiation monitors in the exhaust ventilation from the hot cells would sound an alarm.
- 2. There would be no hazard to facility personnel in the event of a criticality incident in the hot cell having a magnitude of 10^{17} fissions; the resulting dose from fission neutron and gamma rays would be less than or equal to 0.75 rem.
- 3. It is not practical to monitor exterior to the cells for a criticality occuring inside a cell because of the 4' thick shield walls. Neither is it practical to monitor inside each cell because of the extreme level of radiation present from routine operations.

The new storage cells meet the same criteria as applied to the existing hot cells regarding the relevance of the existing exemption. Factors to consider in evaluating the relevance are as follows:

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Dr. A. Thomas Clark - Page Two -November 16, 1981

- 1. The effluents from the waste storage cells flow in a common duct with the effluents from the existing hot cells, passing the stack monitors.
- 2. The containers placed into the storage cells will have previously been packaged and stored in the existing hot cells in a much closer array than what is possible in the storage facility.
- 3. The SNM is packaged in quantities of less than 350 grams per container. Ten times that amount would be required to approach the single parameter limit for the storage facility.
- 4. Because of the reflection and moderation of the concrete and the limited volume remaining, the reactivity of material in storage cannot be significantly effected by abnormal occurences involving water intrusion.
- 5. The 4' thick shield plugs preclude interaction with any other SNM which may be taken through the area above the new storage cells.

We believe these items provide adequate justification for extending license condition 13 of License SNM-639 to include the waste storage cells in the exemption from 10 CFR Part 70.24 (a)(1).

Yours very truly,

Marcus N Dath

Marcus H. Voth Manager Nuclear Operations

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"LICENSE AMENDMENTS"

to: Rouse 11/30/04

Docket No. 70-647

William O. Miller, License Fee Management Branch, ADM MATERIALS LICENSE AMENDMENT CLASSIFICATION

Applicant:	Union Cashide	
License No:	SNM-639	Fee Category: <u>ID</u>
Application	Dated: 11-16-01	Received: 11-25- 41
Applicant's	Classification:	

The above application for amendment has been reviewed by NMSS in accordance with §170.31 of Part 170, and is classified as follows:

- 1. Safety and Environmental Amendments to Licenses in Fee Categories 1A through 1H, 2A, 2B, 2C, and 4A
 - (a) _____ Major safety and environmental
 - (b) _____ Minor safety and environmental
 - (c) _____ Safety and environmental (Categories 1D through 1G only)
 - (d) ____ Administrative
- 2. Justification for reclassification:
- 3. The application was filed (a) pursuant to written NRC request and the amendment is being issued for the convenience of the Commission, or (b) X Other (State reason):

Submitted provides supplemental information aux 20. 1981 application On me

Date

Signature Division of Fuel Cycle & Material Safety