NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | NYIPS3 (2) | 00-00000-00 (3) | 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | (5)
7 8 | LICENSEE CODE 9–14 | LICENSE NUMBER 15–25 | LICENSE TYPE 26–30 | CAT 57–58

CON'T
01 | REPORT SOURCE L (6) | 05000286 (7) | 091278 (8) | 102278 (9)
7 8 | 60 | DOCKET NUMBER 61–68 | EVENT DATE 69–74 | REPORT DATE 75–80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 While operating at 100 percent power, the control room operator
03 noticed that Loop No. 1 T-average was decreasing and found this
04 was caused by failure of the hot leg RTD TE-410A. The RTD was
05 declared inoperable in accordance with the requirements of tech-
06 nical specification table 3.5-2, and the reactor protection trips
07 associated with this particular channel were placed in the tripped
08 condition.
7 8 9 80

09 | SYSTEM CODE IA (11) | CAUSE CODE E (12) | CAUSE SUBCODE A (13) | COMPONENT CODE INSTRU (14) | COMP. SUBCODE E (15) | VALVE SUBCODE Z (16)
7 8 | 9–10 | 11 | 12 | 13–18 | 19 | 20

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | EVENT YEAR 78 (21–22) | — (23) | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 031 (24–26) | / (27) | OCCURRENCE CODE 03 (28–29) | REPORT TYPE L (30) | — (31) | REVISION NO. 0 (32)

ACTION TAKEN X (18) (33) | FUTURE ACTION Z (19) (34) | EFFECT ON PLANT Z (20) (35) | SHUTDOWN METHOD Z (21) (36) | HOURS (22) 0000 (37–40) | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y (23) (41) | NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N (24) (42) | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER N (25) (43) | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER S260 (26) (44–47)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 Entry to containment was made and it was found that the manifold
11 stop valve 561A was leaking borated water onto the cabling and
12 junction box of the RTD in question. The leak was diverted by
13 wrapping the valve with insulating cloth, and the RTD cable and
14 box was rinsed with demineralized water.
7 8 9 80

15 | FACILITY STATUS E (28) | % POWER 100 (29) | OTHER STATUS (30) NA | METHOD OF DISCOVERY A (31) | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) Operator Observation
7 8 | 9 | 10–12 | 13–44 | 45 | 46–80

16 | ACTIVITY RELEASED Z (33) | CONTENT OF RELEASE Z (34) | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) NA | LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) NA
7 8 | 9 | 10 | 11–44 | 45–80

17 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 000 (37) | TYPE (38) | DESCRIPTION (39) NA
7 8 | 9–11 | 12 | 13–80

18 | PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 000 (40) | DESCRIPTION (41) NA
7 8 | 9–11 | 12–80

19 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z (42) | DESCRIPTION (43) NA
7 8 | 9 | 10–80

20 | PUBLICITY ISSUED N (44) | DESCRIPTION (45) NA | NRC USE ONLY
7 8 | 9 | 10–68 | 69–80

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ATTACHMENT 1

Docket No. 50-286

The Power Authority of
the State of New York

LER 78-031/03L-0

The plant was operating at 100 percent power in the steady state.

On September 12, 1978, the operator noted that T-average for loop No. 1 was steadily decreasing. The RTD was then declared inoperable as per Technical Specification Table 3.5-2. and the Reactor Protection System Trips associated with this channel were placed in the tripped condition. Containment entry was made, and it was observed that manifold stop valve 561A (as referred to in LER 78-030/03L-0) was leaking borated water onto the junction box and cabling for RTD No. TE-410A (Sostman and Company, Part No. 11901B-2).

The resistance of the RTD to ground was determined to be 250,000 ohms. This magnitude of resistance is sufficient to affect RTD reading.

The leak was diverted by wrapping the valve with insulating cloth. The junction box and cabling for the RTD were rinsed with demineralized water and allowed to dry. By the next morning, the resistance to ground was infinite. The T-average channel was functioning properly and was subsequently returned to service.

Performance of the reactor was not affected by this incident. No similar events have been recorded to date.