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**R. M. Krich** Vice President Nuclear Licensing

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10 CFR 50.4

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

> Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 NRC Docket No. 50-390

#### Subject: Commitment Summary Report

The purpose of this letter is to provide the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Commitment Summary Report for the period of June 17, 2008 through December 4, 2009, as required by Nuclear Energy Institute's "Guidelines for Managing NRC Commitment Changes." This report summarizes docketed commitments that Tennessee Valley Authority has evaluated and revised using administrative controls that incorporate the guidelines.

There are no regulatory commitments in this letter. Please direct any questions concerning this matter to Kevin Casey, Senior Project Manager at (423) 751-8523.

Respectfully,

R. M. Krich

Enclosure: Commitment Summary Report

cc (Enclosure):

NRC Regional Administrator - Region II NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Watts Bar Nuclear Plant



### Enclosure

# Commitment Summary Report

Commitment Evaluation No./ Commitment Tracking No.	Source Document	Summary of Original Commitment	Summary of Commitment Changes	Basis/Justification For Changes
NCO920006006	Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA's) Letter to NRC Dated June 30, 1994 "Severe Accident Mitigation Design Alternatives (SAMDAs) Evaluation from Updated Individual Plant Evaluation (IPE)"	TVA will develop a plant procedure which would facilitate the cross-tie of the 500kV offsite power to the 6.9kV shutdown boards. This procedure would provide an additional, diverse source of offsite power in the event of loss of the normal 161kV offiste power supply to the shutdown boards. This enhancement addresses the second largest contributor to core damage risk - station blackout.	Decommit	A design change was implemented to convert the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) 500kV switchyard to a double breaker bus configuration. This modification included the WBN, Unit 2 Power System Optimization Project (PSOP) metering which is required for compliance with North American Electric Reliability Corporation transient stability standards. These changes remove the capability to backfeed to the Unit 1 shutdown boards. The intent of the PSOP is to reduce plant generation risk, therefore increasing plant generation stability. In addition to these modifications, other WBN, Unit 1 modifications have reduced the risk of certain design basis events that involve the loss of AC power. Additionally, in preparation for licensing WBN, Unit 2, the SAMDA analysis and Probabilistic Risk Assessment for WBN have been updated and no longer take credit for the 500 kV cross-tie.

### Enclosure

## **Commitment Summary Report**

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NCO930238006	TVA's Letter to NRC Dated July 28, 1993 "Generic Letter 81- 07 - NUREG-0612 - Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants - Revised Response"	In cases where design or procurement is not complete as of the date of this report, WBN is committed to be in compliance prior to the first time the specific lifting device is used after fuel load per Site Standard Practice (SSP) 6.06. The commitment evaluation only affected the portion of commitment NCO930238006 that requires WBN to load test and inspect slings (ASME B30.9 devices) to ANSI N14.6 requirements with a periodicity of 10 years.	Commitment Scope Clarified – Refer to Basis/Justification For Changes	Engineering Specification N3M-940, "Design and Procurement of Lifting Devices," defines "Special Lifting Devices" to include all forms of rigging when designed and dedicated to handle a specific critical load or loads. This imposes ANSI N14.6 testing requirements on ASME B30.9 devices, and is not the intent of the requirements of NUREG-0612 or Generic Technical Activity A-36 which address slings and special lifting devices separately. ASME B30.9 devices, slings, are proof tested to 200% rated capacity by the manufacturer and are inspected by a qualified rigger prior to use, ensuring that the slings are capable of performing their function with sufficient factors of safety. Additionally, slings are regulated by OSHA Regulation 1910.184(c)(4) wherein it is specified that slings shall not be loaded in excess of their rated capacity.