

**REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO NEW
INFORMATION PROVIDED BY AREVA'S LETTER DATED
MARCH 23, 2010**

1. During the March 30, 2010, conference call, AREVA indicated that Accident Sequence 186- 94 in the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) Summary, while originally described for V-72, could occur for V-71, the TBP/CO₂ Separator Tank. V-71 was described in the license amendment application as having the potential for resulting in a consequence of concern. However, the ISA Summary submitted with the license amendment application does not have such accident sequence described for V-71. Consistent with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) 70.22(a)(7), provide a revised Accident Sequence 186-94 for V-71 showing the radiological and chemical consequences of a catastrophic failure. Describe what items relied on for safety and management measures will be used in this Accident Sequence to meet the performance requirements.
2. In the March 23, 2010, letter, AREVA indicated that it discovered an error in the ISA Summary for the license amendment application and a concomitant error in one of the responses to a request for additional information in the area of chemical safety. Such error involved V-72, the TBP holding tank. Consistent with 10 CFR 70.9, confirm if the process and instrumentation diagrams submitted by AREVA for this license amendment application, as well as the rest of the information (excluding the information in the March 23, 2010, letter), is still correct and accurate. If any of the information previously submitted is incorrect, submit the corrected information and explain why the corrections are needed.
3. During the March 30, 2010, conference call, AREVA indicated that since V-72 is normally open to the atmosphere, Accident Sequence 186-94, as originally described in the ISA Summary, would not result in a consequence of concern and should not be included in the ISA Summary. Consistent with 10 CFR 70.22(a)(7), provide the correct accident sequence for V-72 illustrating how a catastrophic failure of this sampling cylinder would not result in a radiological or chemical consequence of concern.
4. AREVA plans to use V-72 as a process tank that supports the operations of the CO₂ extraction process. However, the March 23, 2010, letter describes V-72 as a sampling cylinder, which appears to be a misapplication of the intended design of this cylinder. Consistent with 10 CFR 70.22(a)(7) and 10 CFR 70.64:
 - a) Describe any inspection or maintenance protocols that AREVA will implement to ensure the safe operation of this sampling cylinder.
 - b) Describe how AREVA's intended use of V-72 meets each requirement of the baseline design criteria.

Enclosure