Clinton Power Station 8401 Power Road Clinton, IL 61727

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U-603951 April 1, 2010 SRRS 5A.108

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

> Clinton Power Station, Unit 1 Facility Operating License No. NPF-62 NRC Docket No. 50-461

Subject: Licensee Event Report 2010-002-00

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 2010-002-00: Excessive Leakage through Feedwater Isolation Valve 1B21-F032B. This report is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(ii), degraded or unanalyzed condition, and 10 CFR 50.73 (b)(2)(v), a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.

There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter.

Should you have any questions concerning this report, please contact Mr. D. J. Kemper at (217) 937-2800.

Respectfully,

F.A. Kearney

Site Vice President Clinton Power Station

JLP/blf

Enclosures: Licensee Event Report 2010-002-00

cc: Regional Administrator – NRC Region III NRC Senior Resident Inspector – Clinton Power Station Office of Nuclear Facility Safety – IEMA Division of Nuclear Safety

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NRC FORM	366	U.	S. NUCLEAR RI	GULATO	RY COMMI	SSION	AP	PROVE	D BY OMB	: NO. 3150-01	04	EXPIRES	: 08/31/2010
(9-2007) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)							Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.						
1. FACILITY NAME Clinton Power Station, Unit 1						2. [	. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE 05000461 1 OF 3					}	
4. TITLE Excessive Leakage through Feedwater Isolation Valve 1B21F032B													
5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7 REPORT DATE				ATE	8 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED								
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			1	2. LICENS	SEE CONT	ACT F	OR	THIS L	ER	ТЕ	EPHONE NUMBE	R (Include A	rea Code)
D. J. Kemper, Regulatory Assurance Manager (217) 937-2800													
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ABSTRACT	(Limit to 140	) spaces, i.e., a	approximately 1	5 single-sp	aced type	written	line	s)					
On February 3, 2010, after entering Mode 2 (Startup) following refueling outage C1R12, it was discovered that a primary containment local leak rate test (LLRT) performed on feedwater check valve, 1B21-F032B, exceeded its acceptance criteria. Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.1.3.11 requires that the combined leakage rate for both primary containment feedwater penetrations to be less than or equal to 2 gallons per minute (gpm) for the worst of the isolation valves. The measured leakage rate for 1B21-F032B was reported to be 2.5 gpm. This leakage rate is greater than that assumed in the plant safety analysis. The unit was placed in Mode 4 (Cold Shutdown) to repair the valve and to re-perform the LLRT. After lubricating the valve actuator and stroking the check valve, the LLRT was performed to confirm the valve could meet its safety function for the Feedwater Leakage Control System (FWLCS). Following the satisfactory completion of the LLRT, plant startup was re-commenced on February 4, 2010. The cause of the 1B21-F032B check valve to fail its leak rate test was age-related degradation of the lubrication causing increased friction in the actuator.													

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# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CONTINUATION SHEET

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET		5. LER NUMBER	3. PAGE			
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NARRATIVE

## EVENT DESCRIPTION

On February 3, 2010, after entering Mode 2 (Startup) following refueling outage C1R12, it was discovered that a primary containment local leak rate test (LLRT) performed on feedwater [SJ] check valve [ISV], 1B21-F032B, exceeded its acceptance criteria. Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.1.3.11 requires that the combined leakage rate for the primary containment feedwater penetrations to be less than or equal to 2 gallons per minute (gpm) through the worst of the isolation valves. The measured leakage rate for 1B21-F032B was reported to be 2.5 gpm. This leakage rate is greater than that assumed in the plant safety analysis.

The unit was placed in Mode 4 (Cold Shutdown) to repair the valve and to re-perform the LLRT. After lubricating the valve actuator and stroking the check valve, the LLRT was performed to confirm the valve could meet its safety function for the Feedwater Leakage Control System (FWLCS). Following the satisfactory completion of the LLRT, plant startup was re-commenced on February 4, 2010.

Time line of events

1/18/2010	0100	Local Leak Rate Test performed for 1B21F032B with 2.5 gpm leakage rate
2/2/2010	2138	Plant entered Mode 2 (Startup)
2/3/2010	0730	Issue Report 1025446 written for failed LLRT not identified, discovered by
		Engineering reviewer
2/3/2010	1100	Operations notified of condition; Control Room declared 1B21-F032B inoperable and
		initiated action in accordance with TS 3.6.1.3 to close the feedwater inlet shutoff
		valve, 1B21F065B, to isolate the affected penetration.
2/3/2010	1136	1B21-F065B closed and breaker turned off to comply with TS 3.6.1.3, Condition C
		Required Actions
2/3/2010	1447	FWLCS declared inoperable in accordance with TS LCO 3.6.1.9; entered 30-day
		action to restore FWLCS to an operable condition.
2/3/2010	1930	Plant entered Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown)
2/4/2010	0521	Plant entered Mode 4 (Cold Shutdown)
2/4/2010	1000	Lubricated actuator and stroked valve
2/4/2010	1330	Performed LLRT
2/4/2010	1533	Entered Mode 2; recommenced plant startup

CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of the 1B21-F032B check valve to fail its leak rate test was age-related degradation of the lubrication causing increased friction in the actuator. The actuator had not been re-lubricated since initial installation during a refueling outage that ended in May 1999. No preventive maintenance activities existed to lubricate or overhaul the actuator.

## SAFETY ANALYSIS

The feedwater isolation valves and the FWLCS provide a sealing system to ensure that following a design basis accident loss of coolant accident (DBA LOCA), offsite doses are not exceeded. The 2 gpm leakage limit in TS SR 3.6.1.3.11 has been shown by testing and analysis to bound the condition following a DBA LOCA where, for a limited time, both air and water are postulated to leak through this pathway. The leakage rate of each primary containment feedwater penetration is assumed to be the maximum pathway leakage, i.e., the worst of the two isolation valves in each penetration.

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) U.S. NUCLEAR RI CONTINUATION SHEET

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#### NARRATIVE

Once the condition was identified, prompt actions were taken to ensure that the affected penetration was isolated to comply with TS. Once the plant was in Mode 4, corrective actions were taken to repair and re-test the valve to ensure leakage rates were restored to within acceptance limits.

No actual leakage path existed. The motor operated feedwater containment isolation valve, 1B21-F065B, had been in the closed position prior to plant startup. Once the condition was identified, 1B21-F065B was verified to be in the closed position, and the power was removed from its operator.

## CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The valve was repaired by lubricating the valve actuator. Following completion of repairs, the valve was stroked. An LLRT was completed at 1330 on February 4, 2010 with satisfactory results (0.15 gpm). Mode 2 was entered at 1533 on February 4, 2010.

Preventive maintenance activities will be established to lubricate and overhaul the 1B21-F032 actuators. The cause evaluation recommends lubrication of the actuators on a six-year frequency.

## PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES

This is the first failure of the 1B21-F032B since the installation and implementation of a Feedwater Leakage Control system in 2000. In refueling outage C1R11, which occurred in January 2008, a similar testing failure occurred on valve1B21-F032A with a leak rate result of 3.75 gpm. Following the LLRT failure, the internals of the valve were inspected and found to be satisfactory. Observation of a valve stroke with the valve partially disassembled revealed uneven and un-repeatable side to side movement of the actuator. The disc was cleaned and the actuator was re-lubricated resulting in proper seating of the valve. This event was not reported, and no causal analysis was performed. The testing failure of valve 1B21-F032A is being reported under this LER.

The following LERs occurred prior to the installation of a Feedwater Leakage Control system:

LER 92-003 dated March 31, 1992 – Local Leak Rate Test Failure of Feedwater Containment Isolation Valves Results in Total Leakage Rates in Excess of Technical Specification and 10CFR50 Appendix J Limits.

LER 95-002-01 dated June 6, 1995 – Local Leak Rate Test Failures of Feedwater Containment Isolation Valves Results in Total Leakage Rates Greater than Technical Specification and 10CFR50, Appendix J Limits.

LER 96-013-01 dated July 24, 1997 – Inadequate Actuator Design and Failure to Recognize Limitations of Resilient Seat Design Result in Local Leak Rate Test Failures of Feedwater Containment Isolation Valves and Total Leakage Rates Greater than Technical Specification and 10CFR50, Appendix J Limits.

### COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

Feedwater valves 1B21-F032A and 1B21-F032B are 20-inch, air assisted, non-slam tilting disc check valves, manufactured by Anchor Darling Valve Company.