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REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY

July 9, 1979

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2  
Docket No. 50-247


Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
ATTN: Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch No. 1  
Division of Operating Reactors  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Schwencer:

By submittal dated January 9, 1979, we responded to your letter dated November 28, 1978. Based on recent discussions with members of the NRC Regulatory Staff, a number of clarifications have been made with regard to the information required by your request. Accordingly, we are providing, as Attachment A to this letter, a supplemental response to your November 28, 1978 letter.

Should you or your staff have any questions, please contact us.

Very truly yours,



William J. Cahill, Jr.  
Vice President

attach.

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ATTACHMENT A

Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.  
Indian Point Unit No. 2  
Docket No. 50-247  
July, 1979

A. Containment Purging During Normal Operation:

Consolidated Edison's initial response to the Regulatory Staff's November 28, 1978 request for information was provided on January 9, 1979. That response described the design and use of both the Indian Point Unit No. 2 Containment Purge System and the Containment Pressure Relief Line. The following discussion provides further clarification on the use of these design features.

The containment purge system supply and exhaust ducts each contain two redundant 36-inch containment isolation valves in series which are normally maintained in the closed position during power operation. The Containment Purge System is used for containment atmosphere cleanup, cooldown and ventilation immediately prior to and during shutdown modes when personnel access to containment is required. In addition, the purge system may be utilized to facilitate personnel access at those infrequent instances when containment entry during power operation may be necessary. Past operating experience has shown that only approximately 2% of the annual purge system operating time occurs during power operation.

During power operation, there is a need to provide periodic containment atmosphere pressure relief to compensate for air leakage into containment from various instrument air and weld channel and containment penetration pressurization system sources. This relief of pressure buildup in containment is necessary to preclude eventual actuation of the high containment pressure safety injection signal at 1.6 psig; thus, avoiding unnecessary and unwarranted tripping and cycling of the unit and actuation of safety injection safeguards systems.

As described in our January 9, 1979 submittal, the independent 10-inch Containment Pressure Relief Line, not the Containment Purge System, is utilized to relieve containment atmosphere pressure buildup during power operation. This relief line simply provides pressure relieving capability and does not incorporate the normal ventilation functions of fresh air intake and air circulation that the Containment Purge System does. As described in our January 9, 1979 submittal, the acceptability of frequent pressure relieving during power operation has been documented in a number of docketed references. Because of the normal use of this system during power operation, three (3) 10-inch containment isolation valves in series are provided for the Containment Pressure Relief Line, one inside and two outside containment. Past operating experience has shown that essentially 100% of pressure relief line use occurs during power operation and that containment pressure relieving an equivalent of approximately 2 to 3 hours per day at design flow rate (i.e., 1500 cfm) is required to maintain containment atmospheric pressure.

Based on the above discussion, we understand that, as a minimum, Option (2) of the November 28, 1978 must be addressed for the Containment Purge System and Option (3) must be addressed for the Containment Pressure Relief Line. Consolidated Edison is currently reviewing the design and operation of both the purge and pressure relief systems and is conducting discussions regarding the design and construction of the containment isolation valves for these

systems with the valve manufacturer. It is now expected that the necessary information can be provided to the NRC Regulatory Staff by October 1, 1979. Should this current schedule change, we will so advise the NRC Project Manager for our unit.

During the interim period until such time that the NRC staff has completed their review of the information to be provided, we will limit containment purging (as discussed above) during power operation to no more than ninety (90) hours per calendar year. With regard to the Containment Pressure Relief Line, pressure relieving will be performed as discussed above for the minimum time necessary to maintain containment atmospheric pressure.

Should there be any questions regarding our plans or schedule for addressing the above issues, please contact us.

B. Safety Actuation Electrical Circuitry Manual Override Capability Review:

As discussed in our January 9, 1979 submittal, a review was conducted of the instrumentation and control circuitry for the containment purge system isolation valves and the containment pressure relief line isolation valves. These valves receive an automatic close signal upon generation of either a containment isolation signal (derived from any safety injection signal) or a containment high radiation signal. Manual bypass of either signal does not affect the availability or operation of the other signal. The events at Millstone Unit 2 and Salem Unit 1 described in the November 28, 1978 Regulatory Staff letter cannot occur at Indian Point Unit No. 2 with the present electrical design.

Furthermore, we are in the process of performing a re-review of all Indian Point Unit No. 2 safety actuation signal circuits which incorporate manual override features as discussed in our January 9, 1979 submittal. Preliminary results of the re-review indicate that no non-conforming circuits exist at Indian Point Unit No. 2 and that operation of a bypass will affect no safety functions other than those analyzed and discussed on our docket. The final results of our electrical re-review will be provided at the same time the containment purging information is submitted.