

**Cartwright, William**

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**From:** Brown, Michael  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 24, 2009 11:55 AM  
**To:** Robles, Jesse; Garmon-Candelaria, David; Beltz, Terry; Bernardo, Robert; Boyle, Patrick; Chapman, Travis; Craffey, Ryan; DeMarshall, Joseph; Dority, Dayna; Gaslevic, James; Giantelli, Joseph; Goldfeiz, Eliezer; Gray, Kathy; Haskell, Russell; Ibarrola, Sherlyn; Jardaneh, Mahmoud; Jennings, Jason; Kauffman, John; King, Mark; Kleeh, Edmund; LaVera, Ronald; Le, Hien; Pannier, Stephen; Reisifard, Mehdi; Scully, Derek; Sigmon, Rebecca; Tabatabai, Omid; Thomas, Eric; Thorp, John; Vaughn, Stephen; Webb, Michael; Wegner, Mary; Criscione, Lawrence; Brown, Michael  
**Subject:** Region I Morning Call Notes for Tuesday, November 24, 2009

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**Event Notifications: One (1)**

Outside of Scope

**Region I Morning Call Notes:**

**EN 45517 UNUSUAL EVENT - REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE GREATER THAN 25 GPM**

Beaver Valley Unit 2 was in Mode 4 in the process of removing the "A" RHR loop from service when they observed pressurizer level lowering and PRT level rising. The licensee determined that the identified leak rate was > 25 gpm which met EAL entry condition 2.6.B - an unusual event due to excessive leakage. The UE was declared and all notifications were made.

The licensee was successful at terminating the event by closing the cross tie valves between the "A" and "B" RHR systems. The licensee has determined that the increase in PRT level was due to the "A" RHR suction relief valve lifting. The relief valve lifted due to "A" RHR line being pressurized from the "B" RHR pump discharge through the open cross-tie valves. The duration of the relief lifting was approximately 9 minutes.

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The licensee determined that approximately 800 gallons of water went to the PRT during the event. PRT pressure increased to 39 psig. Setpoint for the PRT rupture disc is between 85-100 psig.

The Senior Resident Inspector responded to the site and is assessing the licensee's response to the event. A Manual Chapter 0309 assessment is being performed to determine what followup activities are warranted.

The licensee terminated the unusual event at 0404 EST.

The agency stayed in normal response mode based on the event being terminated prior to all notifications being made. *(Continue to follow; send to TRGs for ECCS; Samuel Miranda, Pump and Valve; Russell Lake; Emergency Preparedness; Jeffrey Temple, Human Performance; Michael Boggi, and Public Affairs; Scott Burnell)*

**(Update) TMI - RADIATION RELEASE IN CONTAINMENT ASSOCIATED WITH STEAM GENERATOR REMOVAL**

The licensee has concluded that the apparent cause of the event was a change in containment ventilation lineup in conjunction with some open RCS piping penetrations.

The licensee has secured their containment purge supply fans and is only operating containment purge exhaust fans. This ensures that containment will be maintained at a negative pressure.

The licensee did have 3 airborne radiation monitor alarms in containment during the night, however, none of these were due to a radiation release. Two of the alarms were due to power cycling to the airborne radiation monitor and one of the alarms was determined to be due to shine from a vacuum cleaner.

The Chairman briefed the Governor of Pennsylvania and several members of Congress on the event.

The Region continues to have an HP inspector on-site to closely following the licensee's response and will be evaluating their actions. *(send update to TRGs for Containment; Jerome Bettie, Emergency Preparedness; Jeffrey Temple, Health Physics; Steven Garry, Human Performance; Michael Boggi, Dose Assessment; Mark Blumberg and Public Affairs; Scott Burnell)*

Outside of Scope

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