NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE WITHOUT APPROVAL OF THE DIRECTOR, OE

TEMPLATE = SECY 027

DS 03

12/07/05.

Date:

8-18-05 - The September 4, 2001, response to Bulletin 2001-001 was materially incomplete and inaccurate in that the response mischaracterized the accumulation of boric acid on the RVP head as a result of the 12 RFO head inspection, failed to include information that the access to the bare metal of the RPV head was impeded, during the 11 RFO and 12 RFO refueling outages, by the presence of significant accumulations of boric acid deposits, and failed to indicate that the presence of boric acid deposits was not limited to the area beneath flanges. The Design Engineering Manager was aware in June 2001, base on a memorandum he signed, of the accumulation of boric acid on the reactor head and that all the nozzles could not be inspected.

The October 17, 2001, response to Bulletin 2001-001 was materially incomplete and inaccurate, in that all the control rod drive mechanism nozzles were not viewed during the outages and Condition Report 2000-1037 stated that there were five leaking control rod drives located at F10, D10, C11, F8, and G9. The Design Engineering Manager was aware in June 2001, based on a memorandum he signed, that not all the reactor pressure vessel head was cleaned at the end of the 12 RFO, therefore, the licensee could not view all of the control rod drive mechanism nozzles.

The October 11, 2001, presentation to the Commissioner's technical assistants was materially incomplete and inaccurate in that the build-up of boric acid deposits was so significant that the licensee could not inspect all of the nozzles. As a result, FENOC did not have a basis for stating that no visible evidence of nozzle leakage was detected. Although the Design Engineering Manager was aware, in June 2001, that all the nozzles could not be inspected, he failed to correct the inaccurate information on the slides during an October 10, 2001, meeting, that he attended, where the slides were being developed.

Based on the above, the panel proposed issuing an Order banning involvement in all NRC-licensed activities for a period of 5 years for violations of 10 CFR 50.5 (a)(2). The panel determined that a ban of 5 years is appropriate based on the significance of the events at Davis-Besse and the fact that a 5 year ban was previously issued to another former Davis-Besse employee for equally significant acts of deliberate misconduct.

This enforcement action is being proposed prior to the Department of Justice completing its review of the OI investigation results.