Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

Facility: Palisades	Scenario No.: ONE	Op-Test No.: 1
Examiners:	Operators:	

Initial Conditions: 100% power with P-66B HPSI Pump tagged out.

Turnover: P-66B HPSI Pump is tagged out for bearing inspection and will be restored to operable in 4 hours. Shift orders are to alternate running Service Water pumps and then lower power to approximately 87% at 4% per hour to perform Turbine valve testing on the next shift.

Event No.	Malf. No.	Event Type*	Event Description
1	NA	SRO (N) RO (N)	Alternate Running Service Water Pumps
		SRO (N)	
2	NA	BOP (N) RO (R)	Power Reduction
3	Override	BOP (C) SRO (C)	'A' Train CR HVAC Outside Air Damper fails closed
4	RP22A	SRO (I, T) BOP (I)	Hot Leg RTD Failure Low
5	SG01A	SRO (C, T)	'A' S/G tube leak at 0.25 gpm (requires controlled shutdown). Leak then rises to require a reactor trip. (≥ 0.4 gpm requires reactor trip.)
6	Override	BOP (I)	C-02 Reactor Trip P/B fails (requires trip from C-06)
7	SG01A	ALL (M)	SGTR on 'A' S/G
8	Override	RO (C)	Loop Injection MO-3066 fails to open on SIAS
* (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor (T)ech Spec			

Scenario ONE - Simulator Operator Instructions

- Reset to IC 17
- Hang Caution Tag on HPSI Pump P-66B (OOS) hand switch
 - RACKOUT breaker for P-66B using SI24 on PIDSI02
 - Ensure EOOS indicates that P-66B is out of service
- Ensure SW Pumps P-7B and P-7C inservice
- INSERT the following OVERRIDES
 - o Reactor Trip Pushbutton on Panel C-02 to OFF
 - o MO-3066-1 to ON (HS stuck in close position)
 - MO-3066-R to OFF (red light off)
- Create Event Triggers 5 and 6: Event: ZDI1P(171) [MO-3066 switch to OPEN position]
- Create Event Trigger 7: Event: rdsr(13)<100
- Create Event Trigger 8: Event ZDI6P(1060) [V-96 switch to ON position] Action: dmf ANN-K-02-49
- Create Event Trigger 9: Event ZDI6P(1070) [V-26A switch to ON position] Action: dmf ANN-K-02-49

Event #	Remote or Trigger #	Instructions
1		Alternate running SW Pumps- No actions required.
2		Power Reduction – No actions required.
3	REMOTE 1	Overrides HS-1673-D2-G (to ON), HS-1673-D2-R (to OFF), and ANN-K-02-49 (to ON) (Panel C-11A) CR HVAC Train 'A' Outside Air Damper failed closed
4	REMOTE 2	RP22A (PIDRPNI1) Hot Leg #1 RTD Fail TE-0112H, Final Value = 0.0
	REMOTE 3	SG01A (PIDSG01) Severity 0.025. Causes a S/G Tube Leak on 'A' S/G.
5	REMOTE 4	Event: 0 Action: imf sg01a 0.40 [raises the severity of the tube leak to 4 gpm]
6		ACTIVE AT SETUP (override for reactor trip pushbutton on C-02 Panel)
	TRIGGER 5	Action: dor MO-3066-1
7/8	TRIGGER 6	Action: dor MO-3066-R
	TRIGGER 7	Action: imf sg01a 24.0 [raises severity of tube leak to 240 gpm]

Special instructions:

 During SW Pp. swap, if called as Chemistry to recalculate mixing basin discharge flow volume, inform CR this is not required if they are alternating SW pps. When called as AO for SW Pp. parameters, report discharge valve open, oil levels normal. Once P-7C has been started, when asked, report Pl-1320 indicates 72 psig and stable; packing leakoff is NOT excessive.

Scenario ONE - Turnover Information

The plant is at 100% power. P-66B HPSI Pp. is tagged out for pump coupling alignment and will be restored to operable in 4 hours (LCO 3.5.2.B.1 - 72 hrs.). Shift orders are to alternate running Service Water pumps (Start P-7A and stop P-7B and place it in STDBY) and then commence a power reduction at 4% per hr. for performance of turbine valve testing on the next shift. GOP-8 has been completed up to Att. 1, Step 2.0.

On Too	t No : 1	Scenario No.: ONE Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 1
Op-Test No.: 1		Scenario No.: ONE Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 1
Event D	escription:	Alternate Running Service Water Pumps
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	RO	Refers to SOP-15, 7.1.1 and 7.1.2.
	RO	 Starts P-7A SW pump. Make PA announcement. Check discharge valve, oil levels for P-7C. Remove P-7A from standby (place handswitch to TRIP). Starts P-7A. Check amps less than 92 amps. Check local discharge pressure (call to AO). Check packing leakoff not excessive. Expected alarm: EK-1132 for P-7A basket strainer low dp (clears on
		its own) Stops P-7B.
	RO	Note: Chemistry recalculation of mixing basin volume is NOT required.
	RO	 Places P-7B to Standby Ensure P-7A and P-7C operating. Depress STANDBY button on handswitch. Check amber STANDBY light on.

Op-Test No.: 1		Scenario No.: ONE Event No.: 2 Page _1_ of _1_
Event D	escription:	Power Reduction
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	SRO BOP	Ensure DEH is setup for 4% / hour load reduction. ENTERS setter value SELECTS rate of 4% per hour
	SRO	Reviews Precautions and Limitations of GOP-8.
	RO BOP	Reviews Precautions and Limitations of applicable SOPs
	RO	INSERTS Group 4 Control Rods to less than 128 inches: • Control Rod "joystick" MANIPULATED to lower control rods
	RO	Borates to commence downpower. RESET BA and PMW Controllers if not already RESET SET quantity and batch flow limit on FIC-0210B, BA flow controller SET quantity and batch flow limit on FIC-0210A, PMW flow controller START BA Pump (P-56B preferred) OPEN CV-2155, Make Up Stop Valve PUSH start pushbutton on FIC-0210B MONITORS reactor power and T _{AVE} VERIFIES FIC-0210B output signal at zero when boration complete PUSH start pushbutton on FIC-0210A VERIFIES FIC-0210A output signal at zero when PMW flush complete CLOSES CV-2155
	ВОР	Initiates turbine de-rate: PUSHES "GO" pushbutton and observes white light illuminate Informs CRS/RO that turbine is in "GO"

INSERT REMOTE #1

Op-Tes	t No.: 1	Scenario No.: ONE Event No.: 3 Page _1_ of _2_
Event D	Description:	Train 'A' CR HVAC Outlet Damper failed closed
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
		Diagnose loss of 'A' Train CRHVAC:
	ВОР	Indications: V-95, Air Handling Unit Fan, stops running; noticeable lowering of back-round sound
		Major alarm: EK-0249, Control Room LOW Pressure DPIC-1659/1660
		Operator actions from EK-0249:
	ВОР	 CHECK CR HVAC not operating per SOP-24, Ventilation and Air Conditioning System
		 PLACE opposite CR HVAC train in service OR place operating train in Emergency Mode per SOP-24
		Directs BOP to either:
	SRO	Place 'A' Train CRHVAC in Emergency Mode per SOP-24, OR
		Place 'B' train CR HVAC in service per SOP-24
		If directed by SRO, transfer CR HVAC to 'A' Train to Emergency Mode per SOP-24, Section 7.7.9:
		PLACE Control Switch for V-26A, Air Filter Unit Fan, to ON
		 Verify Outside Air Damper or Modulating Damper is CLOSED (D-1 OR D-2)
	ВОР	Verify at least one Exhaust Fan Damper is CLOSED (D-18)
		Verify at least one Purge Fan Damper is CLOSED (D-15)
		Check remaining components status for Train 'A' per procedure
		Ensure off Purge Fan V-94 and Switchgear Exhaust Fan V-47

Required O	perator Actions
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Appendix D

Form ES-D-2

Op-Tes	t No.: 1	Scenario No.: ONE Event No.: 3 Page <u>2</u> of <u>2</u>	
Event D	escription:	Train 'A' CR HVAC Outlet Damper failed closed	
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
		If directed by SRO to place CR HVAC to 'B' Train inservice per SOP-24, Section 7.7.2:	
		ENSURE Control Switch for V-26A, Air Filter Unit Fan, in AUTO	
		PLACE Control Switch for VC-11, Condensing Unit, to OFF/RESET	
		When VC-11 has pumped down and stopped:	
		ENSURE Control Switch for V-96, Air Handling Unit Fan, PLACED to ON	
		PLACE Control Switch for V-95 to AUTO	
		PLACE Control Switch for VC-11 to AUTO	
	BOP	ENSURE Control Switch for VC-10 in AUTO	
		CHECK indications for train being stopped:	
		Notes that Train 'A' Dampers reposition to CLOSED:	
		o Outside Air Damper, D-1	
		 Modulating Damper, D-2 	
		o Recirc Damper, D-3	
		o Discharge Damper, D-4	
		CHECK indications for train ('B') being placed in service:	
		 All Dampers in correct position (OPEN/MODULATING) 	
	SRO	Refer to Technical Specifications and determine the following 30-day required actions MAY conservatively be entered for the inoperable 'A' CR HVAC train:	
		- LCO 3.7.10.A.1	
At the c	At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, <u>INSERT REMOTE #2</u>		

Op-Tes	t No.: 1	Scenario No.: ONE Event No.: 4 Page _1_ of _1_
Event D	Description:	Hot Leg RTD Failure LOW
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
		Diagnoses low failure of Loop #1 Thot signal
		- EK-0967, LOOP 1 LOOP 2 Tave DEVIATION, alarms
		- EK-0968, LOOP 1 Tave/Tref GROSS DEVIATION, alarms
	RO	- EK-06 Rack D 04, NUCLEAR - DT POWER DEVIATION T-INLET OFF -
		NORMAL/CALCULATOR TROUBLE CHANNEL A
		Lowering of calculated ΔT and calculated TM/LP trip setpoint for channel 'A'
		TI-0112HA, Loop 1 Hot Leg Temperature, indicates low
	RO	Checks ARP-5 and ARP-21 for alarms present: report to CRS that ONP-13 needs to be referenced.
	SRO	Enters and directs the actions of ONP-13, Tave/Tref Controller Failure
	RO	Checks ΔT Power for the PIP Node and the SPI Node/Host Computer on a workstation and compares to actual heat balance power per ONP-13
		Refers to and implements the following Tech Spec LCOs:
	SRO	• 3.3.1 (Table 3.3.1-1 Items 1 and 9)
		• 3.3.8 (Table 3.3.8-1 item 4)
		Bypass the Variable High Power Trip and the TM/LP Trip for Channel 'A' per SOP-36 (does not need to be in-hand)
		1. Insert bypass key above affected RPS Trip Unit.
	ВОР	2. Turn key 90° clockwise.
		3. Verify lit yellow light above bypass keyswitch.
		4. Log evolution in the Reactor Logbook
	SRO	Initiates troubleshooting and repairs
	<u> </u>	<u>'</u>

After RPS has been bypassed $\underline{\textit{OR}}$ at the discretion of the Lead Examiner, $\underline{\text{INSERT}}$ REMOTE #3

Op-Test No.: 1		Scenario No.: ONE Event No.: 5/6/7/8 Page 1 of 7
Event D	escription:	'A' Steam Generator Tube Leak/Rupture/Plant Trip
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	SRO BOP RO	Diagnoses Steam Generator Tube Leak on 'A' S/G: EK-1364, GASEOUS WASTE MONITORING HI RADIATION alarms Monitors PZR level, pressure Monitors VCT level Charging-Letdown mismatch
	SRO RO BOP	Notes trends on any of the following: RIA-0631, Condenser Off-Gas Monitor RIA-2323, Main Steam Gamma Monitor ('B' S/G) RIA-2324, Main Steam Gamma Monitor ('A' S/G) RIA-0707, Steam Generator Blowdown Monitor RIA-2325/2326, Stack Gas Effluent Monitors RIA-2327, High Range Noble Gas Monitor
Simulate	SRO BOP or Operator: I	Uses ONP-23.2, Att.1 and/or Att.2 or PPC Page 540 to calculate leak rate. Calculates leak rate of ~ 0.25 gpm. May also use DWO-1 method (15 min) If asked as Chemistry, PCS Gas Total Isotope activity = 0.57 μCi/cc
	SRO	'A' S/G tube leak is identified and quantified, determines that plant shutdown per GOP-8 must occur (Mode 3 within 6 hours). Action level 3
		T
	SRO	Determines that Tech. Spec. 3.4.13.B applies - 6 hours to MODE 3, 36 hours to MODE 5. (> 150 gpd)
	SRO	Have HP determine dose rates on C-42 cation columns Have HP perform surveys per EOP Supplement 14
	or Operator: I	Inform control room that cation surveys for 'A' S/G indicate a higher than

Op-Test	No.: 1	Scenario No.: ONE Event No.: 5/6/7/8 Page 2 of 7
Event De	escription:	'A' Steam Generator Tube Leak/Rupture/Plant Trip
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	BOP/RO	Isolates S/G Blowdowns by closing the following valves on panel C-13: CV-0704, Blowdowns to mixing basin CV-0739, 'A' S/G Surface B/D CV-0767, 'A' S/G Bottom B/D CV-0771, 'A' S/G Bottom B/D CV-0738, 'B' S/G Surface B/D CV-0768, 'B' S/G Bottom B/D CV-0770, 'B' S/G Bottom B/D
	SRO BOP	May raise RIA-0631, Condenser off-gas monitor, setpoint on back of panel C-11
	ВОР	Operates turbine generator controls on the DEH panel for shutdown: Enters setter value Selects rate of ≤ 30% per hour Pushes GO and observes white light energize Informs CRS/RO that turbine is in "GO"
	or Operator: NG REMOTE	Once plant de-rate commences, raise severity of leak to 4 gpm by
	ALL	Diagnoses that leak rate has risen to above 0.4 gpm. Requires reactor trip
	SRO	Directs Reactor Trip
		Plant Trip
	RO	Attempts Reactor trip from C-02 Panel, does not function
	ВОР	DEPRESSES C-06 Panel Reactor Trip Pushbutton (CRITICAL TASK PL-000 447 05 01)

Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: ONE Event No.: 5/6/7/8 Page <u>3</u> of <u>7</u>					
Event D	escription:	'A' Steam Generator Tube Leak/Rupture/Plant Trip			
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior			
	Reactivity Control: YES: reactor was tripped from C-06 Panel Reactor power lowering negative SUR maximum of one control rod not inserted				
	ВОР	Main Turbine Generator criteria: YES • Main Turbine tripped • Generator disconnected from grid			
	ВОР	Feedwater criteria: YES : • PLACES Main FWP Controllers to 'MANUAL' RAMPS to minimum speed • Main FRV and B/Ps CLOSED			
Vital Auxiliaries-Electric: Buses 1C and 1D energized: YES Bus 1E energized: NO (if SIS present) BOP Bus 1A and 1B energized: YES Y-01 energized: YES Six DC Buses energized: YES 3 of 4 Preferred AC Buses energized: YES					

Op-Tes	t No.: 1	Scenario No.: ONE Event No.: 5/6/7/8 Page <u>4</u> of <u>7</u>				
Event D	escription:	'A' Steam Generator Tube Leak/Rupture/Plant Trip				
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior				
		PSC Inventory Control: YES OR NO (Depends on Plant conditions)				
		■ PZR level 20% - 85%				
		■ PZR level trending 42% - 57%				
	RO	■ PCS 25°F subcooled				
		IF NO , would be on PCS being 25°F subcooled (NO CONTINGENCY) or PZR Level < 20% (CONTINGENCY: All available Charging Pumps in service and Orifice Stop Valves Closed)				
		PCS Pressure Control: NO				
	RO	Contingency – manually operates PZR heaters and spray, heaters will be off due to low PZR level, spray valves closed. When PCS pressure is < 1605 psia, verify safety injection initiated, EK-1342 in alarm and all available HPSI and LPSI pumps in service and valves open				
		Notes MO-3066 did not open, opens MO-3066 on panel C-03 (CRITICAL TASK PL-000 433 05 01)				
		If PCS pressure is < 1300 psia, stop 'A' and 'D' PCPs.				
		Core Heat Removal: YES				
	RO	at least one PCP operating				
	NO	- Verify Loop ΔT less than 10°F				
		Verify PCS at least 25°F subcooled				
		PCS Heat Removal: YES				
		 verify BOTH S/G level 5% to 70% with Feedwater available 				
	ВОР	 Verify T_{AVE} between 525°F and 540°F 				
		 Verify BOTH S/G pressures between 800 psia and 970 psia 				
		May start AFW Pump P-8A manually using start switch on panel C-01				

Event Description: 'A' Steam Generator Tube Leak/Rupture/Plant Trip Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Containment Isolation: YES • Verify containment pressure less than 0.85 psig Containment Area Monitors CLEAR: YES • Condenser Off Gas Monitor, RIA-0631, CLEAR: NO • Main Steam Line Monitor: NO Containment Atmosphere: YES RO Verify temperature less than 125°F • Verify Containment pressure less than 0.85 psig Vital Auxiliaries – Water: YES • Verify at least two Service Water Pumps operating • Verify at least one CCW Pump operating Vital Auxiliaries – Air: YES • Instrument Air header pressure greater than 42 psig • Instrument Air header pressure greater than 85 psig Verify BOTH of the following: YES BOP • At least one Condensate Pump operating • At least one Cooling Tower Pump operating PLACES left train CRHVAC in emergency mode: • STARTS V-26A Air Filter Unit Fan	Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: ONE Event No.: 5/6/7/8 Page <u>5</u> of					
RO Containment Isolation: YES • Verify containment pressure less than 0.85 psig Containment Isolation: • Containment Area Monitors CLEAR: YES • Condenser Off Gas Monitor, RIA-0631, CLEAR: NO • Main Steam Line Monitor: NO Containment Atmosphere: YES RO • Verify temperature less than 125°F • Verify Containment pressure less than 0.85 psig Vital Auxiliaries – Water: YES • Verify at least two Service Water Pumps operating • Verify BOTH Critical SW Header Pressures greater than 42 psig • Verify at least one CCW Pump operating RO Vital Auxiliaries – Air: YES • Instrument Air header pressure greater than 85 psig Verify BOTH of the following: YES BOP • At least one Condensate Pump operating • At least one Cooling Tower Pump operating PLACES left train CRHVAC in emergency mode:	Event D	escription:	'A' Steam Generator Tube Leak/Rupture/Plant Trip			
Containment Isolation: Containment Area Monitors CLEAR: YES Condenser Off Gas Monitor, RIA-0631, CLEAR: NO Main Steam Line Monitor: NO Containment Atmosphere: YES Verify temperature less than 125°F Verify Containment pressure less than 0.85 psig Vital Auxiliaries – Water: YES Verify at least two Service Water Pumps operating Verify at least one CCW Pump operating Verify at least one CCW Pump operating Vital Auxiliaries – Air: YES Instrument Air header pressure greater than 85 psig Verify BOTH of the following: YES At least one Condensate Pump operating At least one Cooling Tower Pump operating PLACES left train CRHVAC in emergency mode:	Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior			
Containment Area Monitors CLEAR: YES Condenser Off Gas Monitor, RIA-0631, CLEAR: NO Main Steam Line Monitor: NO Containment Atmosphere: YES RO Verify temperature less than 125°F Verify Containment pressure less than 0.85 psig Vital Auxiliaries – Water: YES Verify at least two Service Water Pumps operating Verify BOTH Critical SW Header Pressures greater than 42 psig Verify at least one CCW Pump operating Vital Auxiliaries – Air: YES Instrument Air header pressure greater than 85 psig Verify BOTH of the following: YES At least one Condensate Pump operating At least one Cooling Tower Pump operating PLACES left train CRHVAC in emergency mode:		RO				
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Condenser Off Gas Monitor, RIA-0631, CLEAR: NO Main Steam Line Monitor: NO Containment Atmosphere: YES Verify temperature less than 125°F Verify Containment pressure less than 0.85 psig Vital Auxiliaries – Water: YES Verify at least two Service Water Pumps operating Verify BOTH Critical SW Header Pressures greater than 42 psig Verify at least one CCW Pump operating Vital Auxiliaries – Air: YES Instrument Air header pressure greater than 85 psig Verify BOTH of the following: YES At least one Condensate Pump operating At least one Cooling Tower Pump operating PLACES left train CRHVAC in emergency mode:						
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Containment Atmosphere: YES • Verify temperature less than 125°F • Verify Containment pressure less than 0.85 psig Vital Auxiliaries – Water: YES • Verify at least two Service Water Pumps operating • Verify BOTH Critical SW Header Pressures greater than 42 psig • Verify at least one CCW Pump operating Vital Auxiliaries – Air: YES • Instrument Air header pressure greater than 85 psig Verify BOTH of the following: YES BOP • At least one Condensate Pump operating • At least one Cooling Tower Pump operating PLACES left train CRHVAC in emergency mode:						
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Vital Auxiliaries – Water: YES Verify at least two Service Water Pumps operating Verify BOTH Critical SW Header Pressures greater than 42 psig Verify at least one CCW Pump operating Vital Auxiliaries – Air: YES Instrument Air header pressure greater than 85 psig Verify BOTH of the following: YES At least one Condensate Pump operating At least one Cooling Tower Pump operating PLACES left train CRHVAC in emergency mode:			Containment Atmosphere: YES			
Vital Auxiliaries – Water: YES • Verify at least two Service Water Pumps operating • Verify BOTH Critical SW Header Pressures greater than 42 psig • Verify at least one CCW Pump operating RO Vital Auxiliaries – Air: YES • Instrument Air header pressure greater than 85 psig Verify BOTH of the following: YES • At least one Condensate Pump operating • At least one Cooling Tower Pump operating PLACES left train CRHVAC in emergency mode:		RO	Verify temperature less than 125°F			
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RO Vital Auxiliaries – Air: YES Instrument Air header pressure greater than 85 psig Verify BOTH of the following: YES BOP At least one Condensate Pump operating At least one Cooling Tower Pump operating PLACES left train CRHVAC in emergency mode:		I NO	Verify BOTH Critical SW Header Pressures greater than 42 psig			
PLACES left train CRHVAC in emergency mode:			Verify at least one CCW Pump operating			
PLACES left train CRHVAC in emergency mode:		Г	T			
Verify BOTH of the following: YES BOP • At least one Condensate Pump operating • At least one Cooling Tower Pump operating PLACES left train CRHVAC in emergency mode:		RO	Vital Auxiliaries – Air: YES			
BOP • At least one Condensate Pump operating • At least one Cooling Tower Pump operating PLACES left train CRHVAC in emergency mode:			Instrument Air header pressure greater than 85 psig			
BOP • At least one Condensate Pump operating • At least one Cooling Tower Pump operating PLACES left train CRHVAC in emergency mode:			Varify POTH of the following: VES			
At least one Cooling Tower Pump operating PLACES left train CRHVAC in emergency mode:		DOD.	1			
PLACES left train CRHVAC in emergency mode:		ВОР	· · · · ·			
			- At least one Cooling Tower Fullip operating			
			PLACES left train CRHVAC in emergency mode:			
		ВОР				
■ ENSURES OFF: V-94, Purge Fan; V-47, Switchgear Exhaust Fan						
		1	-			

Op-Test	No.: 1	Scenario No.: ONE Event No.: 5/6/7/8 Page 6 of 7			
Event De	escription:	'A' Steam Generator Tube Leak/Rupture/Plant Trip			
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior			
	ALL	Diagnose 'A' S/G as affected			
	SRO	MAY direct isolating AFW to 'A' S/G			
		When directed, isolates AFW to 'A' S/G:			
		• SELECTS 'MANUAL' on FIC-0737A			
	BOP	• SELECTS 'MANUAL' on FIC-0749			
		 Raises output to 100% on each controller ('RED' signal indicator to the full right position) 			
		Performs EOP-1.0, attachment 1, Event Diagnostic Flow Chart			
	SRO	Diagnoses a SGTR and enters EOP-5.0, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Recovery			
	SRO	Directs PCS cooldown to below 524°F on Loop Thots			
		Commences a cooldown of the PCS:			
		Selects manual on PIC-0511			
	RO	Adjusts signal on controller to achieve desired TBV position			
		Monitors S/G pressures and cooldown rate			
		Controls 'B' S/G level 60 - 70 %			
		I e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e			
	ВОР	Perform SIS checklist, EOP Supplement 5 (SAT)			
,					
	SRO/RO	Establish PCS temperature and pressure control bands			
	BOP/RO	Closes Letdown orifice isolation valves on Panel C-02:			
	DOF/RO	Places control switches for CV-2003, CV-2004, CV-2005, to CLOSE			

Op-Tes	t No.: 1	Scenario No.: ONE Event No.: 5/6/7/8 Page 7 of 7			
Event D	escription:	'A' Steam Generator Tube Leak/Rupture/Plant Trip			
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior			
		Places right train CRHVAC in emergency:			
	ВОР	Starts CRHVAC Emergency Fan V-26B Ensures Purge Fan, V-94, & Switchgear Exhaust Fan, V-47 secured			
	SRO	Direct chemistry to sample S/G for lithium and activity			
	SRO	Direct EOP supplement 4, HPSI flow verification, completed			
	SRO	When lowest hot leg temperature is < 524 °F, orders 'A' S/G isolated per EOP Supplement 13			
		Performs EOP Supplement 13 to isolate 'A' S/G inside control room (CRITICAL TASK PL-000 209 05 01):			
		If removing heat using the TBV, ensures MO-0501, 'B' S/G MSIV Bypass valve is open			
		Closes MSIVs and 'A' S/G MSIV Bypass valve on panel C-01			
		Closes 'A' FRV, CV-0701, on panel C-01			
	BOP	Closes 'A' FRV Block valve, CV-0742, on panel C-01			
		Closes CV-0749, CV-0737, CV-0737A, AFW to 'A' S/G (if not performed earlier), on panel C-01			
		Closes 'A' S/G Blowdown Valves CV-0767, CV-0771, CV-0739, on panel C-13			
		Directs AO to perform EOP Supplement 13 to isolate 'A' S/G from outside control room			
SIM OP:	Use MS20/N	IS21 and SG09/SG11 on PIDMS01 to isolate 'A' S/G			
SRO: Er	nergency Cla	ssification Level: FA1 Alert			
Termina	te Scenario v	when S/G is isolated or at examiner discretion			

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

Facility: Palisades		Scenario No.: TWO		Op-Test No.: 1
Examiners:			Operators:	
-				

Initial Conditions: 60% power. P-7C, Service Water Pump, is out of service.

Turnover: Shift orders are to alternate running Component Cooling Water pumps and then continue power ascension at 6% per hour.

Event No.	Malf. No.	Event Type*	Event Description	
1	N/A	SRO (N) RO (N)	Alternate operating CCW pumps	
2	N/A	SRO (N) RO (R) BOP (N)	Power ascension	
3	RX08B	SRO (I) RO (I)	PZR Level Control Channel failed low	
4	SI04D	SRO (C, T)	T-82D, Safety Injection Tank loss of pressure (leak)	
5	RM08G	SRO (I, T) RO(I)	West ESS Room Ventilation Radiation Monitor Failure	
6	MS06B	SRO (C) RO (C)	Main Steam Relief Valve RV-0706 leak	
7	FW03	BOP (C)	Failure of AFW Pumps to start in AUTO	
8	RC04	ALL (M)	Primary Coolant System leak	
9	RD16	SRO (C) RO (C)	Two stuck control rods	
* (N)orma			nent, (C)omponent, (M)ajor (T)ech Spec	

Scenario TWO - Simulator Operator Instructions

- Reset to IC-15 (or similar) 60% power MOL IC.
- SW Pump P-7C is OOS with a Caution Tag hung on the handswitch.
 - Use SW16 on PIDSW03 to rackout P-7C breaker
 - o Ensure EOOS indicates P-7C is out of service
- ENSURE CCW Pump P-52C is in service, with P-52A and P-52B in STANDBY.
- INSERT MF, FW03A (PIDFW01) P-8A Fail to AUTO start
- INSERT MF, FW03B (PIDFW01) P-8B Fail to AUTO start
- INSERT MF, FW03C (PIDFW01) P-8C Fail to AUTO start
- INSERT RD16 for two stuck control rods (31, 35)
- Create Event Trigger 5: Event: Reg Group 1 Rod 21 less than 110"

Event #	Remote or Trigger #	Instructions		
1		No actions required.		
2		No actions required.		
3	REMOTE 1	RX08B (PID RX01), PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL CHANNEL DOWNSCALE DEMAND.		
4	REMOTE 2	SI04D (PIDSI04) T-82D, Safety Injection Tank loss of pressure		
5	REMOTE 3	RM08G (PID RM04) Low Rad West Eng SFGD Vent Monitor RIA-1811		
6	REMOTE 4	MS06A (PIDMS01) RV-0706, Main Steam Line Relief Valve Leak, Severity = 100		
7		ACTIVE AT SETUP – No actions required		
8	TRIGGER 5	RC04 (PIDRC01) Primary Coolant Leak, Severity = 75, Ramp = 15 minutes		
9		ACTIVE AT SETUP – No actions required		

Special instructions:

- (EVENT #1) For alternating CCW pps. if asked:
 - o Initial CCW Hx dP is E-54A = 6.6 psid, E-54B = 6.8 psid.
 - After starting P-52A, dPs are: E-54A = 14.1 psid, E-54B = 14.2 psid.
 - When P-52C has been secured, dPs are E-54A = 6.8 psid, E-54B = 6.5 psid.

Scenario TWO - Turnover Information

The plant is at 60% power, MOL. A power ascension was in progress when an engineering hold was implemented to monitor the performance of both Main Feedwater Pumps. The engineering hold is no longer required and both Main Feedwater Pumps have been deemed acceptable for 100% power operation. P-7C, Service Water Pump, is out of service for a bearing inspection. It is expected to be 6 hours before bearing inspection is completed.

Shift orders are to alternate running CCW pumps by placing P-52A in service, and P-52C in STANDBY, per SOP-16, section 7.3.6. Once this is complete, the power ascension is to resume at 6% per hour. At 86% power, the rate of power ascension will be adjusted to 4% per hour.

Op-Test No.: 1		Scenario No.: TWO Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 1				
Event D	escription:	Alternate CCW Pumps				
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior				
	SRO	Enters SOR 16 postion 7.3.6				
	RO	Enters SOP-16, section 7.3.6.				
	RO	Ensures locked open all available CCW pp. suction/discharge valves.				
	RO	Coordinates with AO to open vent for P-52A.				
		Varifica hakk COM Hast Fushan nana in an antian				
	RO	Verifies both CCW Heat Exchangers in operation.				
	RO	Starts P-52A.				
	RO Stops P-52C.					
		Places P-52C in standby:				
	RO	Depress amber STANDBY button above handswitch.				
	Verify amber light is LIT.					
		May request final reading on CCW Heat Evolungers differential pressure, but				
	RO	May request final reading on CCW Heat Exchangers differential pressure, but not required.				

Op-Test No.: 1		Scenario No.: TWO Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 1		
Event D	Description:	Power Ascension		
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
	SRO	Enters/continues and directs the actions of GOP-5.		
	•			
		Operates turbine generator on the DEH panel for power escalation @ 6% per hour:		
		ENTERS setter value		
	BOP	SELECTS rate of 6% per hour		
		PUSHES "GO " pushbutton and observes white light illuminate		
		Informs CRS/RO that turbine is in "GO"		
	•	-		
		Performs periodic dilutions and/or control rod manipulations to maintain T_{AVE} within 3°F of T_{REF}		
		For Dilution:		
		 RESET PMW Controller if not already RESET 		
		 SET quantity and batch flow limit on FIC-0210A, PMW flow controller 		
		OPEN CV-2155, Make Up Stop Valve		
	RO	PUSH start pushbutton on FIC-0210A		
		 VERIFIES FIC-0210A output signal at zero when dilution complete 		
		• CLOSES CV-2155		
		MONITORS reactor power and T _{AVE}		
		For Control Rod manipulations:		
		WITHDRAWS Group 4 Regulating Rods in increments specified by CRS		
		MONITORS reactor power and T _{AVE}		
	1			
	ВОР	Operates turbine generator on the DEH panel for power escalation @ 6% per hour:		
	1	•		
		May divert CVCS letdown to Clean Waste as VCT level rises:		
	RO	 PLACES CV-2056, Letdown to VCT or Radwaste, in the "TO CLEAN WASTE RCVR TANKS" position 		
		 When desired VCT level is achieved, PLACES CV-2056 to the "AUTO" or "TO VOL CNTRL TANK" position (then "AUTO") 		
Aftern	ower has he	en raised 1%-2% <i>OR</i> at the discretion of the Lead Examiner.		

After power has been raised 1%-2% $\underline{\textit{OR}}$ at the discretion of the Lead Examiner, INSERT REMOTE #1

Req	uired	O	perator	Actions
	J J.	_		

Op-Test No.: 1	Scenario No.: TWO Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 1		
Event Description	n: PZR LEVEL CONTROL CHANNEL DOWNSCALE DEMAND		
Time Position	n Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
SRC RO	 Diagnoses a failure of the 'B' PZR level control channel: EK-0761, Pressurizer Level HI-LO - alarm due to LIC-0101B failed low EK-0703, Letdown HT EX Tube Outlet HI Temp - alarm due to closure of Letdown Orifice Stop Valves Observes all three Letdown Orifice Stop Valves open. P-55A variable speed pp lowers to minimum speed. LIC-0101B process output at 0% and setpoint failed low. 		
SRC	Directs RO to shifts PZR level control to 'A' Channel per SOP-1A		
RO	Shifts PZR level control to 'A' Channel per SOP-1A section 7.2.1.f: • Adjust output signal of 'A' channel to 0% • Place selector switch 1/LRC-0101 to CHANNEL 'A' • Place Pressurizer Heater Control Channel Selector Switch to CHANNEL 'A' • Place 'A' Channel Pzr Level Controller to CASCADE: • Adjust raise/lower pushbutton to match blue pointer to red pointer • Depress 'A' pushbutton • Adjust raise/lower pushbutton to adjust blue pointer to approximately 51% level • Depress 'C' pushbutton		

After PZR level control is reestablished $\underline{\textit{OR}}$ at the discretion of the Lead Examiner, INSERT REMOTE #2

Op-Tes	t No.: 1	Scenario No.: TWO Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 1					
Event D	escription:	T-82D, Safety Injection Tank loss of pressure					
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior					
	Diagnose failure of T-82D:						
		Indications: T-82D nitrogen pressure lowering					
	RO	Major alarms:					
		■ EK-1334, Safety Inj Tank HI-LO Pressure					
		■ EK-1336, Safety Inj Tank LO pressure					
		Operator actions for EK-1134:					
		CHECK tank level normal					
		CHECK CLOSED CV-3051, T-82D Vent Valve					
	RO	 MAY adjust tank pressure per SOP-3 to clear alarm (Follow Up Action) 					
		Open CV-1358, Nitrogen to Containment					
		Open CV-3050, T-82D Nitrogen Valve					
		Close CV-3050 when T-82D is at desired pressure					
		Operator actions for EK-1136:					
		CHECK tank level normal					
		CHECK CLOSED CV-3051, T-82D Vent Valve					
	RO	CHECK tank pressure on PPC					
	110	 MAY adjust tank pressure per SOP-3 to clear alarm (Follow Up Action) 					
		Open CV-1358, Nitrogen to Containment					
		Open CV-3050, T-82D Nitrogen Valve					
		Close CV-3050 when T-82D is at desired pressure					
SIMULA pressur		TOR: Delete malfunction SI04D as soon as crew begins to raise T-82D					
		Declares Tank inoperable while the pressure switch is actuated					
	SRO	The following T.S. LCO applies:					
		■ 3.5.1, Action: B.1, enter due to loss pressure in SIT					
	RS has briefed REMOTE #3	d loss of pressure in T-82D <u>OR</u> at the discretion of the Lead Examiner,					

Page 7 of 15

Op-Tes	t No.: 1	Scenario No.: TWO Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 1			
Event D	escription:	West ESS Room Ventilation Radiation Monitor Failure			
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior			
	RO	Informs the SRO of alarm: EK-1371, Rad Monitor Sys Ckt Failure			
	RO	Checks ARP-7 and SOP-38 Attachment 1 section 3 for actions: Coordinates with BOP on status of RIA-1811			
	ВОР	Checks RIA-1811 on Panel C-11 and notes failure low condition: reports to SRO that RIA-1811 is failed.			
	SRO	Enters LCO 3.3.10.A.1 and directs RO to close West ESS Room Damper.			
	RO	Closes West ESS Room Damper PO-1811 and directs AO to check status of remote damper PO-1812.			
	Simulator Operator: If asked as AO to check status of remote ventilation damper PO-1812, report that it is closed				
	After CRS has briefed on West ESS Room ventilation rad monitor <u>OR</u> at the discretion of the Lead Examiner, <u>INSERT REMOTE #4</u>				

Op-Tes	t No.: 1	Scenario No.: TWO Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 1				
Event Description:		'A' S/G RV-0706 stuck open				
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior				
	ВОР	Informs the SRO that indications of excessive load exist: Reactor power rising Tave lowering				
	SRO	 Enters ONP-9, "Excessive Load" Determines that unisolable load rise exceeds 1% change in NI or Delta-T Power (may wait for HB Power Steady to also be above 1%) Directs a reactor trip. 				
	DO	Tring to a standard har decreasing the standard him to take the standard Decreasing to the standard har at Decreasing the standard him to take the standard har at Decreasing the standard him to take the standard him to ta				
	RO Trips reactor by depressing reactor trip pushbutton at Panel C-02					
	SRO/BOP	May direct AO to check for source of steam release.				
minutes	•	f contacted by Control Room as AO to check on steam leak, wait a few back: there is a Steam Generator relief valve open that is blowing steam in				

Op-Test No.: 1		Scenario No.: TWO Event No.: 6/7/8/9 Page <u>1</u> of <u>6</u>			
Event Description:		'A' S/G RV-0706 stuck open, PCS LOCA (750 gpm), Failure of AFW Pumps to start in AUTO, Two stuck Control Rods			
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior			
	DOD	Informs SRO that S/G pressures < 800 psia, CONTINGENCY ACTION:			
	ВОР	MSIVs, CV-0510 and CV- 0501, CLOSED by taking one HS to CLOSE			
	ВОР	Informs SRO that AFW did not initiate, CONTINGENCY ACTION:			
	БОІ	P-8A or C STARTED OR CV-0522B, Steam Supply to P-8B OPENED			
	RO	Informs SRO that PCS pressure < 1300 psia, CONTINGENCY ACTION:			
	- 1.0	STOP an operating PCP in each loop, P-50A and P-50D			
	SRO EOP-1.0 verbal verifications				
		Reactivity Control:			
		Determines Reactivity Control acceptance criteria are NOT MET due to TWO stuck rods. Commences emergency boration. (CRITICAL TASK PL-000 024 05 01) to ensure reactivity control is met. (Event 9)			
		STARTS at least one Boric Acid Pump, P-56A AND/OR P-56B			
		OPENS MO-2140, Boric Acid Pump Feed Isolation			
		VERIFIES Charging Flow greater than 33 gpm			
	RO	AND/OR			
		 OPENS Boric Acid Tank Gravity Feed Isolation Valves: MO-2169 and MO-2170 			
		CLOSE CV-2155, Boric Acid Blender Outlet Control Valve			
		CLOSE MO-2087, VCT Outlet Isolation Valve			
		ENSURE CLOSED MO-2160, SIRW Tank to Charging Pumps Isolation			
		VERIFIES Charging Flow greater than 33 gpm			

Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: TWO Event No.: 6/7/8/9 Page **2** of **6 Event Description:** A' S/G RV-0706 stuck open, PCS LOCA (750 gpm), Failure of AFW Pumps to start in AUTO, Two stuck Control Rods Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Main Turbine Generator criteria verified **BOP** Main Turbine tripped Generator disconnected from grid Feedwater criteria performed: **BOP** PLACES Main FWP Controllers to 'MANUAL' RAMPS to minimum speed PLACES Main FW Controllers to 'MANUAL,' Main FRV and B/Ps CLOSED Vital Auxiliaries-Electric verified: Buses 1C and 1D energized - Bus 1E energized **BOP** Buses 1A and 1B energized Y-01 energized Six DC Buses energized 3 of 4 Preferred AC Buses energized PSC Inventory Control: ■ PZR level 20% - 85% **NO**: verifies max Charging and min Letdown RO ■ PZR level trending 42% - 57% **NO**: verifies max Charging and min Letdown PCS 25°F subcooled PCS Pressure Control: PZR pressure 1650 – 2185 psia and trending toward 2010 – 2100 psia **NO**: verifies PZR spray valves closed and maximum heaters At 1605 psia, verifies Safety Inj Initiated alarm EK-1342 and ensures all RO available HPSI and LPSI pumps operating with the associated loop isolation valves open At 1300 psia, stop PCPs as needed to establish one PCP operating in each loop

Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: TWO Event No.: 6/7/8/9 Page 3 of 6

Event Description: 'A' S/G RV-0706 stuck open, PCS LOCA (750 gpm), Failure of AFW
Pumps to start in AUTO. Two stuck Control Rods

Time Position		Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
		PCS Heat Removal		
	ВОР	 At least one S/G has; level 5% - 70% with Feedwater available NO: CONTINGENCY taken: Start an AFW Pump (CRITICAL TASK PL-061 102 01 01) to ensure PCS Heat Removal is met: (Event 7) 		
		 Places P-8A or P-8C Handswitch to START and verifies flow to S/Gs is 165 gpm on FIC-0727/0749 or FIC-0736A/0737A (may elect to isolate AFW flow to 'A' S/G. 		
		• Places P-8B Handswitch to OPEN and verifies flow to S/Gs is 165 gpm on FIC-0727/0749(may elect to isolate AFW flow to 'A' S/G.		
		■ T _{AVE} 525°F - 540°F NO : verifies Turbine Bypass Valve and ADVs are closed		
		 Verify BOTH S/G pressures 800 psia – 970 psia NO: CONTINGENCY: CLOSE MSIVs, CV-0510 and CV-0501 if S/G pressures < 800 psia, by taking one of these HSs to CLOSE 		
		Containment Isolation: YES		
RO		 Containment pressure < 0.85 psig (may be NO, depends on timing of verification: no contingencies until 4 psig) 		
		Containment Isolation: YES		
	BOP	Containment Area Monitor alarms clear		
	ВОР	Condenser Off Gas Monitor alarm clear		
		Main Steam Line Monitor alarms clear		
		Containment Atmosphere: YES		
	RO	Containment Atmosphere: YES • Containment temperature < 125°F		

Op-Tes	t No.: 1	Scenario No.: TWO Event No.: 6/7/8/9 Page 4 of 6				
Event Description:		'A' S/G RV-0706 stuck open, PCS LOCA (750 gpm), Failure of AFW Pumps to start in AUTO, Two stuck Control Rods				
Time	Time Time Time					
		Vital Auxiliaries – Water: YES				
	RO	 At least two SW Pumps operating BOTH Critical SW Headers in operation with pressure > 42 psig At least one CCW Pump operating 				
	Vital Auxiliaries – Air: YES					
	RO	Instrument Air Pressure > 85 psig				
		PLACES left train CRHVAC in emergency mode:				
	ВОР	STARTS V-26A Air Filter Unit Fan				
		ENSURES OFF: V-94, Purge Fan; V-47, Switchgear Exhaust Fan				
	Verify BOTH of the following: YES BOP At least one Condensate Pump operating					
	At least one Cooling Tower Pump operating					
SRO MAY direct isolating AFW to 'A' S/G						
		When directed, isolates AFW to 'A' S/G:				
	BOP	 SELECTS 'MANUAL' on FIC-0749, P-8A/B flow to S/G 'A' SELECTS 'MANUAL' on FIC-0737A, P-8C flow to S/G 'A' 				
		Raises flow output to 100% on each controller ('RED' signal indicator to the				
	full right position)					
	RO/BOP	May TRIP both MFW Pumps				
	ı					

Appendix D Required Operator Actions

Form ES-D-2

Op-Tes	t No.: 1	Scenario No.: TWO Event No.: 6/7/8/9 Page 5 of 6					
Event Description:		A' S/G RV-0706 stuck open, PCS LOCA (750 gpm), Failure of AFW Pumps to start in AUTO, Two stuck Control Rods					
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior					
	Performs Event Diagnostic Flow Chart per EOP-1.0, Attachment 1						
	SDO.	■ Diagnoses EOP-9.0, Functional Recovery Procedure, LOCA and ESDE					
	SRO	Performs EOP-9.0 strategy brief					
		Establishes PCS pressure and temperature bands with RO					
	SRO	Directs closing CV-1064 and CV-1065, CWRT vent valves					
	ВОР	CLOSES CV-1064 and CV-1065					
	SRO	Directs performance of EOP Supplement 5, Checklist for Safeguards Equipment Following SIAS					
	BOP Completes EOP Supplement 5						
	SRO Directs placing a Hydrogen Monitor in service						
		Places left train H ₂ monitor in service on back of Panel C-11A:					
		■ PLACES HS-2417 to OPEN and RELEASES					
	BOP	■ PLACES HS-2413A, HS-2413B, HS-2415A, and HS-2415B, to OPEN					
	DOF	 Energizes H₂ Recorder, AR-2401, by: PLACING to 'ON' Power Switch and PLACES to 'ON Chart Drive Switch 					
		PLACES HS-2427L to "ANALYZE" position					

Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: TWO Event No.: 6/7/8/9 Page <u>6</u> of <u>6</u> **Event Description:** A' S/G RV-0706 stuck open, PCS LOCA (750 gpm), Failure of AFW Pumps to start in AUTO, Two stuck Control Rods Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior MAY secure last two running PCPs **IF** subcooling <25°F **(CRITICAL TASK**) RO PL-000 007 05 01) Determines success paths for each safety function: • Reactivity: RC-3 Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries-Electric: DC-1, AC-1 PCS Inventory: IC-2 PCS Pressure: PC-3 **SRO** ■ PCS/Core Heat Removal: HR-2 Containment Isolation: CI-1 Containment Atmosphere: CA-2 (Containment pressure > 0.85 psig) Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries-Air: MVAW-1, MVAA-1 Determines PCS/Core Heat Removal is jeopardized S/G Safety Relief Valve open Directs isolating 'A' S/G per EOP Supplement 17, 'A' S/G ESDE Isolation SRO Checklist Isolates 'A' S/G per Supplement 17: (CRITICAL TASK PL-000 209 05 01) BOP CLOSE CV-0742, 'A' S/G Main Feed Reg Block Valve CLOSE S/G E-50A Blowdown Valves: CV-0767, CV-0771, and CV-0739 SRO: Emergency Classification Level: May initially declare Unusual Event, SU5.1, for PCS Leakage but will finally declare Alert, FA1, Loss of PCS Barrier (PCS Leak Rate)

TERMINATE Scenario when 'A' S/G has been isolated per EOP Supplement 17 <u>OR</u> at the discretion of the Lead Examiner.

Appendix D	Scenario Outline	Form ES-D-1

Facility: Palisa	des Scenario No.	: THREE	Op-Test No.: 1
Examiners:			
_			

Initial Conditions: 25% power.

Turnover:

The plant is at approximately 25% power MOL following a startup from a forced outage. P-8A, AFW Pump, is OOS for seal replacement and is currently 12 hours into the 72 hour LCO action statement. The Turbine Drain Valves are closed per SOP-8. A Chemistry hold has just been lifted with S/G chemistry within specifications. GCL-5.1, Power Escalation in Mode 1, has been completed through Step 2.12f. Shift orders are to place DEH Speed Loop to OUT and commence a power escalation to full power at 8%/hour.

Event No.	Malf. No.	Event Type*	Event Description	
1	N/A	BOP (N)	Place DEH Speed Loop to OUT	
2	N/A	SRO (N) BOP (N) RO (R)	Power escalation	
3	MS11	SRO (C) BOP (C)	Turbine Bypass Valve fails open. Requires manual action to terminate steam demand	
4	CV06	SRO (I, T) RO (I)	Loss of CVCS Letdown Backpressure Controller	
5	Override	SRO (C, T)	Diesel Generator Low Lube Oil temperature	
6	MS03A	SRO (C) RO (C)	'A' S/G Main Steam Line Leak Inside Containment (small leak requiring a manual plant trip)	
7	MS03A	ALL (M)	ESDE inside containment (ramped in at time of trip)	
8	ED13A ED13B CH05A CH05B	RO (I)	Right and Left Channel SI Initiate Signals fail Right and Left Channel CHP Signals fail	
* (N)orma	al, (R)eact	ivity, (I)nstrum	nent, (C)omponent, (M)ajor (T)ech Spec	

Scenario THREE - Simulator Operator Instructions

- Reset to IC-14
- Place DEH Loop to IN.
- Setup for TBV fail open:
 - Place PIC-0511 to Manual (press M)
 - o Insert OVRD PIC-0511-M light to OFF
 - Insert OVRD PIC-0511-A light to ON
- Remove P-8A AFW Pump from service:
 - o INSERT FW16A (PIDFW01)
 - o Override DI P-8A-G (PAL04B2) P-8A AFW Pump Green Light to OFF'
 - o Override DI P-8A-W (PAL04B2) P-8A AFW Pump White Light to OFF
 - o Place Caution Tag on handswitch for P-8A stating pump is tagged out
 - o Ensure EOOS indicates that P-8A is out of service
- INSERT ED13A and ED13B (PIDSI01)
- INSERT CH05A and CH05B (PIDCH01)
- Create triggers to delete TBV malfunction when 'manual' PB is depressed on PIC-0511:

Event Trigger 6: Event: zdi3p(717) Action dor pic-0511-MNC-2 Event Trigger 7: Event: zdi3p(717) Action dor pic-0511-m Event Trigger 8: Event: zdi3p(717) Action: dor pic-0511-a

Event #	Remote or Trigger #	Instructions		
1		No actions required.		
2		No actions required.		
	REMOTE 1	PIC-0511-MNC-2 (PAL04B3) to ON		
3		[TRIGGERS 6, 7, and 8 allow operator to control CV-0511]		
4	REMOTE 2	CV06 (PIDCV03) Loss of Letdown Pressure Control Low		
5	REMOTE 3	ANN-K-05-57(PALARM7C), Diesel Generator 1-2 Trouble to ON		
6	REMOTE 4	MS03A (PIDMS01) 'A' S/G Main Steam Line Break Inside Containment; Severity value = 2%, 5 minute ramp		
7	TRIGGER 5	Event: Reg Group 1 Rod 21 less than 110"		
1	I KIGGEK 5	Action: IMF_MS03A_5 [raises MS03A to 5% severity]		
8		ACTIVE AT SETUP – No actions required.		

Special instructions:

- Provide a marked up copy of GCL 5.1 completed through step 2.12f.
- Provide Reactivity Sheets for Core Life.

Scenario THREE - Turnover Information

The plant is at approximately 25% power MOL following a startup from a forced outage. The Turbine Drain Valves are closed per SOP-8. P-8A, AFW Pump, is OOS for seal replacement and is currently 12 hours into the 72 hour LCO action statement. A Chemistry hold has just been lifted with S/G chemistry within specifications. GCL-5.1, Power Escalation in Mode 1, has been completed through Step 2.12f. Shift orders are to place DEH Speed Loop to 'OUT' and commence a power escalation to full power at 8%/hour.

Op-Test No.: 1		Scenario No.: THREE		Page <u>1</u> of <u>1</u>		
Event L	escription:	Place DEH Speed Loop	to Out			
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior				
		Change status of Speed Fee	dback Loop:			
		ENSURE DEH is in 'HOLD'	,			
		■ PRESS Feedback Loops of	n Display keypad			
	ВОР	MOVE cursor to 'SPEED' fe	eedback loop field			
		■ PRESS 'SELECT' on nume	eric keypad			
		■ PRESS 'STOP' on Control	Keypad			
	Speed Feedback Loop on DEH should indicate 'OUT'					

Op-Tes	t No.: 1	Scenario No.: THREE Event No.: 2 Page <u>1</u> of <u>1</u>
Event Description:		Power Ascension
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior		Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	SRO	Enters/continues and directs the actions of GOP-5.
		Operates turbine generator on the DEH panel for power escalation @ 8% per hour:
		ENTERS setter value
	BOP	SELECTS rate of 8% per hour
		PUSHES "GO " pushbutton and observes white light illuminate
		Informs CRS/RO that turbine is in "GO"
		Performs periodic dilutions and/or control rod manipulations to maintain T_{AVE} within 3°F of T_{REF}
		For Dilution:
		 RESET PMW Controller if not already RESET
	RO	 SET quantity and batch flow limit on FIC-0210A, PMW flow controller
		■ OPEN CV-2155, Make Up Stop Valve
		 PUSH start pushbutton on FIC-0210A
		 VERIFIES FIC-0210A output signal at zero when dilution complete
		- CLOSES CV-2155
		 MONITORS reactor power and T_{AVE}
		For Control Rod manipulations:
		 WITHDRAWS Group 4 Regulating Rods in increments specified by CRS
		MONITORS reactor power and T _{AVE}
	RO	May divert CVCS letdown to Clean Waste as VCT level rises:
		 PLACES CV-2056, Letdown to VCT or Radwaste, in the "TO CLEAN WASTE RCVR TANKS" position
		 When desired VCT level is achieved, PLACES CV-2056 to the "AUTO" or "TO VOL CNTRL TANK" position (then "AUTO")

After power has been raised 1%-2% <u>OR</u> at the discretion of the Lead Examiner, <u>INSERT REMOTE #1</u>

Required Operator

Op-Test No.: 1		Scenario No.: THREE Event No.: 3 Page <u>1</u> of <u>1</u>		
Event Description:		Turbine Bypass Valve Fails Open		
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
	SRO BOP RO	Diagnoses Turbine Bypass Valve has failed open: Notes T _{AVE} lowering Power rising Steam flow rising May observe GREEN/RED status light change on C-01 for TBV		
	NO .	position. Possible alarms including: Nuclear Power / delta T, EK-0603, 4, 7, 8, Rack D (if TBV is open long enough)		
	SRO	Enters and directs the actions of ONP-9.0, "Excessive Load Increase"		
	ВОР	Manually closes the TBV: Place controller PIC-0511 to Manual Lowers output signal to zero		
	SRO BOP	Reduce turbine load to restore reactor power to pre-event power level or less. (Not required if TBV is manually closed.)		
	ALL	May go to HOLD on turbine, based on crew judgment		
	SRO	Initiate troubleshooting/repair		
At the d	At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, INSERT REMOTE #2			

Op-Test No.: 1		Scenario No.: THREE Event No.: 4 Page <u>1</u> of <u>1</u>
Event Description:		Loss of CVCS Letdown Back Pressure Controller
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
		Diagnoses failure of PIC-0202, Intermediate Pressure Letdown Controller:
	RO	Indications: PIC-0202 red alarm light illuminated; Pressure rising on PIC-0202 (red pen); PIC-0202 output signal 'Full Closed"; TIA-0202, Intermediate Pressure Letdown RV Discharge Temperature rising; FIC-0202, Letdown Flow reads 0.
		Major alarms: EK-0704, Letdown HT EX Tube Inlet HI-LO Press; EK-0702, Relief Valve 2006 Discharge HI Temp
	DO	Operator Actions from EK-0704 and EK-0702:
	RO	MANUALLY CONTROL PIC-0202 at approximately 460 psig
	SRO	Directs MANUAL CONTROL of PIC-0202 with control, approximately 460 psig
		MANUAL CONTROL of PIC-0202:
	50	■ Depresses 'MANUAL' pushbutton on PIC-0202
	RO	USES Slide Bar to slowly move controller signal the 'OPEN' (to the right)
		PIC-0202 CONTROLLED approximately 460 psig
	CDO	The following T.S. LCO applies:
	SRO	3.4.13, Action: A.1, PCS leakage, 4 hours
	SRO	SRO: Emergency Classification Level: Unusual Event, SU5.1, Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage GREATER THAN 10 gpm

After the SRO has briefed the loss of the Letdown Backpressure Controller OR at the discretion of the Lead Examiner, INSERT TRIGGER #3

Op-Tes	t No.: 1	Scenario No.: THREE	Event No.:5	Page <u>1</u> of <u>1</u>
Event D	escription:	Diesel Generator Lube O	il Temperature Low	
Time	Position	Applica	ant's Actions or Beha	vior
	ВОР	Respond to D/G 1-2 Trouble	alarm per ARP-3, windo	ow 57:
		 Contacts Auxiliary Operator 	to investigate	
Lube Oi report t	I Temperature	As AO, report back that D/G e" in alarm and that TI-1488 (I ump is not running and local on.	K-6B Lube Oil Temp Ir	nd) reads 89°F. If asked,
Simulat	or Operator: (Clear Override on alarm ANN	-K-05-57 after AO repo	ort is made.
	SRO	Determines that D/G 1-2 is of LCO 3.8.1.B.	perable based on lube o	oil temperature and enters
	SRO	Directs BOP to perform offsite	e source check per LCC	3.8.1.B.1 within 1 hour.
	ВОР	Performs offsite source check	c per SR 3.8.1.1	
At the	discretion of	the Lead Examiner, INSER	RT REMOTE #4	

Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: THREE Event No.: 6 Page <u>1</u> of <u>1</u> Event Description: ESDE Inside Containment requiring a Plant trip				
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
		Diagnose ESDE Inside Containment:		
		Indications: T _{AVE} lowering; 'A' Charging Pump speed rising; Containment Pressure rising		
	SRO/RO/BOP	Major alarms:		
	SINO/NO/BOI	EK-1148, Fire System Panel C-47, C-47A/B or C-49 Off Normal; EK-1344, Containment Air Cooler VHX-2 Dry Pan HI Level; EK-1346, Containment Air Cooler VHX-4 Dry Pan HI Level; EK-1362, Containment Pressure Off Normal		
	RO/BOP	No Operator actions apply to EK-1148, EK-1344, EK-1346, and EK-1362, for ESDE		
	SRO	Enters ONP-9, Excessive Load		
	ONO	Directs Plant trip		
	RO	DEPRESSES CO-2 Panel Reactor Trip Pushbutton		

Op-Test No.: 1		Scenario No.: THREE Event No.: 7/8 Page <u>1</u> of <u>7</u>
Event Description:		EOP-1.0 actions/EOP-6.0 (larger ESDE)/SIAS/CHP Auto Failure
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
		Informs SRO that Left and Right Channel SI Initiate pushbuttons PUSHED OR STARTED Left and Right Train HPSI and LPSI Pumps and OPENED all Loop Injection Valves, CONTINGENCY ACTION:
	RO	Containment pressure > 0.85 psig
		 ENSURE ALL available HPSI and LPSI Pumps operating with associated Loop Isolation Valves open (CRITICAL TASK PL-000 433 05 01)
		Informs SRO that CV-3001 and CV-3002 OPENED and P-54B and P-54C and P-54A STARTED: CONTINGENCY ACTION:
	RO	 Containment pressure ≥ 4.0 psig ENSURE OPEN ALL available Containment Spray Vales ENSURE ALL available Containment Spray Pumps are operating (CRITICAL TASK PL-000 433 05 01)
	SRO	EOP-1.0 verbal verifications
		Reactivity Control: YES
	RO	Reactor power lowering
	KO	• negative SUR
		maximum of one control rod not inserted
		Main Turbine Generator criteria: YES
	BOP	Main Turbine tripped
		Generator disconnected from grid
		Feedwater criteria: YES :
	ВОР	 PLACES MFP Controller to 'MANUAL' and RAMPS to minimum speed: YES/NO: (A NO answer may be given due to MSIVs being closed (no steam to MFPs))
		Main FRV and B/Ps CLOSED

Op-Test No.: 1		Scenario No.: THREE Event No.: 7/8 Page 2 of 7
Event Description:		EOP-1.0 actions/EOP-6.0 (larger ESDE)/SIAS/CHP Auto Failure
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
		Vital Auxiliaries-Electric:
		Buses 1C and 1D energized: YES
		Bus 1E energized: NO (if SIS present)
	ВОР	Bus 1A and 1B energized: YES
		Y-01 energized: YES
		Six DC Buses energized: YES
		• 3 of 4 Preferred AC Buses energized: YES
		PCS Inventory Control:
	D0	■ PZR level 20% - 85% YES OR NO (Depends on timing)
	RO	■ PZR level trending 42% - 57% NO
		■ PCS 25°F subcooled YES
		PCS Pressure Control:
	RO	 PZR pressure 1650 – 2185 psia YES OR NO (Depends on timing)
		■ PZR pressure trending toward 2010 – 2100 psia NO
		Core Heat Removal:
		May secure ALL PCPs due to loss of CCW for cooling
	RO	at least one PCP operating: NO
		- Verify Loop ΔT less than 10°F: NO
		Verify PCS at least 25°F subcooled: YES
		PCS Heat Removal:
	P∩D	 Verify at least one S/G has; level 5% - 70%; Feedwater available: YES
	ВОР	• Verify T _{AVE} 525°F - 540°F: NO
		 Verify BOTH S/G pressures 800 psia – 970 psia: NO
	SRO	MAY direct isolating AFW to 'A' S/G
		•

Op-Test No.: 1		Scenario No.: THREE Event No.: 7/8 Page 3 of 7		
Event Description:		EOP-1.0 actions/EOP-6.0 (larger ESDE)/SIAS/CHP Auto Failure		
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
		If directed to isolates AFW to 'A' S/G:		
		• SELECTS 'MANUAL' on FIC-0749, P-8A/B flow to S/G 'A'		
		• SELECTS 'MANUAL' on FIC-0737A, P-8C flow to S/G 'A'		
	ВОР	 Ensuring/raising flow output to 100% on each controller ('RED' signal indicator to the full right position) 		
		CLOSES CV-0522B, Steam from 'A' S/G to P-8B, Turbine Driven AFW Pump		
		Containment Isolation: NO		
		Containment pressure > 0.85 psig Contingency Actions:		
	RO	If/When Containment pressure > 4.0 psig perform all of the following:		
		VERIFY EK-1126 (CIS Initiated) OR PUSH High Radiation Pushbuttons on Panel 13		
		ENSURE CLOSED: Both MSIVs (MO-0510 and MO-0501); Main FRVs; Main FRV Bypasses; CCW Isolation Valves		
		 ENSURE EK-1342 (Safety INJ Initiated) OR PUSH left and right Injection Initiate pushbuttons on Panel EC-13 		
		ENSURE ALL HPSI and LPSI Pumps operating with associated Loop Isolation Valves open		
		RO will have to CLOSE MSIVs and CCW Isolation Valves and push left and right initiate pushbuttons Panel EC-13– <i>if not already done</i>		
		(CRITICAL TASK PL-000 433 05 01 if not previously done)		
		Containment Isolation:		
	ВОР	 Verify Containment Area Monitor alarms clear: NO (Depends on timing: All four in alarm, not collaborated with High Range Gamma Monitors) 		
		Verify Condenser Off Gas Monitor alarm clear: YES		
		Verify Main Steam Line Monitor alarms clear: YES		

Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: THREE Event No.:7/8 Page <u>4</u> of <u>7</u> **Event Description:** EOP-1.0 actions/EOP-6.0 (larger ESDE)/SIAS/CHP Auto Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Containment Atmosphere: NO Containment temperature > 125°F Containment Pressure > 0.85 psig Containment Pressure ≥ 4.0 psig, perform the following: ENSURE OPERATING ALL available Containment Air Cooler 'A' Fans RO ENSURE OPEN ALL available Containment Spray Valves ENSURE ALL available Containment Spray Pumps are operating RO will have to OPEN CV-3001 (CV-3002), Left (Right) Channel Containment Spray Valve, and START P-54B and P-54C (P-54A), Containment Spray Pumps -if not already done (CRITICAL TASK PL-000 433 05 01, If not previously done) Vital Auxiliaries - Water: YES Verify at least two SW Pumps operating RO Verify BOTH Critical SW Headers in operation with pressure > 42 psig Verify at least one CCW Pump operating Vital Auxiliaries - Air: YES RO Instrument Air Pressure > 85 psig PLACES left train CRHVAC in emergency mode: STARTS V-26A Air Filter Unit Fan **BOP** ■ ENSURES OFF: V-94, Purge Fan; V-47, Switchgear Exhaust Fan Starting V-26A may not have to be done, depending if CHP has occurred Verify BOTH of the following: YES **BOP** At least one Condensate Pump operating At least one Cooling Tower Pump operating **SRO** MAY direct isolating AFW to 'A' S/G

Op-Test No.: 1		Scenario No.: THREE Event No.: 7/8 Page <u>5</u> of <u>7</u>		
Event D	escription:	EOP-1.0 actions/EOP-6.0 (larger ESDE)/SIAS/CHP Auto Failure		
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
		If directed to isolates AFW to 'A' S/G:		
		■ SELECTS 'MANUAL' on FIC-0749, P-8A/B flow to S/G 'A'		
		• SELECTS 'MANUAL' on FIC-0737A, P-8C flow to S/G 'A'		
	ВОР	 Ensuring/raising flow output to 100% on each controller ('RED' signal indicator to the full right position) 		
		 CLOSES CV-0522B, Steam from 'A' S/G to P-8B, Turbine Driven AFW Pump 		
	RO	TRIPS ALL Primary Coolant Pumps due loss of CCW cooling		
		Performs Event Diagnostic Flow Chart per EOP-1.0, Attachment 1		
		Diagnoses EOP-6.0, Excess Steam Demand Event		
	SRO	Performs EOP-6.0 strategy brief		
		Establishes PCS pressure and temperature bands with RO		
		Directs SE to perform Safety Function Status checks for EOP-6.0		
	SRO	Directs performance of EOP Supplement 5, Checklist for Safeguards Equipment Following SIAS		
	ВОР	COMPLETES EOP Supplement 5		
	SRO	Directs check to verify minimum SI flow per EOP Supplement 4, Pre-RAS Minimum HPSI Injection Flow		
	ВОР	CHECKS EOP Supplement 4		
	SRO	Directs performance of EOP Supplement 6, Checklist For Containment Isolation and CCW Restoration		
		1		
	ВОР	COMPLETES EOP Supplement 6		
		1		

Op-Tes	t No.: 1	Scenario No.: THREE Event No.:7/8 Page <u>6</u> of <u>7</u>		
Event D	escription:	EOP-1.0 actions/EOP-6.0 (larger ESDE)/SIAS/CHP Auto Failure		
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
	SRO	May direct steaming unaffected S/G (B) to within 50 psi of affected S/G (A)		
		Begins steaming 'B' S/G:		
	RO	HIC-0780A, Steam Dump Controller, 'MANUAL' pushbutton PUSHED		
		• 'Slidebar' taken to the OPEN position		
	SRO	May direct use of PZR Auxiliary Spray to lower PCS pressure		
		Refers to EOP Supplement 37, PZR Pressure Control Using Auxiliary Spray:		
		ENSURE CV-1057 and CV-1059 switches in CLOSE		
	RO	ENSURE at least one charging pump in operation		
	RO	ENSURE OPEN HS-2111, Charging Line Stop		
		ENSURE CLOSED MO-3072, Charging Pump Discharge to Train 2		
		OPERATE HS-2117, Aux. Spray CV-2117 keyswitch as desired		
	SRO	Directs placing handswitches for Letdown Orifice Stop Valves to close		
		PLACES handswitches to CLOSE:		
	RO	• HS-2003 (CV-2003)		
	1.0	• HS-2004 (CV-2004)		
		• HS-2005 (CV-2005)		
	SRO	Directs isolating 'A' S/G per EOP Supplement 17, 'A' S/G ESDE Isolation Checklist		
	<u> </u>	<u> </u>		
		Isolates 'A' S/G per Supplement 17: (CRITICAL TASK PL-000 209 05 01)		
	ВОР	CLOSE CV-0742, 'A' S/G Main Feed Reg Block Valve		
		CLOSE S/G E-50A Blowdown Valves: CV-0767, CV-0771, and CV-0739		
	-			

Form ES-D-2

Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: THREE Event No.:7/8 Page 7 of 7

Event Description: EOP-1.0 actions/EOP-6.0 (larger ESDE)/SIAS/CHP Auto Failure

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Simulator Operator: When instructed by BOP to isolate 'A' S/G outside the Control Room per Supplement 13, then perform the following:

MS20 (PIDMS01) Main Steam Dump Manual Valve CA-0781, value = CLOSED

MS21 (PIDMS01) Main Steam Dump Manual Valve CA-0782, value = CLOSED

SG09 (PIDMS01) Manual Throttle VIv MS-101 for CV-0782, value = 0

SG11 (PIDMS01) Manual Throttle VIv MS-103 for CV-0781, value = 0

SRO: Emergency Classification Level: Unusual Event, FU1, Loss of Containment Barrier (Containment pressure GREATER THAN 4.0 psig with LESS THAN one full train of depressurization equipment operating)

TERMINATE Scenario when 'A' S/G has been isolated per EOP Supplement 17 <u>OR</u> at the discretion of the Lead Examiner.