Duke Energy®

DAVE BAXTER
Vice President
Oconee Nuclear Station

Duke Energy
ON01VP / 7800 Rochester Highway
Seneca, SC 29672

864-873-4460
864-873-4208 fax
dabaxter@dukeenergy.com

March 2, 2010

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

ATTENTION: Document Control Desk

Subject: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke)
Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 1
Docket No. 50-269
Generic Letter 2008-01, Supplemental Response

On January 11, 2008, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Generic Letter (GL) 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal, and Containment Spray Systems. The GL required a written response within nine months consistent with the requested actions and information of the GL. If the requested response date could not be met, a 3-month response was requested to provide the proposed alternative course of action.

By letter dated May 8, 2008, Duke provided an alternative course of action for Oconee as well as Catawba and McGuire. Because some of the system piping referenced in the GL is located in areas inaccessible during power operation (i.e., Containment), the field verifications could not be completed until the upcoming refueling outages. Once the outage related field verifications were complete, the results would be provided to the NRC within 90 days of the end of the refueling outage. By letter dated September 25, 2008, the NRC accepted Duke's alternative course of action.

The attachment to this letter provides the Oconee Unit 1 post outage supplemental response to Duke's GL 2008-01 9-month response dated October 13, 2008.

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NRR

There are no new commitments contained in this supplemental response.

Please contact Russ Oakley at (864) 873-3829 if additional questions arise.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on March 2, 2010.

Sincerely,

Dave Baxter, Vice President
Oconee Nuclear Site

Attachment

cc: w/attachment

Mr. Luis Reyes
Regional Administrator, Region II
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center
61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 23T85
Atlanta, GA 30303-8931

Mr. Jon Thompson (addressee only)
Project Manager
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Mail Stop O-8 G9A
Washington, D.C. 20555

Mr. John Stang
Project Manager
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Mail Stop O-8 G9A
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. Andy Sabisch
NRC Senior Resident Inspector
Oconee Nuclear Station

Attachment
Oconee Unit 1
Generic Letter (GL) 2008-01
9-Month Supplemental Response

This attachment contains the results of field verifications performed during the Oconee Unit 1 fall 2009 refueling outage for the Low Pressure Injection (LPI), Core Flood (CF), and High Pressure Injection (HPI) systems' piping inside the Unit 1 Containment and Unit 1 Letdown Storage Tank (LDST) Room (deemed inaccessible for the GL 08-01 initial 9-month response). The Unit 1 Building Spray (BS) system piping did not require any further field verifications due to the design of the system. Piping for the BS system inside containment is open to the building atmosphere and is normally empty.

Survey Measurements

Field surveys were performed inside containment and Letdown Storage Tank Room to verify the relative slope of the horizontal piping sections. The piping slope surveys were performed by site personnel. Survey acceptance criteria were the same as described in Oconee's October 13, 2008 GL response.

Based upon piping configuration review, selected confirmatory Ultrasonic Testing (UT) locations were inspected and were verified to be water solid. Surveys identified eight locations which could be potential gas accumulation sites due to adverse pipe slope conditions. Based on review of the slope survey results, two additional high point locations on the HPI piping in the LDST Room were identified and vent valves were installed in these locations. In addition, one location on HPI discharge piping inside containment, and two locations on the LPI piping inside containment were identified which warrant future installation of an effective vent valve. Two additional program monitoring locations were also identified. The addition of vent valves and enhanced monitoring described above are not required as conditions of operability. Operability is assured by current venting procedures without additional changes to system configuration or vent valve additions. The vent valve additions are an enhancement to current venting capability.

Corrective Actions

No corrective actions were identified which are needed to ensure continued operability of these systems.

Conclusion

Pipe slope surveys and selected UT inspections were performed during the Oconee Unit 1 fall outage for the inaccessible portions of High Pressure Injection, Low Pressure Injection, and Core Flood systems. The results of this effort did not change the conclusions of Oconee's October 13, 2008 GL response or result in any additional corrective actions required for continued operability.