ATTACHMENT A

PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES

CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC.
INDIAN POINT UNIT NO. 2
DOCKET NO. 50-247
APRIL, 1994

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Table 4.1-1

Minimum Frequencies for Checks, Calibrations and Tests of Instrument Channels

	Channel Description	Check	Calibrate	Test	Remarks
27.	Turbine Trip				
	a. Low Auto Stop Oil Pressure	N.A.	R	N.A.	
28.	Control Rod Protection (for use with LOPAR fuel)	N.A.	R	*	
29.	Loss of Power				
	a. 480v Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage)	N.A.	R	R	
	b. 480v Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Degraded Voltage)	N.A.	R	R	
	c. 480v Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Alarm)	N.A.	R	M	
30.	Auxiliary Feedwater				
	a. Steam Generator Water Level (Low-Low)	S	R#	R#	
	b. Low-Low Level AFWS Automatic Actuation Logic	N.A.	N.A.	M	Test one logic channel per month on an alternating basis.
	c. Station Blackout (Undervoltage)	N.A.	R	R	

* Within 31 days prior to entering a condition in which the Control Rod Protection System is required to be operable unless the reactor trip breakers are manually opened during RCS cooldown prior to T_{cold} decreasing below 350°F and the breakers are maintained opened during RCS cooldown when T_{cold} is less than 350°F.

Table 4.1-1

Minimum Frequencies for Checks, Calibrations and Tests of Instrument Channels

	Channel Description	Check	Calibrate	Test	Remarks
	d. Trip of Main Feedwater Pumps	N.A.	N.A.	R#	
31.	Reactor Coolant System Subcooling Margin Monitor	M	R	N.A.	
32.	PORV Position Indicator (Limit Switch)	M	R#	R#	
33.	PORV Block Valve Position Indicator (Limit Switch)	M*	R#	R#	
34.	Safety Valve Position Indicator (Acoustic Monitor)	M	R#	R#	
35.	Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate	M	R	R	
36.	PORV Actuation/ Reclosure Setpoints	N.A.	R#	N.A.	
37.	Overpressure Protection System (OPS)	N.A.	R#	**	

* Except when block valve operator is deenergized.

** Within 31 days prior to entering a condition in which OPS is required to be operable and at monthly intervals thereafter when OPS is required to be operable.

ATTACHMENT B

SAFETY ASSESSMENTS

CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC.
INDIAN POINT UNIT NO. 2
DOCKET NO. 50-247
APRIL, 1994

SAFETY ASSESSMENT

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC.
INDIAN POINT UNIT NO. 2
DOCKET NO. 50-247

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE

Technical Specification Table 4.1-1 requires the following surveillances to be performed on a refueling basis:

1. Item 30a, Calibrate and Test channels for Auxiliary Feedwater initiation on steam generator water level (low-low).

2. Item 30d, Test channels for Auxiliary Feedwater initiation on trip of main feedwater pumps.

Currently this surveillance is performed every 18 months (+25%). The proposed change in surveillance frequency is to every 24 months (+25%). This proposed change is being made in accordance with the guidance contained in Generic Letter 91-04.

The Auxiliary Feedwater System supplies high-pressure feedwater to the steam generators to maintain a water inventory for decay heat removal. The system is used for normal startup and shutdown as well as for events leading to a loss of main feedwater.

The system consists of three pumps divided into two separate systems. The first system includes a turbine-driven pump. The second system includes two motor driven pumps, each capable of supplying the required auxiliary feedwater to two steam generators. The auxiliary feedwater pumps are automatically started on receipt of any of the following signals:

1. Steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump:

   a. low-low water level in any two of the four steam generators.

   b. loss of offsite power concurrent with a unit trip and with no safety injection signal present.

2. Motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump:

   a. low-low water level in any steam generator.

   b. automatic trip of main feedwater pump(s) as indicated by loss of main feed pump control oil pressure after manual control switch was last operated to the "start" position.

   c. safety injection signal.

   d. loss of outside power concurrent with a unit trip.

Complete test results were reviewed from the last four refuelings. These tests spanned a period in excess of five years. Results of only one test were found to be unsatisfactory. A summary of the results for this test which did not meet the acceptance criteria is provided below.

Test Performed 3/8/86

This test did not meet the acceptance criteria because Relay R-1 did not initially pick up. The contacts on the boiler feed pump breaker which energize R-1 were cleaned, and on retest, R-1 was verified to pickup. R-1 opens PCV-1139, the steam supply to the turbine-driven auxiliary boiler feedwater pump (ABFP).

Thus, a review of the test results from the last four refuelings reveals that only one test resulted in a relay failure which affected only the steam driven pump and would not have prevented the auxiliary feedwater system from supplying more than the required amount of feedwater.

BASIS FOR NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION

The proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration since:

1. There is no significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident.

   The test results over the last four refuelings confirmed system operability with only one failure. This failure would not have impaired the ability of the auxiliary feedwater system to perform its intended safety function. The auxiliary feedwater system is redundant and diverse. The failure in the turbine driven pump did not impact the motor driven pumps.

   Based on the historical test data, it is concluded that no significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident would be incurred by extending the operating cycle due to an increased surveillance interval.

2. The possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed has not been created.

   The failure noted from the past test data appears random in nature and would not have defeated the redundancy in design that exists in the AFW system. The AFW system would have been capable of performing its intended safety function and therefore a new or different kind of accident would not have been created.

3. There has been no reduction in the margin of safety.

   Past historical data demonstrates that the AFW systems would perform their safety function for an extended operating cycle should the surveillance period be extended by several months.