Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.
Millstone Power Station
Rope Ferry Road
Waterford, CT 06385

Dominion

JAN 2 9 2010

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Serial No. 10-042
MPS Lic/TGC R0
Docket No. 50-336
License No. DPR-65

DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.
MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 2
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2009-005-00

This letter forwards Licensee Event Report (LER) 2009-005-00 documenting a condition discovered at Millstone Power Station Unit 2, on December 2, 2009. This LER is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of the containment air locks to control the release of radioactive material.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. William D. Bartron at (860) 444-4301.

Sincerely,

A. J. Jordan
Site Vice President – Millstone

Attachments: 1

Commitments made in this letter: None

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406-1415

Ms. C. J. Sanders
Project Manager
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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NRC Senior Resident Inspector
Millstone Power Station

ATTACHMENT

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2009-005-00

MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 2
DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.

NRC FORM 366 (9-2007) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 08/31/2010

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET NUMBER	3. PAGE
Millstone Power Station - Unit 2	05000336	1 OF 3

4. TITLE

Both Containment Air Lock Doors Open in Mode 1

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000
12	2	2009	2009	– 005 –	00	01	29	2010	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000

9. OPERATING MODE

1

10. POWER LEVEL

100

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: *(Check all that apply)*

☐ 20.2201(b)	☐ 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
☐ 20.2201(d)	☐ 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
☐ 20.2203(a)(1)	☐ 20.2203(a)(4)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(i)	☐ 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	☐ 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(x)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	☐ 50.36(c)(2)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	☐ 73.71(a)(4)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	☐ 50.46(a)(3)(ii)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	☐ 73.71(a)(5)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(v)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	☒ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	☐ OTHER
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER

FACILITY NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
William D. Bartron, Nuclear Station Licensing	860-444-4301

13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED

☐ YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) ☒ NO

15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT *(Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)*

On November 13, 2009, with Millstone Power Station Unit 2 exiting a refueling outage and preparing to go from Mode 5 to Mode 4, both the inner and outer containment personnel hatch air lock doors were closed, verified closed and successfully pressure tested.

On December 2, 2009, while in Mode 1 at 100% power, personnel entered the containment for a planned entry. Subsequently, while in the process of entering the containment, a second entry team opened the outer air lock door and observed the inner door ajar. This condition should have been prevented by a design interlock which prevents opening the outer air lock door if the inner air lock door is not closed. The interlock failed to perform its design function because it was not properly reset during the refueling outage due to inadequate procedures. The outer air lock door was immediately closed. The time both air lock doors were open was less than one minute.

The procedures that restore and verify the containment air lock door interlock have been revised. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) as any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.

1 Event Description

On November 13, 2009, with Millstone Power Station Unit 2 exiting a refueling outage and preparing to go from Mode 5 to Mode 4, both the inner and outer containment personnel hatch air lock doors [DR] were closed, verified closed and successfully pressure tested.

On December 2, 2009, while in Mode 1 at 100% power, personnel entered the containment for a planned entry. Subsequently, while in the process of entering the containment, a second entry team opened the outer air lock door and observed the inner door ajar. This condition should have been prevented by a design interlock which prevents opening the outer air lock door if the inner air lock door is not closed. The interlock failed to perform its design function because it was not properly reset during the refueling outage due to inadequate procedures. The outer air lock door was immediately closed. The time both air lock doors were open was less than one minute.

This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) as any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.

2 Cause

The interlock failed to perform its design function because the interlock had not been properly reset in Mode 5 prior to entering Mode 4 on November 13, 2009. Although the interlock had not been properly reset on November 13, 2009, both doors were fully closed and a successful pressure test of the air lock was completed prior to restarting from a refueling outage. (The containment air lock interlock mechanism is defeated in Modes 5 and 6 during refueling outages.)

The cause of the interlock not being properly reset was an inadequate procedure that did not provide sufficient details to complete the interlock restoration. A contributing cause is that the surveillance procedure credited with verifying the proper restoration of the interlock was not adequate and incorrectly concluded that the interlock had been restored.

3 Assessment of Safety Consequences

This condition is judged to be of very low safety significance. The requirements on containment penetration closure and operability ensure that a release of radioactive material within containment to the environment will be minimized. Plant Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.1.3 "Containment Air Locks" and 3.6.1.1 "Containment Integrity" apply.

TS 3.6.1.3a states that the containment air lock shall be operable with both doors closed except when the air lock is being used for normal transit entry and exit through containment, then at least one air lock door shall be closed.

Upon discovery and recognition the inner air lock door was ajar; the outer door was immediately closed. Although TS 3.6.1.3 Action b (Action b states in part, "With only the containment air lock interlock mechanism inoperable, verify an OPERABLE air lock door is closed within 1 hour and lock an OPERABLE air lock door closed within 24 hours.") was met, this condition is being reported as a condition which could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of the containment air locks to control the release of radioactive material.

4 Corrective Action

Upon discovery that the inner air lock door was ajar, the outer door was immediately closed.

The maintenance procedure which restores the containment air lock interlock has been revised to provide clearer steps for restoration of the interlock. The surveillance procedure has been revised to ensure that restoration of the interlock has been achieved.

Additional corrective actions are being addressed in accordance with the Millstone Corrective Action Program.

5 Previous Occurrences

No previous similar events/conditions were identified.

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].