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February 22, 2010

ATTN: Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

**BELL BEND NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
RESPONSE TO RAI No. 69
BNP-2010-049 Docket No. 52-039**

Reference: 1) M. Canova (NRC) to R. Sgarro (PPL Bell Bend, LLC), Bell Bend COLA – Request for Information No. 69 (RAI No. 69) –SPCV - 3626, e-mail dated February 16, 2010

The purpose of this letter is to respond to the request for additional information (RAI) identified in the referenced NRC correspondence to PPL Bell Bend, LLC (PPL). This RAI addresses the Main Control Room Area Air Conditioning System as discussed in Chapter 9.4 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and submitted in Part 2 of the Bell Bend Nuclear Power Plant (BBNPP) Combined License Application (COLA).

Enclosure 1 provides the response to RAI Question 09.04.01-2. There are no new regulatory commitments contained in this letter.

If you have any questions, please contact the undersigned at 570.802.8102.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on February 22, 2010

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Rocco R. Sgarro". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

Rocco R. Sgarro

RRS/kw

Enclosure: As stated

DO79
NRC

cc: (w/o Enclosures)

Mr. Samuel J. Collins
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Enclosure 1

Response to NRC Request for Additional Information No. 69
Bell Bend Nuclear Power Plant

Question 09.04.01-2:**Radiological Protection and System Response**

In addressing the conceptual design information associated with protection against toxic gas as addressed in section 9.4 of the EPR Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), the applicant has also departed from the EPR FSAR in areas unrelated to toxic chemicals. Specifically, there are departures/omissions related to radiological protection of the control room operators and the system response to other design basis events. The applicant provided no basis for these departures. Please provide an explanation why these departures are acceptable or eliminate the departures.

Response:

In the response to Request for Additional Information No. 89 for the U.S. EPR FSAR, AREVA identified that the conceptual design information relating to toxic gas detectors in the U.S. EPR FSAR was meant to reflect the possibility that not all the U.S. EPR sites may need toxic gas detectors. This determination would be based on the site-specific hazards analysis performed in each Combined License (COL) FSAR in Chapter 2.2.3. In its RAI response, AREVA agreed that in order to meet General Design Criteria (GDC) 19 and the corresponding Standard Review Plan (SRP) acceptance criteria for control room habitability, the conceptual design information would be deleted from the Main Control Room (MCR) design basis in the U.S. EPR FSAR (ML083110245).

In Revision 1 to the U.S. EPR FSAR Section 9.4.1, Main Control Room Air Conditioning System, AREVA subsequently deleted the conceptual design information in FSAR Section 9.4.1 (ML091671567).

In the U.S. EPR FSAR Revision 1 impact assessment for the BBNPP COLA, these changes were identified and implemented in Revision 2 of the BBNPP COLA. BBNPP FSAR Section 9.4.1 contains no departures from the U.S. EPR FSAR in areas unrelated to toxic chemicals. There are also no departures/omissions related to radiological protection of the control room operators and the systems response to other design basis events in BBNPP FSAR Section 9.4.1.

One departure from the U.S. EPR that has been identified results from the site-specific chemical hazards analysis performed in BBNPP FSAR Section 2.2.3. The results of this analysis demonstrate that there are no chemical hazards on or near the BBNPP site that warrant the installation of toxic gas sensors and an automatic isolation capability of the MCR ventilation system due to the MCR toxic gas concentrations and the available time for operators to don protective equipment. This departure has been added to the relevant sections of the BBNPP FSAR and to COLA Part 7, Departures and Exemption Requests.

COLA Impact:

The BBNPP FSAR will not be revised as a result of the response to this question.