Indian Point 3
Nuclear Power Plant
P.O. Box 215
Buchanan, New York 10511

914-736-8000

New York Power Authority

November 21, 1989
IP3-89-083

Docket No. 50-286
License No. DPR-64

Document Control Desk
Mail Station PI-137
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

The attached Licensee Event Report LER 86-012-01 is hereby submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73.

The Authority is submitting this revision to withdraw a commitment made in the original report. In Rev. 0 to this LER, the Authority stated that a modification was being designed to allow for easier access to the D.C. cabinets. The Technical Services Department has reviewed the installation of such access devices and determined that they would not reduce the likelihood of this event from occurring. The Authority has classified this event as an isolated circumstance resulting from personnel error. The Technical Services Department will not, in the future, remove covers from D.C. panels for investigative/verification work with the unit on line.

This event is of the type defined in paragraph 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

Very truly yours,

Joseph Russell
Resident Manager
Indian Point Three Nuclear Power Plant

VC/rj
Attachment

IE22
1/1

cc: Mr. William Russell
Regional Administrator
Region 1
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

INPO Records Center
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/88

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Indian Point, Unit 3	0 5 0 0 0 2 8 6	1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4)

Unit Trip Caused by Unintentional Opening of a DC Power Supply Breaker

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
1 1	1 4	8 6	8 6	— 0 1 2	— 0 1	1 1	2 1	8 9		0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	1 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Vincent R. Coulehan, Plant Engineer	AREA CODE 9 1 4 7 3 6 8 0 4 7

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On November 14, 1986, while verifying some electrical plant drawings for an on-going drawing update program, the cover plates on the direct current (DC) power panels were removed to allow re-inspection of internal wiring. When the cover plant on No. 31 DC power panel was being replaced, a breaker within the panel was inadvertently opened. This deenergized No. 31 DC distribution panel, which powers various plant protection functions. A reactor trip was then generated by the reactor protection train B bistables, which became actuated upon loss of their control power. Although entry into the internals of the DC power panels is an infrequent occurrence and these cover plates have been removed and reinstalled in the past without incident, corrective actions to preclude this from occurring again were accomplished by not allowing these covers to be removed for verification work while the plant is on line.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Indian Point, Unit 3	0 5 0 0 0 2 8 6	8 6	— 0 1 2	— 0 1	0 2 OF 0 3

TEXT *(If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's)* (17)

On November 4, 1986, while verifying some electrical plant drawings for an ongoing drawing update program, the cover plates on the direct current (DC) power panels were removed to allow re-inspection of internal wiring. When the 7 feet high by 3 feet wide cover plant on No. 31 DC power panel was replaced by the plant operators, the plate slipped and inadvertently pushed the breaker for circuit No. 16 open. This caused No. 31 DC distribution panel (which is fed by circuit 16) to become deenergized. The train B reactor protection relays are among the devices powered by No. 31 DC distribution panel. When control power to these relays was removed, a reactor trip was initiated, due to their "fail safe" design. The trip occurred at 0923 hours with the unit at 100 percent power.

During and immediately following the reactor trip, other devices associated with No. 31 DC distribution panel were affected due to the loss of power. Control room supervisory annunciators were deenergized and No. 31 Main Boiler Feed Pump had to be tripped locally at the pump because the control circuit for remote operation of this pump receives power from No. 31 DC distribution panel. The sequence for opening the main electrical generator output breakers after a unit trip was not completed due to the temporary loss of No. 31 DC distribution panel. Valves which have acutation relays powered from No. 31 distribution panel went to their "fail safe" positions.

Approximately 2 minutes and 26 seconds after the trip, power was restored to the affected distribution panel by manually closing the opened breaker. At that time, all control room supervisory alarms returned to normal, and the main generator output breakers opened automatically. The affected valves were repositioned by the operators during the performance of post trip procedures. No damage to plant equipment wa sustained during the event.

Although entry into DC power panel internals is an infrequent occurrence and these cover plates have been removed and reinstalled in the past without incident, corrective actions to preclude this from occurring again were accomplished by not allowing these covers to be removed for verification work while the plant is on line.

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Indian Point, Unit 3	0 5 0 0 0 2 8 6	8 6	— 0 1 2	— 0 1	0 3 OF 0 3

TEXT *(If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's)* (17)

The Unit was synchronized to the bus at 0624 hours on November 15, 1986. No similar events have been reported in an LER to date. This event is reportable under 10CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (iv) as a reactor protection system actuation.