

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Indian Point, Unit 3	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 6	PAGE (3) 1 OF 15
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TITLE (4)
Emergency Diesel Generator Trip Due to Inadvertent Restoration Following Calibration

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0	3	21	8	9	006	0	4	18			0 5 0 0 0
											0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9) N

POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Richard Bystrak, Supervisory Engineer	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE: 9114 7136 18 0413

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On March 23, 1989, with the plant shut down and the reactor defueled, the number 33 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) tripped shortly after starting for a scheduled performance test (3PT-V16). The cause for the EDG trip has been attributed to improper restoration of valves manipulated during a calibration of oil pressure switches just previous to this event. More detailed procedures requiring restoration signoffs have been issued as a result of this incident. This event is reportable because for a period of 39 hours the plant had less than two EDGs available which is outside the Technical Specifications for the existing plant conditions. The plant remains shut down with the reactor defueled.

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						OF

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

EVENT DESCRIPTION

On March 23, 1989, with the plant shut down and the reactor defueled, the test group attempted to run number 33 emergency diesel generator (EDG) (EK)(A152)(ALCO Model No. 251E16MS) for a scheduled 3PT-V16 "EDG Functional Test". The diesel generator started but tripped within 30 seconds on low lube oil pressure. Operators found isolation valves to Oil Pressure Switches (OPS) 1,2 and 3 shut; they should normally be open. The valves were opened and another attempt to start and run the diesel generator was made, which again resulted in the EDG tripping on low lube oil pressure. The sensing lines were vented and the EDG ran successfully on the third attempt. The 31 and 32 EDG OPS valves were checked and found to be open. The diesels were then run under the performance functional test 3PT-V16; both diesels ran satisfactorily.

INVESTIGATION OF THE EVENT

An investigation of this event has been conducted which included a review of the history for the DGs from the beginning of March until the time of the event on March 23.

During the period from March 2-4 all three EDGs were scheduled to have their lube oil pressure switches calibrated. Calibration of the lube oil pressure switches assures that the EDGs will receive the signal to shut down at a predetermined pressure to prevent internal damage to the engine.

On March 4, 1989 the 33 EDG was taken out of service for calibration of its OPS switches which required the repositioning of the sensing line isolation valves for the OPS switches to the closed position. Upon completion of the calibration procedure the EDG was declared operable and returned to service.

On March 23, 1989, during the scheduled performance of 3PT-V16 functional test on 33 EDG the isolation valves for the oil pressure switches were found closed. This resulted in EDG 33 sensing an artificially low lube oil pressure and tripping shortly after startup.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

The following is a list of calibrations and scheduled performance runs for the period of concern:

Dates	Calibration OPS Switches	Operational Performance Runs on Diesels
March 2, 1989	EDG #31	
March 3, 1989	EDG #32	3PT-V16 EDGs 31 and 33
March 4, 1989	EDG #33	3PT-V16 EDG #32
March 13, 1989		EDG #31 run by test group satisfactorily
March 23, 1989		3PT-V16 EDG 33 fails functional, OPS valves found shut
March 23, 1989		3PT-V16 rerun EDG 33 satisfactory, 32 and 31 EDG also ran satisfactorily

It has been determined that the 31 and 32 EDGs were properly returned to service because both DGs were run satisfactory following their calibrations. The 33 EDG was also shown to be operable immediately prior to its calibration because it was successfully run on March 3. It should be noted that running of the EDGs was done as a scheduled functional test and not as a result of recent calibrations. It is presumed that the 33 EDG was rendered inoperable as a result of the calibration performed on March 4. The procedure to perform this calibration was inadequate and failed to address the restoration of the OPS valves.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Indian Point Three is currently involved in an extensive procedure upgrade program for the I&C Department which will address the concerns of this event.

CAUSES OF THE EVENT

The failure to restore OPS valves 1,2 and 3 on EDG number 33 to the normally open position is attributed to the following root causes:

1. Personnel error on the part of the I&C technician who failed to return the 33 EDG to its precalibration configuration.
2. The procedure used to perform the OPS calibration was inadequate because it did not address system restoration.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

As a result of this event the following actions have been done or are planned to be done:

1. Superintendent of the I&C Department will conduct discussion with entire department for the purpose of communicating the details of this event and its potential consequences.
2. In the interim, before the new I&C procedures are issued, a generic Temporary Procedure Change (TPC) has been issued delineating steps on how systematic restorations of instruments under calibration are to occur. These TPCs will also require signed acknowledgments from both the instrument technicians and licensed operators.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT

This LER is being submitted under the requirements of 10CFR50.73.(a)(2)(i)B. Technical Specification 3.7.F.4 requires, as a minimum under all conditions, including cold shutdown, two diesel generators be operable. The 31 and 32 EDGs were taken out of service on six different occasions during the period March 4-23, for a total of 39 hours. During this 39 hour period only one diesel generator was determined to be operable, thereby violating the technical specification. A need for the EDGs would be called for in the event all offsite power was lost. The Indian Point Three site is served from four independent sources of outside power, 2-13.8 KV feeders, and 2-138 KV feeders.

The electrical requirements for the plant conditions at the time of this event could have been served from a single EDG.

SECURING FROM THE EVENT

On March 23, 1989 number 33 EDG was restored to service and all three EDGs had functional tests performed to verify their operability. The plant remains in cold shutdown with the reactor defueled. No similar LERs have occurred at this facility.

Indian Point 3
Nuclear Power Plant
P.O. Box 215
Buchanan, New York 10511
914-736-8000



**New York Power
Authority**

April 18, 1989
IP3-89-031


Docket No. 50-286
License No. DPR-64

Document Control Desk
Mail Station PI-137
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

The attached Licensee Event Report LER 89-006-00 is hereby submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73. This event is of the type defined in the requirements per 10CFR50.73.(a)(2)(i)B.

Very truly yours,


William A. Josiger
Resident Manager
Indian Point Three Nuclear Power Plant

RB/rj
Attachment

cc: Mr. William Russell
Regional Administrator
Region 1
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

INPO Records Center
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

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