NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2 Docket No. 50-247 License No. DPR-26


During an NRC inspection conducted from July 6 through 10, 1998, the following violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG 1600, the violation is listed below:

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion VII, "Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and Services," requires that measures shall be established to assure that purchased services, whether purchased directly or through contractors and subcontractors, conform to the procurement documents. These measures shall include provisions, as appropriate, for examination of products upon delivery. Step 3.4.c. of procedure OP-290-1, "Engineering Operations Manual," states that a designated Approver is responsible for ensuring that completed vendor calculations fulfill the requirements of their objectives.

Contrary to the above, in July 1998, measures to assure that purchased services conformed to procurement documents, including provisions for examination of products upon delivery were not effective in that vendor calculations pertaining to various motor-operated valves were approved that did not fulfill the requirements of their objectives as exemplified below. As a result, the need to verify and validate design inputs for the affected motor-operated valves was not identified for further resolution.

- 1. Valve factors used in vendor calculations for containment spray valves 889A and 889B were nonconservative and inconsistent with the methodology specified in calculation PGI-00350-00, "Valve Factor Basis Evaluation," dated July 1, 1998.
- 2. Vendor calculations for globe valves 956E, 956F, 990A and 990B increased the valve disk area design input term to compensate for valve operation under high temperature blowdown flow conditions. However, the compensation method was not validated by empirical data.
- 3. Vendor calculations for safety injection pump suction valves 887A and 887B utilized a thrust prediction methodology that is limited to water conditions no greater than approximately 150 degrees Fahrenheit. However, the design-basis temperature of the valves is 188 degrees Fahrenheit.
- 4. The results of calculations performed by the vendor for fifteen Aloyco and Anchor/Darling gate valves were not compared with valve-specific test results to verify that the outputs were bounded by the test data.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).



The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reason for the violation, the corrective actions taken and planned to correct the violation and prevent recurrence, and the date when full compliance was achieved is already adequately addressed on the docket in Inspection Report No. 50-247/98-11. However, you are required to submit a written statement or explanation pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201 if the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position. In that case, or if you choose to respond, clearly mark your response as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation," and send it to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice).

If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001.

Dated at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania this 24th day of July 1998