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July 2, 1993

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2
Docket No. 50-247

Mr. Thomas T. Martin
Regional Administrator - Region I
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406

SUBJECT: Special Report on June 20, 1993 Inoperability of
Fire Pumps

This letter satisfies the requirement of Technical Specification 3.13.A.3.b.ii to submit a special report within 14 days following an event which renders the high-pressure water fire protection system inoperable in a manner other than permitted by Technical Specification 3.13.A.2. This report outlines the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to operable status. Telephone and written notifications, in accordance with Technical Specification 3.13.A.3.b.i, were made on June 21, 1993.

Technical Specification 3.13.A.1.a states that the high-pressure water fire protection system shall have two main motor-driven fire pumps and one diesel-driven fire pump operable and properly aligned to the high-pressure fire header. Technical Specification 3.13.A.2 allows both motor-driven fire pumps or the diesel-driven fire pump to be out of service provided the inoperable equipment is restored to operable status within seven days. Technical Specification 3.13.A.3.a states that an alternate fire protection system shall be established within 24 hours with the high-pressure water fire protection system inoperable in a manner other than permitted by Technical Specification 3.13.A.2.

On June 20, 1993, the motor-driven fire pumps were taken out of service and the turbine building fire header was isolated in order to permit scheduled corrective maintenance on valves in that header. At this time, Technical Specification 3.13.A.2.a was applicable and a 7 day allowed outage time and compensatory measures were in effect. The diesel-driven fire pump was maintaining pressure in the high-pressure water fire header. Soon after the equipment tagout was instituted, but prior to the start of repair work, the diesel-driven fire

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•pump stopped operating and could not be restarted. With all three fire pumps out of service, Technical Specification 3.13.A.3.a became applicable and a 24 hour allowed outage time took effect. The motor-driven fire pumps were returned to service approximately five hours after the diesel-driven fire pump became inoperable, within the allowed outage time of 24 hours.

It was subsequently determined that the solenoid valve that admits fuel oil to the governor was faulty. The solenoid valve is normally closed and is energized to open. An open circuit in the wiring caused the valve to close which isolated the fuel oil supply and resulted in the stopping of the diesel-driven fire pump. The solenoid valve was replaced and the pump was restored to operable status on June 24, 1993, within the allowed outage time of 7 days. The corrective maintenance on the fire header will be rescheduled for a later date.

Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr. Charles W. Jackson, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing.

Very truly yours,



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