

Stephen B. Bram
Vice President

Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
Indian Point Station
Broadway & Bleakley Avenue
Buchanan, NY 10511
Telephone (914) 737-8116

March 13, 1989


Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2
Docket No. 50-247

Mr. William Russell
Regional Administrator - Region I
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406-1498

SUBJECT: Automatic Switch Company (ASCO) Solenoid Valve Failure Mechanism-
10 CFR Part 21 Notification

Consolidated Edison Company of New York ("Con Edison") is hereby providing written notification pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21 of a deviation in a supplied component. Verbal notification was made to your office on March 10, 1989. As described in the Attachment, thirteen ASCO Series NP valves purchased by Con Edison and since returned to the manufacturer were subject to a potential failure mode that could possibly have created a substantial safety hazard.

Very truly yours,



cc: Document Control Desk
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mail Station P1-137
Washington, DC 20555

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Mr. Donald Brinkman, Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects I/II
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mail Stop 14B-2
Washington, DC 20555

Senior Resident Inspector
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PO Box 38
Buchanan, NY 10511

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Attachment

Evaluation of Deviation in Supplied Component
Automatic Switch Company (ASCO) Solenoid Valves,
Model Nos. NP831665V, NP8316E35V, NP8320A185V,
NP8320A193V, NP8321A7V

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NP8320A185V, NP8320A193V, NP8321A7V

Problem Description:

A notification dated January 30, 1989 from ASCO described a potential failure mode for thirteen ASCO Series NP (8316, 8320, 8321) valves recently purchased by Con Edison. According to the manufacturer, there is the possibility that the solenoid return spring (core spring) on these specific valves may disengage from the solenoid core, resulting in leakage or failure of the valve to shift when deenergized.

Applicability to Indian Point Unit No. 2:

Based on this notification, Con Edison initiated action to determine whether the thirteen valves involved had been accepted and/or installed at Indian Point Unit 2. Con Edison determined that the valves had not yet been used in the plant. Eleven valves were located in warehouse stock and the two remaining valves were located at receipt inspection.

ASCO has stated that no other valves purchased by Con Edison are affected by this problem.

Actions Taken:

Based on the above applicability to Indian Point Unit No. 2, Con Edison took the following additional actions:

1. All thirteen valves were immediately issued "hold" tags to prevent their use and a quality control inspection report was issued.
2. The valves were returned to the manufacturer on February 16, 1989.

Evaluation:

The thirteen valves of concern were not dedicated to a specific application. These valves could have been used in safety-related applications as basic components, as defined in 10 CFR 21.3(a)(1). The deviation described by the manufacturer had the potential to create a substantial safety hazard if the valves had been installed. Notification under the provisions of 10 CFR 21 is deemed to be appropriate considering the postulated application of the valves, despite the fact that none of the valves had been installed.