Stephen E. Quinn
Vice President

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June 9, 1997

Re: Indian Point
Unit No. 2
Docket No. 50-247
LER 97-12-00

Document Control Desk
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mail Station PI-137
Washington, DC 20555

The attached Licensee Event Report 97-12-00 is hereby submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.

Very truly yours,

Thomas Schmeisser for Stephen Quinn

Attachment

cc: Mr. Hubert J. Miller
Regional Administrator - Region I
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Mr. Jefferey Harold, Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects I/II
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mail Stop 14B-2
Washington, DC 20555

Senior Resident Inspector
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PO Box 38
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NRC FORM 366 (6-89)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Indian Point Unit No. 2	0 5 0 0 0 2 4 7	1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4)

FCV-625 IVSWS Leakage Greater than Technical Specification Limit

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 5	0 9	9 7	9 7	— 0 1 2	— 0 0	0 6	0 9	9 7		0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9): N

POWER LEVEL (10): 0 0 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

[ ] 20.402(b)	[ ] 20.405(c)	[ ] 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	[ ] 73.71(b)
[ ] 20.405(a)(1)(i)	[ ] 50.36(c)(1)	[ ] 50.73(a)(2)(v)	[ ] 73.71(c)
[ ] 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	[ ] 50.36(c)(2)	[ ] 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	[ ] OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
[ ] 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	[X] 50.73(a)(2)(i)	[ ] 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
[ ] 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	[ ] 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	[ ] 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
[ ] 20.405(a)(1)(v)	[ ] 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	[ ] 50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (AREA CODE)
Philip Griffith, Sr. Licensing Engineer	9 1 4 7 3 4 - 5 1 9 0

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
X	C C	I S V	A 3 9 1	Y					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

[XX] YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) [ ] NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15): MONTH 0 8 DAY 3 1 YEAR 9 7

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

Surveillance tests of containment isolation valves were performed during the 1997 refueling outage, with containment integrity not required. The as-found leakage rate for valve FCV-625 sealed with water from the Isolation Valve Seal Water System could not be quantified since the pressure drop across the valve could not be maintained with the test rig at its maximum flow rate of 2498 cubic centimeters per hour. Due to leakage across this valve in excess of the test rig capabilities, the 14,700 cubic centimeters per hour leakage rate Technical Specification limit for containment isolation valves sealed by this system was considered exceeded.
This valve will be repaired as necessary and testing will be performed prior to plant startup to ensure operability.

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

Westinghouse 4-Loop Pressurized Water Reactor

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCES:

Total leakage rate of Isolation Valve Seal Water System (IVSWS) exceeded the Technical Specification 4.4.D.2.c limit of 14,700 cubic centimeters per hour due to assumed excessive leakage through FCV-625 containment isolation valve sealed with water.

EVENT DATE:

May 9, 1997

REPORT DUE DATE:

June 9, 1997

REFERENCES:

Indian Point 2 Condition Identification and Tracking System 97-E01476

PAST SIMILAR OCCURRENCES:

LER 84-06, LER 88-03, LER 89-08, LER 93-03, LER 95-06

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCES:

During the 1997 refueling outage, with containment integrity not required, it was assumed that the as- found leakage through the containment isolation valve FCV-625, which is supplied seal water from the IVSWS, tested in refueling surveillance test PT-R26A, "Local IVSWS Test Type 'C,'" was greater than 14,700 cubic centimeters per hour. Technical Specification 4.4.D.2.c specifies a maximum allowable leakage rate of 14,700 cubic centimeters per hour. The exact leakage for FCV-625 could not be determined since the test pressure could not be maintained by the test rig, which is limited to 1.1 gallons per minute. Because the actual leakage rate could not be measured, the Technical Specification limit was considered to have been exceeded.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCES:

The IVSWS assures the effectiveness of those containment isolation valves that are located in lines connected to the reactor coolant system, or that could be exposed to the containment atmosphere during any condition that requires containment isolation, by providing a water seal at the valves. The system provides a simple and reliable means for injecting seal water between the seats and stem packing of the globe and double disc types of isolation valves, and into the piping between closed diaphragm type isolation valves. The resulting water seal blocks any potential leakage of the containment atmosphere through the valve seats and stem packing. The water is introduced at a pressure slightly higher than the containment design pressure of 47 psig. The possibility of leakage from the containment or reactor coolant system past the first isolation point is thus prevented by assuring that if leakage occurs, it will be from the IVSWS into containment. Containment isolation valve FCV-625 is sealed with IVSWS water.

CAUSE OF OCCURRENCES:

Technical Specification 4.4.D.2.c leakage rate limit was considered to be exceeded due to excessive leakage through the IVSWS sealed containment isolation valve FCV-625, component cooling water return from RCP thermal barrier. The cause of excessive leakage is at this time indeterminate. A revision to this report will be submitted to document the cause of the excessive leakage through FCV-625.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

A Work order was written for repair of valve FCV-625. Repairs will be made to valve FCV-625 to correct the leakage described above and the valve will be retested to ensure operability prior to startup of the plant.