Stephen E. Quinn
Vice President

Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
Indian Point Station
Broadway & Bleakley Avenue
Buchanan, NY 10511
Telephone (914) 734-5340

November 27, 1996

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2
Docket No. 50-247
LER 96-21-00

Document Control Desk
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mail Station P1-137
Washington, DC 20555

The attached Licensee Event Report LER 96-21-00 is hereby submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.

Very truly yours,

Jack McElroy
for Steve Quinn

Attachment

cc: Mr. Hubert J. Miller
Regional Administrator - Region I
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Mr. Jefferey F. Harold, Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects I/II
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mail Stop 14B-2
Washington, DC 20555

Senior Resident Inspector
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PO Box 38
Buchanan, NY 10511

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NRC FORM 366 (6-89) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 4/30/92

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Indian Point Unit No. 2	0 5 0 0 0 2 4 7	1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4)

Containment Isolation Valve Closure Due to Offsite Electrical System Disturbance

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
										0 5 0 0 0
1 0	3 0	9 6	9 6	- 0 2 1	- 0 0	1 1	2 7	9 6		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)					
POWER LEVEL (10)	1 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
George Dahl, Engineer	9 1 4 7 3 4 - 5 1 8 6

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
	YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)				
X	NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On October 30, 1996, a significant voltage perturbation in the 345KV offsite electrical system resulted in the tripping of one of the two main generator output breakers and the temporary loss of various plant equipment. The disturbance resulted in the closure of the steam generator blowdown lines' containment isolation valves, which is an actuation of the containment isolation system, an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF). Although reportable, this automatic actuation of ESF components did not occur in response to an ESF signal and was not required to mitigate any radiological event. The plant remained at 100% power and all equipment was restored to service within approximately 45 minutes.

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

Westinghouse 4-Loop Pressurized Water Reactor

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Actuation of a portion of the containment isolation system, an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), due to closure of the steam generator blowdown containment isolation valves.

EVENT DATE:

October 30, 1996

REPORT DUE DATE:

November 29, 1996

REFERENCE:

CITRS (Condition Identification and Tracking System) No. 96-E02420

PAST SIMILAR OCCURRENCES:

LER 92-15 - problem at an off-site substation resulted in a voltage drop onsite, which caused containment pressure relief line containment isolation valves to close.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

The plant was operating at 100% power on October 30, 1996 when a voltage perturbation of the 345KV electrical system tripped one of the two main generator output breakers and caused the temporary loss of various plant equipment. The safety related steam generator blowdown containment isolation valves closed, which is their fail-safe position. The plant remained stable at 100% power throughout the event. Subsequently, the District Operator informed the station that an equipment failure had occurred at an off-site substation.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Sample lines for the blowdown streams from each of the four steam generators merge into one line which is monitored by radiation monitor R-49 for an increase in activity which may be indicative of a steam generator tube leak. Each blowdown line has two air-operated containment isolation valves which require power to their associated solenoid valves to maintain them normally open. When the monitor's setpoint is reached, the containment isolation valves are automatically closed. The circuitry to accomplish this consists of a skid and local control unit (LCU) for the monitor and an isolating device. When the skid detects a predetermined radiation level setting in the blowdown sample, the LCU de-energizes a circuit in the isolating device. This opens a contact in the isolating device which removes power to the solenoid valves. The resulting venting of the control air allows the actuator to close the containment isolation valves. Closure of these containment isolation valves on a containment isolation safeguards signal is accomplished through an independent circuit.

The skid and LCU are powered from safety related motor control center (MCC) 26BB and the isolating device is powered from safety related MCC 26A. In this instance, the LCU did not de-energize the circuit in the isolating device but the 345KV system voltage perturbation was sufficient to de-energize the circuit, which is powered from MCC 26A via a 208/120V distribution panel.

The blowdown containment isolation valves are part of the containment isolation system which is an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF). This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) because it involves the automatic actuation of an ESF. The actuation of the ESF components was not in response to an ESF signal and was not required to mitigate any radiological event.

CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The significant voltage perturbation in the 345KV offsite electrical system was sufficient to cause a circuit in the isolating device associated with R-49 to de-energize, which resulted in the closure of the steam generator blowdown containment isolation valves. The 345KV electrical system perturbation was caused by an off-site substation equipment failure.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

All equipment was restored to service within approximately 45 minutes and the generator output breaker was reclosed. There were no adverse effects on the operation of the plant.