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Vice President

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October 18, 1996

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2
Docket No. 50-247
LER 96-19-00

Document Control Desk
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mail Station P1-137
Washington, DC 20555-0001

The attached Licensee Event Report LER 96-19-00 is hereby submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

Very truly yours,

Attachment

cc: Mr. Hubert J. Miller
Regional Administrator-Region I
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Mr. Jefferey F. Harold, Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects I/II
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mail Stop 14B-2
Washington, DC 20555

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Senior Resident Inspector
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PO Box 38
Buchanan, NY 10511

290047

NRC FORM 366 (6-89) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 4/30/92
ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Indian Point Unit No. 2	0 5 0 0 0 2 4 7	1 OF 0 4

TITLE (4)

Plant Shutdown Technical Specification 3.0.1, H-2 Recombiners

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 9	1 8	9 6	9 6	0 1 9	0 0	1 0	1 8	9 6		0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
N		20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
1 0 0		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
Robert T. Allen	9 1 4 7 3 4 - 5 1 2 9

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
X YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	NO		0 1	2 4	9 7

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

During a scheduled walkdown of seismic supports, a System Engineer questioned the adequacy of the seismic supports for instrument air tubing for the valves that control hydrogen flow (FCV-2A and FCV-2B) to 21 and 22 Hydrogen Recombiners. A stress analysis performed could not confirm operability of the instrument air tubing to valves FCV-2A and FCV-2B. Accordingly both Hydrogen Recombiners were declared inoperable (Technical Specification 3.3.G.1) and the plant was declared outside its design basis. A plant shutdown was commenced in accordance with Technical Specification 3.0.1. After additional clamps were installed, one train of the instrument air tubing was deemed operable, and the shutdown was terminated.

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

Westinghouse 4 Loop Pressurized Water Reactor

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Instrument air tubing that provides control of Hydrogen Recombiner valves FCV-2A and FCV-2B could not be confirmed to be seismically supported.

EVENT DATE:

September 18, 1996

REPORT DUE DATE:

October 18, 1996

REFERENCES:

CITRS 96-E02147, CITRS 96-E02153

PAST SIMILAR OCCURRENCES:

None

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

While the unit was operating at 100 percent power on September 18, 1996, a system engineer conducting a scheduled walkdown of seismic supports questioned the adequacy of the seismic support of the instrument air tubing associated with Hydrogen Recombiner valves FCV-2A and FCV-2B. In May, 1996, a walkdown of the Chemical Volume and Control System (CVCS) discovered some seismic supports, unrelated to the current event, which were then in a degraded condition. Corrective actions from the May, 1996, event included providing enhanced training to the system engineers on identifying degraded seismic supports during system walkdowns and increasing the sensitivity towards inspections of seismic supports during system walkdowns. Based on ensuing training which reinforced that small instrument air tubing should be supported approximately every five (5) feet, it appeared to the system engineer in the instance described here that an additional seismic support might be required on the instrument air tubing, since there

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: (continued)

was a span of greater than five (5) feet without a seismic support. A stress analysis was performed and the results could not confirm operability of the instrument air tubing to valves FCV-2A and FCV-2B. Both Hydrogen Recombiners were declared inoperable (Technical Specification 3.3.G.1) at approximately 1800 hours and a plant shutdown was commenced in accordance with Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.1. After additional clamps were installed on the instrument air tubing for valve FCV-2B, the as left condition was then deemed acceptable, and 22 Hydrogen Recombiner was declared operable. Technical Specification 3.0.1 was exited, Technical Specification LCO 3.3.G.2.a was entered (providing that one hydrogen recombiner or its associated flow path may be inoperable for a period not to exceed 30 days), and the shutdown was terminated at approximately 2000 hours. Additional clamps were also installed on the tubing for FCV-2A, which resulted in 21 Hydrogen Recombiner being declared operable at approximately 2245 hours on September 18, 1996. This in turn provided for exiting LCO 3.3.G.2.a. The Hydrogen Recombiners are not required for use until 13 days after a loss of coolant accident (UFSAR Section 6.8.2.1, Technical Specification 3.3.G Basis). Valves FCV-2A and FCV-2B are located in the immediate vicinity of the Hydrogen Recombiner control panels, and adequate time would have been available to affect any repairs required to the instrument air tubing should a degraded condition actually have occurred and the operation of the Recombiners had been required. This LER is being written pursuant to 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B), providing for reporting of any operation or condition not in concurrence with the plant's Technical Specification.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

A field inspection of the seismic Class I tubing in question determined that the supports may have been inadequate. A detailed root cause analysis to determine the cause of this event is in progress. Past work orders and modification packages pertaining to this equipment and equipment located in close proximity have been identified, and the job histories are currently being reviewed.

CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

A detailed root cause analysis to determine the cause of this event is in progress.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Immediate corrective action was to install additional clamps on the tubing to valves FCV-2A and FCV-2B, and to continue the system walkdowns of seismic supports for additional systems. When the detailed analysis of this event is completed, a supplement will be issued to this LER which will provide the cause of the occurrence and list any additional recommended corrective actions.