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June 19, 1995

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2  
Docket No. 50-247  
LER 95-14-00

Document Control Desk  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Mail Station P1-137  
Washington, DC 20555

The attached Licensee Event Report LER 95-14-00 is hereby submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.

Very truly yours,



**Attachment**

cc: Mr. Thomas T. Martin  
Regional Administrator - Region I  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
475 Allendale Road  
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Mr. Francis J. Williams, Jr., Project Manager  
Project Directorate I-1  
Division of Reactor Projects I/II  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Mail Stop 14B-2  
Washington, DC 20555

Senior Resident Inspector  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
PO Box 38  
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) **Indian Point Unit No. 2** DOCKET NUMBER (2) **0 5 0 0 0 2 4 7** PAGE (3) **1 OF 0 3**

TITLE (4) **Service Water Leakage into Containment**

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0	5	1 8 9 5	9 5	0 1 4	0 0	0 6	1 9	9 5			0 5 0 0 0
<p>THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)</p>											

OPERATING MODE (8) <b>N</b>	20.402(b)	20.406(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10) <b>0 0 0</b>	20.406(a)(1)(i)	50.38(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
	20.406(a)(1)(ii)	50.38(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
	20.406(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)	
	20.406(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME **Pedro Franceschi, Engineer** TELEPHONE NUMBER **9 1 4 7 3 4 - 5 6 7 0**

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
B	B1	PLS X		N					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)  NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On May 18, 1995, while the plant was at a Hot Shutdown Condition coming out of the 1995 Refueling Outage, a Service Water leak was detected inside containment occurring at the Fan Cooler Unit #22 discharge flow element weld. The leak was estimated to be .00026 gpm. Such small leakage will not affect the discharge flow transmitter response. A four (4) hour Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) was entered for Containment Integrity per IP2 Technical Specification 3.6.A.3. This LCO was exited prior to the 4 hour limit when fan cooler Unit #2 was isolated and a seven (7) day LCO entered per Technical Specification 3.3.B.2.a. The leak was repaired to ASME Section XI requirements and the Fan Cooler Unit returned to service. The leak was at a weld connection between the 10" discharge carbon steel cement lined piping and stainless steel instrument line (discharge flow transmitter) transition weld. The probable cause of the leak was inadequate or defective coating of the two metals at the weld which resulted in galvanic interaction and corrosion of the carbon steel.

An inspection of all Service Water connections inside containment was performed with no further leakage identified.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION**

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)  <u>Indian Point Unit No. 2</u>	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0   5   0   0   0   2   4   7	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		9   5	-   0   1   4	-	d   0	d   2   OF   0   3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

**PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:**

Westinghouse 4-Loop Pressurized Water Reactor

**IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:**

Service Water Leakage into Containment

**EVENT DATE:**

May 18, 1995

**REPORT DUE DATE:**

June 19, 1995

**REFERENCES:**

Significant Occurrence Report (SOR) 95-357, 95-358 and followup review

**PAST SIMILAR OCCURRENCE:**

August 20, 1991  
December 22, 1980

**DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:**

On May 18, 1995, during normal containment rounds, operations identified a leak of approximately .00026 gpm on the weld for Fan Cooler Unit (FCU) #22 Service Water discharge flow transmitter instrument line. The leak was on the welded connection between the stainless steel instrument line and the 10" discharge header carbon steel piping. The service water piping is a low temperature, low pressure piping which is part of containment integrity boundary when the FCUs are not isolated.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION**

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-630), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)  Indian Point Unit No. 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5   0 0   0 2   4 7	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		9 5	- 0   1   4	- 0   0	0 3	OF	0   3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

**ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:**

This is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(c). This report is being made because a leak in a weld was identified on a Service Water header from a FCU inside Containment. Since the FCUs are for accident mitigation, Service Water is not isolated during normal reactor operation and the service water piping is considered to be a passive part of the Containment boundary. Per Technical Specification 3.6.A.3, a four (4) hour Limiting Condition of Operations ( LCO) was entered to restore containment integrity. Once the Service Water to FCU #22 was isolated, this LCO was exited and the FCU LCO of seven (7) days was entered in order to perform a full ASME Section XI repair. A leak rate of .00026 gpm would not affect the required response of the flow transmitter nor would it result in post accident containment flooding to the Recirculation pump motors during Post-Accident Recirculation duration of one (1) year (.36 gpm limit). An inspection of all service water connections inside containment for pressure boundary leakage was completed with no further leakage identified.

**CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:**

The probable cause of the leak on the carbon steel cement lined piping to stainless steel piping weld is inadequate or defective coating of the weld area. This condition exposes the two dissimilar metals to service water which results in galvanic interaction and subsequent corrosion of the carbon steel piping.

**CORRECTIVE ACTION:**

The immediate corrective action was to isolate FCU #22 and perform an ASME Section XI repair. An inspection for pressure boundary leakage of all Service Water connections inside containment was also conducted, and completed with no further leakage identified. Operations, under an existing procedure, will monitor the Service Water Fan Cooler Unit discharge header flow element connections for pressure boundary leakage during Containment Monthly Inspections.

Long term corrective action will be for Engineering to identify all Service Water Carbon Steel/Stainless Steel connections inside and outside containment within the ASME Section XI boundary and implement appropriate corrective actions..