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
March 13, 1995

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2
Docket No. 50-247
LER 95-06-00

Document Control Desk
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mail Station P1-137
Washington, DC 20555

The attached Licensee Event Report LER 95-06-00 is hereby submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.

Very truly yours,



Handwritten signature of Stephen E. Quinn, with the initials 'SEQ' written below it.

Attachment

cc: Mr. Thomas T. Martin
Regional Administrator - Region I
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Mr. Francis J. Williams, Jr., Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
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US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mail Stop 14B-2
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Indian Point Unit No. 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 4 7	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 1 5
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TITLE (4)
Containment Isolation Valve Technical Specification Leakage Limits Exceeded

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)															
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)														
0	2	0	9	9	5	9	5	0	0	0	6	0	0	3	1	3	9	5		0	5	0	0	0

OPERATING MODE (9) N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																							
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(a)(1)(i)	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	20.405(a)(1)(v)	20.406(c)	60.36(c)(1)	60.36(c)(2)	60.73(a)(2)(i)	60.73(a)(2)(ii)	60.73(a)(2)(iii)	60.73(a)(2)(iv)	60.73(a)(2)(v)	60.73(a)(2)(vi)	60.73(a)(2)(vii)	60.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	60.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	60.73(a)(2)(ix)	73.71(b)	73.71(c)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 368A)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)									
NAME George Dahl, Engineer							TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 9 1 4 7 3 4 - 5 1 8 6		

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)											
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	
X	C	C	I S V	A 3 9 1	Y	X	C	C	I S V	I 2 0 7	Y
X	C	C	I S V	A 3 9 1	Y	X	W	D	I S V	I 2 1 1	Y

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)				<input type="checkbox"/> NO		0	6	3 0 9 5

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

Surveillance tests of containment isolation valves were performed during the current refueling outage, with containment integrity not required. The combined leakage rate for all valves sealed with water from the Isolation Valve Seal Water System and tested as of this report was greater than 488,582 cubic centimeters per hour. Due to excessive leakage across three individual valves and one pair of valves, the 14,700 cubic centimeters per hour leakage rate Technical Specification limit for containment isolation valves sealed by this system was exceeded. Additionally, the combined leakage rate across two containment isolation valves, one sealed with nitrogen from the Isolation Valve Seal Water System and the other sealed with air from the Weld Channel and Containment Penetration Pressurization System, exceeded the 0.5L_a leakage rate Technical Specification limit but the actual rate was undetermined. All the valves have been or will be repaired and testing will be performed prior to plant startup to ensure leakage is curtailed or is within acceptable limits.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION**

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20585, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

Westinghouse 4-Loop Pressurized Water Reactor

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCES:

Total leakage rate of Isolation Valve Seal Water System (IVSWS) exceeded the Technical Specification 4.4.D.2.c limit of 14,700 cubic centimeters per hour due to excessive leakage through three individual and one pair of containment isolation valves sealed with water. The combined leakage rate of 0.5L_a specified in Technical Specification 4.4.D.2.a was exceeded due to leakage through two containment isolation valves sealed with gas.

EVENT DATE:

February 9, 1995 (date combined leakage exceeded Technical Specification limit)

REPORT DUE DATE:

March 13, 1995

REFERENCES:

Significant Occurrence Reports (SOR) 95-95, 95-100, 95-102, 95-104, 95-112, 95-136, 95-136, 95-137, 95-174

PAST SIMILAR OCCURRENCES:

LER 84-06, LER 88-03, LER 89-08, LER 93-03

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCES:

During the current refueling outage, it was determined that the total combined leakage through the containment isolation valves supplied seal water from the IVSWS and tested in refueling surveillance test PT-R26A, "Local IVSWS Test Type 'C'", as of this report was greater than 488,582 cubic centimeters per hour. Technical Specification 4.4.D.2.c specifies a maximum allowable leakage rate of 14,700 cubic centimeters per hour. The excessive leakage was primarily across three individual containment isolation valves (FCV-625, 797, 791) and one pair of valves (1702/1705), which together exhibited leakage of greater than 476,400 cubic centimeters per hour. The exact amount of leakage was not determined for two of the individual valves and the one pair of valves.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION**

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-630), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20585, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCES: (continued)

Refueling surveillance tests PT-R26B, "Local IVSWS Test Type 'C' (Nitrogen)", and PT-R27, "Containment Isolation Valve Leakage", were also performed. For PT-R26B, the leakage through one valve (732) could not be determined because the valve could not be closed. This valve is sealed with nitrogen from the IVSWS. The required test pressure could not be obtained due to gross leakage through one valve (85C) tested in PT-R27. Air from the Weld Channel and Containment Penetration Pressurization System (WCCPPS) seals this valve. Technical Specification 4.4.D.2.a specifies a maximum allowable combined leakage rate of 0.5 L_a for certain classes of valves, which includes these two valves. Because the actual leakage rate could not be measured, the Technical Specification limit was assumed to be exceeded.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCES:

The IVSWS assures the effectiveness of those containment isolation valves that are located in lines connected to the reactor coolant system, or that could be exposed to the containment atmosphere during any condition which requires containment isolation, by providing a water seal at the valves. The system provides a simple and reliable means for injecting seal water between the seats and stem packing of the globe and double disc types of isolation valves, and into the piping between closed diaphragm type isolation valves. The resulting water seal blocks any potential leakage of the containment atmosphere through the valve seats and stem packing. The water is introduced at a pressure slightly higher than the containment design pressure of 47 psig. The possibility of leakage from the containment or reactor coolant system past the first isolation point is thus prevented by assuring that if leakage does exist, it will be from the IVSWS into containment. Containment isolation valves FCV-625, 797, 791, and 1702/1705 are sealed with IVSWS water.

For lines that would be subjected to pressure in excess of the IVSWS design pressure in the event of an accident due to the operation of the recirculation pumps, the isolation valves for the lines can be sealed by nitrogen gas from the high-pressure nitrogen supply of the IVSWS. Containment isolation valve 732 is sealed in this manner and the nitrogen gas injection is manually initiated. The WCCPPS supplies compressed air to all containment penetrations and inner liner weld channels and maintains a pressure in excess of containment design pressure during all reactor operations, thereby ensuring that there will be no outleakage of the containment atmosphere during an accident. Valve 85C is sealed by the WCCPPS.

These systems operate to limit fission product release from containment during a design basis accident. Although no credit is taken for the operation of these systems in the calculation of offsite accident doses, they do provide assurance that the containment leak rate is lower than that assumed in the accident analysis should an accident occur.

These events are reportable because Technical Specification limits were exceeded.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION**

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 60.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-630), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20585, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Indian Point Unit No. 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 4 7 9 5	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
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		- 0	0 6	- 0	0	0 5 OF 0 5

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 368A's) (17)

CAUSE OF OCCURRENCES:

Technical Specification 4.4.D.2.c leakage rate limit was exceeded due to excessive leakage through the following containment isolation valves sealed by IVSWS water:

1. Valve 625 - Component cooling water return from RCP thermal barrier - to be repaired prior to plant start-up
2. Valve 797 - Component cooling water supply to RCP thermal barrier - packing leak and indications on seat and disc
3. Valve 791 - Component cooling water supply to excess letdown heat exchanger - to be repaired prior to plant start-up
4. Valves 1702/1705 - Reactor coolant drain tank pump discharge - to be repaired prior to plant start-up

Technical Specification 4.4.D.2.a leakage rate limit was exceeded due to excessive leakage through the following containment isolation valves sealed by IVSWS nitrogen (732) and WCCPPS air (85C):

1. Valve 732 - Residual heat removal pump suction line from reactor coolant system - to be repaired prior to plant start-up
2. Valve 85C - Personnel airlock bleed valve - to be repaired prior to plant start-up

A revision to this report will be submitted to document the cause for leakage through each valve.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Work orders were written for each of the failed valves. Repairs were or will be made to each individual valve as necessary and as described above. Each valve will be retested prior to startup of the plant to ensure the applicable leakage rate criteria are met.