ATTACHMENT I

PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE

CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC.
INDIAN POINT UNIT NO. 2
DOCKET NO. 50-247
MARCH 1999

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A proposed new Technical Specification Section 4.0.2 ("Inadvertent Surpassing Of Surveillance Interval" - pages 4.1-1a and 4.1-1b) shall be inserted between Technical Specification 4.0.1 (page 4.1-1) and Technical Specification 4.1 (page 4.1-2). The Specification and its Basis are provided on the following two pages.

4.0.2 Inadvertent Surpassing Of Surveillance Intervals

Failure to perform a Surveillance Requirement within the allowed surveillance interval, defined by Specification 4.0.1, shall constitute a noncompliance with the operability requirements for a Limiting Condition for Operation. The time limits of the action requirements are applicable at the time it is identified that a Surveillance Requirement has not been performed. The action requirements may be delayed up to 24 hours to permit the completion of the surveillance when the allowable outage time limits of the action requirements are less than 24 hours. Surveillance Requirements do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment.

Basis

Specification 4.0.2 establishes the failure to perform a Surveillance Requirement within the allowed surveillance interval, defined by the provisions of Specification 4.0.1, as a condition that constitutes a failure to meet the operability requirements for a Limiting Condition for Operation. Under the provisions of this specification, systems and components are assumed to be operable when Surveillance Requirements have been satisfactorily performed within the specified time interval. However, nothing in this provision is to be construed as implying that systems or components are operable when they are found to be inoperable although still meeting the Surveillance Requirements. This specification also clarifies that the action requirements are applicable when Surveillance Requirements have not been completed within the allowed surveillance interval and the time limits of the action requirements apply from the point of time it is identified that a surveillance has not been performed and not at the time that the allowed surveillance interval was exceeded. Completion of the Surveillance Requirement within the allowable outage time limits of the action requirements restores compliance with the requirements of Specification 4.0.2. However, this does not negate the fact that the failure to have performed the surveillance within the allowed surveillance interval, defined by the provisions of Specification 4.0.1, was a violation of the operability requirements of a Limiting Condition for Operation that is subject to enforcement action. Further, the failure to perform a surveillance within the provisions of Specification 4.0.1 is a violation of a Technical Specification requirement and is, therefore, a reportable event under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) because it is a condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

If the allowable outage time limits of the action requirements are less than 24 hours or a shutdown is required to comply with the action requirements, e.g., Specification 3.0.1, a 24-hour allowance is provided to permit delay in implementing the action requirements. This provides an adequate time limit to complete the surveillance before a shutdown is required to comply with action requirements or before other remedial measures would be required that may preclude completion of a surveillance. The basis for this allowance includes consideration for plant conditions, adequate planning, availability of personnel, the time required to perform the surveillance, and the safety significance of the delay in completing the required surveillance. This provision also provides a time limit for the completion of Surveillance Requirements that become applicable as a consequence of reactor operating condition changes imposed by action requirements. If a surveillance is not completed within the 24-hour allowance, the time limits of the action requirements are applicable at that time. When a surveillance is performed within the 24-hour allowance and the Surveillance Requirements are not met, the time limits of the action requirements are applicable at the time the surveillance is terminated.

Surveillance Requirements do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment because the action requirements define the remedial measures that apply. However, the Surveillance Requirements have to be met to demonstrate that inoperable equipment has been restored to operable status.

ATTACHMENT II

SAFETY ASSESSMENT

CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC.
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SECTION I - Description of Changes

The proposed Technical Specification 4.0.2 was developed from the guidance provided in Generic Letter 87-09 (Reference 1) for the Pressurized Water Reactor Standard Technical Specifications (PWR STS).

As stated in Reference 1, the problem involves unnecessary shutdowns caused when the allowed surveillance intervals are inadvertently exceeded. The solution is to clarify the applicability of the action requirements, to specify a specific acceptable time limit for completing a missed surveillance in certain circumstances, and to clarify when a missed surveillance constitutes a violation of the operability requirements of a Limiting Condition for Operation

SECTION II - Evaluation of Changes

When a surveillance interval is inadvertently exceeded it is overly conservative to assume that systems or components are inoperable, since a vast majority of surveillances do in fact demonstrate that systems or components are operable. When a surveillance is missed, it is primarily a question of operability that has not been verified by the performance of a Surveillance Requirement. Proposed Technical Specification 4.0.2 includes a time limit of 24 hours that allows a delay of required actions to permit the performance of the missed surveillance and is based on consideration of plant conditions, adequate planning, availability of personnel, the time required to perform the surveillance, and the safety significance of the delay in completing the surveillance.

If a plant shutdown is required before a missed surveillance is completed, it is likely that it would be conducted while the plant is being shut down because completion of the missed surveillance would emanate the shutdown requirement. Such an evolution is undesirable since it increases the risk to the plant and public safety for two reasons. First, the plant would be in a transient state involving changing plant conditions that offer the potential for an upset that could lead to a demand for the system or component being tested. This would occur when the system or component is either out of service to allow performance of the surveillance test or there is a lower level of confidence in its operability because the normal surveillance interval was exceeded. If the surveillance did demonstrate that the system or component was inoperable, it usually would be preferable to restore it to operable status before making a major change in plant operating conditions. Second, a shutdown would increase the pressure on the plant staff to expeditiously complete the required surveillance so that the plant could return to power operation. This would further increase the probability for a plant upset when both the shutdown and surveillance activities place a demand on the plant operators.

Thus, the 24-hour time limit would balance the risks associated with an allowance for completing the surveillance within this 24-hour period against the risks associated with the potential for a plant upset and challenge to safety systems when the alternative is a shutdown to comply with the action requirements before the surveillance can be completed. Therefore, the proposed Technical Specification change is safe.

SECTION III - No Significant Hazards Evaluation

Consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.92, the enclosed application involves no significant hazards based on the following information:

1) Does the proposed license amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response:

No. This proposed change will result in either the plant condition either remaining unchanged (i.e., the system or component is declared operable) or in the plant proceeding to a shutdown condition (i.e., the system or component is declared inoperable). If at the end of the 24-hour interval, it is necessary to proceed to shutdown, this shutdown is indistinguishable from any shutdown where a system or component is declared inoperable. Allowing an additional 24 hours to perform the surveillance balances the risks associated with an allowance for completing the surveillance within this 24-hour period against the risks associated with the potential for a plant upset and challenge to safety systems when the alternative is a shutdown to comply with the action requirements before the surveillance can be completed. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2) Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response:

No. This proposed change will result in either the plant condition either remaining unchanged (i.e., the system or component is declared operable) or in the plant proceeding to a shutdown condition (i.e., the system or component is declared inoperable). If at the end of the 24-hour interval, it is necessary to proceed to shutdown, this shutdown is indistinguishable from any shutdown where a system or component is declared inoperable. Allowing an additional 24 hours to perform the surveillance balances the risks associated with an allowance for completing the surveillance within this 24-hour period against the risks associated with the potential for a plant upset and challenge to safety systems when the alternative is a shutdown to comply with the action requirements before the surveillance can be completed. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3) Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response:

No. This proposed change will result in either the plant condition either remaining unchanged (i.e., the system or component is declared operable) or in the plant proceeding to a shutdown condition (i.e., the system or component is declared inoperable). If at the end of the 24-hour interval, it is necessary to proceed to shutdown, this shutdown is indistinguishable from any shutdown where a system or component is declared inoperable. Allowing an additional 24 hours to perform the surveillance balances the risks associated with an allowance for completing the surveillance within this 24-hour period against the risks associated with the potential for a plant upset and challenge to safety systems when the alternative is a shutdown to comply with the action requirements before the surveillance can be completed. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Therefore, the proposed change to the Technical Specifications does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

SECTION IV - Impact of Changes

This change will not adversely impact the following:

ALARA Program
Security and Fire Protection Programs
Emergency Plan
FSAR or SER Conclusions
Overall Plant Operations and the Environment

The proposed Technical Specification change, as recommended by the NRC in Generic Letter 87-09 (Reference 1), requires no modification of the plant, is safe, and does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

SECTION V - Reference

1. USNRC Generic Letter 87-09, "Sections 3.0 and 4.0 of the Standard Technical Specifications (STS) on the Applicability of Limiting Conditions for Operation and Surveillance Requirements (Generic Letter 87-09)," dated June 4, 1987

ATTACHMENT III

SUMMARY OF THE PROPOSED CHANGE

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SUMMARY OF THE PROPOSED CHANGE

The proposed Technical Specification 4.0.2 was developed from the guidance provided in NRC Generic Letter 87-09 for the Pressurized Water Reactor Standard Technical Specifications.

As stated in the Generic Letter, the problem involves unnecessary shutdowns caused when the allowed surveillance intervals are inadvertently exceeded. The solution is to clarify the applicability of the action requirements, to specify a specific acceptable time limit for completing a missed surveillance in certain circumstances, and to clarify when a missed surveillance constitutes a violation of the operability requirements of a Limiting Condition for Operation.

The change allows a delay of 24 hours in the implementation of the action requirement (usually to take the plant to cold shutdown) so as to implement the missed surveillance.