CHAPTER 19 PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section	<u>n</u> <u>Title</u>	<u>Page</u>
19.1	INTRODUCTION	19.1-1
19.2	INTERNAL INITIATING EVENTS	19.2-1
19.3	MODELING OF SPECIAL INITIATORS	19.3-1
19.4	EVENT TREE MODELS	19.4-1
19.5	SUPPORT SYSTEMS	19.5-1
19.6	SUCCESS CRITERIA ANALYSIS	19.6-1
19.7	FAULT TREE GUIDELINES	19.7-1
19.8	PASSIVE CORE COOLING SYSTEM - PASSIVE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL	19.8-1
19.9	PASSIVE CORE COOLING SYSTEM - CORE MAKEUP TANK	(S 19.9-1
19.10	PASSIVE CORE COOLING SYSTEM - ACCUMULATOR	19.10-1
19.11	PASSIVE CORE COOLING SYSTEM - AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM	19.11-1
19.12	PASSIVE CORE COOLING SYSTEM - IN-CONTAINMENT REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK	19.12-1
19.13	PASSIVE CONTAINMENT COOLING	19.13-1
19.14	MAIN AND STARTUP FEEDWATER SYSTEM	19.14-1
19.15	CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM	19.15-1
19.16	CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN CONTROL SYSTEM	19.16-1
19.17	NORMAL RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM	19.17-1
19.18	COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM	19.18-1
19.19	SERVICE WATER SYSTEM	19.19-1

TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT.)

<u>Sectio</u>	<u>n Title</u>	Page
19.20	CENTRAL CHILLED WATER SYSTEM	
19.21	AC POWER SYSTEM	
19.22	CLASS 1E DC & UPS SYSTEM	
19.23	NON-CLASS 1E DC & UPS SYSTEM	
19.24	CONTAINMENT ISOLATION	
19.25	COMPRESSED AND INSTRUMENT AIR	SYSTEM 19.25-1
19.26	PROTECTION AND SAFETY MONITORI	NG SYSTEM 19.26-1
19.27	DIVERSE ACTUATION SYSTEM	
19.28	PLANT CONTROL SYSTEM	
19.29	COMMON CAUSE ANALYSIS	
19.30	HUMAN RELIABILITY ANALYSIS	
19.31	OTHER EVENT TREE NODE PROBABIL	ITIES 19.31-1
19.32	DATA ANALYSIS AND MASTER DATA B	ANK 19.32-1
19.33	FAULT TREE AND CORE DAMAGE QUA	ANTIFICATION 19.33-1
19.34	SEVERE ACCIDENT PHENOMENA TRE	ATMENT 19.34-1
19.35	CONTAINMENT EVENT TREE ANALYSI	S 19.35-1
19.36	REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM DEPRES	SSURIZATION 19.36-1
19.37	CONTAINMENT ISOLATION	
19.38	REACTOR VESSEL REFLOODING	
19.39	IN-VESSEL RETENTION OF MOLTEN C	ORE DEBRIS 19.39-1
19.40	PASSIVE CONTAINMENT COOLING	
19.41	HYDROGEN MIXING AND COMBUSTIO	N ANALYSIS 19.41-1

TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT.)

Section	Title	Page
	DITIONAL CONTAINMENT FAILURE PROBABILITY	19.42-1
19.43 RELI	EASE FREQUENCY QUANTIFICATION	19.43-1
19.44 MAA	P4.0 CODE DESCRIPTION AND AP1000 MODELING	19.44-1
19.45 FISS	ION PRODUCT SOURCE TERMS	19.45-1
19.46 NOT	USED	19.46-1
19.47 NOT	USED	19.47-1
19.48 NOT	USED	19.48-1
19.49 OFF	SITE DOSE EVALUATION	19.49-1
19.50 IMPC	ORTANCE AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS	19.50-1
19.51 UNC	ERTAINTY ANALYSIS	19.51-1
19.52 NOT	USED	19.52-1
19.53 NOT	USED	19.53-1
19.54 LOW	POWER AND SHUTDOWN PRA ASSESSMENT	19.54-1
19.55 SEIS	MIC MARGIN ANALYSIS	19.55-1
19.56 PRA	INTERNAL FLOODING ANALYSIS	19.56-1
19.57 INTE	RNAL FIRE ANALYSIS	19.57-1
19.58 WINI	DS, FLOODS, AND OTHER EXTERNAL EVENTS	19.58-1
19.59 PRA	RESULTS AND INSIGHTS	19.59-1
19.59.10.6	Combined License Information PRA Configuration Controls FERENCES	19.59-2
APP. 19A	THERMAL HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS TO SUPPORT SUCCESS CRITERIA	19A-1

TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT.)

<u>Section</u>	Title	<u>Page</u>
APP. 19B	EX-VESSEL SEVERE ACCIDENT PHENOMENA	19B-1
APP. 19C	ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT OF AP1000 DESIGN FEATURES	19C-1
APP. 19D	EQUIPMENT SURVIVABILITY ASSESSMENT	19D-1
APP. 19E	SHUTDOWN EVALUATION	19E-1
APP. 19F	MALEVOLENT AIRCRAFT IMPACT	19F-1

CHAPTER 19 PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT

19.1 INTRODUCTION

19.2 INTERNAL INITIATING EVENTS

19.3 MODELING OF SPECIAL INITIATORS

19.4 EVENT TREE MODELS

19.5 SUPPORT SYSTEMS

19.6 SUCCESS CRITERIA ANALYSIS

19.7 FAULT TREE GUIDELINES

19.8 PASSIVE CORE COOLING SYSTEM - PASSIVE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL

19.9 PASSIVE CORE COOLING SYSTEM - CORE MAKEUP TANKS

19.10 PASSIVE CORE COOLING SYSTEM - ACCUMULATOR

19.11 PASSIVE CORE COOLING SYSTEM - AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM

19.12 PASSIVE CORE COOLING SYSTEM - IN-CONTAINMENT REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK

19.13 PASSIVE CONTAINMENT COOLING

19.14 MAIN AND STARTUP FEEDWATER SYSTEM

19.15 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM

19.16 CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN CONTROL SYSTEM

19.17 NORMAL RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM

19.18 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM

19.19 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

19.20 CENTRAL CHILLED WATER SYSTEM

19.21 AC POWER SYSTEM

19.22 CLASS 1E DC & UPS SYSTEM

19.23 NON-CLASS 1E DC & UPS SYSTEM

19.24 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION

19.25 COMPRESSED AND INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM

19.26 PROTECTION AND SAFETY MONITORING SYSTEM

19.27 DIVERSE ACTUATION SYSTEM

19.28 PLANT CONTROL SYSTEM

19.29 COMMON CAUSE ANALYSIS

19.30 HUMAN RELIABILITY ANALYSIS

19.31 OTHER EVENT TREE NODE PROBABILITIES

19.32 DATA ANALYSIS AND MASTER DATA BANK

19.33 FAULT TREE AND CORE DAMAGE QUANTIFICATION

19.34 SEVERE ACCIDENT PHENOMENA TREATMENT

19.35 CONTAINMENT EVENT TREE ANALYSIS

19.36 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM DEPRESSURIZATION

19.37 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION

19.38 REACTOR VESSEL REFLOODING

19.39 IN-VESSEL RETENTION OF MOLTEN CORE DEBRIS

19.40 PASSIVE CONTAINMENT COOLING

19.41 HYDROGEN MIXING AND COMBUSTION ANALYSIS

19.42 CONDITIONAL CONTAINMENT FAILURE PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION

19.43 RELEASE FREQUENCY QUANTIFICATION

19.44 MAAP4.0 CODE DESCRIPTION AND AP1000 MODELING

19.45 FISSION PRODUCT SOURCE TERMS

19.46 NOT USED

19.47 NOT USED

19.48 NOT USED

19.49 OFFSITE DOSE EVALUATION

19.50 IMPORTANCE AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

19.51 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS

19.52 NOT USED

19.53 NOT USED

19.54 LOW POWER AND SHUTDOWN PRA ASSESSMENT

19.55 SEISMIC MARGIN ANALYSIS

19.56 PRA INTERNAL FLOODING ANALYSIS

19.57 INTERNAL FIRE ANALYSIS

19.58 WINDS, FLOODS, AND OTHER EXTERNAL EVENTS

19.59 PRA RESULTS AND INSIGHTS

This section of the referenced DCD is incorporated by reference with the following departures and/or supplements.

19.59.10.5 Combined License Information

STD COL 19.59.10-1 A review of the differences between the as-built plant and the design used as the basis for the AP1000 seismic margins analysis will be completed prior to fuel load. A verification walkdown will be performed with the purpose of identifying differences between the as-built plant and the design. Any differences will be evaluated and the seismic margins analysis modified as necessary to account for the plant-specific design, and any design changes or departures from the certified design. A comparison of the as-built SSC high confidence, low probability of failures (HCLPFs) to those assumed in the AP1000 seismic margin evaluation will be performed prior to fuel load. Deviations from the HCLPF values or assumptions in the seismic margin evaluation due to the as-built configuration and final analysis will be evaluated to determine if vulnerabilities have been introduced.

The requirements to which the equipment is to be purchased are included in the equipment specifications. Specifically, the equipment specifications include:

- 1. Specific minimum seismic requirements consistent with those used to define the Table 19.55-1 HCLPF values. This includes the known frequency range used to define the HCLPF by comparing the required response spectrum (RRS) and test response spectrum (TRS). The range of frequency response that is required for the equipment with its structural support is defined.
- 2. Hardware enhancements that were determined in previous test programs and/or analysis programs will be implemented.
- A review of the differences between the as-built plant and the design used as the basis for the AP1000 PRA and DCD Table 19.59-18 will be completed prior to fuel load. The plant specific PRA-based insight differences will be evaluated and the plant specific PRA model modified as necessary to account for plant-specific design and any design changes or departures from the design certification PRA.

It has been confirmed that the Winds, Floods, and Other External Events analysis documented in DCD Section 19.58 is applicable to the site. The site-specific design has been evaluated and is consistent with the AP1000 PRA assumptions. Therefore, Chapter 19 of the AP1000 DCD is applicable to this design.

STD COL 19.59.10-3	A review of the differences between the as-built plant and the design used as the basis for the AP1000 internal fire and internal flood analyses will be completed prior to fuel load. Plant specific internal fire and internal flood analyses will be evaluated and the analyses modified as necessary to account for the plant-specific design, and any design changes or departures from the certified design.
STD COL 19.59.10-4	 The AP1000 Severe Accident Management Guidance (SAMG) from APP-GW-GLR-070, Reference 1 to DCD Section 19.59, is implemented on a site-specific basis. Key elements of the implementation include: SAMG based on APP-GW-GLR-070 is provided to Emergency Response Organization (ERO) personnel in assessing plant damage, planning and
	prioritizing response actions and implementing strategies that delineate actions inside and outside the control room.
	• Severe accident management strategies and guidance are interfaced with the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP's) and Emergency Plan.
	 Responsibilities for authorizing and implementing accident management strategies are delineated as part of the Emergency Plan.
	 SAMG training is provided for ERO personnel commensurate with their responsibilities defined in the Emergency Plan.
STD COL 19.59.10-5	A thermal lag assessment of the as-built equipment required to mitigate severe accidents (hydrogen igniters and containment penetrations) will be performed to provide additional assurance that this equipment can perform its severe accident functions during environmental conditions resulting from hydrogen burns associated with severe accidents. This assessment will be performed prior to fuel load and is required only for equipment used for severe accident mitigation that has not been tested at severe accident conditions. The ability of the as-built equipment to perform during severe accident hydrogen burns will be assessed using the Environment Enveloping method or the Test Based Thermal Analysis method discussed in EPRI NP-4354 (DCD Section 19.59, Reference 3).
	Add the following new information after DCD Subsection 19.59.10.5:
STD SUP 19.59-1	19.59.10.6 PRA Configuration Controls
	PRA configuration controls contain the following key elements:

- A process for monitoring PRA inputs and collecting new information.
- A process that maintains and updates the PRA to be reasonably consistent with the as-built, as operated plant.
- A process that considers the cumulative impact of pending changes when applying the PRA.
- A process that evaluates the impact of changes on currently implemented risk-informed decisions that have used the PRA.
- A process that maintains configuration control of computer codes used to support PRA quantification.
- A process for upgrading the PRA to meet PRA standards that the NRC has endorsed.
- Documentation of the PRA.

PRA configuration controls are consistent with the regulatory positions on maintenance and upgrades in Regulatory Guide 1.200.

Schedule for Maintenance and Upgrades of the PRA

The PRA update process is a means to reasonably reflect the as designed and as operated plant configurations in the PRA models. The PRA upgrade process includes an update of the PRA plus a general review of the entire PRA model, and as applicable, the application of new software that implements a different methodology, implementation of new modeling techniques, as well as a comprehensive documentation effort.

- During construction, the PRA is upgraded prior to fuel load to cover those initiating events and modes of operation contained in NRC-endorsed consensus standards on PRA in effect one year prior to the scheduled date of the initial fuel load for a Level 1 and Level 2 PRA.
- Prior to license renewal the PRA is upgraded to include all modes of operation.
- During operation, PRA updates are completed as part of the upgrade process at least once every four years.
- A screening process is used to determine whether a PRA update should be performed more frequently based upon the nature of the changes in design or procedures. The screening process considers whether the changes affect the PRA insights. Changes that do not meet the threshold for immediate update are tracked for the next regulatory scheduled update. If the screening process determines that the changes do warrant a

PRA update, the update is made as soon as practicable consistent with the required change importance and the applications being used.

PRA upgrades are performed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.71(h).

Process for Maintenance and Upgrades of the PRA

Various information sources are monitored to determine changes or new information that affects the model assumptions or quantification. Plant specific design, procedure, and operational changes are reviewed for risk impact. Information sources include applicable operating experience, plant modifications, engineering calculation revisions, procedure changes, industry studies, and NRC information.

The PRA upgrade includes initiating events and modes of operation contained in NRC-endorsed consensus standards on PRA in effect one year prior to each required upgrade.

This PRA maintenance and update incorporates the appropriate new information including significant modeling errors discovered during routine use of the PRA.

Once the PRA model elements requiring change are identified, the PRA computer models are modified and appropriate documents revised. Documentation of modifications to the PRA model include the changes as well as the upgraded portions clearly indicating what has been changed. The impact on the risk insights is clearly indicated.

PRA Quality Assurance

Maintenance and upgrades of the PRA are subject to the following quality assurance provisions:

Procedures identify the qualifications of personnel who perform the maintenance and upgrade of the PRA.

Procedures provide for the control of PRA documentation, including revisions.

For updates of the PRA, procedures provide for independent review, or checking of the calculations and information.

Procedures provide for an independent review of the model after an upgrade is completed. Additionally, after the PRA is upgraded, the PRA is reviewed by outside PRA experts such as industry peer review teams and the comments incorporated to maintain the PRA current with industry practices. Peer review findings are entered into a tracking system. PRA upgrades receive a peer review for those aspects of the PRA that are upgraded.

PRA models and applications are documented in a manner that facilitates peer review as well as future updates and applications of the PRA by describing the

processes that were used, and provide details of the assumptions made and their bases. PRA documentation is developed such that traceability and reproducibility is maintained. PRA documentation is maintained in accordance with Regulatory Position 1.3 of Regulatory Guide 1.200.

Procedures provide for appropriate attention or corrective actions if assumptions, analyses, or information used previously are changed or determined to be in error. Potential impacts to the PRA model (i.e., design change notices, calculations, and procedure changes) are tracked. Errors found in the PRA model between periodic updates are tracked using the site tracking system.

PRA-Related Input to Other Programs and Processes

The PRA provides input to various programs and processes, such as the Maintenance Rule implementation, reactor oversight process, the RAP, and the RTNSS program. The use of the PRA in these programs is discussed below, or cross-references to the appropriate FSAR sections are provided.

PRA Input to Design Programs and Processes

The PRA insights identified during the design development are discussed in DCD Subsection 19.59.10.4 and summarized in DCD Table 19.59-18. DCD Section 14.3 summarizes the design material contained in AP1000 that has been incorporated into the Tier 1 information from the PRA. A discussion of the plant features important to reducing risk is provided in DCD Subsection 19.59.9.

PRA Input to the Maintenance Rule Implementation

The PRA is used as an input in determining the safety significance classification and bases of in-scope SSCs. SSCs identified as risk-significant via the Reliability Assurance Program for the design phase (DRAP, Section 17.4) are included within the initial Maintenance Rule scope as high safety significance SSCs.

For risk-significant SSCs identified via DRAP, performance criteria are established, by the Maintenance Rule expert panel using input from the reliability and availability assumptions used in the PRA, to monitor the effectiveness of the maintenance performed on the SSCs.

The Maintenance Rule implementation is discussed in Section 17.6.

PRA Input to the Reactor Oversight Process

The mitigating systems performance indicators (MSPI) are evaluated based on the indicators and methodologies defined in NEI 99-02 (Reference 201).

The Significance Determination Process (SDP) uses risk insights, where appropriate, to determine the safety significance of inspection findings.

PRA Input to the Reliability Assurance Program

The PRA input to the Reliability Assurance Program is discussed in DCD Subsection 19.59.10.1.

PRA Input to the Regulatory Treatment of Nonsafety-Related Systems Programs

The importance of nonsafety-related SSCs in the AP1000 has been evaluated using PRA insights to identify SSCs that are important in protecting the utility's investment and for preventing and mitigating severe accidents. These investment protection systems, structures and components are included in the D-RAP/MR Program (refer to Subsection 17.4), which provides confidence that availability and reliability are designed into the plant and that availability and reliability are maintained throughout plant life through the Maintenance Rule. Technical Specifications are not required for these SSCs because they do not meet the selection criteria applied to the AP1000 (refer to Subsection 16.1.1).

MOV Program

The MOV Program includes provisions to accommodate the use of risk-informed inservice testing of MOVs (Subsection 3.9.6).

19.59.11 REFERENCES

Add the following text to the end of DCD Subsection 19.59.11:

201. NEI 99-02, Nuclear Energy Institute, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Technical Report NEI 99-02, Revision 5, July 2007.

APPENDIX 19A THERMAL HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS TO SUPPORT SUCCESS CRITERIA

APPENDIX 19B EX-VESSEL SEVERE ACCIDENT PHENOMENA

APPENDIX 19C ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT OF AP1000 DESIGN FEATURES

APPENDIX 19D EQUIPMENT SURVIVABILITY ASSESSMENT

APPENDIX 19E SHUTDOWN EVALUATION

APPENDIX 19F MALEVOLENT AIRCRAFT IMPACT