NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/88

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Indian Point, Unit 3	0 5 0 0 0 2 8 6	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)
SINGLE FAILURE CONCERN FOR AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 4	3 0	8 7	8 7	0 0 5	0 0	0 6	0 1	8 7	Indian Point, Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 2 4 7
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9): N

POWER LEVEL (10): 0 9 9

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	X 50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (AREA CODE)
John J. Anderson, Site Reactor Engineer	9 1 4 7 3 6 - 1 8 3 4 3

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15): MONTH DAY YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On April 30, 1987, with the Reactor at 99 percent power, the New York Power Authority (NYPA) became aware of a potential "single failure" concern with the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW). A review of the AFW system determined that failure of a single relay could prevent automatic starting of both motor driven AFW pumps during low low steam generator level (with offsite power available) or automatic trip of both main feedwater pumps. The unit was brought to cold shutdown on May 2, 1987 for a scheduled refueling outage. A modification will be installed prior to plant start-up to resolve the single failure concern.

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PDR ADOCK 05000286
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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6) YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	PAGE (3)
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On April 30, 1987 with the reactor at 99 percent power, the New York Power Authority (NYPA) became aware of a potential single failure concern for the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system at the Consolidated Edison Company's Indian Point Unit 2. NYPA immediately reviewed the AFW system at Indian Point Unit 3 and determined that a single relay failure could prevent automatic starting of both motor driven auxiliary boiler feedwater pumps (ABFP).

Relay BFP in the auto-start circuitry for the AFW system is actuated by either low low steam generator water level (with offsite power available) or automatic trip of both main boiler feedwater pumps. After receiving one of these signals, relay BFP in turn actuates the timing sequence for starting of both motor driven ABFP's. A postulated failure of this relay could therefore prevent automatic starting of both motor driven pumps for the above mentioned plant conditions. Regardless of the status of relay BFP, the automatic starting ability of the motor driven pumps would not be prevented during blackout or safety injection signals. Operation of the redundant steam driven ABFP NO. 32 is not affected by the postulated relay failure.

Since, by design, some operator action is required to put No. 32 ABFP in service, no credit can be taken for this pump analytically for ten minutes. Similarly, during the postulated failure of relay BFP, the operators are assumed to be unable to manually start the motor driven ABFP's for 10 minutes although the relay failure does not preclude manual operation. Since the AFW system is used to remove residual heat, this postulated failure is reportable under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(D).

The unit was shutdown on May 2, 1987 for a scheduled refueling outage, thereby terminating the 72 hour limiting condition for operation (LCO) that began when the discovery was made. The design which resulted in this concern will be modified prior to unit start-up. The remainder of the AFW system was reviewed and confirmed that no similar concerns existed elsewhere. No similar events have been reported in an LER to date.

Indian Point 3
Nuclear Power Plant
P.O. Box 215
Buchanan, New York 10511
914 739.8200

New York Power Authority

June 1, 1987
IP3-WAJ-033Z
IP3-JJA-151H

Docket No. 50-286
License No. DPR-64

Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Sir:

The attached Licensee Event Report LER 87-005-00 is hereby submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73. This event is of the type defined in Paragraph 50.73 (a) (2) (v).

Very truly yours,

William A. Josiger
Resident Manager
Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant

JJA:sn:05
Attachment

cc: Mr. William Russell
Regional Administrator
Region 1
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

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1100 Circle 75 Parkway
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