POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
INDIAN POINT NO. 3 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
P. O. BOX 215 BUCHANAN, N. Y. 10511
TELEPHONE: 914-739-8200

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November 15, 1980
IPP-FWG-10850

Docket No. 50-286
License No. DPR-64

Boyce H. Grier, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region 1
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

The attached Licensee Event Report 80-013/03L-0 is hereby submitted in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification 6.9.1. This event is of the type defined in 6.9.1.8. (b) of the Technical Specification. Three copies of this letter and attachment are enclosed as required.

Very truly yours,

S. S. Zulla
Resident Manager

FWG/bam

cc: Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attn: William McDonald, Director (3 Copies)
Office of Management Information & Program Control
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Office of Inspection and Enforcement (30 Copies)
c/o Distribution Services Branch, DDC, ADM
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ATTACHMENT 1

Docket No. 50-286
LER 80-013/03L-0

Power Authority of the
State of New York

The plant was in the cold shutdown condition.

On October 17, 1980, while performing the Pressurizer Safety Valve Setting Test (3PT-R5), valve PCV-466 would not fully release at its set pressure. That is to say, instead of popping to full open at set pressure, it leaked through the throat. As the pressure was increased beyond the procedural setpoint of 2485 ± 25 psig, excess pressure was vented out the throat of the valve.

The operability of this valve is covered by Technical Specification 3.1.A.2.b, which requires all safety valves to be operable whenever the reactor is above the cold shutdown condition. Whereas the reactor was at cold shutdown during the performance of the test, the potential exists for the valve to have failed during plant operation. (3PT-R5 was last performed on October 31, 1979.)

When the valve was disassembled and inspected, the cause of the leakage was found to be grooves in the valve seat and on the face of the disk insert. The valve seat was lapped, and the disk insert was replaced. The valve was reassembled and tested, and this time the valve did release properly in the required pressure range of 2485 ± 25 psig. The actual pressure was recorded at 2500 psig. The valve leakage was then tested at normal operating pressure (2235 psig), and there was no leakage.

During the same performance of 3PT-R5, it was observed that the setpoint for pressurizer safety valve PCV-464 was below the limit of 2485 ± psig, as defined by Technical Specification 3.1.A.2.C. Instead the valve was observed to operate at a test pressure of 2420 psig.

Crosby Model HB Valve PCV-464 was reset to a pressure of 2480 psig, which is within Technical Specification limits. The problem was determined to be mechanical valve drift.

A similar event occurred on November 27, 1979 (LER 79-013/01T-0).