


REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY

UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

Regulatory File Cy.



IN THE MATTER OF:

CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK,
(Indian Point Station, Unit No. 2)

Docket No. 50-247


RETURN TO REGULATORY CENTRAL FILES ROOM 016

Place - Springvale Inn, Croton-on-Hudson, N. Y.

Date - November 2, 1971

Pages. 2259-2484

DUPLICATION OR COPYING OF THIS TRANSCRIPT
BY PHOTOGRAPHIC, ELECTROSTATIC OR OTHER
FACSIMILE MEANS IS PROHIBITED BY THE ORDER
FORM AGREEMENT



REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY

Telephone:
(Code 202) 547-6222

ACE - FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

Official Reporters

415 Second Street, N.E.
Washington, D. C. 20002

4926

NATION-WIDE COVERAGE

8110160153 711102
PDR ADOCK 05000247
PDR

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

=====]

In the Matter of:]

CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK,]
INC.]

Docket No.

(Indian Point Station, Unit No. 2]

50-247

=====]

Springvale Inn
Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y.

Tuesday, November 2, 1971

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing,
pursuant to notice, at 9:00 a.m.

BEFORE:

SAMUEL W. JENSCH, Esq., Chairman,
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.

DR. JOHN C. GEYER, Member.

MR. R. B. BRIGGS, Member.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

I N D E X

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Witness

Direct

Daniel Ford

2267

John Bernard Roll

2296

1 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Please come to order. I
2 believe that the suggestion from the attorneys yesterday
3 was that after a study of yesterday's transcript, they
4 will be prepared to proceed with further cross-examination
5 on the emergency core cooling system; is that correct?

6 MR. ROISMAN: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

7 One preliminary matter, which is given what
8 appears to be continuing weather conditions around here
9 which are somewhat relevant. I wonder if we might discuss,
10 just for a moment, when the hearings will reconvene next
11 week, assuming that we don't finish up this week. I would
12 like to suggest that if we don't, it might be helpful
13 at least for us in terms of digesting material, if we
14 schedule to reconvene Tuesday morning rather than on
15 Monday morning, to add one additional, if you will, study
16 day prior to the reconvening next week. It would be
17 helpful for me to know in terms of making plans for when
18 to be back here and on what day that would be. I spoke
19 with Mr. Karman and Mr. Trosten. They did not have any
20 objection to setting Tuesday as the day we would reconvene
21 next week.

22 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: I think there is a great
23 desire on the part of the Commission that these proceedings
24 continue in successive days as far as possible. I think
25 perhaps if you could give some indication of the necessity

1 of this besides the convenience of it, it would be helpful
2 to the Board in making its judgment.

3 MR. ROISMAN: My thought was this, Mr. Chairman.
4 We are getting a lot of information to digest that is
5 coming in on this subject really just this week. I think
6 we could shorten the time if we had the full three days,
7 Saturday, Sunday and Monday, to attempt to digest the
8 material and focus our cross-examination for next week
9 on the subjects.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: In other words, you took evidence,
11 from witness Moore yesterday orally rather than waiting
12 for responses by interrogatories which seemingly would
13 expedite the situation, and a couple of days now would
14 permit you to review the matter and be better prepared
15 to cross-examine, and the net effect of it would be to
16 expedite it and move the case more rapidly at that time
17 than if we did not take a recess on Monday?

18 MR. ROISMAN: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

19 MR. TROSTEN: Mr. Chairman, that was exactly the
20 basis upon which I agreed with Mr. Roisman, that I agreed
21 with that this would actually expedite the proceeding if
22 we did this.

23 THE CHAIRMAN: The Board would give some
24 consideration to that. What is the suggestion of the Staff?

25 MR. KARMAN: The Staff concurs. We feel that

1 rather than delay it it may very well expedite the matter.

2 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Very well. This information
3 that came from witness Moore yesterday of course was your
4 first information of the kind.

5 MR. KARMAN: That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

6 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: And you likewise feel that you
7 need Monday, too?

8 MR. KARMAN: It's not only that testimony. We
9 are going to have lots of other testimony that's going
10 to come up between now and the end of this session, which
11 much of it will not have been previously distributed.

12 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Well, the Board has some
13 scheduling problems. The Board is inclined to accept the
14 suggestions of the parties, but at this time no determination
15 will be made. We expect to be able to indicate that
16 situation tomorrow morning.

17 MR. TROSTEN: Mr. Chairman, may I just ask this
18 question in connection with the Board's consideration of
19 the schedule.

20 We are intending to go through Friday of this
21 week is my understanding of the situation, is that not
22 correct, Mr. Chairman?

23 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Yes, that is correct.

24 MR. TROSTEN: And I might ask Mr. Roisman if
25 he has given consideration as far as the matter of

1 expediting the schedule is concerned, and the Board might
2 wish to consider this too, to adjourning on Thursday and
3 reconvening on Monday versus continuing through Friday
4 and then reconvening on Tuesday. I mean this is another
5 possibility that I think consideration perhaps ought to
6 be given to. I agreed with Mr. Roisman that perhaps
7 a day, leaving a day out would expedite the hearing, but
8 we haven't discussed the matter of which would be
9 preferable from everybody's point of view.

10 MR. KARMAN: The Staff would be amenable to
11 either one, Mr. Chairman.

12 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: But in any event you feel that
13 some time would advantageous to preparation?

14 MR. KARMAN: I believe it would, yes, sir.

15 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Well, let us give consideration
16 to that matter. This suggestion that Applicant's
17 Counsel has made may be very helpful to the Board but
18 we will see how the situation develops as to our own
19 scheduling. We expect to indicate tomorrow morning.

20 Very well. Are we ready to proceed with further
21 examination?

22 MR. TROSTEN: Yes.

23 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Who is the witness decided
24 from cross-examination?

25 MR. TROSTEN: Mr. Chairman, we are prepared this

1 morning to have witness Moore resume the stand in order
2 to respond to certain questions that were raised yesterday
3 to which he said he would provide additional information
4 today. So I would like to ask witness Moore to resume
5 the stand, please.

6 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Please come forward,
7 Mr. Moore.

8 MR. ROISMAN: Mr. Chairman, one last preliminary
9 matter. As I had advised the parties, we were hoping
10 that we would be able to have with us to assist us in
11 cross-examination one of the authors of the report,
12 A Critique of the New AEC Design Criteria for Reactor
13 Safety Systems, which was prepared by the Union of
14 Concerned Scientists. I think this is a fair statement
15 to say that this probably represents from the standpoint
16 of Intervenors by far the most sophisticated presentation
17 and analysis on the part of emergency core cooling systems.
18 We feel fortunate to have with us this morning Mr. Daniel
19 Ford, who is one of the authors of that report, and I
20 have discussed this with Mr. Trosten and with Mr. Karman
21 as to whether or not they would have any objection to having
22 Mr. Ford conduct the cross-examination on the emergency
23 core cooling system as a technical expert on behalf of the
24 Citizen's Committee in order to expedite the matter rather
25 than to have the whispering back and forth. And they

1 have asked me if I would have Mr. Ford state for the
2 record what his qualifications are for doing this, and
3 I wonder if I could do that at this time and then ask
4 the Board to rule on whether he will be permitted to
5 cross-examine.

6 I should point out that Mr. Ford's expertise in
7 the area is acquired outside the normal educational
8 disciplines, to wit, he does not have a degree in nuclear
9 engineering or physics, but instead has worked very closely
10 with Henry Kendall, Professor of Physics at MIT, James
11 MacKenzie.

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 Also, a nuclear, in the preparation of this report,
2 and his qualifications are more in terms of what he has
3 acquired in the course of this, if you will, intensive study
4 program than in the more formal educational pursuits.

5 I have talked to him and I am aware that his input
6 into this report is extremely high and it is not merely that
7 he was by any stretch of the imagination an "also" on the report
8 but a very important part of it.

9 I'd like Mr. Ford to state in some detail his qualifi-
10 cations, if that is all right with the Board.

11 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: In order to have it formally on the
12 part of the record we will have him sworn.

13 (Daniel Ford, sworn.)

14 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Will you give your name, address
15 and your present business activity and your background, please.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1 DR. FORD: My name is Daniel Ford. My residence is
2 415 Broadway, Cambridge, Massachusetts. My office address is
3 the Research Project on Pollution, 1583 Massachusetts Avenue,
4 Cambridge, Massachusetts.

5 Professionally I'm the Coordinator of this
6 Environmental Research Project which is funded to Harvard by
7 the National Science Foundation.

8 I organized a group of nuclear engineers and nuclear
9 physicists with whom we investigated the Idaho Semi Scale Tests
10 starting in the middle of last spring and have been involved
11 since that time in extensive research on all the engineering
12 data pertaining to the Emergency Core Cooling System.

13 I'm the principal author of the two reports that have
14 been issued by the Union of Concerned Scientists. I have
15 lectured at Harvard University in the program of national
16 sciences on the subject of Reactor Safety. This experience is
17 basically what constitutes my expertise on Emergency Core
18 Cooling matters.

19 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Will you give us your educational
20 background.

21 DR. FORD: I have a Bachelor's degree in economics
22 from Harvard College, which I received in June of 1970. I
23 have been involved full time in economic research, environmental
24 research since that time. My further educational experience,
25 I have been nominated as a junior fellow of the Society of

1 Fellows to do Interdisciplinary Research in Environmental
2 Problems which I hope to begin approximately a year from now.

3 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: What was your work with Professor
4 Kendall? Would you identify him for the record, please.

5 DR. FORD: Professor Kendall is co-author of the
6 two Union of Concerned Scientists Reports. The first one was
7 issued in July of this year entitled, "Nuclear Reactor Safety
8 and Evaluation of New Evidence." It was reprinted by the
9 American Nuclear Society in the September issue of Nuclear
10 News, and the second report, for the record, is the critique
11 of the new AEC design criteria which was issued two weeks ago.

12 Professor Kendall is a nuclear and high energy
13 physicist. He is a professor and on the faculty of the
14 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His contribution in
15 his scientific background, with that he is perhaps the most
16 prominent high energy physicist in the country today. He is
17 listed by the Atomic Energy Commission in their annual survey
18 in their sponsored research as the principal investigator of
19 electron scattering in their experiments at the Stanford
20 Linear Accelerator Center. His experimental work on the
21 structure of the neutrons is considered in Science Magazine as
22 the single most important contribution of high energy physics
23 in the last thirty years.

24 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: These Idaho Semi Scale Tests I
25 believe were conducted sometime in November through February.

1 DR. FORD: November through March.

2 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: November 1970 to March of 1971.
3 They were, I think, released and made available to the public
4 generally about April or May, I believe.

5 DR. FORD: That's correct. I believe the first
6 public announcement was a front page in the Washington Post,
7 on May 26th.

8 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Since that time, how many hours
9 have you worked with Professor Kendall on this type of subject?

10 DR. FORD: If you will believe me, I will say night
11 and day since we learned of the tests early in May. We have
12 been working seven days a week on the subject since that time.

13 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Is there any comment from the parties?

14 MR. TROSTEN: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

15 Under Section 2.733 of the Atomic Energy Commission
16 Rules of Practice, at the request of a party, Mr. Roisman, the
17 Board may permit, as the Board knows, a qualified individual
18 of scientific or technical training or experience to parti-
19 cipate on behalf of that party in the examination and cross-
20 examination of expert witnesses.

21 Dr. Ford could, of course, sit at the table with
22 Mr. Roisman and suggest to Mr. Roisman questions which Mr.
23 Roisman could then place. There would obviously be no harm in
24 that.

25 On the basis of what Mr. Ford has said, the

1 qualifications that he has stated, it is Applicant's position
2 that Mr. Ford is not a qualified individual who has scientific
3 or technical training. He is not an expert in the fields in-
4 volved.

5 Consequently, it is our position that he certainly
6 is not a competent witness to sponsor the document to which
7 Mr. Roisman referred, the critique by the Union of Concerned
8 Scientists, or the other documents to which Mr. Roisman
9 referred. We would most certainly enter an objection to his
10 qualifications as a witness to sponsor any such testimony.

11 On the other hand, if Mr. Roisman desires to have
12 Mr. Ford either help him with the cross-examination by
13 suggesting questions or in some instances actually to ask the
14 question in lieu of Mr. Roisman asking the question, we would
15 not object to that.

16 MR. ROISMAN: Mr. Chairman, let me say as I had
17 stated at the outset, that we were not intending to introduce
18 the critique of the AEC interim criteria into evidence under
19 the sponsorship of Mr. Ford; that it was only for the cross-
20 examination purpose.

21

22

23

24

25

1 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: It is so understood.

2 The Staff.

3 MR. KARMAN: Mr. Chairman, it would seem that
4 technically under Section 2.733, that there is a serious
5 question as to whether or not Mr. Ford were to qualify
6 as a qualified individual with scientific or technical
7 training. The Staff certainly has no desire to lengthen
8 these hearings by having Mr. Ford pass a question to
9 Mr. Roisman for his examination. I think, for the record,
10 we place ourselves in our position not objecting to this
11 procedure, only in the hopes of speeding along the hearing.
12 We leave to the Board the question as to whether or not
13 the Intervenor has complied with Section 2.733.

14 MR. ROISMAN: Mr. Chairman, may I just speak
15 to the comments that these two gentlemen have made? First
16 let me point out the 2.733 was obviously written to
17 include people other than people with formal technical
18 training, since it refers to the experience along with the
19 word "training" as listing a qualified individual. The
20 purpose of this Section, it seems to me, is clear. It
21 was in order to attempt to expedite the proceeding.
22 People with special knowledge may very well -- Although
23 this may seem to be an admission against interest. -- may
24 not be lawyers, but other people who have special knowledge
25 that could expedite the proceeding. The only problem I

1 could imagine, if it turned out that Mr. Ford's cross-
2 examination appeared to be pointless to the Board or get
3 us far afield. I would suggest that perhaps the best test
4 of that would be, we are going to have like an hour or
5 an hour and a half of cross-examination until we make
6 that decision. Then Mr. Ford would be perfectly amenable
7 to doing the cross-examination during that period and
8 see if there does seem to be a problem. If not, and we
9 seem to be advancing as I am convinced we will, it seems
10 to me that the purposes that would be served by having a
11 technically trained or experienced person to cross-examine
12 would be better met than this whispering from Mr. Ford
13 to me and I asking the question of Mr. Moore.

14 MR. TROSTEN: May I make one more comment?

15 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Yes. Proceed.

16 MR. TROSTEN: It has been the Applicant's
17 position throughout this proceeding, and will continue
18 to be that position, that we have no desire to lengthen
19 the proceeding or to complicate it by raising technical
20 or legalistic objections to procedure. We feel this way
21 about the matter: we would like to see the cross-
22 examination proceed. We feel that in no sense, in our
23 view -- And I am not saying this in a pejorative sense
24 with respect to Mr. Ford in any way or with respect to
25 Mr. Roisman. In no sense in our view will Mr. Ford qualify

1 for a technical position involving the complex engineering
2 and scientific and chemical engineering disciplines which
3 are involved here, either by his training or by his
4 experience. On the other hand, in the interest of moving
5 forward with this proceeding, if the Board chooses
6 to follow the practice of allowing Mr. Ford to assist
7 Mr. Roisman to pose these questions, we think we could
8 go forward with it.

9 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: I think one of the problems
10 that the Commission contemplated in a rule of this kind
11 is to be sure that whatever is undertaken will expedite
12 the development of relevant information. The interrogation
13 of witnesses is not necessarily limited to lawyers. I
14 think, however, that lawyers, from experience, learn to
15 frame questions which are not argumentative and which
16 seek facts rather than argument from the witness. There
17 may be certain techniques that lawyers develop from their
18 experience which better expedite a hearing.

19 The Board is not convinced that Mr. Ford is
20 qualified to be a witness on matters of nuclear engineering,
21 for instance, but will permit him to undertake cross-
22 examination for a while to see if some of the problems don't
23 become worse. If they do not and the parties are not
24 objecting, we will see if the problem arises specifically.
25 Therefore, Mr. Ford, you are permitted to interrogate

1 witness Moore. Will you proceed.

2 MR. TROSTEN: In accordance with my understanding
3 of Mr. Roisman this morning, it is my intention to have
4 the witness Moore at this time respond to certain
5 questions that were raised yesterday.

6 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Yes. Will you proceed in
7 that respect.

8 MR. TROSTEN: Would you please, Mr. Moore,
9 identify the points in issue by transcript reference
10 and general subject and then proceed to give your response.

11 MR. MOORE: Yes, sir.

12 The first question I will address is the one
13 indicated in the transcript on page 1703 and 1704. 1703,
14 lines 23 through 25 and 1704, lines 1 through 14.

15 This refers to a question from Mr. Roisman
16 regarding the number of rod burst tests that had been
17 performed. The Westinghouse series of rod burst tests
18 consisted of a series of single rod burst tests comprising
19 a total of about 125 rods which were burst under various
20 conditions. These were unirradiated rods. There were
21 sixteen irradiated single rod burst tests. And the multi-
22 rod burst tests performed by Westinghouse included a
23 total of 168 rods which were burst. So this is the total
24 number of burst rods, over 380, 390.

25 MR. TROSTEN: Would you proceed, Mr. Moore, unless

1 either Mr. Roisman or the Board questions you with regard
2 to these particular answers.

3 DR. FORD: Excuse me. Is it preferred that I
4 would interrupt now to ask a question on this specific
5 answer?

6 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: It might be advisable if you
7 would, yes.

8 DR. FORD: I am not clear when you give the
9 quantity of rods as 168. Do you mean that there was a
10 test mock-up that had 168 rods in it?

11 MR. MOORE: No. These were multi-rod burst tests
12 which included, each test run included fourteen rods which
13 were pressurized and there were a total of twelve tests.

14 DR. FORD: I see. Thank you.

15 MR. MOORE: The second point is on page 1689,
16 lines five through eleven, where in response to a question
17 regarding the temperature of the fuel rods near the hot
18 rod I replied that I would expect they were in the range
19 of 1800 to 2000 degrees Fahrenheit with a peak rod
20 temperature of 2300 degrees Fahrenheit.

21 In subsequent checking I found that the rods
22 immediately adjacent to the hot rod will in fact be within
23 twenty to thirty degrees of the hot rod. The numbers that
24 I indicated, the 1800 to 2000, represents the temperature
25 of the average rod in the assembly which contains the

1 hottest rod. I wanted to clarify that point.

2 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Thank you.

3 MR. MOORE: The final question is found on page
4 1706 of the transcript beginning at line 10 where
5 Mr. Roisman asked for a census of the zirc-water reaction
6 corewide in terms of the percentage of rods affected and
7 the amount of metal-water reaction associated with those
8 rods. And I have a corewide temperature and zirc-water
9 reaction census for Indian Point-2 for the double-ended
10 cold leg rupture, which gave a peak clad temperature of
11 2300 degrees Fahrenheit. The census was obtained by
12 splitting the reactor core into eight different power
13 regions and then calculating the temperatures of each of
14 these power regions with seven axial increments along the
15 length of the rod. In doing this calculation then we
16 determined at the end of the transient what the heat clad
17 temperature is in each one of these regions and also
18 the corresponding metal-water reaction that was obtained.

19 Perhaps the best way to summarize this is to
20 indicate the volume of the core which exceeded a given
21 temperature. With this calculation .17 percent of the
22 core reached a temperature greater than 2000 degrees
23 Fahrenheit. 1.6 percent of the total core, by volume,
24 of total cladding by volume, reached a temperature greater
25 than 1900 degrees. 5.2 percent was greater than 1600 degrees

1 and twelve percent was greater than 1400 degrees.

2 Now the assumption is made in our analysis that
3 there is no zirc-water reaction at temperatures below
4 1800 degrees Fahrenheit and on that basis there are really
5 only two of these regions which have any zirc-water reaction
6 whatsoever. The first is the region which includes
7 the hot spot, and that has a total zirc-water reaction
8 of 7.5 percent for that small region. And there is a
9 second region of the same size which sees a total reaction
10 of 2.1 percent metal-water reaction for that region. And
11 adding those two together we get a corewide metal-water
12 reaction of less than .05 percent. As indicated in the
13 testimony yesterday the number for Indian Point was less
14 than .07 and in fact is closer to .05 percent.

15 We have evaluated the effect of assuming metal-water
16 reaction to occur at all temperatures rather than the
17 limitation of 1800 degrees and above, and taking this
18 particular case we obtained seven and a half percent at
19 the peak, at the hot spot, assuming that there is a zirc-water
20 reaction, can be a zirc-water reaction at all temperatures
21 in accordance with the parabolic rate. There is only a
22 difference corewide of .005 percent. That's a trivial
23 difference. So the assumption of 1800 degrees and above
24 is warranted.

25 In summary, looking at the census for the core we

1 are talking about very limited regions of the core which
2 actuall participate in a metal-water reaction and a very,
3 very small fraction of the total zirc in the core is
4 actuall reactive.

- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10
- 11
- 12
- 13
- 14
- 15
- 16
- 17
- 18
- 19
- 20
- 21
- 22
- 23
- 24
- 25

1 MR. TROSTEN: Not now. Do you have a question, Dr.
2 Ford?

3 DR. FORD: I have several questions. My first ques-
4 tion relates to the interrelationships between eight regions
5 and your calculations. Do you solve the system simultaneously
6 for all eight regions or are these eight distinct calculations
7 with your computer code that you are reporting to us?

8 MR. MOORE: These are distinct calculations for each
9 region.

10 DR. FORD: I see. So that a phenomenon such as a
11 radial flow between the different power regions of the core
12 is not considered in your calculations at all?

13 MR. MOORE: The calculations are performed using
14 the coolant sink temperatures which are obtained by taking an
15 energy balance on the water as it enters the core. The
16 temperature rod, the largest part of the temperature rod
17 occurs during adiabatic heat-up. Where there is no, essentially
18 no flow in the core. And during the reflood portion of the
19 transient where the temperature is turned around there is very
20 little radial redistribution flow.

21 DR. FORD: I see. Then would you--

22 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Excuse me just a minute. I know
23 you intended to answer directly as you felt you could, but are
24 you able to answer the question? I think it was radial flow
25 then is not considered in your calculation, is that correct?

1 MR. MOORE: That is correct. On the basis of a
2 consideration which says that it is not important.

3 DR. FORD: Can you tell me whether there is any
4 experimental confirmation of your contention that radial flow
5 is not an important phenomenon?

6 MR. MOORE: Yes. For one case our FLECHT results in
7 a rod bundle showed that there was very little radial flow.

8 DR. FORD: I see. But isn't the question that we
9 are talking about now radial flow over substantial regions
10 of the core between these eight power regions, not just radial
11 flow within a bundle?

12 MR. MOORE: Either case.

13 DR. FORD: Well, I mean doesn't the bundle wall
14 prohibit radial flow beyond the bundle?

15 MR. MOORE: There are no bundle walls in our
16 reactors.

17 DR. FORD: No. I am talking about in the FLECHT
18 test.

19 MR. MOORE: I am speaking of the radial flow that
20 existed within the assembly in the FLECHT test.

21 DR. FORD: Right. And I asked you concerning the
22 experimental confirmation, and you cited the FLECHT test, is
23 that correct? So I am talking about simply since the FLECHT
24 test only considered single bundles how can they relate or
25 provide information pertaining to a phenomenon involving flow

1 between large numbers of the bundles?

2 Your contention, am I correct, was that there is no
3 radial flow between the eight core nodes that you set up, is
4 that correct?

5 MR. MOORE: No. I indicated that the radial flow
6 between assemblies is small.

7 DR. FORD: Right. Now can you explain how a test
8 which involves no separate regions, it's only a single bundle,
9 how this can be relevant to the significance of radial flow
10 between regions?

11 MR. MOORE: Well, because there is really no
12 differentiation between assemblies and within assembly in
13 terms of the rod-to-rod behavior. As you know, our assemblies
14 are open lattice assemblies, so it's very difficult to
15 discriminate what would happen between assemblies and within
16 assembly.

17 DR. FORD: Now in the FLECHT tests there are single
18 bundle tests of ten-by-ten and seven-by-seven, seven rods, is
19 that correct?

20 MR. MOORE: That is correct.

21 DR. FORD: In the test apparatus those bundles are
22 enclosed within a box, is that correct?

23 MR. MOORE: That's correct.

24 DR. FORD: Now this box as you note doesn't exist in
25 the reactor itself. That's what you mean by open lattice, is

1 that correct?

2 MR. MOORE: That's correct.

3 DR. FORD: So the kind of flow that I am talking about,
4 because of this open lattice, isn't this correct that this
5 can't be considered an experimental situation which closes the
6 whole bundle off completely?

7 MR. MOORE: Yes. But I am speaking of the flow
8 variations within the assembly that don't have anything to do
9 with the fact that there is a wall around the assembly.

10 DR. FORD: Right. But I am talking about, am I
11 making myself clear--

12 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: I wonder if it would be helpful
13 if we used that chart again, that easel or paper, and take a
14 new sheet and Mr. Moore you probably could describe the
15 difference between the two situations. Will you tell us what
16 you are considering within the box and then depict in a lower
17 portion of that easel sheet the eight regions that you had
18 in mind and as to which I understand the interrogator is saying
19 are those situations comparable and are they equal.

20 MR. MOORE: As far as speaking about the FLECHT test
21 which would have bundles of rods which are within a housing,
22 and then he is asking what about the situation where I have
23 many assemblies and he is asking the question with respect to
24 flow redistribution throughout the core and I indicated we
25 have some data within the FLECHT test where I am looking at

1 flow redistribution between the various channels for flow
2 within the bundle of rods where there are differences and
3 power generation within the rods. I submit that this is some-
4 what analogous.

5 I will agree that there is a scaling effect here to
6 the situation corewide, for now I am looking at the flow
7 redistribution between flow channels between rods and also
8 considering all the assemblies in the core.

9 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Can you depict your eight regions
10 that you have in mind in that lower circle to reflect the core?
11 I understand you made seven analyses of eight separate regions.
12 Then you can indicate how generally they would be located with-
13 in the core, or do you want to take another sheet?

14 MR. MOORE: Well, there are not specific geometrical
15 regions in that the calculation is performed without inter-
16 action between individual regions. So if I have a core and I
17 look at the power distribution in the core and I have a few
18 assemblies which are equivalent to the hot spot. Let's just
19 say that these assemblies--so I have one region in the
20 analysis which calculates what happens in these typical
21 assemblies.

22

23

24

25

1 Then I look at an assembly which is ninety
2 percent, has a power of ninety percent.

3 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Would you show that on a
4 diagram, too.

5 MR. MOORE: These could be located, then, in
6 various parts of the core, and in fact, represent a
7 total volume of the core of ten percent. So I've got
8 a region which represents ten percent of the core which
9 will be redistributed in this manner.

10 Then I take a region which is eighty percent of
11 the peak assembly. So I have, for the hot spot, 1.2 percent;
12 for the ninety percent of the hot assembly power, this
13 is ten percent of the core. This is hot assembly. This
14 is .9 times the hot assembly.

15 Then I take a region which represents eighty
16 percent of the hot spot, the hot assembly, and that
17 represents twenty-three percent of the core.

18 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Will you show that in your
19 core as you depicted that.

20 MR. MOORE: These regions would tend to be
21 scattered towards the middle regions. The lower power
22 regions, as I continue on down here, tend to be in the
23 outer regions of the core. The hotter assemblies tend
24 to be toward the center of the core.

25 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: To go back to that FLECHT test

1 diagram, all within a box, do you have the same temperature
2 distribution in that upper sketch as you would for the
3 core, the heat distribution?

4 DR. FORD: Could you identify which FLECHT
5 report you are referring to?

6 MR. MOORE: WCAP-7665, page 2-3.

7 DR. FORD: Is this a proprietary report?

8 MR. MOORE: No.

9 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Proceed.

10 DR. FORD: The variation in power from rod to
11 rod for this particular set of ten-by-ten test section
12 was 1.1 down to .95.

13 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Can you generally indicate
14 where those were located?

15 MR. MOORE: Well, the .95 tend to be primarily
16 in the outer edges with a few in this region. The 1.1
17 and 1.0s were scattered within the assembly.

18 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: You mean scattered near the
19 box sides itself?

20 MR. MOORE: No. There were some -- There is
21 one up here at 1.1.

22 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Mark that somewhere, please.

23 MR. MOORE: 1.1 up here. Then there were 1.1s
24 within. The point I was making, the fact there is a
25 gradient of 1.5 here, a 1.0 and a 1.1 So I had some

1 variation of power within the assembly.

2 I don't want to overemphasize this particular
3 aspect. I think we should go back to the basic physical
4 situation in response to Mr. Ford's question. We are
5 talking about the radial flow distribution that you get
6 during the reflood part of the transient which is of
7 interest here in determining the peak temperature.

8 Under this condition, the main pressure drop in
9 the core is the elevation head. There is very little
10 frictional pressure losses within the core. There is
11 really no large frictional flow redistribution considerations
12 during the reflood phase of the transient. The total
13 pressure drop across the core is about 2 p.s.i. So it
14 just isn't a situation which creates large radial flow
15 redistributions.

16 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Just one further question. I
17 won't interrupt any more.

18 It is your thought that the FLECHT test within
19 that box arrangement is similar enough to the core
20 distribution of heat you depicted on the other sheet so
21 that it obviates any consideration, significant
22 consideration of radial flow; is that correct?

23 MR. MOORE: That's correct. I think it is
24 corroborative of the basic physical argument. I would
25 also like to indicate that we are only talking with respect

1 to calculating peak temperatures, about a very few assemblies.
2 As I said, the hot assemblies consist of only 1.2 percent
3 of the total core volume.

4 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: What's the number of rods?
5 Can you tell us what the 1.2 percent would be?

6 MR. MOORE: That would be about 300 and some rods.

7 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Out of the total of what?

8 MR. MOORE: A little less than 40,000.

9 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Thank you. Excuse me for
10 interrupting your proceeding, Mr. Ford.

11 DR. FORD: I have a large number of questions
12 concerning this demonstration.

13 Can you tell me first of all concerning this
14 FLECHT test, what instrumentation did you use to measure
15 the flow in different parts of the bundle?

16 MR. MOORE: We had a --

17 DR. FORD: Could you refer to the page number
18 of the report, please.

19 MR. MOORE: Page 3-111 of the FLECHT report,
20 WCAP-7665.

21 It indicates we had a pressure tap within the
22 bundle and a pressure tap transducer in the housing wall.
23 We were measuring the differential pressure between these
24 two. As plotted in that figure on page 3-111, very little
25 pressure difference was indicated across the assembly,

1 therefore indicating essentially zero, a very small radial
2 flow.

3 DR. FORD: These were the only instrumentation
4 that you had this bundle to determine radial flow; is
5 that correct?

6 MR. MOORE: That's correct.

7 DR. FORD: You didn't have any instrumentation
8 that determined local boiling conditions, did you?

9 MR. MOORE: Not directly, no.

10 DR. FORD: Did you have any instrumentation to
11 determine local coolant velocity?

12 MR. MOORE: No, we did not.

13 DR. FORD: Do you disagree with the statement
14 made in the Oak Ridge National Laboratory report,
15 Protection Instrumentation Systems in Light-Water-Cooled
16 Power Reactor Plants, by H. G. O'Brien and C. F. Walker,
17 ORNL- NSIC-29, published in October 1969? It states, and
18 I quote from page 137. I am going to quote the entire
19 section to make sure the context is clear.

20 MR. TROSTEN: Do you wish to have a copy of this
21 in front of you as Mr. Ford is reading?

22 MR. MOORE: He may read it and then I will look
23 at it.

24 DR. FORD: It says, "In many instances, plant
25 variables that must be prevented from reaching safety limits

1 cannot be measured directly, and the values of the safety
2 limit variables must be inferred from measurements of
3 other variables. Although neutron and gamma fluxes can
4 be measured as a function of position in the core
5 (usually in the core coolant channels), techniques for
6 measuring local heat flux, cladding temperature, fuel
7 center-line temperature, local coolant boiling and local
8 flow velocity are not presently available for in-core use.
9 The values of safety limit variables such as these must
10 therefore be inferred from other measurements, together
11 with known or assumed parameters (cross-sections, heat
12 transfer coefficients, et cetera). We feel that research
13 and development is needed on methods for directly measuring
14 the safety variables and thus reducing the need for using
15 the somewhat tenuous chains of inference."

16 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Let him read it. When he has
17 indicated he has completed reading, you may propound the
18 next question, sir.

19 MR. MOORE: Yes.

20 DR. FORD: The question is whether you agree or
21 disagree with that statement.

22 MR. MOORE: Well, that includes -- I would say
23 I agree in a qualified manner, which I would like to qualify.
24 That includes a considerable number of measurements,
25 some much more difficult than others. The main point that

1 the author here is making is, I believe, the fact that
2 he is talking about in-core use. This is a key consideration
3 in measuring these kinds of variables to have instrumentation
4 which will stand up under the radiation environment in-core,
5 and also be of such a type that they do not influence
6 the reactor performance. So in that sense I would agree.

7 DR. FORD: Can you indicate what instrumentations
8 are available to perform those functions outside of the
9 core? For example, FLECHT test bundle. Could you
10 measure it? It is non-nuclear, so some of the measurements
11 are irrelevant. But specifically, for local boiling
12 conditions, cladding temperature and local coolant velocity,
13 do you have instrumentation that you could have used, that
14 could have been used on the FLECHT bundle?

15 MR. MOORE: There is instrumentation to make
16 local flow measurements. This is really not relevant
17 to the FLECHT test or to the consideration of whether or
18 not we have radial flow in the sense that if you can
19 ascertain that there do not exist large pressure gradients
20 within the bundle, then you have already demonstrated that
21 there is not large flow redistribution. So there was no
22 need in that case to obtain a flow measurement.

23 DR. FORD: But isn't the experimental situation --
24 Excuse me. Aren't you referring to this as an experimental
25 confirmation of the fact that there is no radial flow?

1 You are not arguing on the basis of postulated pressure
2 differences?

3 MR. MOORE: I'm sorry. I don't understand that.

4 DR. FORD: Let me rephrase it. In other words,
5 the whole point of our discussion of this FLECHT data is
6 whether or not it provides an experimental confirmation
7 of the existence of radial flow.

8 Independent of a priori considerations about
9 pressure differential, wouldn't the point of a relevant
10 experiment be to measure whether or not there is radial flow?

11 MR. MOORE: No, not necessarily.

12 DR. FORD: That isn't your idea of experimental
13 confirmation?

14 MR. MOORE: It is not a necessity to measure
15 flow directly.

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Excuse me. That first part of
2 the question could be answered. I think it was something to
3 this effect: Did the FLECHT test seek to confirm radial flow
4 manners? Can you answer that yes or no?

5 MR. MOORE: No. It was not primarily designed to
6 do that.

7 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: What was its primary purpose?

8 MR. MOORE: To determine the heat transfer that you
9 obtained using bottom flooding into a core.

10 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Would secondary considerations
11 include radial flow?

12 MR. MOORE: Yes. That's the reason we installed
13 this particular instrumentation.

14 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Very well. Will you proceed.

15 DR. FORD: I see.

16 Is your theoretical analysis of the radial flow
17 question presented in the FLECHT reports or is this an
18 interpretation that you are giving simply on an ad hoc basis
19 in answer to my question?

20 MR. MOORE: The discussion, the argument concerning
21 why we don't expect radial flow is not excluded in the FLECHT
22 report.

23 DR. FORD: Can you explain what the chain of
24 inference is between your pressure tab measurement and radial
25 flow phenomena? What information do you have that would

1 indicate that the pressure tab would give you certain data if
2 there were radial flow and give you other data if there were
3 not radial flow?

4 MR. TROSTEN: May I interrupt the questioning just
5 at this point? I don't want to interrupt Mr. Ford's train of
6 thought or the questioning, but I want to make this one point.
7 We have brought a witness here yesterday in response to one of
8 Mr. Roisman's questions concerning certain zirc-water reaction.
9 He was brought here especially for this purpose, who is
10 urgently needed back in the Westinghouse offices as soon as
11 his testimony is completed today. I would like to inquire of
12 Mr. Ford, if he could, at some convenient time, terminate his
13 questioning of Mr. Moore so that we could get the other
14 witness' testimony on the record and then resume his ques-
15 tioning of Mr. Moore.

16 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Would this be a convenient place
17 to interrupt your examination or do you desire to propound
18 a few more questions?

19 DR. FORD: There are a large number of questions on
20 the matter. I think I could conveniently defer them to later.
21 I planned to go through the transcripts. If I could have
22 five or ten minutes to put myself in a zircalloy-water frame
23 of mind, I would appreciate it.

24 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: You are going to interrogate on
25 zircalloy-water, too; is that correct?

1 DR. FORD: The metal-water reaction. That's the
2 witness, whose convenience we are discussing. Could I have
3 a few minutes?

4 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: At this time let's recess and
5 reconvene in this room at 10:05.

6 (A short recess is taken.)
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Do you desire to have another
2 witness available for your examination after this, Counsel?

3 MR. TROSTEN: Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.

4 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Will you call the gentleman,
5 please.

6 MR. TROSTEN: I would like Dr. Jack Roll to join
7 Mr. Moore on the witness stand, please.

8 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: And he has not been sworn as I
9 recall.

10 MR. TROSTEN: That is correct.

11 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Dr. Roll, would you stand and
12 raise your arm, please.

13 (John Bernard Roll, sworn.)

14 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Have a seat, please.

15 MR. TROSTEN: Dr. Roll, would you please give your
16 full name.

17 DR. ROLL: My name is John Bernard Roll.

18 MR. TROSTEN: Would you give your business address,
19 please.

20 DR. ROLL: Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Box
21 355, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

22 MR. TROSTEN: Please describe your educational
23 background.

24 DR. ROLL: Bachelor of Chemical Engineering,
25 University of Detroit, 1958. Ph.D., Chemical Engineering,

1 Purdue University, 1962.

2 MR. TROSTEN: Would you please give a statement of
3 your professional background and experience?

4 DR. ROLL: From 1962 to 1964 I was on active duty
5 with the U. S. Army but I signed to the United States Atomic
6 Energy Commission. I was stationed at Germantown, Maryland,
7 in the Division of Reactor Development. From 1964 to the
8 present time I have been with Westinghouse Electric
9 Corporation. My present capacity is manager of Performance
10 Analysis in the Engineering Department, Nuclear Fuel Division.

11 The doings of this group are primarily to review
12 data from test evaluation programs, interpret this data and
13 model this data and apply it to design and performance
14 analyses of the nuclear fuel rod. The group consists of
15 eight engineers and four technicians.

16 MR. TROSTEN: Thank you, Dr. Roll.

17 Now with respect to the question which appears on
18 the transcript page 1720 relating to the zirconium water
19 reaction, are you familiar with the question that was raised
20 by Mr. Roisman yesterday concerning that matter?

21 DR. ROLL: Yes, sir. I reviewed the transcript.

22 MR. TROSTEN: Would you please comment with regard
23 to the question raised by Mr. Roisman.

24 DR. ROLL: - I believe the context of the question
25 was that based upon the results reported in the reference

1 ORNL document did we have any reason to re-evaluate our
2 application, I believe, of the Baker-Just equation to a com-
3 putation of degree of zirc-water reaction, and I believe
4 that Mr. Moore provided essentially the answer that I would
5 have provided, that that is no we could not use that single
6 data point to re-evaluate or reapply the Baker-Just equations.

7 As pointed out by Mr. Moore in yesterday's pro-
8 ceedings, the measurement of the extent of zirc-water reaction
9 was in fact by an inferred route, and there were no direct
10 measurements taken. There was a large uncertainty in the
11 measurement of total hydrogen evolution during the experiment.

12 The subtraction of other known effects resulted in
13 a fifty per cent uncertainty in the amount of hydrogen which
14 can be associated or applied with the zirc-water reaction,
15 and from this they inferred the two-tenths per cent raw
16 metal-water reaction. This was then compared, presumably by
17 Mr. Roisman, to indicate that perhaps there was more zirc-
18 water reaction here than one would expect based on reported
19 temperatures.

20 But however, I pointed out in the Oak Ridge report
21 there was not a direct measurement of temperature and they
22 point out that the effects of thermocouple effects themselves
23 and the power distribution with the bundle it enters result in
24 an uncertainty in the temperatures of the fuel during the
25 experiment.

1 Therefore, one cannot make a direct inference on
2 reported temperatures and lead yourself to the conclusion
3 that the extent of zirc-water reaction was higher or much
4 higher than would have been predicted by Baker-Just.

5 I'd like to add further that we have, as a part of
6 our work, in particular under the FLECHT program, reviewed the
7 extent of zirc-water reaction, under what we considered to be
8 much more representative conditions, that is zircalloy clad
9 fuel rods with our particular time and temperature histories
10 and our particular coolant content, that is our particular
11 water conditions, and I believe as reported in the documenta-
12 tion summarized in the FLECHT reports we find very good agree-
13 ment with the Baker-Just equation, and so we believe in summary
14 that the Oak Ridge report presents a single data point to
15 germaneness to our specific application must be questioned
16 inasmuch as the data point was not, the test was not run to
17 substantiate the Baker-Just equation.

18 And secondly, in summary, the work that we have done
19 under the FLECHT program and reported in the FLECHT reports
20 we believe reaffirms our use of the Baker-Just equations in
21 evaluating zirc-water reaction under our conditions of loss
22 of coolant accident.

23 MR. FROSTEN: I have no further direct questions of
24 Dr. Roll at this time, Mr. Chairman.

25 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Very well. Intervenors, if you

1 desire to proceed, do so, please.

2 DR. FORD: Yes. The authors of that Oak Ridge
3 report ORNL 4635 contend that it is the most realistic
4 simulation of loss of coolant accident conditions to date.
5 Do you dispute that claim?

6 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: I wonder if you'd tender to the
7 witness you wish to question.

8 DR. FORD: Yes, Mr. Roll, please.

9 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Yes. I mean you say the authors
10 of the ORNL report make a certain contention. Will you point
11 to the report wherein the contention is made.

12 DR. FORD: Oh.

13 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: And tender it to the witness.

14 DR. FORD: Let's get the reference and then we will
15 come back to the question in a few minutes.

16 Can you describe the techniques of FLECHT measure-
17 ment of zircalloy water reaction that were used in your
18 FLECHT tests compared to the techniques used in the ORNL
19 4365 tests?

20 DR. ROLL: The measurements, the techniques which
21 were used in the ORNL reported tests were one of measuring
22 hydrogen evolution which is a direct result of the chemical
23 reaction between zircalloy or zirconium and water and then
24 subtracting from this measured hydrogen evolution other
25 effects, that is the total volume of gas in the system during

1 the tests, the changing volume of gas due to the over-
2 pressurization of the transient itself and then by subtraction
3 of two relatively large numbers arriving at a smaller number
4 which they attribute then to hydrogen evolution during
5 the zirc-water reaction, and from this they infer then the
6 total extent of the zirc-water reaction. In work which we did--

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1 DR. FORD: Excuse me. Just in point of
2 clarification.

3 In the hydrogen evolution that they subtract
4 from the total zirc-water used hydrogen as a residual,
5 did they consider hydrogen by radiolysis of water?

6 DR. ROLL: I looked for that specific point
7 in the report. I took a brief scan for review. I did
8 not see that point noted. They may have. If they did
9 not, then the calculated result of zirc-water reaction
10 is on the conservative side.

11 Let me continue then. The measurement that
12 we took in evaluating the result of our FLECHT test with
13 regard to extent of zirc-water reaction were in fact
14 metallographic cross-sections at various enlargements from
15 which the experienced metallographers can infer nature of
16 the phases in the cross-section. That is they can determine
17 the portion of the original zircalloy which remains as
18 original zircalloy. That portion which is oxygen saturated,
19 that portion which is in fact converted to zirconium oxide.
20 With these direct measurements at a number of cross-sections,
21 one can then calculate explicitly the quantity of zirconium
22 which has been converted to zirconium dioxide and the
23 quantity of zirconium which is oxygen saturated from which
24 you can then determine the total quantity of zirconium
25 which has in fact reacted in some way with the oxygen.

1 This was not done on the Oak Ridge test.

2 DR. FORD: Can you explain what experimental
3 confirmations there are of the correlation between the
4 metallographic cross-analysis and cross-measurement of
5 hydrogen evolution? Is there a topical -- This is the
6 technique you used in the FLECHT test. Is there a
7 further primary source that confirms this as a reliable
8 technique?

9 DR. ROLL: I believe the technique of looking
10 at zirconium and zirconium oxide is in itself a primary
11 source of data and need not be substantiated somewhere else.
12 The question is, how do we know what is the extent of
13 zirconium and oxygen reaction. The answer is, you know
14 this by looking at the quantity of zirconium which has
15 been converted to zirconium oxide.

16 DR. FORD: But I mean the phase analysis in
17 terms of a priori plausibility, as to what you begin with.
18 In terms of the specific quantitative relationship between
19 the phase analysis and the extent of the reaction on
20 prediction of hydrogen. I will concede that the overall
21 plan of going to the metallographic second step in terms
22 of the analysis is plausible. What I am wondering is
23 whether this plausibility has been convincingly confirmed
24 by experimental analysis. That was my question. I am
25 looking for a topical report on the subject.

1 DR. ROLL: I fail to see how I can answer this
2 question to your satisfaction. The topical reports --
3 For example, I refer you to our own FLECHT report and
4 reproductions of the cross-sections.

5 DR. FORD: In my context I am looking for a
6 topical report specifically on the technique of your
7 metalographic analysis. I know you use it in the FLECHT
8 reports, describe it in the FLECHT reports. But in terms
9 of what primary data confirms that as a reliable thing
10 to use, I haven't seen anything. I am just wondering
11 whether you can provide a topical report as a reference.

12 DR. ROLL: I could --

13 DR. FORD: Can you come to it readily?

14 DR. ROLL: I cannot. It is a basic technique
15 which is used to identify phases and structures in materials.
16 It is used in several places. I think the literature on
17 extensive zirc-water reaction, I can't pull out a topical
18 number right now. It is replete with these kind of
19 references where it is explicitly as to the nature and
20 extent of the zirc-water reaction.

21 DR. FORD: You can't say that you are familiar
22 with any state of the art survey with regard to the use
23 of this technique that would support its use?

24 DR. ROLL: No, I can't.

25 DR. FORD: Thank you.

1 You mention there was a fifty percent uncertainty
2 in the ORNL-4635 estimate of the hydrogen evolved, and
3 therefore of the extent of metal-water reaction. Have
4 you performed a statistical analysis of your own estimate
5 of metal-water reactions, and can you present the various
6 statistical indices of the confidence that we may have
7 in your estimates? What would be, for example, the
8 probability that the 7.5 percent metal-water reaction in
9 the core hot spot, what would be the probability against
10 a no hypothesis that it was zero?

11 DR. ROLL: The probability of our calculated
12 7.5 percent being, in fact, zero -- I believe is your
13 question. -- is exceedingly low.

14 DR. FORD: In terms of whether it is 7.5 or 8.5
15 or 6.5, what are the confidence limits there? What is
16 the probability that that estimate is 100 percent
17 mistaken, the probability that it is 1/100th of a percent
18 mistaken?

19 DR. ROLL: The method of calculation which
20 uses, in our analyses -- Not of the FLECHT data but of
21 the application. To the loss of coolant accident, uses
22 parabolic rate equations which we believe are on the
23 conservative side. That is, we may be reaction rate
24 limited by availability of steam or water at the surface.
25 The parabolic rate was derived with essentially an infinite

1 and complete source of water at the surface of the reaction.
2 Therefore, our estimate as presented in our analysis of
3 the loss of coolant accident, would be on the high side.
4 Is that responsive to your line of questioning?

5 DR. FORD: Let me try to preface my concern
6 with statistical questions with a brief diagram.

7 From a statistical point of view, I am talking
8 in terms of the general scheme here, of having a set of
9 experimental data to which we wish to fit some function.
10 Let's suppose, through either just simple straightforward
11 statistical analysis of the data, we fitted a line through
12 the data, or suppose alternatively that this is the line
13 predicted by the analytical models that we use. We can
14 say, with reference to the data point, with reference
15 to the relationship between this predicted line and the
16 body of data, we can compute various statistical indices
17 which say how well this line represents this data.
18 Specifically we can measure and integrate over the whole
19 area what the distances are between the observations and
20 the point.

21 What I am asking you for is, in terms of the
22 predicted rates or metal-water reaction, how in this
23 situation did you relate statistically the experimental
24 data to the curve that you are using?

25 DR. ROLL: We did not, for example, in your

1 context, calculate a mean standard of what is predicted
2 and measured. So I cannot give you a typical value.
3 You can relate to the predicted versus measured figure
4 in the WCAP. You may look at that yourself.

5 DR. FORD: What I am looking for --

6 DR. ROLL: Did I cover the deviation, no.

7 DR. FORD: Did you calculate the percent of
8 variance within the experimental data that is accounted
9 for by your relationship?

10 DR. ROLL: No.

11 DR. FORD: Can you explain, in terms of this
12 diagram, how you make a conservative estimating procedure?
13 Let me refer to it.

14 I am assuming here and fitting this main line
15 to this data; that I am doing it by usual statistical
16 techniques; that this particular line, of all possible
17 lines that could be put through this set of data,
18 minimizes the potential error. If we wanted to make a
19 particularly conservative analysis and if we knew that the
20 cladding temperature or the build-up of hydrogen in the
21 containment was worse if this curve had a particularly
22 different position, if it was worse as this curve moves
23 down, then we will say what we will do to be conservative
24 is, we will put this curve below all experimental data so
25 that there is a range in which metal-water reactions might

1 be small or low, and since there being a small or high,
2 and since they being high is not clearly a good thing, we
3 will assume that they are high, and that that is the
4 analysis that relates our experimental data to the
5 analytic model that we use.

6 Is this the way in which you conservatively
7 derive your metal-water reaction rate from the experimental
8 data?

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 DR. ROLL: Let me refer to WCAP-7665 figures on Page
2 B 20 in particular and on B 23. I think these are page
3 numbers.

4 DR. FORD: Yes, I see them.

5 DR. ROLL: I believe the answer to your question,
6 does the prediction, i.e., Baker-Just, go over the top of the
7 data. I think the answer is essentially yes, looking
8 particularly at the figure on page B 20.

9 DR. FORD: Excuse me. Are you giving the result of
10 a statistical analysis?

11 DR. ROLL: These are data points.

12 DR. FORD: Are there any statistical indices?

13 DR. ROLL: I have already said we do not calculate
14 a standard deviation for these data points.

15 DR. FORD: Well now let me go back here. As I
16 explained, the conservative estimating procedure that I have
17 stereotyped here, what you would do would be to place the line
18 above all existing data points and therefore whatever the
19 data indicated you were clearly on the conservative side.

20 Now as I look at the diagram here on page B 20
21 there is data on both sides of the line. The preponderance
22 of a design one side, but nevertheless there is no clear
23 indication from the diagram that you followed the conservative
24 estimating procedure that I have described schematically here,
25 is that correct?

1 DR. ROLL: To support your point, I think your
2 figure on Page B 20 is germane, that is measured oxide
3 versus predicted oxide.

4 DR. FORD: That clearly supports my point.

5 DR. ROLL: Right. Now this is not necessarily a
6 measure on B20.

7 DR. FORD: Let me clarify the elliptical remark
8 for the record. It clearly supports my point that you didn't
9 use the conservative estimating procedure that I described
10 here, is that correct?

11 DR. ROLL: I believe we can state for the record
12 that the data points which are reported by ourselves in
13 support of the FLECHT tests where they are explicit measure-
14 ments of predicted measurements of oxide figures as compared
15 to predicted values, all the data points are overpredicted.
16 That is we are conservative.

17 The figure on Page B 20, 1, 2, 3 are on the line
18 of prediction, and that all the other data points are below
19 it.

20 Or perhaps you don't understand. The figure, this
21 is measured versus predicted and any points which fall below
22 the 45 degree line are in fact below the prediction.

23 DR. FORD: Yes. Now of the variety of lines that
24 you could draw above the existing data can you justify in
25 any statistical way the particular line that you did pick

1 in this instance to implement the general kind of conserva-
2 tive estimating procedure that I am talking about?

3 DR. ROLL: The line that was picked is the Baker-
4 Just equation.

5 DR. FORD: Yes. But I'm talking statistically did
6 you try to find in the data a correlation, and if that had,
7 you know, more statistical confidence in that than the Baker-
8 Just equation, use that instead.

9 Let me ask you, to clarify that question--

10 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Wait a minute, now. I wonder if
11 you'd just take one at a time here.

12 First you started out by saying, "Did you find the
13 statistical correlation?"

14 DR. FORD: Right.

15 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Yes or no. Then we will go on to
16 the next question.

17 DR. FORD: My standing question is did you find
18 any statistical correlation?

19 DR. ROLL: And my standing answer was no we did not
20 determine a mean standard deviation.

21 DR. FORD: You didn't look for one at all?

22 MR. TROSTEN: Dr. Roll, do you understand the
23 question? If you don't understand the question--

24 DR. ROLL: Well, I am not sure what I can say in
25 addition to what I have already said, and I think for me to

1 try and continue to paraphrase my answer is not going to
2 really be responsive, because I have stated what we did. I
3 have stated here this is data in support of this equation
4 and I think that really is what I should do.

5 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: I think the question is you might
6 have done something else and he said did you look for some
7 statistical correlation, yes or no?

8 DR. ROLL: I believe the answer to the question is
9 no, we did not do a statistical fit to the Baker-Just
10 equations.

11 DR. FORD: Can you tell me in general about the
12 topical reports that have been submitted in support of the
13 Applicant's license, whether it is the general practice in
14 terms of relating experimental data to analytical models
15 that you do not perform the common routine statistical
16 analysis of the data?

17 MR. TROSTEN: Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. I am not
18 really certain whether that question is one that should be
19 directed to either Dr. Roll or to Mr. Moore.

20 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Well, I think it is a little
21 board, but it should be limited to what they did. They can
22 tell what they did. If somebody else has something, call
23 another witness, but I think as far as their work is con-
24 cerned, the question is proper.

25 In all of the work that either Messrs. Moore or

1 Roll did did they--finish your question, if you will.

2 DR. FORD: In general have you made it a practice
3 to compute the routine statistical indices on a data sample
4 in the process of relating it to your analytical model?

5 MR. TROSTEN: Mr. Moore, are you in a position to
6 respond to that question? I believe in view of Dr Roll's
7 more limited responsibilities in the licensing area that it
8 would appear to me that if either of you is in a position to
9 answer a question of this nature it would be you.

10 On the other hand, perhaps it should be addressed ,
11 to another witness.

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Well, he will know what he
2 did, I assume, and therefore I think if you limit the
3 question to what he did, and if he doesn't understand the
4 question or something or it has to be rephrased, I think
5 he has been on the stand enough to know that he can say
6 he doesn't know.

7 MR. MOORE: We have many cases --

8 DR. FORD: Excuse me. The question was directed
9 to Mr. Roll. I am concerned with --

10 MR. MOORE: But you have asked a broader question
11 which I feel I should be the one to answer.

12 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Can you just answer it yes
13 or no and then explain it?

14 MR. MOORE: Yes. We use a statistical approach
15 in evaluating experimental data in developing various
16 correlations in the course of our analyses. I think
17 the point here is we are using a generally widely accepted
18 relationship for the determination of the zirc-water
19 reaction and what we did in this FLECHT report was
20 indicate that this was in fact conservative because all
21 of the data points fell below that that would be predicted
22 with that generally accepted correlation.

23 So in the specific instance we have no need
24 to develop any statistical representation of the amount
25 of zirc-water reaction.

1 You must understand that when we do these
2 accident analyses many assumption are involved in doing
3 the calculations and we pick these assumptions in the
4 direction to give us a conservative answer.

5 DR. FORD: I see. Now can you tell me with
6 regard to the fact that this correlation is generally
7 widely accepted, can you tell me why you bother at all if
8 the correlation is widely accepted, why do you bother to
9 relate it to experimental data if you are not going to
10 perform statistical analysis of that relationship?

11 MR. MOORE: We feel that's the prudent thing
12 to do. The statistical evaluation would indicate a margin
13 of conservatism which we chose not to take credit for.

14 DR. FORD: Can you tell me in terms of your
15 exposure to experimental science whether the methodology
16 which you call prudent is at all typical of practice in
17 experimental physical science?

18 MR. MOORE: All I can speak from is my experience
19 in the nuclear industry, and I can surely state that the
20 assumptions that are made in our analyses are very
21 carefully and conservatively derived and in my opinion in
22 a very prudent manner, yes.

23 DR. FORD: Well, no. My specific question was
24 the principle which you call prudent was simply taking a
25 generally widely-accepted correlation, but not doing any

1 statistical analysis of its relationship to the data.

2 That's the principle that you call prudent, is that correct?

3 MR. MOORE: That is not correct. The statement
4 I made was we take the widely-accepted relationship --
5 The prudent thing I mentioned was to check our own data
6 against that when the opportunity arose, which was in
7 conjunction with the FLECHT test.

8 DR. FORD: Yes. But if you don't do any
9 statistical analysis what does the check consist in?

10 MR. MOORE: Mere observation of the figure on
11 B20 indicates that all of the data falls below the
12 prediction.

13 DR. FORD: Does it indicate that of all possible
14 curves that could be related in a conservative way to
15 that data that the curve that you have chosen minimizes
16 all the error?

17 MR. MOORE: I am not trying to develop a better
18 correlation which more accurately predicts the amount of
19 zirc-water reaction. I already have a correlation which
20 overpredicts the reaction, and therefore I did not choose
21 to pursue it.

22 DR. FORD: I see. Well, as far as that aspect
23 of the methodology, that concludes my questions.

24 Now the second aspect of the methodology relates
25 to simply the range of the experimental data that you are

1 talking about. While it makes sense in a limited look
2 at the thing to take existing data and draw a conservative
3 curve in relation to it, what assurance do we have that
4 you have of all sufficient data such that the range is
5 representative of the range that actually occurs in the
6 phenomena?

7 For example, if we drew this curve here as a
8 conservative estimate of this relationship but in fact we
9 went to do more experiments and the points marched on
10 below that curve, it would turn out on subsequent analysis
11 that we hadn't made a, you know, an ultimately conservative
12 judgment. My question is can you assure us in terms
13 of the range of data that you have assembled that your
14 experiments have covered all of the relevant situations,
15 that they have been performed parametrically with all of
16 the relevant constraints varied so that we have the full
17 range to which we can relate the prediction, the full
18 range of experimental data to which we can relate the
19 analytical model?

20 DR. ROLL: Bear in mind it was not the purpose
21 of our experiment to explicitly cover the range of variables
22 as may be specifically related to the Baker-Just equations.
23 We presented this information in support of Baker-Just
24 and not to derive it. However, work that has been done
25 in derivation of the equation itself as well as substantiated

1 by others, including Westinghouse, has covered a broad
2 range and continues to show its applicability.

3 I should refer again to the figure on page B20
4 where we are talking. We have data points in excess of
5 ten percent, perhaps in excess of twenty percent reaction,
6 and I believe the predicted numbers referred to in this
7 particular application are on the order of seven and a
8 half percent. Therefore, we have overcovered that range.

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 DR. FORD: What theoretical justification is there
2 for regarding that range as a full range relevant in the
3 experimental situation?

4 DR. ROLL: Please. I am not clear what you mean by
5 that.

6 DR. FORD: All right. Let me try again.

7 What justification is there for the cut-off point
8 that you use in terms of collecting experimental data? I
9 mean you say you have the cut-off point at twenty per cent
10 metal-water reaction. What justification is there for that
11 cut-off?

12 DR. ROLL: I didn't say we had a cut-off point. I
13 said reports--

14 DR. FORD: Simply in terms of the sample--

15 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Let him finish his answer.

16 I said he is to let you finish your answer. Proceed.

17 DR. ROLL: I merely said these data which we are
18 reporting cover a range in excess of that calculated for this
19 specific application, and the range of conditions under which
20 these--the range of conditions in the test itself itself under
21 which the zirc oxide thicknesses came about were selected to
22 be typical of the kinds of coolant temperature and time con-
23 ditions to be expected for the loss of coolant accident.

24 DR. FORD: But what justification do you have for
25 basing your analysis of the equation on simply those dozen

1 dates? I mean for example if further experiments were done
2 that indicated that not very far beyond the bounds at which
3 you stopped a different statistical curve would be fit to the
4 data, then that further experimental data would completely
5 change your check on the curve, that it's only valid
6 obviously over this specific range. And what I am wondering
7 is what confidence can we have that your range is broad
8 enough so that we need not worry about changes in our
9 analysis simply based on new experimental data.

10 DR. ROLL: I believe the conditions of the FLECHT
11 experiments, that is coolant flow, time and temperatures,
12 cover the range of conditions predicted for this particular
13 application. Therefore the range of conditions at which we
14 are determining the zirc oxide reaction cover the range for
15 this specific application.

16 DR. FORD: In all of the tests, the FLECHT tests
17 that provided data for this analysis, were electrically heated
18 rods used that had their heat source as an internal filament
19 within the rod?

20 DR. ROLL: That's correct.

21 DR. FORD: Can you describe how the heat transfer
22 conditions within the rod relate to the extent of metal-water
23 reactions?

24 DR. ROLL: I believe that it in no way affects the
25 extent of zirc-water reaction. The key parameters are time

1 at temperature and the source of getting this time at tempera-
2 ture is not a factor in the extent of reaction.

3 DR. FORD: Well, is the temperature gradient of the
4 fuel not a factor in the extent of metal-water reaction?

5 DR. ROLL: That's correct.

6 DR. FORD: What evidence have you done with cladding
7 with different temperature gradients to confirm this?

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 DR. ROLL: Now you have asked a couple of
2 questions. You asked me did the temperature grading
3 in the fuel affect the results. I answered negative.
4 Then you reasked the same question, what evidence do I
5 have that temperature cladding is not a factor. What
6 really are you asking?

7 DR. FORD: That is a clear error. I am talking
8 about the temperature grading in the cladding.

9 DR. ROLL: Inasmuch as the detailed reaction
10 kinetics of reaction between zirconium and water is
11 partially a diffusion controlled process, certainly the
12 temperature grading in the cladding is going to have
13 some effect. It has not been quantified per se in our
14 work, but our work was not directed toward obtaining
15 detailed chemical reaction kinetics information. What our
16 work was attempted to do was to take our set of conditions
17 and compare them to the calculations, which we feel we
18 have done.

19 DR. FORD: Can you tell me what is or what was
20 the temperature gradient in the cladding in the FLECHT tests?

21 DR. ROLL: I'm sorry. I missed your question.

22 DR. FORD: I asked, what was the temperature
23 gradient in the cladding in the FLECHT tests?

24 DR. ROLL: The grading should have been on the
25 order of five or ten degrees from inside-outside across

1 the cladding. This is a rough calculation based on the
2 power in the test rod during the time of the FLECHT test.
3 But whatever it is, it will be the same in the FLECHT test
4 as it is in the reactor inasmuch as the same simulated
5 fuel rod powers were used. That is the power in the rod
6 in the FLECHT test are the same as expected in the loss
7 of coolant accident. Therefore, the gradients are the same.

8 DR. FORD: Let me understand this. You are
9 telling me what it should have been, in general, and
10 that in addition it should be the same as what was in the
11 reactor. You are not telling me what it was measured
12 as in either.

13 DR. ROLL: That is correct. We did not measure
14 clad o.d. temperature and clad i.d. temperature. However,
15 knowing -- Again, basic materials like zirconium, and
16 knowing the heat in the rod, one can then calculate very
17 simply the temperature drop across the cladding.

18 DR. FORD: Inside the cladding influencing the
19 inside temperature of the cladding, there are different
20 conditions when you use -- Or is it correct that there
21 are differences when you use electrically heated rods
22 filled with aluminum with no simulation of the gap between
23 the cladding and the fuel from the situation in the
24 reactor where you are using ceramic UO2 pellets filament
25 and a gas gap between the cladding and the fuel?

1 DR. ROLL: The test was set up with -- Let me
2 partially modify my previous answer. We did have o.d.
3 thermocouples on the test to measure the heat transfer
4 coefficient which was the objective of the test, not
5 explicitly to measure the temperature drop across the
6 cladding. But particular to your last question, the
7 heat into the fuel bundle was measured and the conditions
8 in and out -- That is the coolant conditions in and out
9 was measured. Therefore, the only way the heat could
10 get from inside the rod to outside the rod was through
11 the cladding. It is not a great exercise to calculate
12 the temperature drop across the cladding.

13 DR. FORD: Excuse me. You indicate that in
14 order to measure the temperature drop across the cladding
15 you had a thermocouple on the outside of the cladding,
16 and no thermocouple on the inside of the cladding?

17 DR. ROLL: No, I didn't indicate that. I believe
18 I said that we did have thermocouples on the outside of
19 the cladding. The objective of the experiment was to
20 determine the heat transfer coefficients from cladding to
21 coolant. Therefore, we had the thermocouples on the
22 outside of the cladding. The objective of the experiment
23 was not to determine -- Therefore, we didn't have numerous
24 thermocouples on both sides of the cladding.

25 DR. FORD: I understand the objectives of the test.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

I am concerned with the conditions.

This five to ten degree gradient, could you explain to me, mathematically, how this would be derived from just the information you were given? I believe it was claimed it was an obvious kind of thing to calculate. It isn't to me.

1 DR. ROLL: We have a piece of cladding or
2 essentially considered a flat plate for simplicity. There
3 is an internal temperature and an outside temperature.
4 In simple geometry, the heat transfer, BTU per hour per
5 square is really simply the thermal conductivity of the
6 material times the temperature difference, i.d. to o.d.
7 in simple geometry.

8 Now, what we had here was a heat source on the
9 inside and a heat sink on the outside. By measuring both,
10 we knew what the heat transfer was. That is the heat
11 BTU per hour square through the cladding. That's the
12 q/a term. Thermal conductivity of the material is a basic
13 property of the material. So the temperature drop across
14 the cladding can be determined from this as q/a divided
15 by Δk . That's how I said it is a simple calculation.
16 Is that really what you are after?

17 DR. FORD: The diagram was what I was after.
18 Now I will try to comment on it.

19 In normal fuel rod there is a gap between the
20 ceramic uranium dioxide fuel pellet and the fuel cladding.

21 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: If you can get some of your
22 response vocally, Dr. Roll -- I think you were nodding
23 affirmatively. Say yes so we might clarify the statement.

24 DR. ROLL: I agree. There is fuel inside the
25 cladding.

1 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: And the gap?

2 DR. ROLL: And there is a gap.

3 DR. FORD: The gap in a reactor, after it has
4 undergone some burn-up into its fuel cycle, there will
5 be gas in this gap. Is it correct that the temperature
6 on the inside of the fuel pellet is not the same as the
7 temperature of the inside of the cladding; that the
8 gas-heat transfer coefficient is an important determinate
9 of the temperature drop between here and here? Simply
10 in terms of the heat transfer within a real fuel rod,
11 there is this particularly significant heat transfer
12 coefficient relating to the gap.

13 DR. ROLL: It is correct that the heat transfer
14 coefficient in the system you are looking at is an important
15 factor in determining the temperatures of the pellet.

16 DR. FORD: Since it is the heat and the pellet
17 being transferred through the cladding, the gap is also
18 important in determining what the temperature of the
19 cladding is?

20 DR. ROLL: Not quite correct. We really have
21 fixed this outside temperature and we are calculating
22 temperature increments as we go through the various thermal
23 barriers. Given the flow of heat, this q/a terms and
24 a sink temperature again -- And the sink temperature
25 was measured, and is then a straightforward calculation

1 to the internal i.d. temperature of the cladding. The
2 calculation of temperature across this gap and into this
3 heat source, be it a fuel pellet or an electrically heated
4 heater of some sort, this is a significant factor.
5 However, we are not really looking at this portion. This
6 is a source of heat which is known and determined. We
7 are looking at the conditions across the cladding. The
8 conditions across the cladding are not really determined
9 by the temperature of the simulated fuel inside the
10 test rod.

11 DR. FORD: Why are you going from the heat?

12 In terms of tracing heat flow, why are you going backwards
13 from the heat sink into the fuel? The heat flows through
14 the fuel or heat source over the gap through the cladding
15 and into the heat sink. So that functionally speaking,
16 the temperature of the cladding in the first instance,
17 the primary source making the temperature is the heat
18 transfer from the fuel. Isn't the fuel and the reactor
19 used to generate the heat?

20 DR. ROLL: That's correct, but the temperatures
21 in the cladding are not determined by the temperature
22 of the fuel.

23 DR. FORD: Have you determined, in your computer
24 code analysis, when you postulate the geometry and heat
25 transfer conditions of the typical rod you consider, what

1 heat transfer coefficient you assumed, if any, if you
2 considered it at all, for the gas in the gap?

3 DR. ROLL: I believe this is in Mr. Moore's
4 area.

5 MR. TROSTEN: May I interrupt just a moment?
6 Mr. Chairman, I'm sorry for the conference taking place
7 during the discussion, but the reason why we have been
8 doing this is that it appears apparent to us that some of
9 the questions that are being raised are of a somewhat
10 general nature which really are more appropriately answered
11 by another witness. They are really beyond the scope
12 of the direct testimony offered by Dr. Roll.

13 I think from the standpoint of Mr. Ford's inquiry
14 and from the standpoint of the public who are present here
15 in this room, and perhaps for the Board, it would be
16 preferable that if we were to add another witness to the
17 panel who would be in a better position, I believe, to
18 respond more quickly and more expeditiously to the questions
19 being raised, it might be helpful.

20 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: I think you can select any
21 witness that will assist in this regard. I thought
22 Dr. Roll was doing a real good job myself.

23 MR. TROSTEN: I think he is doing a fine job, too.

24 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: He is explaining what has been
25 undergone. I don't know if his answers are as good as the

1 explanations, but --

2 MR. TROSTEN: I think he is doing a fine job, too.
3 It is just a matter of not the answers that he is giving
4 but the nature of the questions that are being raised,
5 it seems to me, that it would be preferable that we put
6 another witness on. I would like at this time to ask
7 Mr. Wiesemann to join the panel there.

8 DR. FORD: Excuse me.

9 MR. BRIGGS: While Mr. Wiesemann is putting
10 his chair up here, maybe Mr. Ford could tell us what the
11 point is that he is trying to make.

12 DR. FORD: I was just going to attempt that. In
13 my earlier questioning when I began considering the gradient
14 within the fuel cladding, Dr. Roll answered in the
15 affirmative to my question as to whether the temperature
16 gradient in the cladding would have an influence on the
17 extent of metal-water reaction. The point of my line of
18 questioning has been to see how the heat transfer conditions,
19 as simulated by electrically heated rods, how they relate
20 to the temperature gradients of the cladding in the reactor
21 and how you are capable, without simulating the gap in
22 between ceramic pellets of the cladding, wherein you know
23 it has a very significant determinate of the heat transfer
24 of the whole fuel pellet from the center out to the edge.
25 We know that. I would like to know how, when you don't

1 simulate that, you can correctly analyze what the internal
2 temperature would be of the fuel cladding.

3 As a follow-up to the affirmative answer that
4 this gradient makes a difference, I'd like to proceed with
5 this whole line.

6 I am further not too anxious to try to frame
7 my questions for three different approaches. My feeling
8 was that Dr. Roll was without objection technically,
9 giving the information that I wanted. My feeling is that
10 since this pertains to the metallurgical phenomena which
11 he has opened up, I think it would certainly confuse me
12 and not confuse matters to substitute witnesses at this
13 point. I realize that the interrelationships of various
14 phenomena within the accident situation are such that
15 we can have a man for every variable. But I think a little
16 bit of synthesizing at this point would be useful.

17 MR. TROSTEN: Mr. Chairman --

18 MR. BRIGGS: Excuse me just a moment. It would
19 help me to know, are you familiar with heat transfer
20 calculations?

21 DR. FORD: I have studied very carefully the
22 entire FLECHT fuel rod simulation of an actual heat rod.
23 That's why I am so interested in the gas gap coefficient
24 and what problems result from the lack of simulation of
25 that. I think that I can claim at least very substantial

1 presumptive grounds, personally, for the investigation
2 that I am doing. Although it is quite clear to me that
3 basic theory in-depth I cannot fathom.

4 MR. WIESEMANN: Excuse me. In listening to
5 some of the questions, I have detected a couple of
6 questions which indicate perhaps a fundamental lack of
7 understanding of a couple of things which perhaps if I
8 explained them Mr. Ford would be able to understand how
9 we arrive at the delta T without considering the condition
10 of the gap and whether or not we have the pellets.

11 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Proceed.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1 MR. WIESEMANN: First of all, the question you
2 raised was you didn't understand why Dr. Roll seemed to be
3 working from the outside back to the inside when the heat was
4 coming from the inside.

5 If we take a situation where this exists where there
6 is no heat being generated, all of the temperatures or all of
7 the components, whatever they are, are uniform. When you turn
8 the heat source on, the heat begins to rise internally. As
9 the temperature rises internally, heat begins to be trans-
10 ferred. The transfer of heat is a function of the temperature
11 gradient across the assemblage. However, at any point in
12 time at any given temperature gradient, the amount of heat
13 flowing from the surface of the fuel, or whatever heating
14 element is used, through this system is the same through each
15 portion.

16 If it were not the same, or, in other words, if
17 there were less heat being transmitted through the cladding
18 than were being transmitted from the fuel, the temperature
19 would rise. If there was more heat being transmitted through
20 the cladding than through the fuel, the temperature would
21 drop.

22 So that when we come to an equilibrium condition,
23 we have the situation where the total amount of heat being
24 generated in the fuel is also being transmitted through the
25 clad gap.

1 Going back to your question about working backwards,
2 if you know the temperature of a fluid, the external portion
3 or this heat sink, as you call it, that you can calculate
4 backward knowing the total amount of heat that is generated.
5 You can calculate backwards and get the temperatures at any
6 point along here. Also, you can take any single element in-
7 volved here, and knowing the total amount of heat that is
8 being transferred through this expression, this one here or
9 this one that you choose, you can calculate the difference
10 in temperature between these two points. You can't determine,
11 the absolute temperature. You need a measurement of a
12 temperature to get the absolute temperature of these two
13 points.

14 Mr. Roll, or Dr. Roll, was trying to explain to you
15 that the temperature gradient here is the function of heat
16 that is generated in the fuel because that heat is being
17 transferred through the cladding. That's a fundamental law
18 of conservation of energy and continuity that leads to this
19 conclusion that what goes in has to come out on the other side.
20 Otherwise you do not have a steady state situation.

21 Does that help explain?

22 DR. FORD: I know what goes in must come out. I am
23 just trying to ascertain whether you have any direct measure-
24 ments that indicate that what goes in and out on your
25 simulated fuel rod goes in and out--whether it does this in

1 exactly the same way as a real fuel rod.

2 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Let's stop right there. That's
3 really the nub of your whole inquiry. Can either gentlemen
4 volunteer. Would you like to direct the question to which
5 one? Dr. Roll is sitting on this side. Would you like to
6 try him first?

7 DR. FORD: Yes.

8 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Dr. Roll, please.

9 DR. ROLL: In answer to the question of whether we
10 have direct experimental evidence what goes in and out in our
11 tests are the same as what goes in and out in the fuel in the
12 reactor, the answer to that question is no. However, we again
13 revert to the fairly straightforward calculation that both
14 myself and Mr. Wiesemann attempted to discuss, that if you
15 know your source term, your heat source term in units of heat
16 flow per area, and you know the basic properties in the
17 material, it is a relatively simply calculation to determine
18 the temperature gradients through the cladding. That really
19 is what we are interested in. That really is what I believe
20 the line of questioning is meant to characterize.

21 DR. FORD: Can you explain to me why some of the
22 analytical models for analyzing the core heat-up, why they
23 explicitly simulate the gap between the cladding and the
24 fuel, and why they explicitly simulate changes in the gap
25 between the cladding and the fuel during the course of a

1 loss of coolant accident?

2 MR. MOORE: In the course of the loss of coolant
3 accident of the gap conductants that is important in
4 determining the initial temperature of the fuel so that we
5 know the stored heat in the fuel, which then must be removed
6 early in transient. The gap conductants later in the transient
7 when we are in the period of adiabatic heat-up, and this is
8 the point in time where we are getting the metal water re-
9 action, the gap conductants is really not important because
10 the cladding and the fuel are heating up together with very
11 little temperature difference between the two, because the
12 power levels are very low. The reactor has been shut down.
13 And it is under these conditions that we are talking about
14 calculating metal-water reactions where the total heat
15 transferred through the clad is very small and therefore the
16 gradients are very small throughout the fuel pellet.

17 DR. FORD: Well now, can you tell me do the
18 Westinghouse codes explicitly simulate the gap between the
19 cladding and the fuel?

20 MR. MOORE: Yes.

21 DR. FORD: Do they assume that the gas in that gap,
22 the heat transfer coefficient--

23 MR. MOORE: Do we assume a heat transfer coefficient?
24 Is that the question.

25 DR. FORD: Yes.

1 MR. MOORE: Yes.

2 DR. FORD: Can you tell me is that heat transfer
3 coefficient the same on different axial levels of the rod or
4 are they different?

5 MR. MOORE: No. The gap coefficient varies de-
6 pending on the power level in the rod.

7 DR. FORD: Now if the gap closed in a earlier
8 portion of the transient, would this bring about a much
9 greater increase in fuel rod maximum cladding temperature
10 than if the gap were preserved in its usual form throughout
11 the transient?

12 MR. MOORE: Not necessarily, no.

13 DR. FORD: Well, what analysis have you done, what
14 sensitivity analysis have you done, to relate the maximum
15 clad temperature to this particular variable, to both the
16 size of the gap and its heat transfer coefficient?

17 MR. MOORE: We have looked at the effect of an
18 initial gap which is as I mentioned earlier primarily and
19 effect on stored energy. So that we tend to overpredict
20 the amount of stored energy. And then we have looked at
21 sensitivity studies to assign gap coefficients which tend
22 to get the heat out of the fuel, to the cladding, at the
23 worst time with respect to the transient.

24 DR. FORD: No, no. Explicitly in terms of what
25 assumption do you make about the gap that overpredicts.

1 MR. MOORE: I don't have the exact numbers right
2 here. I would have to get them. There is an initial gap
3 conductant assumed and that later in the transient a reduced
4 gap conductant is assumed.

5 DR. FORD: Well, the initial one being higher, does
6 that mean that the heat transfer is greater, and that con-
7 tributes to redistributing the stored thermal energy more
8 quickly than if you assumed the lower one first? How is that
9 conservative?

10 MR. MOORE: Well, I am not going to assume a very
11 low, very unrealistic gap conductance at the beginning of a
12 transient.

13 DR. FORD: Well, but explain to me how you have
14 done this conservatively? According to your statement you
15 estimated that the heat transfer for the gap is high early
16 and low later.

17 MR. MOORE: Higher earlier and lower later.

18 DR. FORD: Lower later.

19 Now on what grounds do you claim that the specific
20 quantitative estimate, that you claim that that is con-
21 servative? If it were lower earlier, I mean, or if it's
22 simply lower than the number you choose, that would increase
23 or delay the removal of store thermal energy, is that correct?

24 MR. MOORE: I am sorry. I missed the question.

25 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Let's take the first one. Why

1 is the assumption of a higher, whatever the word is here,
2 coefficient--

3 DR. FORD: Heat transfer coefficient.

4 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: --more conservative?

5 MR. MOORE: The assumption of a higher heat transfer
6 coefficient at the beginning of a transient is not conserva-
7 tive per se. The coefficient that's used is a low value
8 considering the actual operating conditions of the fuel and
9 cladding. In other words, we at the beginning of the transient
10 underpredict the gap conductants such that the stored energy,
11 tends to be higher. But then it makes sense later in the
12 transient for this gap conductants to be reduced.

13 DR. FORD: How does the assumed heat transfer co-
14 efficient for the gap during the early stages of the accident,
15 how does that relate to the normal heat transfer coefficient
16 for the gap?

17 MR. MOORE: It is lower.

18 DR. FORD: By about what fraction?

19 MR. MOORE: I don't have that figure here.

20 DR. FORD: Is it ten per cent lower, fifteen per
21 cent lower? Do you have any idea what the order of
22 magnitude is that we are talking about?

23 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: He is pausing. I wonder would it
24 serve your purpose to get the exact figure at a later time
25 and proceed in the record?

1 DR. FORD: Yes, it would.

2 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Proceed on that basis.

3 Would you do that.

4 MR. MOORE: Fine.

5 DR. FORD: Can you set forth the experimental data
6 that you rely upon, perhaps when you present the coefficient
7 itself, the experimental data that you rely upon to demonstrate
8 in the statistical analysis that it is indeed a conservative
9 statement for this coefficient?

10 MR. MOORE: Yes.

11 DR. FORD: If you can present that.

12 Now back to the whole thrust of this line of
13 questioning. Is it a true statement that if you assumed a
14 very low, a much lower heat transfer coefficient for the
15 gap than you do now in the early stages of the accident, is
16 it true that this would result in much higher temperature
17 for the cladding and much metal-water reaction?

18 MR. MOORE: The results are sensitive to gap
19 conductance. So if I had very low gap conductances, yes, I
20 could get higher temperatures.

21 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Higher temperatures at the
22 cladding would result in a greater metal-water reaction, is
23 that correct?

24 MR. MOORE: That's correct.

25 DR. FORD: By very sensitive what do you mean in

1 a quantitative way? What per cent change in the heat transfer
2 coefficient to the gap. What would be the per cent change of
3 maximum cladding temperature that would accompany that?

4 MR. MOORE: I would prefer to give you those figures
5 when I get the exact figures for conductances that's used in
6 the analysis.

7 MR. FORD: Well, can you?

8 MR. MOORE: I am not recalling from memory what the
9 results of the parameter studies, the sensitivity studies,
10 actually were.

11 MR. FORD: I think then if the basic data on the
12 sensitivity will come at a later point I will conclude now
13 our questions with regard to the similitude of the fuel rod,
14 simulated fuel rod heat transfer, to actual fuel rod heat
15 transfer.

16 We do have additional questions on metal-water
17 reactions, though.

18 The interim policy statement of the Atomic Energy
19 Commission published on June 29th on Emergency Core Cooling
20 Systems noted that the fuel element cladding temperature of
21 2300 degrees "has been chosen on the basis of available data
22 on embrittlement and possible subsequent shattering of the
23 cladding."

24 That's Section 4 of the Interim Policy Statement,
25 paragraph A 1.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Now I notice Applicant's counsel has handed a document to the witness to let him read it before you propound your question.

DR. FORD: Oh.

1 MR. WIESEMANN: What was the question?

2 DR. FORD: I was just calling your attention
3 to that statement about which I was going to ask you a
4 number of questions. The first question concerns or is
5 why is cladding embrittlement a relevant criteria for
6 determining the maximum clad temperature during the loss
7 of coolant accident?

8 MR. TROSTEN: Mr. Chairman, it seems to me
9 that a question of this sort really ought to be directed
10 to the witness from the Atomic Energy Commission Staff.
11 At some point during the course of the hearing if the
12 question has been directed to the Staff and Mr. Roisman
13 wishes to ask for the Applicant's witness' comments on
14 what the Staff has said or comments on the criteria
15 generally we might not have any objection to that. But
16 I think questions generally directed to why the criteria
17 are what they are and whether they are valid and questions
18 of that general sort really should be directed to the
19 witness for the Regulatory Staff.

20 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Well, I think it is a question
21 of semantics here. I think under the analysis that
22 Applicant's Counsel has propounded that questions in that
23 regard were not to the Staff but perhaps as I understand
24 this question it is to these gentlemen who are in the
25 nuclear industry, and I understand he is seeking to find

1 out something as to what would be the available data
2 in their understanding, why is 2300 a significant
3 cladding temperature consideration. I inferred from the
4 question that he was seeking some data from these witnesses
5 as to their understanding of what it is. These witnesses
6 can't speak for the Commission, of course.

7 DR. FORD: It's our understanding that the
8 development of the interim criteria, in the development
9 of the interim criteria the Commission solicited and received
10 the assistance of the major reactor vendors, that they
11 supplied information in terms of their experimental
12 programs. They conducted computer code calculations
13 and sensitivity analysis for the Commission and so it's
14 our feeling that the reactor vendors are in a very good
15 position to explain, to make a contribution to the
16 explanation of the criteria, and to clarify the experimental
17 support for the criteria.

18 And since in addition the computer codes of
19 course mentioned in the criteria, the Westinghouse code,
20 is proprietary material, and there is no way -- The
21 Commission itself is not in a position under its disclosure
22 regulations to simply release this proprietary material,
23 so there is no other way except asking the vendors on
24 this aspect of the interim policy statements, asking them
25 germane questions.

1 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Has that cleared that up?

2 MR. TROSTEN: To this degree, Mr. Chairman,
3 Applicant's Counsel has no objection to the witnesses
4 for the Applicant responding as technical experts on
5 matters pertaining to the interim acceptance criteria or
6 on the Westinghouse evaluation model.

7 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: I think the question should
8 be understood in the context you have just stated and on
9 that basis the witness can consider the matter. Can you
10 do that, please.

11 Do you have the question before you, Mr. Moore?

12 MR. MOORE: It might be well if the question
13 were repeated.

14 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Restate it, please, if you will.

15 DR. FORD: Could the Reporter read the question
16 back, please.

17 (The pending question is read by the Reporter.)

18 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Can you handle that, Mr. Moore?

19 DR. FORD: The question was as I wanted to say,
20 why was the clad embrittlement the relevant criteria,
21 not just a relevant criteria?

22 MR. MOORE: In determining maximum temperature?

23 DR. FORD: That's correct.

24 MR. MOORE: Well, clad embrittlement is, of
25 course, of interest because we want to be sure that the

1 cladding is maintained in a way that we can insure a
2 coolable geometry in the core. So we want to preclude
3 embrittlement which could have the potential for causing
4 shattering of the cladding.

5 This embrittlement limit has then been related
6 back to an allowable peak temperature.

7 DR. FORD: My question is more general. It is
8 why in terms of all of the phenomena that could go on
9 in the loss of coolant accident, that is functionally
10 related to maximum clad temperature, why is embrittlement
11 suggested as the relevant criteria? I mean for example,
12 why is not the threshold level for the onset of changes
13 in core geometry, why is that not fed as the relevant
14 conservative place for maximum clad temperature, which
15 would be at 1600 degrees?

16 MR. MOORE: Well, I can only state my judgment,
17 that's really an Atomic Energy Commission limit, but --

18 DR. FORD: Well, let me clarify.

19 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Let him finish his answer.

20 DR. FORD: Okay, I am sorry.

21 MR. MOORE: In order to show that we can
22 tolerate this highly unlikely event, which is this
23 double-ended rupture of primary system piping, our main
24 requirement is to ensure that we can continue to cool
25 the core. It is not one of trying to maintain the core

1 within limits that, for example, would allow you to
2 return to operation. This is a highly unlikely situation.
3 So the design basis is to ensure public health and safety
4 by ensuring ourselves that we can continue to cool the
5 core.

6 DR. FORD: Yes, but why do you consider the
7 onset of embrittlement as a more important factor in your
8 ability to maintain the core in a coolable configuration?
9 Why do you maintain that as more important than simply
10 the general onset at about 1600 degrees of major change
11 in core geometry?

12 MR. MOORE: It's not a question of it being
13 more important. It's just in our judgment this represents
14 a reasonable limit which does ensure the fact that you
15 can cool the core?

16 DR. FORD: Well now, if the threshold level
17 defining major changes in the onset of core geometry were
18 chosen as the basic reason for maximum clad temperature,
19 then is it correct that instead of a 2300 degree max clad
20 chosen on embrittlement consideration we would have
21 something like a 1600 degree max clad chosen on the basis
22 of changing core geometry.

23 MR. MOORE: I indicated we want to ensure a
24 coolable geometry, not the fact that geometry cannot change.

25 DR. FORD: Well now, with reference to what

1 constitutes a coolable geometry, you obviously believe
2 that a badly damaged core, from embrittlement, would no
3 longer be, or you couldn't guarantee that it would be
4 coolable. But do you contend that you can guarantee that
5 a core that is simply badly damaged from rod swelling
6 and so forth, you can guarantee under all the conditions
7 that might be postulated, all the range of gas pressures,
8 internal pressures, the heating rates, can you guarantee
9 without scientific qualification that these kinds of
10 changes in core geometry won't interfere with your
11 ability to effectively turn around the temperature
12 transient for a LOCA?

13 MR. MOORE: I must say that's a very broad
14 question. With respect to the Indian Point reactor and the
15 conditions that are postulated for the initiation of the
16 accident and the conditions that are calculated subsequent
17 to the accident, yes, the core is in a coolable geometry,
18 and this has been corroborated by extensive amount of
19 experimentation with these geometries.

20 DR. FORD: Yes, but --

21 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Excuse me. I wonder if you
22 could go back to the question. I think the connections
23 that he is propounding may be different than those you
24 had postulated.

25 DR. FORD: I was specifically trying to be quite

1 general. I am talking about all of the conditions that
2 you might postulate under a range of internal gas pressures
3 going from approximately fifty psi to 2000 psi for the rods
4 over a range of internal heating rates during the heat-up
5 going from a range of five degrees Fahrenheit a second to
6 a 100 degrees Fahrenheit a second. These are the
7 experimental conditions that are being used in the current
8 research on fuel rod variances and core geometry changes.

9 What I am asking about, over that whole range
10 it's one thing for what specific pressures or heating rates,
11 that you selected are, whether you can do it in that
12 circumstance, but I'm asking over the whole range of
13 influential, importantly influential conditions, whether
14 you can guarantee that this emergency core cooling system
15 will be able to function effectively and turn around a
16 temperature increase.

17 MR. MOORE: The answer to that is yes for these
18 ranges that you are talking about, as long as they are
19 ranges within the expectation of the operation of this
20 reactor.

21 DR. FORD: I see. Now do you challenge the
22 ranges that are currently used in research on geometry
23 changes in pressurized water reactors, namely the ranges
24 that I indicated of between fifty psi to 2000 psi internal
25 rod pressure and from heating rates from forty-five degrees

1 Fahrenheit to 100 degrees Fahrenheit per second? Is
2 that range unreasonable to you?

3 MR. MOORE: No.

4 DR. FORD: Now within that range can you present
5 experiments over that entire range? I believe there were
6 168 burst tests. Can you tell me what range of pressures
7 were tested there?

8 MR. MOORE: Table I in WCAP-7379-L I am looking
9 at indicates a --

10 MR. ROISMAN: Did you say Volume I?

11 MR. MOORE: Volume I.

12 MR. ROISMAN: Mr. Chairman, we have a Volume I
13 here of that report which I gather is normally proprietary.
14 We got a non-proprietary version with the numbers crossed
15 off.

16 MR. MOORE: Table I. Are Table I and Table II
17 in the report?

18 MR. ROISMAN: I am not sure the Tables are
19 attached.

20 Let me see.

21 MR. MOORE: Page 9.

22 MR. ROISMAN: Pages 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 were
23 deleted from our copy.

24 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: If we took a recess you could
25 confer as to whether there is a release of proprietary

1 information possible. At this time let us recess to
2 reconvene in this room at 11:50.

3 (A brief recess is taken.)
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: please come to order.

2 Intervenor's interrogator, ready to proceed? Will
3 you do so, please?

4 DR. FORD: Just to begin with the report on the
5 discussion between the Intervenor and Applicants, we are going
6 to arrange to sign agreements covering my access to proprietary
7 material. But I have some general questions about the nature
8 of the tests that I think can be answered. If it is at all
9 proprietary material--I don't know what is proprietary or not.
10 --then I will stop it and defer it to later.

11 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Very well. Proceed.

12 DR. FORD: Are the tests that you have performed
13 over the various ranges of internal pressures and so forth,
14 are they all single-rod tests or do you have bundle tests as
15 well?

16 DR. ROLL: We conducted both types of tests. The
17 single-rod tests reported in the WCAP 7379 reports and the
18 multi-reports as reported in WCAP 7495 reports.

19 DR. FORD: And the multi-rod tests are the ones
20 that are the proprietary ones; is that correct?

21 DR. ROLL: Both tests reports are proprietary. You
22 have a volume 1.

23 DR. FORD: I have a non-proprietary part. I have a
24 proprietary class 3, which means non proprietary.

25 DR. ROLL: That's volume 2 of 7379. That work was

1 conducted under AEC contract and was released as a public
2 document.

3 DR. FORD: On the type of heating that was done, is
4 it a correct statement that all of the single-rod tests used
5 induction heating rather than internal filaments?

6 DR. ROLL: No. It is not. Our single-rod test used
7 radiant heating, not induction heating. The multi-rod test
8 did use the rods themselves as the heater element. We did not
9 have an internal heater.

10 DR. FORD: Electric filaments?

11 DR. ROLL: No. We used electrical resistance of the
12 rods themselves.

13 DR. FORD: Is the material governing such things,
14 for example, as the temperature coefficient of electrical
15 resistivity for the rods themselves, is that proprietary infor-
16 mation?

17 DR. ROLL: No. That's general available information.

18 DR. FORD: Does the zircalloy cladding of a high
19 temperature coefficient of electrical resistivity?

20 DR. ROLL: The coefficient of electrical resistivity
21 for zircalloy is adequate to get the heating rates needed for
22 the purposes, which were practical.

23 DR. FORD: I am asking for an additional parameter
24 about the experiment, namely, whether or not it has a high
25 temperature coefficient of electrical resistivity, whatever its

1 adequacies in other respects are.

2 DR. ROLL: It has a temperature coefficient of
3 resistivity which we were aware of and used in designing the
4 rods. I don't know what context you are asking the question,
5 high.

6 DR. FORD: Are you aware of the phenomena that will
7 result if it had as molybdenum filaments had?

8 DR. ROLL: Yes. We did not experience that
9 phenomena.

10 DR. FORD: You didn't experience any? What was the
11 power difference axial levels? You didn't get any power shifts?
12 Has it any coefficient of electrical resistivity at all? Then
13 you could get a feedback.

14 DR. ROLL: We were concerned primarily with degrees
15 per second. We did calibrate the experiment so that we knew
16 for given power input to the total test bundle in the
17 molybdenum rod tests, and we could then, by experiment,
18 determine what power input was needed to get to degrees per
19 second that was germane to the test.

20 DR. FORD: I appreciate that, but that's not
21 responsive. I am concerned with whether or not, on different
22 axial levels of the bundle, you experienced increases in
23 temperature due to the temperature coefficient of resistivity
24 of the cladding.

25 DR. ROLL: Of course.

1 DR. FORD: Fine. What was the magnitude of that
2 power shifting?

3 DR. ROLL: I didn't say we got power shifting.
4 You asked a question, did we get increases in temperature due
5 to the thermal coefficient of resistivity. I answered in the
6 affirmative. I didn't say we got power shifting.

7 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Let him answer.

8 DR. ROLL: I know what you are seeking. I believe
9 there were some difficulties, experimental difficulties in
10 other tests in the FLECHT program, not our own, relating to
11 the change in resistance of the heaters with the temperature.
12 They got some results which they later said were not relevant.
13 They had problems determining the results because of that.
14 We calibrated our experiment. We calibrated our test rods
15 so we knew what kind of axial temperature grading we were
16 getting during our tests for our set of test conditions.

17 MR. FORD: I know it is all calibrated and
18 determined. What I am concerned to determine is the way in
19 which it is calibrated, how that relates to the differences,
20 the axial differences in temperature, and how this relates
21 to metal-water reaction, how it relates to swelling, how it
22 relates to embrittlement, and so forth.

23 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: What is your question?

24 DR. FORD: There was a comment to explain why--the
25 comment is to provide a statistical, if you will, comparison

1 of between the axial power levels of the test rods and the
2 axial power levels of temperature differences along that you
3 expect or have good reason to expect in a reactor during
4 transients, heat-up transients.

5 DR. ROLL: Let's try it again.

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Wait a minute. I think
2 sometimes the question gets a little long because you are
3 explaining why you are asking it. Do you have any
4 statistical --

5 DR. FORD: Comparison of the axial power levels
6 of your test rods versus the axial power levels of honest-
7 to-goodness rods during a loss of coolant?

8 DR. ROLL: My answer is, no, we do not. I'd
9 like to append that answer by saying, the power level in
10 these experiments are not germane. Power level is not
11 germane.

12 DR. FORD: Doesn't the local increase in power
13 level feed back mechanisms that result from any positive
14 temperature coefficient of resistivity, and doesn't that
15 cause power shifting? It is a question of the magnitude
16 that you may want to say is insignificant. Isn't that
17 the whole reason why we are concerned with what the
18 coefficients of resistivity are?

19 DR. ROLL: I'd like to try to remake the point
20 that power per se is not the important parameter here.
21 We are trying to simulate in rate of heat-up, that is
22 degrees per second. That is what we felt was the important
23 parameter that was the parameter that was measured. I
24 believe our ability to measure this parameter and report
25 it is contained in the documentation.

1 DR. FORD: You measure this parameter of
2 degrees Fahrenheit per second. Do you measure it at
3 different axial levels?

4 DR. ROLL: Yes.

5 DR. FORD: Is the ratio of a given location
6 to mean heat-up rate for your test bundle with its
7 electrical simulation, is that exactly the same as the
8 ratio of that parallel location to mean heat-up rate a
9 real honest-to-goodness rod? May I contribute a diagram?

10 DR. ROLL: We believe it is. We believe the
11 multi-rod burst test is adequate simulation of power
12 distributions and heat-up rates that will be observed
13 in the actual fuel assembly during the loss of coolant
14 situation.

15 DR. FORD: I'm sure you believe that. I'm
16 asking what confirmation you have in this specific case,
17 that the phenomenon of the temperature coefficient of
18 electrical resistivity of the cladding does not produce
19 a dissimilar axial distribution of heat-up rates during
20 the accident situation.

21 DR. ROLL: The distribution of heat-up rates
22 along the rod were within five to ten percent of a mean
23 value. Not necessarily of the objective value but five
24 percent to ten percent of the mean value. That's a rough
25 number, looking at these data.

1 DR. FORD: In other words, there was no pronounced
2 cosine axial curve?

3 DR. ROLL: That's correct.

4 DR. FORD: That it was simply uniform or more
5 or less uniform along a five percent or ten percent
6 variation along the axial?

7 DR. ROLL: Except for the end, which was six
8 inches of the rods. There were heat losses at the ends
9 of the experiments. Three-foot long rod. We believe
10 the end six inches probably had a lower heat-up rate.

11 DR. FORD: So that within the relevant eleven
12 feet of rods, the temperature distribution is more or
13 less uniform?

14 DR. ROLL: No, I didn't say that.

15 DR. FORD: Within five percent?

16 DR. ROLL: No. The test had a roughly two foot
17 flat power --

18 DR. FORD: They are not full-length rods?

19 DR. ROLL: No, three-foot rods.

20 DR. FORD: Of course. I see.

21 At any rate, nevertheless, along the instrumented
22 range that you are concerned with, the power distribution
23 and the heat-up rate was pretty much uniform; is that
24 right?

25 DR. ROLL: Quite uniform, yes.

1 DR. FORD: Is this uniform heat-up rate --
2 That's quite different, is it not, from the axial cosine
3 power curves and so forth that you expect in real fuel
4 rods? The middle is in relation to the mean. The middle
5 of the rods in the plant run about forty or fifty percent
6 in terms of what the accident heat-up rate is just in
7 terms of power density of -- The center point is fifty
8 percent more than the mean; is that correct?

9 MR. MOORE: That's correct, for the twelve-foot
10 reactor. The purpose of the three-foot tests were about
11 a one to two foot uniform kind of heat-up rate and was to
12 simulate the hottest region of the core looking at that
13 axial power distribution that you were talking about,
14 looking over the region of highest temperatures, which
15 is one to two feet.

16 DR. FORD: So that an important question about
17 rod failures, such as axial randomness or non-randomness,
18 is not answered at all in this test; is that correct?

19 MR. MOORE: On the contrary. I disagree. The
20 tests which had a uniform heat-up of over a region of
21 about one to two feet is equivalent to a reactor situation
22 where the highest temperatures, the highest power parts
23 of the rod along the twelve-foot length, over there there
24 is a one to two foot uniform power generation. That's the
25 region of interest. That's why the tests are applicable.

1 DR. FORD: I see.

2 Now, is the Applicant's position that you expect
3 local concentration of fuel rod failures, that you don't
4 expect axial randomness?

5 MR. MOORE: We expect axial randomness within
6 this two feet region, two foot region, as we observed in
7 the burst test.

8 DR. FORD: So that within the microcosmic world
9 of the test, there is some randomness. But in terms of
10 full length fuel rods, you expect that the fuel rod failure
11 would be concentrated in one and a half to two feet; is
12 that correct?

13 MR. MOORE: They would tend to be, just on the
14 basis of the power distribution, the heat-up rate, to be
15 concentrated in a two-foot elevation of the rod.

16 DR. FORD: Within just the small rods, what was
17 the axial distribution observed. What percent, let's say,
18 of the failures were exactly at the mean, the mean length
19 of the heated portion?

20 MR. MOORE: I would refer you to the figures
21 in this report, WCAP-7495.

22 DR. FORD: Is that a proprietary document?

23 MR. MOORE: Yes, it is proprietary. You can see
24 what degree of random this is. It is quite random.

25 DR. FORD: What, statistically speaking, does

1 that mean? What is the standard deviation?

2 MR. MOORE: I suggest you look at the figures
3 and arrive at your own conclusions.

4 DR. FORD: I am perfectly happy to examine them.
5 I don't know what the conditions of the agreement are.
6 Has Westinghouse performed a statistical analysis of the
7 randomness of fuel rod failures from this test data?

8 MR. MOORE: Yes, in terms of determining the
9 consequent flow blockage that you obtained with these
10 failures?

11 DR. FORD: In this statistical analysis, with
12 reference to the mean point of the test bundle, what is
13 the standard deviation? What is the mean relationship
14 of failures to that mean area of the rod, and what is the
15 standard deviation?

16 MR. MOORE: The data reduction of the multi-rod
17 burst tests with respect to the maximum blockage and the
18 correlation of this data is indicated in figure 2 of
19 report WCAP-7495, Volume II. Again, it is a proprietary
20 report.

21 DR. FORD: That's figure 2 of WCAP --

22 MR. MOORE: 7495-L, Volume II.

23 DR. FORD: Thank you. I think it is going to
24 be difficult to continue this transient with proprietary
25 material that can't be discussed. I think I will return

1 to the questions concerning embrittlement that started us
2 off on these tests.

3 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Proceed.
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1 MR. FORD: What experimental data has Westinghouse
2 amassed that would assist or on a basis which occurred to
3 determine the point at which embrittlement of the rod becomes
4 a hazard and which could determine which maximum clad tempera-
5 tures should be set to avoid problems due to embrittlement?

6 MR. ROLL: The data, the tests that we have run on
7 conditions leading to embrittlement of the rods are what we
8 call the series of quench tests, and these are reported in
9 WCAP 7379, Volume 1.

10 DR. FORD: I have the non-proprietary Volume 2 of
11 that. In these quench tests it says, and I quote, this is
12 page 6, "quenching of the samples was achieved by spraying
13 the samples from above with room temperature water."

14 In a loss of coolant accident situation with
15 Westinghouse, any of the Westinghouse emergency core cooling
16 systems spraying from above with room temperature water?

17 DR. ROLL: No.

18 DR. FORD: Would you explain then both with regard
19 to the use of the spray and the use of room temperature water
20 how this quench test simulates the conditions that would
21 occur in the Indian point 2 reactor with Westinghouse's
22 emergency core cooling systems operating if they don't spray,
23 if they don't use room temperature water?

24 MR. ROLL: The intent of the test was to subject
25 to rods to a fairly abrupt thermal transient and similar to

1 that but not exactly the same as that to be experienced in
2 an actual reactor. And this was accomplished for reasons of
3 experimental problems.

4 Bear in mind these were done in a hot cell. They
5 had to be done remotely, and the method of spraying was
6 felt to be an ample simulation of the thermal transient that
7 the rods would be subjected to.

8 DR. FORD: Of the thermal shock?

9 DR. ROLL: Right, thermal shock.

10 DR. FORD: Well, if this is correct that a spray
11 situation at room temperature water is an adequate simulation
12 of conditions in a pressurized water reactor, but this imply
13 that the data evolved by General Electric and evolved in the
14 BWR FLECHT tests involving spraying things with room tempera-
15 ture water, that all of these experiments provide relevant
16 data for the pressurized water reactor?

17 MR. MOORE: To what GW data are you referring?

18 DR. FORD: I am referring to all of the tests that
19 General Electric has performed and tests that have been sub-
20 contracted to General Electric by Idaho Nuclear pertaining
21 to the BWR FLECHT tests.

22 DR. ROLL: I don't think you can make that generali-
23 zation. I think that conditions here were not really an
24 attempt to simulate a spray from the top. We were attempting
25 to simulate a thermal transient on the rods.

1 DR. FORD: Right, but I am correct that the only
2 mechanism of cooling, the only mechanism of giving a thermal
3 shock to the rods, the only mechanism of quenching, was some-
4 thing that's quite similar to the other kind of reactors,
5 boiling water reactors' emergency core cooling system.

6 DR. ROLL: No, I don't think again you can make
7 that generalization. I said for reasons of experimental
8 problems related to heating up and quenching and irradiated
9 fuel rod remotely in a hot cell this is the way the experimenter
10 elected to do the job.

11 DR. FORD: Right.

12 DR. ROLL: I don't mean to infer--to go into your
13 broad generalization at all.

14 DR. FORD: I see. But how do you establish--I mean
15 there has to be some relevant isomorphism between the
16 experimental result and the situation in the real reactor. Are
17 you going to draw any implications from the experimental
18 result to the expected performance of the reactor emergency
19 cooling system and the fact that you cannot in general use
20 BWR FLECHT data with their kind of cooling mechanisms and so
21 forth? It seems to me that the general applicability of this
22 test, this kind of test, is what is in question. I am
23 wondering if you can give me the justification--I understand
24 that experimentally it may be more convenient or may be
25 impossible in the particular way you wanted to set up the

1 experiment to do anything but do it with the spray system at
2 room temperature water that you used.

3 What I want to know is how the concocted test set-up,
4 how you can infer at all without substantial error the relation-
5 ship between these test results and situations in your
6 pressurized water reactor during temperature transients.

7 DR. ROLL: Is your line of questioning relevance
8 of the tests that were run in the report of Volume 2?

9 DR. FORD: Precisely.

10 DR. ROLL: Perhaps it's necessary to look at also,
11 out Volume 1, but in that series of quench tests there we
12 actually drop the rod into a container of water to get the
13 effects--we did not spray them in tests that we ran reported
14 in Volume 1.

15 DR. FORD: It does not simulate phenomena you
16 expected to occur in the loss of coolant accidents, that is
17 the rod is going to drop?

18 DR. ROLL: We felt that was an adequate simulation
19 of the thermal transient that the rods would see. That is
20 time from the higher temperature to the time at essentially
21 room temperature.

22 DR. FORD: Well, is your time to quench based on--

23 DR. ROLL: I am sorry.

24 DR. FORD: Is your time to quench based on a test
25 that involved dropping a rod?

1 DR. ROLL: That is correct.

2 DR. FORD: Into a large container of water?

3 DR. ROLL: That is correct.

4 DR. FORD: Rather than something that simulated

5 how a rod in the environment of other rods also undergoing

6 thermal changes would be cooled by--

7 DR. ROLL: The tests that we ran--

8 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Wait a minute. Let him finish.

9 DR. FORD: I will repeat the question.

10 Does your test or is your correlation of time to

11 quench based on a test that involves dropping a rod into a

12 container of water, how does this simulate the actual con-

13 ditions under which a rod would actually be if it were

14 quenched, namely that it's in the dynamic environment of

15 other rods also undergoing thermal transients. I just can't

16 see at all the basis isomorphism between your experimental

17 situation and the situation you postulate to exist in a loss

18 of coolant accident.

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 DR. ROLL: The tests that we ran put more
2 severe transients on the rods than we would expect during
3 the quench phase of the loss of coolant accident.

4 DR. FORD: Didn't the test in a radically
5 dissimilar way deliver the coolant in a quantity that is
6 not expected -- In a quantity and with the speed that I
7 see no basis for expecting to occur in an actual loss
8 of coolant accident?

9 DR. ROLL: That's quite correct. In a radically
10 dissimilar and very conservative way the quantity of
11 coolant was delivered to the test rods, and hence the
12 thermal transient or thermal shock on the test rod was
13 more severe than we expect to see in a loss of coolant
14 accident.

15 DR. FORD: Well, did the test situation give
16 the rod more coolant more quickly than what one would
17 expect in the situation in a real reactor?

18 DR. ROLL: That's correct.

19 DR. FORD: Well, exactly how is giving it more
20 coolant more quickly conservative?

21 MR. WIESEMANN: I think maybe you ought to explain
22 what the phenomenon of thermal shock is.

23 The phenomenon of thermal shock consists of
24 establishing temperature gradients within a piece of material
25 which result in stress gradients, and if I take a piece

1 of material and I subject this material to a temperature
2 gradient and this material is, let's assume just for
3 purposes of discussion, that this material is not free
4 to move, it's restrained by other materials surrounding
5 it, at this high temperature we have expansion, thermal
6 expansion of the material where the temperature is high
7 which is greater than the expansion of the material where
8 the temperature is low. This means that the material on
9 one side of the specimen is tending to become longer
10 whereas the one on the other side is tending to become
11 shorter, which means the material is in a sense trying to
12 tear itself apart.

13 One part of it wants to be long, one part of it
14 wants to be short. Now the steeper the temperature gradient,
15 the more rapid the cooling, the steeper the temperature
16 gradient and the steeper the temperature gradient the
17 higher the stresses that occur which tend to pull the
18 material apart.

19 And it's a well-established engineering
20 fundamental from the standpoint of thermal shock that
21 if you subject a piece of material to higher temperature
22 gradients due to more rapid cooling that you also subject
23 the material to higher internal stresses which tend to
24 cause the material to fail. And this is the basis for our
25 saying that more rapid cooling of these rods is more likely

1 to produce the shattering or breaking mechanism. Because
2 this material is not ductile, if it is brittle, it will
3 break, just as a glass breaks. You have seen this happen
4 probably in your own home where you pour some hot water
5 in a cold glass or cold water in a hot glass and the
6 glass, which is brittle, breaks.

7 DR. FORD: I see. Could you add on to your
8 diagram the curve describing the relationship between
9 ductility and temperature for zircalloy?

10 MR. WIESEMANN: I couldn't draw the exact curves,
11 except that ductility --

12 DR. FORD: Analytically the general shape of
13 the curve.

14 MR. WIESEMANN: But ductility and temperature
15 are not the only considerations, and I should refer that
16 question to Dr. Roll, because there are some chemical
17 considerations.

18 DR. FORD: If you are not going to put on the
19 curve, I can't follow it the way I wanted to.

20 MR. WIESEMANN: Perhaps Dr. Roll could address
21 himself to it.

22 DR. ROLL: We have --

23 DR. FORD: Let me ask the question that concerns
24 me that I was going to look at the curve for, namely is
25 the temperature at which you effect cooling in the experiment

1 lower than the temperature at which cooling would be
2 effected if it didn't have this rapid supply of coolant?

3 MR. WIESEMANN: I think I can draw you a general
4 curve, and that is the general curve of temperature versus
5 ductility is that in general the ductility increases with
6 temperature. Plus if the material is colder it tends to
7 be less ductile, more brittle.

8 DR. FORD: In discussing an internally pressurized
9 rod at a temperature considerably below the point at which
10 it would perforate, would rod swelling be greater or less as
11 temperature was higher for a rod much below its perforation
12 point?

13 DR. ROLL: The rod swelling would be greater the
14 higher the temperature.

15 DR. FORD: Is it also correct that the greater
16 the swelling the greater the potential for embrittlement?

17 DR. ROLL: Perhaps, but I don't --

18 DR. FORD: Well let me ask you --

19 DR. ROLL: I don't see the line of questioning.
20 The greater the swelling the greater the potential for
21 embrittlement?

22 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: He will give you another one.

23 DR. ROLL: I say perhaps, but I --

24 DR. FORD: So that if the temperature and amount
25 of swelling that had taken place in a rod, or you have two

1 rods, which you begin to quench them when they are at
2 different temperatures, they have different swelling, they
3 have different potential for embrittlement, is it correct
4 that when you are cooling rods in this experimental
5 situation you are cooling them at higher temperatures and
6 at lower swelling than you would if they were simply
7 there with less coolant allowing them to swell and going
8 up to higher temperatures and higher ductility? Is the
9 nod affirmative?

10 DR. ROLL; Continuing, are we still on the
11 ductility temperature? Is this part of your question?

12 DR. FORD: That's part of it. Would it help if
13 I gave my conclusions?

14 DR. ROLL: Well, it may.

15 DR. FORD: Basically the conclusion is that in
16 your experimental situation your cooling rods are not as
17 swollen as they would be expected to be in the transient
18 with much less coolant around them immediately. The fact
19 that the real live rod which would be more swollen would
20 mean that in the area of swelling the wall thickness would
21 be less, the nil ductility temperature of the metal is
22 a function of its wall thickness. In the metallurgic
23 research at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory it was
24 indicated that the embrittlement temperature with reduced
25 wall thickness from rod swelling would be considerably lower

1 than the embrittlement temperature assuming that the rod
2 hadn't swelled up that much.

3 So the basic point is that from the point of
4 view of thermal shock that analysis is all perfectly
5 adequate. But I'm suggesting through my questions what
6 you haven't taken into consideration is that wall thickness
7 that you are talking about changes during the accident,
8 and in a real situation it's allowed to change and in
9 your experimental situations just dropping it into the
10 water at predetermined temperature, not allowing it to
11 continue to swell before it was finally quenched, that
12 has a very non-conservative experimental -- That's very
13 non-conservative experimental data related to the
14 phenomenon that I'm particularly concerned with.

15 Now that I have stated my conclusions and
16 arguments and hypotheses I hope you can respond.

17 MR. TROSTEN: May I just interject at this point.
18 Mr. Ford has in a sense asked the question by stating his
19 own views on the subject, and it seems to me that the only
20 way that the witness can respond is either to say, "Well,
21 I agree with what you say," or, "I disagree with what you
22 say," and just let it go at that. Unless you have something
23 else you can add to that.

24 MR. ROISMAN: Mr. Chairman, the witness asked
25 to have that conclusion given so that he'd just have a

1 better idea how to answer the question. Mr. Ford's
2 prepared to go through the questions that reach that
3 conclusion step by step, but the witness thought it might
4 be helpful to see where he was going, and that was the
5 only reason that Mr. Ford went on that way.

6 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: And after having stated that
7 I think I know you intended to end up by saying, "Is
8 this correct?"

9 DR. FORD: Yes.

10 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Now will you try and answer
11 on that?

12 DR. FORD: I could partition matters.

13 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Let's try it this way. He
14 may fully agree with everything you have said and that
15 will move the case along quite well.

16 DR. ROLL: Let me make some observations and
17 see if I can describe why I don't agree with your conclusion
18 as stated.

19 First of all, rods which have swollen but not
20 burst have done so because they have not been subjected
21 to high temperatures to get them into the bursting
22 temperature. Therefore, they have not been at high enough
23 temperatures to get them to a point where there is any
24 significant zirc-oxide reaction, zirc-water yields and
25 zirc-oxide. Therefore, the combination of having a swollen

1 rod with sizable quantities of zirc-oxide on it, I believe
2 that combination is almost mutually exclusive.

3 Secondly, the swelling as it relates to wall
4 thinning, you don't swell and burst and then contract.
5 So that the rods which have burst have shown for their
6 particular combination of rate and pressure, will have
7 shown the maximum swelling for that, as I say, for
8 that particular combination.

9 And then finally we did run some tests on
10 previously burst rods and these tests, quench tests, with
11 previously burst rods, and these data points with the
12 rest of our data points together comprise our discussion
13 of limits on mechanical integrity of the rods with regard
14 to the quench phenomenon and related to total quantity
15 of zirc-water reaction.

16 DR. FORD: Let me address the questions to some
17 of the premises that you have raised.

18 Your first one was all I must say I really
19 caught and I'm focusing on that a moment. You said that
20 if the rods had not yet burst they were not at a high
21 enough temperature for metal-water reactions, zircalloy-
22 water reactions to take place, is that correct?

23 DR. ROLL: No, it's not. I said if they hadn't
24 burst they hadn't gotten to the temperature at which they
25 would have burst for the particular combination of heat rate

1 and internal pressure. They are always at a lower
2 temperature than their bursting temperature if they haven't
3 yet burst.

4 DR. FORD: Right. But you are claiming that the
5 temperatures at which they will have not yet burst are
6 temperatures at which a significant zircalloy-water reaction
7 won't take place.

8 DR. ROLL: Well, I meant to infer there or meant
9 to leave the impression that if they were at a lower
10 temperature they would have had less zirc-water reactions
11 than if they had actually gone up to this bursting
12 temperature.

13 DR. FORD: But isn't it the case from the fuel
14 rod failure tests at Oak Ridge that they have a number of
15 failures that don't occur until a range here of 2550 degrees,
16 2600 degrees. Clearly that's in a range where you could
17 have significant metal-water reaction, is that correct?

18 DR. ROLL: I am not intimately familiar with
19 the Oak Ridge report.

20 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Well at least in any event I
21 think that you should show it to the witness either now
22 or during the recess so that he will have an opportunity
23 to review it.

24 DR. FORD: All right. Let me ask a specific
25 question. Is it correct that a combinatio of low heating

1 rate and low internal pressure -- By low I mean low in
2 terms of pressure, between fifty and 100 psi and low in
3 terms of heating rate, safe five or ten degrees Fahrenheit
4 a second, is it correct that at those low heating rates
5 and low internal pressures, the temperature at burst will
6 be way up in the 2000 degrees Fahrenheit, in the region
7 of significant metal-water reaction?

8 DR. ROLL: The conditions that we looked at
9 and as reported in our document, we show that for --
10 In particular the document is 7379 Volume I, page 45.
11 We have a curve there of bursting temperatures and we
12 say essentially things are going to be burst by the time
13 they get up to 2000 degrees F.

14 DR. FORD: I see. I don't have that in front of
15 me. I have Volume II, the non-proprietary version of
16 the same document.

17 This is Table IV, page 11 of the report you just
18 cited.

19 MR. MOORE: Excuse us. We need Volume II.

20 DR. FORD: Now directing your attention to
21 Table IV, page 11, it seems to present exactly the data
22 I was talking about. It gives, for example, a low heating
23 rate, low pressure for rod LY-12 and the temperature
24 observed at failure is 2431 degrees. So is this affirmative
25 evidence? And even in tests with higher heating rates but

1 low pressure I call your attention to rod LY-7. You had
2 a heating rate of 100 degrees Fahrenheit per second,
3 but a low fifty psig, and its temperature at burst was
4 2630 degrees. So is it clear that things get up way
5 above 2000 degrees before they burst?

6 DR. ROLL: It's our data and we signed off on it.
7 Yes. The temperatures are there, but --

8 DR. FORD: Well now --

9 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Let him finish.

10 DR. FORD: Excuse me.

11 DR. ROLL: I'm concurring in the Table that
12 is being quoted. I say yes, that's right. He has adequately
13 read off the data points.

14 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: The question was at those
15 higher heating rates, 100 degrees Fahrenheit per second
16 and fifty psig, that there will a temperature of 2630
17 degrees before they burst. Yes or no?

18 DR. ROLL: Does the data indicate that temperature?

19 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Yes.

20 DR. ROLL: Yes. It's in the report.

21 DR. FORD: Am I correct in my observation that
22 this is a very clear contradiction of what your idea was
23 of temperatures at bursts of things?

24 MR. MOORE : That's not true, because what
25 Dr. Roll was referencing was what happens in a reactor,

1 and there is a specific time-temperature relationship
2 in a reactor in terms of how the cladding does heat up,
3 that LY-12 would be 500, 4 or 500 seconds before that
4 temperature is reached. In fact, the purpose of this
5 test was to try to get those kinds of temperatures and
6 we were forced to -- Before we burst -- And we were
7 forced to use very low internal pressures in many cases
8 in order to achieve them. They are not representative
9 of time-temperature history that you get in an actual
10 fuel rod.

11 DR. FORD: Could you identify which combinations
12 of heating rates and which combinations of pressures,
13 internal pressure and temperature and heating rate, would
14 be expected in the accident? I mean which among these
15 are realistic?

16 MR. MOORE: Just looking at the Table it's
17 difficult for me to look at all those combinations and
18 try to derive that. I was looking at the combinations of
19 specific interest, the 2630 and the 2431 degrees
20 Fahrenheit, and I was excluding those specific ones as
21 not being representative. It would take me longer to
22 figure out how representative some of the others are.

23 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: And maybe this would be a good
24 occasion to recess and have an opportunity to work on that
25 over the noon hour. Will that be a convenient place to

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

interrupt your examination?

DR. FORD: Yes indeed.

CHAIRMAN JENSCH: At this time let's recess.

We will reconvene in this room at two o'clock.

(The luncheon recess is taken.)

M01

A F T E R N O O N S E S S I O N

CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Please come to order.

Will the witness resume the stand.

Intervenors' counsel, are you ready to proceed?
I'd like to, before we proceed, indicate that there is no
smoking in the room. Will you extinguish all burning.

Will you proceed, please?

DR. FORD: I'll wait until all the witnesses are
there.

I'd like to begin by simply taking a very quick
overall view at the way metal-water reactions are treated
than just simply what your codes considered these reactions.
At a later point we can go into justification for the way
in which they are considered or the justification of not
considering them, and so forth.

I'd like to know, first, whether the Westinghouse
codes simulate and continuously calculate the way they do
zircalloy-water reactions, whether they simulate and calculate
eutectic meltings between the Inconel springs and the cladding
and the liquid-metal reactions that were to accompany that
eutectic.

MR. MOORE: The zirc-water reaction is simulated
continuously. That is the only reaction that is simulated.

DR. FORD: So that's specifically to the point,
there is no simulation at all of the phenomenon of eutectic

1 formation, eutectic melting and metal-water reaction between
2 that eutectic alloy and steam or water in the entire course
3 of the transient?

4 MR. MOORE: That's correct.

5 MR. WIESEMANN: As stated yesterday in the hearing.

6 DR. FORD: The second question is whether the codes
7 simulate and continuously calculate the reaction rate between
8 uranium dioxide and water, the conversion UO3 under the con-
9 ditions of the accident.

10 DR. ROLL: Under the conditions of the accident,
11 there is essentially no reaction between UO2 and water.

12 DR. FORD: But do the codes themselves explicitly
13 what this and simulate the variables which would, under
14 relevant conditions, contribute to a reaction between uranium
15 dioxide and water?

16 Independent of your feeling as to whether or not
17 it is necessary to simulate this, does the code have the
18 capability?

19 DR. ROLL: Under the conditions which we see in the
20 loss of coolant sequence of events, there is no reaction
21 between water and UO2. The reaction is not favored
22 thermodynamically. So there is none. Having this framework
23 of conditions, then we say that it doesn't keep track of
24 anything.

25 DR. FORD: I just wanted to make a survey, whether

1 you consider these. It may be irrelevant. I would like to
2 get an overall view of your metal-water reaction consideration.

3 Thirdly, do you consider possible and simulate
4 and continuously calculate reactions between the cladding and
5 the fuel itself, that kind of exothermic reaction?

6 DR. ROLL: We do not consider any effects related
7 to a so-called reaction between the fuel and the clad.

8 DR. FORD: Do you consider, in your analysis, the
9 collection of uranium dioxide and fuel in the balloons formed
10 by plastic deformation of the rods?

11 DR. ROLL: No, we do not.

12 DR. FORD: Thank you.

13 Now we are back to embrittlement. I'd like to
14 establish some general grounds.

15 Do you consider the degree of embrittlement as a
16 function of integrated exposure time, exposure temperature?

17 MR. MOORE: We do the analysis and calculate--the
18 answer is yes, in that we do the analysis and calculate the
19 total amount of metal-water reaction, and compare this to
20 what we determine to be the acceptable limit with respect to
21 embrittlement.

22 DR. FORD: Cladding temperatures below 2,300
23 degrees, Fahrenheit, do you expect there will be any signi-
24 ficant embrittlement?

25 MR. MOORE: No. As I indicated earlier in testimony

1 this morning, very little of the cladding has any kind of
2 metal-water reaction at all.

3 DR. FORD: What correlations have you developed
4 between cladding temperature and the ductility at room
5 temperature in metal?

6 MR. ROLL: What have we, Westinghouse, developed?

7 DR. FORD: Yes.

8 DR. ROLL: We have done no work in this area germane
9 to this particular problem.

10 DR. FORD: So that in terms of the quench test that
11 we were discussing before, they were concerned with analyzing
12 the phenomenological effects of just a variety of postulated
13 accident situations, and is it correct to say that they were
14 really not attempts to collect data from which you can
15 demonstrate what the relationship is between cladding tempera-
16 tures and embrittlement?

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 DR. ROLL: The experiments that were performed
2 were not directed toward elucidating that the ductility
3 versus temperature curve and hence the determination of
4 nil ductility temperature.

5 DR. FORD: And so in terms of an experimental
6 contribution to the suitability of a 2300 degree cladding
7 embrittlement, you, Westinghouse, makes no contribution.

8 MR. WIESEMANN: Would you rephrase that question,
9 please?

10 DR. FORD: Does the Applicant take the position,
11 does Westinghouse take the position, that any data that they
12 have confirmed 2300 degrees as a reasonable limit with
13 regard to considerations of cladding embrittlement?

14 MR. WIESEMANN: Not reasonable, but very
15 conservative. The data from the tests we have performed
16 which showed that the shattering phenomenon does not
17 occur at temperatures well above 2300 degrees, and for
18 the zirconium water reactions up to sixteen percent confirms
19 very clearly that the 2300 degrees is a very conservative
20 value used.

21 DR. FORD: Now the use of 2300 degrees as an
22 indicator of the onset of embrittlement, can you give
23 us your feeling as to how changes in wall thickness of
24 the rods that accompany local swelling, how this increases
25 probability of embrittlement and how this changes the

1 relationship between maximum cladding temperature and
2 nil ductility.

3 MR. WIESEMANN: Your question assumes that the
4 onset of the embrittlement occurs at 2300 degrees. I
5 don't believe there has been any evidence adduced in
6 this proceeding directed to this end. I think that the
7 general, the criteria that the AEC proposed, said that
8 that temperature is a temperature which when used would
9 be such that you would not have this problem. But there
10 was nothing said that this was the place which would
11 define or demark the onset of this. In fact, I think we
12 made it very clear that we don't have this problem at
13 temperatures up to 2700 degrees, and for zirconium-water
14 reactions to sixteen percent of local areas.

15 DR. FORD: Now in the tests in which you dropped
16 the rods into a volume of water, were the rods internally
17 pressurized?

18 DR. ROLL: No, they were not.

19 DR. FORD: I see. And do we assume therefore,
20 that there was no swelling deformation of the rods?

21 DR. ROLL: No, you don't infer that because
22 four of the rods that had been dropped had been pre-burst,
23 had been burst prior to this, and then were run back to
24 temperature again and dropped.

25 DR. FORD: I see.

1 How many rods were dropped in total?

2 DR. ROLL: I believe the number is twelve, eight
3 of which are reported in Volume I and four of which are
4 reported in Volume II of 7379.

5 DR. FORD: I see . So there were twelve rods,
6 four of which had been pressurized and had been burst?

7 DR. ROLL: That's correct.

8 DR. FORD: What was the pressurization of the rods
9 and the heating rate?

10 DR. ROLL: Let me change that previous statement
11 on number of tests. I was thinking a different series
12 of tests.

13 MR. WIESEMANN: While he is looking for that
14 let's make sure we understand the question. Are you asking
15 for the temperature and the pressure and the temperature,
16 rate of temperature rise for the rods?

17 DR. FORD: I'm looking for the temperature-time
18 history of the rods, of the initial condition before it
19 was dropped into the water.

20 MR. WIESEMANN: Just before it was dropped?

21 DR. FORD: Right.

22 MR. WIESEMANN: You are not talking about the
23 conditions that led to the bursting in the first place?

24 DR. FORD: Yes, that's what I said, temperature,
25 time and history of the rods, at what heating rates, and

1 the internal temperatures and so forth.

2 DR. ROLL: Let me summarize correctly the total
3 spectrum of point test conditions. I am quoting out of --

4 DR. FORD: Excuse me. There are special reasons
5 why I am only interested if the rods have been internally
6 pressurized and I'd rather just keep my question just
7 limited to them at the moment.

8 DR. ROLL: Right. I hear you but I want to
9 correct what I said before. I said that we had twelve
10 total quench tests and that number is wrong. Forty-seven
11 quench tests.

12 Now quench tests with pressurized rods. For
13 quench test conditions for the series of tests with the
14 pressurized rods, the pressures considered were 100, 200,
15 500, 1000 and 2250 psi.

16 DR. FORD: Could you give me the source for this
17 data, please?

18 DR. ROLL: WCAP-7379, Volume I.

19 DR. FORD: Page?

20 DR. ROLL: It's Table VII on page 19.

21 DR. FORD: I presume you are looking for the
22 heating rate?

23 DR. ROLL: Oh, I'm sorry. No, I was waiting
24 for a question.

25 DR. FORD: Oh.

1 DR. ROLL: It's not clear that we have it
2 reported in here.

3 DR. FORD: Excuse me; I didn't hear that.

4 DR. ROLL: We don't have heating rate reported
5 here. I don't recall what it was for this particular
6 series of tests.

7 MR. WIESEMANN: This particular test is done
8 to get the relationship between zirconium-water reaction
9 and temperature and whether or not there is a shattering
10 problem with respect to the cladding. Therefore, the
11 heating rate wasn't an important factor. The important
12 factor was the maximum temperature and the amount of
13 zirconium-water reaction.

14 DR. FORD: Would you repeat the purpose of the
15 test again, please?

16 MR. WIESEMANN: The purpose of the quench test
17 was to derive the safe range for purposes of determining
18 that we did not have any clad embrittlement problem.

19 DR. FORD: Now I read in WCAp-7379, is that the
20 document we are talking about, Volume II, I read, this
21 is on page 2, "The purpose of these tests was to compare
22 and correlate General Electric procedures and results
23 in testing ductively heated pressurized tube failure with
24 those of Westinghouse radiatively heated samples."

25

1 DR. ROLL: If you read the total context of the
2 paragraph, you will see that an additional twelve tests were
3 run by General Electric on our material for unirradiated
4 tubes. The purpose of those twelve tests on unirradiated
5 tubes, was to compare procedures, that is the methodology
6 that were used in their Cincinnati laboratory versus ours
7 that was done in our Pittsburgh laboratories, not to derive
8 specific information. To see if the procedures themselves
9 gave comparative results, and that's what is stated in the
10 paragraph, if you read the whole paragraph.

11 DR. FORD: I can't find--I have looked through the
12 entire volume 2 here. I can't find any comparison of pro-
13 cedures and results and so forth. I asked him to restate
14 the purpose because it is not at all clear.

15 MR. ROLL: We were asking the question in the con-
16 text of the quench tests. That's the context that Mr.
17 Wieseemann answered for that particular series of quench
18 tests. These were not quench tests that are being talked
19 about here.

20 DR. FORD: Excuse me. The title on section 2 reads,
21 "Burst and Quench Tests on Irradiated Tubes."

22 MR. ROLL: And these are a series of tests that were
23 burst tests run on unirradiated material to compare results
24 on the apparatus used at Cincinnati to the apparatus used in
25 Pittsburgh.

1 DR. FORD: Where is the comparison of results.
2 Where is that presented. Is that not in Volume 2?

3 DR. ROLL: That's correct.

4 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Is the witness waiting to discover
5 some data for the question?

6 DR. FORD: I believe the question is where the
7 results are a comparison between GE techniques and their own,
8 and how is that presented.

9 MR. TROSTEN: Mr. Chairman, do you want the inter-
10 rogation to proceed to another matter while the witnesses
11 are looking for that? We can do that if you wish.

12 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Let's see if the interrogator can
13 wait for the data or does he want it now before he proceeds.

14 MR. WIESEMANN: I thought we were answering ques-
15 tions on embrittlement. I don't understand how we suddenly
16 wandered off in an area related to burst tests.

17 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: A different question, I think,
18 did it. If you follow the questions, you will notice they
19 shift.

20 DR. FORD: I might suggest that there is a relation-
21 ship between the bursts in terms of wall thickness and the
22 susceptibility of rod to embrittlement. I might ask on this
23 matter directly, whether the Applicant has studied the work
24 in this area done at Oak Ridge Laboratory. The most recent
25 paper entitled, "Analyses of LOCA Transience in Terms of

1 cladding embrittlement," by D. O. Hobson, of Oakland National
2 Laboratory. This is contained in the 1971 Winter Meeting
3 transaction of the American Nuclear Society, this past
4 October, page 700 and 701. I'm asking whether the Applicant
5 is familiar with this work?

6 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Could you refer to the document
7 to refresh their recollection.

8 MR. WIESEMANN: I think one general point--the
9 answer to your question on this is, we are familiar with this
10 work. One particular point I think we want to make again.
11 We have made this before. I believe it was made yesterday.
12 These tests have been performed with rods which had been
13 swollen and burst, where this effect that you are talking
14 about that might possibly result in lower temperatures of
15 embrittlement is included within the data that was used to
16 establish the limits of roughly 2700 degrees and sixteen
17 per cent zirconium-water reaction that were used to bound
18 the safe area.

19 DR. FORD: It is correct that the Commission has
20 judged higher temperatures than 2300 degrees as regard to
21 possible embrittlement as non-conservative.

22 MR. WIESEMANN: No, that's not true. In fact, I
23 can interpret the statement you read this morning as saying
24 that you expect--in fact, I can only interpret it that way,
25 that they expect that further testing may result in higher

1 temperatures being justified.

2 DR. FORD: Specifically with the Oak Ridge testing
3 with which you indicated your familiarity, their test results
4 are that basically at 2300 degrees from their data, you don't
5 expect any cladding embrittlement. But, their data going up
6 to 2400, 2500, 2600 degrees you do get, according to them,
7 nil ductility temperatures that would indicate severe rod
8 embrittlements at room temperature. This is their result.
9 What I am asking is whether you have any specific criticisms
10 of the methodology of this research and whether you can relate
11 to us the procedure of which are critical, and explain how
12 it produces the erroneous view that 2300 degrees is fairly
13 well established by the data, as the point above which
14 embrittlement would be expected.

15 MR. WIESEMANN: I think the answer I gave you earlier
16 was, quite true the temperature at which embrittlement would
17 be expected is about 2300 degrees, but the 2300 degrees has not
18 been defined as being the threshold of the point at which there
19 would be difficulty in maintaining the integrity of the core
20 cladding in a reactor of the type we are talking about. The
21 mere fact that ductility decreases does not in itself mean
22 that there is a problem in maintaining integrity of the core.

23 DR. FORD: I quote here. "We evaluate that steam
24 exposure over a range of LOCA transients having peak tempera-
25 tures below 2300 degrees Fahrenheit causes little embrittlement.

1 unless times at temperature are unusually long. Exposure
2 at increasingly higher temperatures result in progressively
3 greater embrittlement, in keeping with the rapid changes in
4 oxidation and diffusion kinetics with temperature in this
5 range."

6 MR. WIESEMANN: That's a true statement. It is
7 not in conflict with what we have been saying.

8 DR. FORD: But you would disagree with that, that
9 you get room temperature nil ductilities? The point is that
10 they indicate there would be embrittlement problems and not,
11 at 2300 degrees. Do you disagree with that?

12 MR. WIESEMANN: We have done tests which we feel
13 show that the range of safe operation is approximately 2700
14 degrees, and sixteen per cent LOCA metal-water reaction.
15 Based on this, we are convinced that the criteria established
16 by the AEC in their interim policy statement is a conserva-
17 tive one. I see nothing in the evidence that you presented
18 that would say that there was anything wrong with that
19 conclusion.

20 DR. FORD: More to the point. You are citing what
21 I believe is an experimental result which is not consistent
22 with their experimental result. What I asked you before--
23 and I'm asking again.

24 MR. WIESEMANN: But they both show that 2300 degrees
25 is all right.

1 DR. FORD: What I am asking you now is that in terms
2 of their experimental technique and so forth with which you
3 are familiar, do you have any basic criticisms of this Oak
4 Ridge report?

5 MR. WIESEMANN: I don't think we have undertaken to
6 do a critique of the Oak Ridge report per se, since the
7 results of the Oak Ridge test do not affect our conclusions,
8 that 2300 degrees is adequate. If we were trying to prove
9 that 2300 degrees or 2700 degrees or some other temperature
10 of that sort were adequate, I think we might have em-
11 barked on something like that and studied all of the
12 differences. But since there wasn't this need, this was not
13 done.

14 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: I take it the answer to the
15 question is no? The question was, have you any specific
16 criticisms--

17 MR. WIESEMANN: We don't know if we have any
18 specific criticisms having not done a detailed critique of
19 the test.

20 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: You think your tests--thank you.
21 Proceed.

22

23

24

25

1 DR. FORD: To get the relationship between your
2 test results and their test results let me see whether
3 the Board test results are consistent with this conclusion.
4 This is from page 700 of the report.

5 "Peak temperatures of 2100 degrees, 2200 degrees,
6 2300 degrees, 2400 degrees, gave zero ductility values
7 below room temperature. That is some ductility would be
8 retained at room temperature. Peak temperatures of 2500
9 and 2600 degrees gave zero ductility temperatures of 290
10 and 1800 degrees Fahrenheit respectively."

11 Is your experimental data consistent or
12 inconsistent with this experimental data?

13 DR. ROLL: I think the key point of difference
14 in the interpretation of results between the Oak Ridge
15 people and ourselves, it is just that it's a different
16 interpretation of the results, that they were looking, they
17 had a standard procedure, I believe, in their apparatus,
18 which would be to run the sample up to a particular
19 temperature and I believe that was the whole time there,
20 at which time they would quickly air quench it and bring
21 it back down to the temperature and then measure the
22 ductility. With this standard procedure, with increasing
23 temperatures you are also getting markedly increasing
24 degrees of zirc, zirc to zirc oxide formation, and they
25 are relating it merely then to a temperature of exposure

1 per this standard procedure gives us then a particular
2 ductility or lack thereof at room temperature.

3 The interpretation that we had put on our tests
4 and in generally our tests are consistent with their
5 tests in that it is time and temperature which is important
6 and that 2300 degrees for whatever it takes to get a large
7 degree of zirc-water reaction could be bad. 2600 degrees
8 for a short time, if that short time at that temperature
9 resulted in less than sixteen percent conversion, we would
10 say would be acceptable. But it's merely, I think, a
11 different interpretation and an application of the results
12 of the test.

13 Time at temperature is what we would propose
14 as being the relevant combination of primaries to consider.
15 They merely considered temperature per their standard
16 test conditions.

17 DR. FORD: I see. Then you directly contradict
18 their statement that they integrate exposure time and
19 exposure temperature. They don't just consider an
20 exposure temperature an instantaneous time. You contradict
21 their own description of their experiment.

22 MR. WIESEMANN: There is a difference between
23 describing the test and correlating the results and I
24 think what Dr. Roll is saying is that we have found that
25 the embrittlement situation is one which correlates to

1 the amount of zirconium-water reaction for temperatures
2 below the 2700 degrees, and that when you consider the
3 nature of the results as reported by Oak Ridge that you
4 have to consider the fact that when they are reporting
5 temperatures and nil ductility values that somewhere behind
6 that is a zirconium-water reaction which is a function
7 of not only the temperature they had but the time they
8 held it there. And for example they could have reported
9 varying ductility values for the same temperature simply
10 because of holding it at that temperature for different
11 times.

12 And as Dr. Roll is saying the reason that didn't
13 happen was they had a standard test procedure which held
14 the material at a given temperature for a fixed period
15 of time so that you didn't get the results at different
16 periods of time at the same temperature such as what we
17 obtained in ours.

18 DR. FORD: I see. Excuse me. I am trying to
19 pursue Dr. Roll and I am trying to clarify whether his
20 statement of what the Oak Ridge tests were is consistent
21 with their statements of what they were, and I am afraid
22 that the parenthetical remark from the other witness is
23 interrupting this investigation. And if when we resume
24 Dr. Roll has reviewed Oak Ridge material I'd appreciate
25 the Reporter would read back my last question and Dr. Roll's

1 last answer.

2 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Are you ready, Dr. Roll?

3 DR. ROLL: I am ready.

4 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Will the Reporter read the
5 question.

6 (The last previous statement by Dr. Roll and
7 the last previous question by Dr. Ford are read by the
8 Reporter.)

9 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: I wonder how much consultation
10 is necessary if we are asking this witness to give his
11 view of this statement. If you have something later to
12 add, do so. I think the panel of witnesses is confusing.

13 Will you proceed, Dr. Roll.

14 DR. ROLL: The write-up which you directed is
15 not a description of the test. It's a description of an
16 application of an analysis of those tests, and yet the
17 equation which they used here was derived from the test
18 in which I had said I believe I correctly portrayed their
19 procedure for deriving the data. With that procedure
20 for deriving the data they applied in this article and
21 reached the conclusions in the last paragraph of the
22 article, and I believe that what I said, listening to it
23 again per the court reporter, I don't see any contradiction.

24 DR. FORD: The point of clarification is you
25 talked about the procedure for deriving the data. The data

1 that I am talking about is the nil ductility temperature
2 calculated with the equation. I am not talking about the
3 method of deriving the individual experimental results
4 themselves. Does that resolve the conflict between us?

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 MR. ROLL: I don't think it does. I believe, as
2 I said before, it's time and temperature which is important.
3 The equation has both time and temperature in it. Therefore,
4 one must have both parameters to calculate a degree of
5 oxygen uptake and with the degree of oxygen uptake and going
6 back to their basic data one can then determine whether or
7 not you have no ductility temperatures that are important or
8 not.

9 DR. FORD: I see. Now when they integrate that
10 equation, integrate the temperature and time at temperature,
11 does that fulfill the procedure that you are talking about?

12 DR. ROLL: That's correct.

13 DR. FORD: And well, don't they explain in the
14 paragraph following the equation and that's precisely what
15 they do?

16 DR. ROLL: They do. They say they integrated the
17 equation over time and temperature for typical transients.

18 DR. FORD: I see. And that is satisfactory or un-
19 satisfactory to you?

20 DR. ROLL: That is satisfactory.

21 DR. FORD: I see. Now then in this procedure which
22 is satisfactory to you you therefore do not question that the
23 nil ductility temperature as a function of cladding tempera-
24 tures given here, you don't challenge them?

25 DR. ROLL: For representative time and temperature

/Bt2

1 histories.

2 DR. FORD: You don't challenge them?

3 DR. ROLL: I don't know that they used representa-
4 tive time and temperature histories. If they state they did,
5 if they integrated the equations, we will have to accept that
6 at face value.

7 DR. FORD: I see. Now in terms of the experiments
8 that you have done for these temperature references, for 100
9 to 2600 degrees, have you calculated nil ductility values,
10 zero ductility temperatures?

11 DR. ROLL: No, we have not.

12 DR. FORD: I see. So there is no data, experimental
13 data, that Westinghouse has evolved that would calculate, that
14 would contradict the zero ductility temperatures of the Oak
15 Ridge research?

16 MR. WIESEMANN: Far better than that.

17 DR. ROLL: That's correct.

18 DR. FORD: Excuse me, Dr. Roll, please.

19 MR. WIESEMANN: Far better.

20 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: I think Mr. Wiesemann until you are
21 called upon to pad up something or add something to this I
22 don't think it's necessary to interrupt. I think that the
23 interrogator has to have his question to the witness. I think
24 there is a lot of confusion among the panelists. They feel
25 they have to confer or supplement, when I don't think the

1 question necessarily calls for it.

2 Will you proceed.

3 DR. FORD: Thank you.

4 MR. TROSTEN: Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. I just want
5 to observe that in Mr. Wieseemann's defense in this respect
6 that the nature of the questions that Mr. Ford is raising
7 are such that he sometimes ranges beyond the scope of a
8 particular witness' previous testimony, the original direct,
9 and it is perhaps understandable, therefore, that one of the
10 other panel of witnesses may feel that the question actually,
11 is being directed to him. I appreciated what you are saying,
12 sir, and I agree with the point you are making.

13 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Well, if there is any question
14 I think the interrogator can say, "Now I think the other
15 witness ought to answer this." Until he does we will presume
16 the same witness is under interrogation.

17 Will you proceed.

18 DR. FORD: I'd like to proceed from the fact that
19 there is no contradiction at the moment between the
20 experimental zero ductility temperatures estimated by Oak
21 Ridge, no criticism of their procedures. I'd like to proceed
22 to a further observation. They contend, and I quote, "We
23 would emphasize that our data are for full wall thickness
24 tubing. Cladding swelling would significantly decrease the
25 thickness and would cause embrittlement to occur at lower

1 exposure temperatures."

2 Is there any data evolved from Westinghouse research
3 that would challenge this statement in the Oak Ridge research
4 report? I will give you the statement.

5 DR. ROLL: I have two comments drawn to the con-
6 clusion that they reach in the article. The first comment is
7 that in addition to making the general statement that they
8 did the test run for full wall tubing and that any swelling
9 would tend to reduce the thickness of the wall, let me also
10 point out that they did the test with oxidation on both
11 sides, so they are getting twice as much oxidation intake
12 that we could get, time and temperature transient. So that
13 in that degree you have one effect trading to another.

14 The second point that I would like to make, referring
15 back to our own tests, are we ran a series of time and
16 temperature transients which gave us a degree of oxygen
17 pickup, and these results are reported in the WCAP and for
18 cases where we got up to, in fact, several cases in excess
19 of sixteen per cent reaction, and then subjecting the tubes
20 to what we think are severe thermal transients, tubes which
21 had been previously burst, and hence we were getting the
22 attack on the thin sections, we did not find the tubes
23 failed.

24

25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

DR. FORD: Yes.

Now I'm talking in terms of -- I realize you have tests pertaining to five internal pressures unspecified, unfindable heating rates, and that you have this small amount of experimental data. My question is whether the data that you have that you can confidently say that that data contradicts challenges or confirms the conclusion that if you considered systematically the effect of plastic deformation, swelling, changes in wall thicknesses, you would have a much lower acceptance criteria than 2300 degrees.

DR. ROLL: The data which we have does not contradict the raw data from Oak Ridge tests. The interpretation of the data with regard to what we were trying to analyze says that the criteria which we have proposed of sixteen percent reaction is acceptable whereas -- The criteria of 2300 degrees F is equally possible and possibly more conservative.

DR. FORD: I'm not sure that's responsive to my question. I know that there is a certain quantity of experimental data available. What I am asking you is whether the data that you have is of sufficient quantity, that it has covered so thoroughly the various aspects of embrittlement, the various conditions that induce embrittlement and so forth, that you have evolved convincing

1 evidence that would resolve the doubt about the acceptance
2 temperature that is indicated by the Oak Ridge researchers.

3 DR. ROLL: I believe the tests that we have run
4 adequately characterize a limit for a degree of oxygen,
5 or a limit of degree of oxygen uptake.

6 DR. FORD: Are you contending that the tests
7 that you have done were deformation resulting from five
8 internal pressures, down to five heating rate, that that
9 is adequate to cover the entire gamut of heating rates
10 from 100 to -- Internal pressures from 2200 and heating
11 rates from 5 to 100 degrees Fahrenheit? Simply as a
12 scientist, would you be willing to state that, you know,
13 enough research has been done? Irrespective of whether
14 or not the five tests that you have contradict or support
15 this, are those five tests sufficient in your judgment,
16 involving consideration of all the parameters that influence
17 this? Is that test sufficient or is that body of data
18 sufficient to contradict, in a clear way, the Oak Ridge
19 conclusion that the 2300 degrees would be too high
20 embrittlement cut-off point if you considered swelling
21 of the rods?

22 DR. ROLL: There are a number of questions
23 there. Let me see if I can find out what they really were.

24 You were inferring that we had only five tests.
25 That's question number one, did we run five tests. The

1 answer to that question is no. As I had stated, we had
2 run approximately forty tests altogether.

3 DR. FORD: But I think the point was that there
4 were five tests that involved cladding deformation, that
5 the rods had been burst. So you had the wall thickness
6 change that we are talking about.

7 DR. ROLL: That's incorrect.

8 DR. FORD: All forty-seven tests?

9 DR. ROLL: That's incorrect. We had run eleven
10 tests with previously burst tubing.

11 DR. FORD: It is eleven now?

12 DR. ROLL: It always had been eleven.

13 DR. FORD: Previously you referred me to WCAP-7379,
14 Volume I, Table VII, page 19. You gave me five internal
15 pressures from that. Are you still referring to that, or
16 do you change?

17 DR. ROLL: You asked the question, I believe,
18 quite a while ago, what pressures did we use for the
19 quench test. The five pressures that I gave you was in
20 answer to that question. We actually ran ten total tests
21 with rods that were pressurized. In addition to that,
22 we ran eleven tests on rods that were previously burst.
23 In addition to that, we ran twenty-two tests on just tubing
24 specimens at various times and temperatures, and in
25 addition to that four we ran -- Four tests on irradiated

1 specimens.

2 DR. FORD: Can you give me the tests again
3 slowly, please.

4 DR. ROLL: Ten tests on tubing specimens which
5 were pressurized, not burst. It was just pressurized.
6 Eleven tests on tubing specimens which had been previously
7 pressurized and burst; twenty-two tests on tubing specimens
8 which were neither pressurized nor had been previously
9 burst; four tests on tubing specimens which were irradiated
10 tubing. I believe they were neither pressurized nor had
11 been previously burst.

12 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Are you reading from
13 proprietary data?

14 DR. ROLL: I believe it is. This is 7379,
15 Volume I. I believe the data, the conditions of the test
16 and the numbers of the test are in fact part of the deleted
17 pages in the issue which you have.

18 DR. FORD: We are concerned with this Oak Ridge
19 conclusion. We are concerned, do you agree, with the
20 effect of changing wall thickness on embrittlement and nil
21 ductility temperatures and function of cladding? That
22 is the issue. That is the assertion.

23 DR. ROLL: That's the assertion in the Oak Ridge
24 conclusion.

25 DR. FORD: So we are concerned with wall thickness

1 variations and their impact.

2 Can you tell me what is the relevance, just
3 to shorten things out quickly, of the twenty-two tests
4 that were neither pressurized nor burst, and therefore,
5 we assume that the wall thickness wasn't affected, and
6 the four tests on irradiated rods that were neither
7 pressurized nor burst. Are they relevant tests to the
8 question of the influence of wall thickness on nil
9 ductility embrittlement?

10 DR. ROLL: Sure, they are, because they are
11 related to the total metal -- Equivalent metal-water
12 reaction. If the test conditions in these two series
13 of tests are such as to give a particular metal-water
14 reaction, then the results or the conclusions which you
15 derive from those tests are germane to the analysis of
16 conditions with a similar metal-water reaction.

17 DR. FORD: But the point at issue is -- Am I
18 not correct that it is the wall thickness variation as
19 the parameter that we are talking about altering? It
20 is that parameter which is influencing what the nil
21 ductility temperature is; is that correct?

22 DR. ROLL: Not clear.

23

24

25

1 DR. FORD: Let's do a little more basic work then.
2 Is it your impression that wall thickness is related to
3 embrittlement?

4 MR. ROLL: In my opinion, locally, the integrity
5 of the cladding in the area of burst, which is a very small
6 total area, could be affected by the local metal-water
7 reaction that is related to the wall thickness. The answer
8 is yes. Locally this would have an effect.

9 DR. FORD: Can you characterize the nature of this
10 effect? Is it in the direction that the Oak Ridge people
11 assert, namely that if you wanted to avoid this effect, you
12 have to keep cladding temperature lower than if wall thick-
13 ness wasn't changed?

14 DR. ROLL: Yes. If you wish to preclude that
15 effect, you would in fact wish to make the limiting
16 temperature lower. But, again, to bring us back to the point
17 of interpretation that it is time and temperature which are
18 important and not temperature per se. So one may not
19 necessarily reduce the temperature if one had control over
20 time at that temperature.

21 DR. FORD: I see. Well, assuming the same
22 temperature and the same time at that temperature, would the
23 nil ductility be different in the way the Oak Ridge people
24 have asserted if the wall thickness were reduced versus if
25 it were constant?

1 DR. ROLL: I believe the answer is yes.

2 DR. FORD: So that we know you are talking about a
3 local phenomena as indeed they obviously were, with that
4 qualification and with the further qualification that you
5 are talking about same time and temperature exposure. You
6 would accept the conclusion of that Oak Ridge report; is that
7 correct?

8 DR. ROLL: I believe I would accept the conclusion
9 which you have stated. Again, I don't have a copy of that
10 Oak Ridge report in front of me. I don't think it said that
11 that is what would happen or did they indicate the degree to
12 which you would have to reduce the temperature.

13 MR. MOORE: It is here.

14 DR. ROLL: We do have it.

15 DR. FORD: Could you read it aloud, please.

16 DR. ROLL: You are right.

17 "We conclude that steam exposure over a range of
18 LOCA transients having peak temperatures below 2300 degrees
19 F. causes little embrittlement, unless the times at tempera-
20 ture are unusually long. Exposures at increasingly higher
21 temperatures result in progressively greater embrittlement,
22 in keeping with the rapid changes in oxidation and diffusion
23 kinetics with temperature in this range. We would emphasize
24 that our data are for full-wall-thickness tubing. Cladding
25 swelling would significantly decrease this thickness and

1 would cause embrittlement to occur at lower exposure
2 temperatures."

3 I would agree with that conclusion.

4 DR. FORD: Thank you.

5 MR. TROSTEN: Mr. Chairman, while Mr. Ford is getting
6 ready to propose his next question, may I ask for a five-
7 minute recess so that I could confer with the witnesses? Is
8 that permissible, Mr. Chairman.

9 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Well, is it something that is
10 bearing on the interrogation? You can confer with them right
11 here if it will take a moment.

12 MR. TROSTEN: I just wanted to talk to them briefly.
13 I thought maybe we could take just a two or three-minute
14 recess.

15 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: It isn't quite our time. Will you
16 proceed.

17 DR. FORD: With reference to this diagram, I tried
18 to indicate here a phenomenon that we postulate for the sake
19 of this question. It may occur during a loss of coolant
20 accident, namely, that the mechanical damage in the ceramic
21 pellets may be such, with the burn-up of the fuel, that once
22 you form a balloon from local swelling, that the mechanically
23 lucent fuel would migrate within the fuel rod and collect
24 in this balloon.

25 I'd like to ask a series of questions related to

1 phenomenon.

2 The first question is, what experimental data has
3 Westinghouse evolved pertaining to the phenomenon of uranium
4 dioxide pellet migration during the course of the loss of
5 coolant accident?

6 DR. ROLL: We have none.

7 DR. FORD: You have evolved no experimental data?

8 DR. ROLL: That's correct.

9 DR. FORD: Has Westinghouse conducted any analytical
10 consideration of this phenomenon, and does it have any model,
11 that would predict the extent to which it would be expected
12 under different transient conditions?

13 DR. ROLL: No, we do not. In the calculations,
14 we run this phenomenon of pellet chips falling down into the
15 balloon and is not considered.

16 DR. FORD: Even though you don't have any experi-
17 mental work or analytical model of your own pertaining to this,
18 is there any data whatsoever, theoretical or experimental,
19 relating to this phenomena that you know of?

20 DR. ROLL: I believe one piece of information that
21 I am sure you are familiar with, because you quoted from it,
22 is the Oak Ridge document, in which they begin to conjecture
23 that this is what happened and caused otherwise unexplained
24 results.

25 DR. FORD: If I might refresh your memory, wasn't

1 that in connection with propagated fuel element failures?
2 They were talking about the pellets from that balloon region
3 themselves being ejected. They weren't talking about, as I
4 recall migration and collection.

5 DR. ROLL: They were talking about what happened
6 to pellet chips.

7 DR. FORD: But the specific phenomenon of collec-
8 tion in the balloon, that isn't considered?

9 DR. ROLL: Perhaps.

10 DR. FORD: In any experimental or theoretical data
11 with which you are familiar; is that correct?

12 DR. ROLL: That's correct.

13 DR. FORD: A priori, can you suggest any reasons
14 why if this phenomenon did occur, that the local cladding
15 temperature would not be increased significantly by the
16 presence of this extra material?

17 MR. MOORE: Under the assumptions that are made
18 for the loss of coolant analysis, the period of time when
19 we get a large temperature increase is associated with the
20 adiabatic heat-up of a transient. The stored energy of the
21 fuel has essentially been removed. We are now operating with
22 a fairly small temperature through the fuel. I would just
23 say, in my opinion, building up some additional fuel in the
24 vicinity of a very localized burst will not have a large
25 contribution.

1 DR. FORD: You talk simply in terms of stored
2 thermal energy. It is correct that migrating fuel brings with
3 it the decay products that are contributing at the stage of
4 the accident that we are concerned with.

5 MR. MOORE: That is correct, but that was my point,
6 that the power generation rate of the residual heat is quite
7 low. That's the reason we were discussing the very small
8 temperature.

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1 DR. FORD: I see. But if you increased simply
2 locally the amount of fuel by whatever volumetric percent
3 of the balloon as compared to the non-deformed geometry,
4 I mean just from inspection of the various tests of the fuel
5 rod failures, it's quite clear that, you know, the volume
6 could increase in the area by a factor of four to five.
7 Is that an unfair scanning of just the pictures of the size
8 of these balloons?

9 MR. MOORE: I think that is an unfair characteri-
10 zation of the increase in volume, but let me further pursue
11 your point.

12 The thing we have to bear in mind is that not
13 only is the amount of fuel we have there important. The
14 heat transfer capability between that fuel and the cladding
15 is important, and if this fuel is loosely packed in this
16 volume as it would seem to have to be, if it's migrated,
17 and certainly it has to be in some kind of pieces, is
18 then it is not in very good contact at all with the cladding.

19 So I have difficulty getting heat from the
20 fuel to the cladding to add to the heat of reaction. In
21 fact, we have performed calculations with fuel in the
22 vicinity of a burst rod with the expected load gap
23 coefficients, and you find that the cladding as it heats
24 up due to the exothermic reaction, the zirc-water reaction,
25 that the cladding actually becomes hotter than the fuel and

1 the fuel in that vicinity becomes a heat sink.

2 DR. FORD: Can you tell me when you refer to
3 it being loosely packed, I suppose we should talk about
4 the density of the fuel. As a function of density do
5 you have data pertaining to -- As a function of fuel
6 density do you have data pertaining to heat transfer
7 characteristics, such that you could in terms of data
8 that you have make calculations relevant to this
9 phenomenon?

10 MR. MOORE: We have data from which we could
11 attempt to derive an effective heat transfer. The place
12 where we would be unable to quantify the situation would
13 be to actually determine the expected density under this
14 configuration.

15 DR. FORD: I see. But you haven't done analyses
16 to date which could be gone to in a facile way to relate
17 heat transfer conditions to density of the uranium fuel?

18 MR. MOORE: Let me clarify it. It's not so much
19 the density of the UO_2 itself; it's the degree to which
20 it is in contact or in close proximity to the cladding.
21 So it's not the conductivity of the UO_2 per se; it's
22 the conductivity between the fuel and the cladding itself.

23 Of course, the fuel under conditions where you
24 don't have a burst can be in closer contact. If the fuel
25 is going to migrate somehow into this kind of an open

1 volume it clearly is not going to be in close contact with
2 the cladding of that whole region.

3 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: I wonder if we could get
4 that question answered. We might have it come up again.
5 The question was have you had a study of these heat
6 transfer characteristics and so forth, and you say you
7 do or don't have? You argued something because it wasn't
8 material in your thinking and the question was, that
9 can be answered, do you have any studies.

10 MR. MOORE: I answered the question there are
11 studies on conductivity of UO_2 as a function of density.
12 I further went on to state that that was not relevant to
13 the question that we are postulating here. Conductivity
14 of UO_2 as a function of density is not a concern.

15 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Proceed.

16 DR. FORD: Can you tell me if we wanted to
17 perform scoping calculations, if we assumed, if we
18 determined failures, what the expanded value is like, say
19 only a factor of two, if we wanted to perform scoping
20 calculations, assuming that it was all densely packed
21 and in contact with cladding, could you do calculations
22 in that way to get some indication of what the maximum
23 conceivable contribution to local cladding temperature
24 could be under conditions which admittedly these heat
25 transfer conditions are admittedly not plausible, a priori?

1 MR. MOORE: Yes. One could perform scoping
2 studies with arbitrary assumptions.

3 DR. FORD: Short of actually performing those
4 calculations for us is there any reasonable assurance
5 that the increase in the local heat source of your maximum
6 rod, you have already calculated it at 2300 degrees on
7 the nose, is there any assurance, convincing assurance
8 that you can give us, that this would not be a phenomenon
9 which would push us up over the interim acceptance
10 criteria?

11 MR. MOORE: The kind of information I would
12 present relative to that would be estimates of the effect
13 of heat transfer between that fuel and the cladding,
14 and it's my opinion that that would end up being such a
15 low value that we would actually have fuel as a heat sink
16 in the vicinity of bursts, and that therefore there would
17 really be no penalty associated with this.

18 But I would have to perform a calculation with
19 an appropriate gap conductance.

20 DR. FORD: But you are assuming, as I understand
21 your experimental and analytical position with regard to
22 this problem in terms of the work that you have done and
23 the firm calculations and data you can put your hands on,
24 at the moment the Applicant is not in a position to resolve
25 the doubt as to whether or not this would increase local

1 cladding temperature in such a way that this plant would
2 not meet the interim criteria.

3 MR. MOORE: I see no real mechanism for getting
4 compaction of extra fuel in those regions and I know of
5 no experimental evidence which would say otherwise.

6 DR. FORD: Yes. But given the fact that you have
7 no experimental data pertaining to how much compaction
8 would be necessary to cause problems, I mean just given
9 a basic lack of data in consideration of this area, are
10 we to say that at this point there is some doubt of
11 substance as to whether or not this phenomenon would
12 affect the maximum cladding temperature, and your ability
13 to meet the interim criteria?

14 MR. MOORE: Not at all.

15 DR. FORD: Thank you.

16 On the further question which Dr. Roll indicated
17 was involved in mechanical behavior of the fuel pellets,
18 their ability to contribute to fuel rod propagation, do
19 you accept the view of the Oak Ridge researchers in the
20 ORNL-4635 that there was indeed a propagating fuel
21 element failure mode taking place in that transient test
22 and it was related to the ejection of UO_2 pellets?

23 DR. ROLL: Can we get a copy of the report here?

24 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Can you point the witness
25 to a particular section thereof which reflects the

1 statement you have just made?

2 DR. FORD: I gave away my only copy.

3 DR. ROLL: You want to get the page number or
4 take this back and we will find one?

5 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: I think the witness needs
6 the reference in the report that he is asking for, and
7 if you could give it to him, hand it back to him, give
8 him the page number.

9 MR. ROISMAN: Mr. Chairman, in our statement
10 of questions to the Applicant on October 12, 1971, question
11 No. 34, "To what extent does the Applicant's analysis
12 consider propagation of the failures caused by fragments
13 from burst rods, fuel pellets or other causes?"
14 And we directed their attention to pages 32 and 69 of
15 the Oak Ridge National Lab report 4635.

16 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Does the witness have the page
17 of the report?

18 MR. MOORE: I have it.

19 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Can he answer the question from
20 the report?

21 DR. ROLL: I wonder if I could just -- Is it
22 permissible to reread our answer to the same question
23 yesterday?

24 DR. FORD: Yes. Well, if that is what you are
25 going to do I am just going to continue further questioning

1 of that. If you'd like to read your answer of yesterday,
2 sure.

3 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: He doesn't have to read it
4 again for the record. We have had it once.

5 MR. MOORE: We have answered the question.

6 MR. TROSTEN: May I interrupt, Mr. Chairman.
7 Question No. 32 is a question that was asked of Mr. Moore
8 yesterday, as I recall it.

9 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: What page?

10 MR. ROISMAN: 34.

11 MR. TROSTEN: I'm sorry. The particular
12 question, what was the number of the question you just
13 read?

14 MR. ROISMAN: 34.

15 DR. FORD: 34.

16 MR. TROSTEN: 34, I am sorry.

17 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: What page does the witness
18 have before him?

19 MR. WIESEMANN: 1679.

20 MR. MOORE: The answer is on page 1679.

21 MR. TROSTEN: The answer is on page 1679, and
22 what is unclear to me, Mr. Chairman, is when the question
23 was asked of Mr. Moore and Mr. Moore answered the question
24 why the interrogator is now somehow posing the same
25 question to Dr. Roll. Would he please explain to me, or

1 why somebody is asking this question of Dr. Roll? The
2 question has been asked and answered.

3 DR. FORD: I see. This is in the context of
4 today's discussion.

5 MR. TROSTEN: I know.

6 DR. FORD: But --

7 MR. TROSTEN: But the point is --

8 DR. FORD: It is the development of the analysis
9 that we have been doing of fuel rod migration.

10 MR. TROSTEN: I understand that, Mr. Ford.

11 DR. FORD: Dr. Roll earlier raised the issue
12 of the Oak Ridge test in connection with fuel rod
13 migration. He thought it had to do with filling of the
14 balloon rather than ejection and propagation. So in terms
15 of both continuing the development of this discussion of
16 mechanical behavior of the fuel elements during cladding
17 and in terms of if Dr. Dr. Roll cares to go further than
18 the answer of Dr. Moore, that's acceptable.

19 MR. TROSTEN: I would suggest that if there is
20 a question that relates to the answer raised by witness
21 Moore, if the question be directed to witness Moore and
22 if witness Moore feels that somehow he is not capable
23 of answering the question he can then defer the answer to
24 someone else.

25 DR. ROLL: I wonder if I could set the record

1 straight. You asked the question somewhere earlier was
2 I familiar with any data at all having to do with pellet
3 chip movement, et cetera.

4 DR. FORD: Yes.

5 DR. ROLL: I responded that the only thing
6 I knew of was the Oak Ridge document having to do with
7 that test. I did not raise the question of this. I did
8 not mean to offer concurrence in the Oak Ridge conclusions
9 or to mean that it was a significant phenomena. You asked
10 a question, was there any data related to movement of
11 pellet chips in the core. My answer was the only thing
12 I was aware of at all was this document. That's all
13 I meant to infer by that answer.

14 DR. FORD: I am asking you now that since you
15 are by your confirmation aware of this data, I am asking
16 you for your judgment on it as to whether or not the Oak
17 Ridge data demonstrates that propagating fuel element
18 failure modes would take place when rods burst in the LOCA
19 transient.

20 DR. ROLL: I have not reviewed the Oak Ridge
21 report in detail, nor have I talked with the authors of
22 the Oak Ridge report to know in detail what they did and
23 why they have reached this conclusion. Therefore, I don't
24 think I should offer merely conjecture and opinion based
25 on a previous review of this report, and one on which you

1 are apparently placing great weight.

2 DR. FORD: I will respect that and if I could
3 direct questions to Mr. Moore pertaining to his answer
4 of yesterday.

5 You indicated that your analysis doesn't
6 consider propagating failure modes. I was wondering
7 whether you can define for us the problems that could
8 ensue, the significance of propagating fuel element
9 failure modes, in your judgment. You indicated it cryptically
10 here yesterday. I am wondering if you could elaborate
11 on that.

12 MR. MOORE: Yes.

13 The point I was making in my answer yesterday
14 is that if one postulates a possible propagation of fuel
15 failures due to this mechanism, then you would get
16 potentially more fuel failures as a result of this.

17 I indicated in the analysis that we performed
18 and under the conservative assumptions that we make we
19 feel a large fraction of the fuel rods in the core
20 anyway. Even without any consideration of fuel failure
21 propagation. So these rods have in fact already failed
22 and have relieved the internal pressure through bursting.

23 So that any additional contribution of failures
24 which may under this hypothesized mechanism occur would
25 be small with respect to the total number, which are

1 assumed to occur with design calculation.

2 DR. FORD: Now you assumed that the rods in
3 the vicinity of the instigator, you presume that they have
4 already failed. Do you presume that they have already
5 failed in the same place, I mean in the same axial levels?

6 MR. MOORE: They have failed at -- Some rods
7 have failed at the same axial level as determined by the
8 multi-rod burst testing, and this assumption has been
9 incorporated into an analysis which I described yesterday
10 which determined the effect of adjacent failures and
11 rods which would be in contact.

12 DR. FORD: Isn't the real problem of propagating
13 fuel element failure modes that it would concentrate the
14 failures in one place rather than just letting each rod
15 fail at its own will?

16 MR. MOORE: That could be a concern if the
17 adjacent rods had not already failed at some other location.

18 DR. FORD: I see. But in terms of your
19 indication this morning at a given level, axial level,
20 the temperature difference within an assembly is only
21 on the order, I believe you said, of twenty degrees or
22 thirty degrees, doesn't this indicate -- And I presume
23 that because the whole bundle is moved around during core
24 loading and enrichment, by moving around that their
25 internal fuel, that their internal gas pressure is pretty

1 much the same, too. So that we would expect that in terms
2 of the forces acting on all the rods in the bundle, they
3 are all pretty much the same. Is that a reasonable
4 interpretation of the data that you have given us?
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1 MR. MOORE: They are very close within an assembly
2 here.

3 DR. FORD: I see. So that we could expect if such
4 and such a combination of internal pressure and heating rate,
5 if it was for a given combination of internal pressure and
6 heating rate, we'd associate with this a predicted burst
7 temperature which you do need predict, so that we would pre-
8 dict for this, for any given assembly, or certainly for the
9 assemblies in the middle of the core, that they would all
10 have the rods in the assembly, they would all have pretty
11 must the same predicted burst temperatures, is that correct?

12 MR. MOORE: Yes.

13 DR. FORD: So that in terms of the role of propa-
14 gating fuel elements, that in terms of the dynamics of the
15 situation wouldn't it be significant if they were propagating
16 fuel elements because of the rods in the group everybody was
17 already set to burst, one burst and started each other, the
18 rest of them were already ready to go, this extramechanical
19 effect, wouldn't we expect from this, from the data on
20 temperature distribution and conditions in the rod, that this
21 is the problem with propagating fuel element failure modes,
22 that the heat-up has got to a point where it's just waiting
23 for something to happen to cause a real local blockage
24 problem?

25 MR. MOORE: No. In fact, I would use the same

1 argument in the reverse, to support my contention that it's
2 properly not a problem, and that the rods are very similar
3 and they are very similar then to the multi-rod burst con-
4 figuration, and rods failed at nearly the same time, and in
5 differently randomly located spots along the rod.

6 So that I would expect the neighboring rods to have
7 failed about the same time some place else. So any failure
8 propagation due to fuel would not add to the problem in any
9 one location.

10 DR. FORD: Well, let me ask the big question.

11 Of course, since we are talking about the mechanical
12 effect of the uranium dioxide pellets as the mechanism for
13 propagating fuel, they are not in the tests that you are
14 talking about. They are electrically heated rods, isn't that
15 correct?

16 MR. MOORE: I am speaking of the failures that
17 would occur independent of propagation. And you postulated
18 an assembly where you postulated that all the rods were very
19 close to failure because they were all behaving similarly.
20 This is identical to the situation in the multi-rod burst
21 tests. They are all ready to fail. I haven't failed any yet.
22 I haven't propagated any fuel yet. And then suddenly
23 practically all the rods in that assembly fail at the same
24 time in a random way, and if you were to hypothesize that
25 subsequent to that that some fuel came out it's not going to

1 affect the neighboring rod because it's already failed.

2 DR. FORD: No. But I think the point is that the
3 main mechanism that we are concerned with, the mechanical
4 effect of the fuel rods, of the release ejected pellet, is it
5 correct to say that that is not simulated at all in these
6 tests which you are referring to?

7 MR. MOORE: That's correct.

8 DR. FORD: So that basically these tests because
9 they don't in any way simulate the mechanism for propagating
10 fuel element mode, they can't be used, or can they, to say
11 that there will be no propagating fuel element failure modes?

12 MR. MOORE: My point is the neighboring rod will
13 already have failed at basically the same time due to its
14 own mechanical failure as exhibited in the multi-rod burst
15 test before I would get into a problem of fuel failure
16 propagation.

17 DR. FORD: Then let us talk one test that has been
18 done to date, using live fuel rods, with fuel pellets, namely,
19 the Oak Ridge 4635 document. Is it clear from that that this
20 phenomenon as the authors assert, is it clear from that that
21 indeed this ejected uranium pellet did propagate the fuel
22 element failure modes? You didn't have random failure in the
23 area; you had all local failures.

24 MR. MOORE: Absolutely not. The report in fact only
25 indicated one single rod which may have had premature failure

1 because of possible fuel ejection from a ruptured rod. One
2 rod may have had a premature failure. The basis for deciding
3 whether it was premature failure was a calculation that said
4 detailed stress time temperature calculations, which said it
5 should have failed a little later than it actually failed.
6 It is my understanding looking at the report that that is the
7 conjecture of the author, is that possibly this rod, this one
8 rod failed prematurely due to the effect you are talking about.
9 This has nothing to do with the fact that all the failures
10 occurred over a small breach in the axial length of the core
11 of a few inches.

12 As I indicated yesterday, clearly that nonrandomness
13 of failures in that test is associated with the power distri-
14 bution in the axial direction which tended to concentrate the
15 power over a two-inch region.

16 DR. FORD: Well, I see now what. You have given
17 us your impression as to what the tests were and what the
18 author has concluded. Can you substantiate that interpreta-
19 tion in terms of the report itself?

20 MR. MOORE: No, I cannot. I have cursorily read the
21 report. I have not contacted the authors, but I am merely
22 pointing out the presumption as stated by the authors on how
23 they ascertained that this could have been the case.

24 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Is this a convenient place to
25 interrupt your examination?

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

DR. FORD: Yes.

CHAIRMAN JENSCH: At this time let us recess, re-
convene in this room at 3:45.

(Recess.)

1 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Please come to order.

2 Before we proceed, Board has been giving
3 consideration to various schedule possibilities. In view
4 of the uniform expression to move the case along to have
5 an extra day for preparation with these new data which
6 we have been submitted and which are anticipated to be
7 presented, the Board accepts the suggestion of Applicant's
8 Counsel that we recess Thursday night and reconvene
9 Monday morning at nine o'clock.

10 Proceed.

11 DR. FORD: I'd like to return to the question
12 of the Oak Ridge 635 tests related to propagated fuel
13 element failing modes. I'd like to read the analysis
14 given by the Oak Ridge authors. This was on the page
15 references which we previously pointed out to the
16 Applicant's witnesses.

17 It states on page 32, and I quote, "Calculations
18 based on hoop stress show the center rod should have
19 ruptured several seconds before rod H." That is an
20 adjacent rod. "The pellets in the center irradiated rod
21 were cracked into small pieces, and the pieces may have
22 settled inside the rod as the cladding swelled, thus making
23 a somewhat concentrated heat source. The direct effect
24 on rod H was probably the spilling out of UO₂ chips that
25 heated and caused local stress concentrations ^{where} the

1 expanding cladding of rod H pressed against UO₂ pieces.
2 of
3 This form/fuel rod failure propagation would not occur
4 in out-of-reactor fuel rod failure tests and apparently
5 would not have occurred in the treat experiments with
6 unirradiated rods since the unirradiated pellets remained
7 intact."

8 Directing Mr. Moore's attention to this analysis,
9 I would like to ask him to identify the aspects of this
10 analysis with which he disagrees. I will give him --
11 You have your own copy.

12 MR. MOORE: I have my own copy here.

13 DR. FORD: To identify the aspects of this
14 analysis with which you disagree and to set forth the
15 experimental data that confirms your alternative
16 hypothesis.

17 MR. MOORE: As I indicated in testimony prior
18 to the recess, I merely pointed out that results of this
19 test were somewhat conjectural on the part of the author,
20 as indicated by his words, where he says, "The pellets
21 in the center irradiated rod may have settled inside the
22 rod as the cladding swelled. The direct effect on rod H
23 was probably a spilling out of UO₂ chips that heated and
24 caused the stress concentrations."

25 The whole analysis was predicated upon a
calculation of what the stress should have been in this

1 rod H compared to the stress in the center rod, and the
2 fact that rod H failed sooner was because of this
3 conjecture.

4 DR. FORD: I see. Do you find the use of terms
5 like "probably" in this analysis uncommon and general in
6 experimental interpretation to indicate that this is a
7 kind of footloose conjecture that is not really an intimate
8 part of the heuristic interpretation of research results?

9 MR. MOORE: I guess I don't understand that
10 question.

11 DR. FORD: I will repeat it and perhaps clarify
12 it.

13 Do you contend that the language, the qualifications
14 that were being given is in a style that is clearly typical
15 of experimental reports in general, or don't you agree
16 that one of the main functions of such research is a
17 heuristic one and the evolution of hypotheses, and in
18 terms of collating, assembling the presumptive evidence
19 of fuel evidence failure modes, do you contend that this
20 is something unsatisfactory from a scientific point of
21 view, and for that reason is not worthy of our consideration?

22 MR. TROSTEN: Mr. Chairman, I would merely
23 like to observe that I really believe that that question
24 is not really a proper question to direct to Mr. Moore.
25 If Mr. Moore wants to answer it, since he is a qualified

1 engineer and technical expert, he may do so. I really
2 don't think the question is a proper one.

3 MR. MOORE: I would say it is a rather esoteric
4 one. I'd rather not get into it. My point is, the
5 fact that this author has identified a possible situation,
6 I don't find fault with that. I don't think he or we
7 should take this implied situation, inferred situation.
8 There were no direct measurements to show that this
9 in fact was the case. We shouldn't take this isolated
10 single experiment at this point and draw any significant
11 conclusions.

12 MR. ROISMAN: Mr. Chairman, in terms of Mr.
13 Trosten's suggestion which was never articulated, nor
14 do I think the witness articulated objection at all --
15 The question was asked by Mr. Ford was perfectly proper.
16 He wants to know whether this kind of language in the
17 usage of the terms as to what was probably the case is
18 so unusual in experiments that it would justify the
19 conclusion that has been drawn from it by Mr. Moore,
20 namely that it showed that we should disregard this
21 propagation effect that the author was talking about, or
22 on the other hand, is the use of the terms that it
23 probably was so, a fairly standard procedure used in
24 experiments; and he can't draw all the support he
25 attempts to draw from that language. He is trying to find

1 out the basis for this judgment that that language
2 supports his conclusion about the possibility of propagating
3 fuel failures. I don't see anything improper about
4 asking him to give us that basis, if he has one.

5 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: There was no objection. The
6 comment was made by Applicant's Counsel. The witness
7 proceeded to answer. I suppose there are several ways
8 to approach it. If you ran parallel columns on all the
9 experimental reports that come out of Oak Ridge or Idaho
10 Nuclear, you will find a lot of probablies and maybes and
11 sometimes and so forths. Whether you would infer from
12 that that that's kind of standard experimental report
13 language, I don't know. I infer from the witness' answer
14 that he felt there was an initial approach to this problem.
15 In view of the fact that there were some probabilities
16 expressed, he didn't think it was proper. This is his
17 opinion to attribute any great significance to the matter,
18 not that it is something worthy of further consideration.
19 But at the present stage, he doesn't feel that it's
20 reached that point.

21 Is that your position, Mr. Witness?

22 MR. MOORE: Yes, sir.

23 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Very well. Proceed.

24 DR. FORD: Can you tell me, given that position,
25 are we to now review Westinghouse reports and to reject

1 all non-directly measured conclusions as to the values of
2 particular variables?

3 MR. MOORE: I thought you had been doing that
4 all day.

5 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Take a shot at the answer and
6 your comment about what he was doing.

7 DR. FORD: Are you now then conceding one of
8 the basic points that I have been trying to make?

9 MR. MOORE: No. I am saying each case we have
10 to look at one at a time.

11 DR. FORD: Back to the specific language that
12 is used. Let's see what clear contradictory evidence
13 that you could offer us as a corrective to the purported
14 speculation that is going on here. Going back to the
15 main section of the report, page 32, I quoted the paragraph
16 as beginning, "Calculations based on hoop stress show
17 that the center rod should have ruptured several seconds
18 before rod H."

19 Do you have any criticisms of the way in which
20 this report calculated the hoop stress of the center
21 rod such that the inference it draws from the result of
22 that calculation can be invalidated with your evidence?

23 MR. MOORE: Since the report does not tell me
24 how they calculated this hoop stress, I really can't
25 comment.

1 DR. FORD: Does Westinghouse have, for the tempera-
2 ture and pressure of this center rod, any calculation which
3 they could supply which would indicate a different result from
4 what you indicate is not a documented calculation? At least
5 it is not documented as I see it on Page 32.

6 MR. MOORE: We have calculated burst conditions as
7 a function of temperature and internal pressure. But not in
8 the sense and to the degree of accuracy that might be implied
9 necessary for this kind of a calculation to draw this con-
10 clusion. It depends on for what purpose you are trying to
11 make the calculation. So I would not apply our calculation
12 to this experiment and I certainly cannot do it without any
13 information regarding the actual experiment.

14 DR. FORD: One thing that is given here very clearly
15 is a description of the heat-up rate, the internal pressure of
16 the rod, rod diameter and so forth. Is there any additional
17 information that you would need to calculate the hoop stress
18 to check out their calculation? They give the entire time
19 temperature of the rod, the cladding, thickness, inside and
20 outside diameter and so forth.

21 MR. MOORE: I would require uncertainties of these
22 parameters, properties of the specific cladding.

23 DR. FORD: Is there any other data?

24 MR. MOORE: I can't recall or think of any right
25 offhand.

S2Wt2

1 DR. FORD: In the Westinghouse reports I have yet
2 to see, in any table that we have, any indication that all
3 of the uncertainties in any of the parameters that influence
4 hoop stress. Are you asking for kind of an analysis which
5 you yourself do not practice?

6 MR. MOORE: When I do an analysis within
7 Westinghouse, it is not incumbent to indicate all the un-
8 certainties in any particular report.

9 DR. FORD: You contend that in order to calculate
10 hoop stress, you would need certain variables and statistical
11 information pertaining to these variables, whether probability
12 is at certain deviations. I am saying, in all of the data
13 that you have presented, I am asking, is my impression correct
14 that you have in no case included all of the statistical
15 uncertainty information that you require now to do any cal-
16 culation of hoop stress?

17 MR. MOORE: And in no case do I do a hoop stress
18 calculation in support of the application for the Indian
19 Point plant.

20 DR. FORD: I see. In none of the topical reports
21 that predict time to burst is there any hoop stress calcula-
22 tion?

23 MR. MOORE: Predictions of time to burst are not
24 significant or important with respect to our analysis.

25 DR. FORD: I see. Now, as part of your--

1 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: I wonder if we could get that
2 answer again. I think you asked him are there any of these
3 analyses of hoop stress or something about it. Could you
4 try it again? Do you have any analyses of hoop stress, yes
5 or no?

6 MR. MOORE: Yes.

7 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Proceed.

8 DR. FORD: Is the hoop stress analysis and the
9 per cent of rods perforating, is this used to calculate the
10 release of fission products in the containment or the accident?

11 MR. MOORE: Not at all.

12 DR. FORD: Do you mean that fission product
13 release into the containment is not a function of the hoop
14 stress that would take place?

15 MR. MOORE: It is a function of that, but we assume
16 that all of the rods failed when we determined the releases
17 as indicated in testimony yesterday by Mr. Wiesemann.

18 DR. FORD: Can you tell me, in the time to burst
19 data in which you do present, because you don't present the
20 uncertainties in the hoop stress parameters, that we should
21 dismiss them or regard them as providing no relevant infor-
22 mation at all?

23 MR. MOORE: I really can't comment on that.

24 DR. FORD: You seem to consider acceptable practice
25 in this area because it is your practice to present results

1 of hoop stress calculations and burst predictions. I find no
2 footnote saying to forget this column, it is irrelevant, an
3 irresponsible way of doing things.

4 MR. MOORE: These calculations that you are referring
5 to that we may perform were not intended to determine the kind
6 of effect this presented in the specific report periods. So
7 you must understand for what purpose you are making these
8 calculations in order to determine with what accuracy it is
9 important that they remain.

10 DR. FORD: I see. Now, if you were given data
11 pertaining to the accuracy of a specific parameter, is your
12 experimental data sufficient to provide the basis for
13 sensitivity analysis; that the range of possible values of
14 this parameter would result in ranges and possible values of
15 hoop stress? Are you prepared to do a sensitivity analysis
16 even if you have the uncertain data?

17 MR. MOORE: For what case? I am confused.

18 DR. FORD: For calculating the hoop stress on the
19 center rod and as a test.

20 MR. MOORE: What is the question?

21 DR. FORD: You want uncertainty data for the
22 parameters and hoop stress calculations. What I am asking
23 you is, when you get these uncertainty parameters, what are
24 you going to do with them? Are you prepared and do you have
25 a sufficient base of experimental data relating these

1 parameters to hoop stress that you can perform some kind of
2 sensitivity analysis?

3 MR. MOORE: Experimental data with respect to what?

4 DR. FORD: With respect to the determinates of
5 hoop stress. Could you say, for example, if I told you that
6 my estimate of cladding thickness was accurate to within one
7 per cent, can you go from this uncertainty estimate to tell
8 me what difference this would make to calculate at hoop
9 stress?

10 MR. MOORE: I would think so, yes.

11 DR. FORD: What experimental data have you at all
12 on that particular sensitivity analysis involving hoop stress
13 at bursting to this parameter?

14 MR. MOORE: Clad thickness, was that the parameter?

15 DR. FORD: Yes.

16 MR. MOORE: It is the fact that the stress is
17 proportional to the area. That's a fairly fundamental
18 parameter.

19 DR. FORD: For all of the uncertainty parameters
20 that you are concerned with, are you prepared to do this kind
21 of analysis?

22 MR. MOORE: No, I am not. I don't understand quite
23 where the questioning is going. I indicated that I could
24 not comment on the calculations performed by Oak Ridge, but
25 obviously they are important in developing their hypothesis.

1 DR. FORD: But what I'm trying to obtain is some
2 indication from you of whether or not the calculations that
3 were made were reasonable ones and whether you are able,
4 with your analysis of the situation, to provide us with infor-
5 mation that says that is clearly wrong and therefore this
6 whole concern with propagating fuel element failure should
7 be forgotten about completely.

8 MR. MOORE: I have no basis to make any judgment
9 on that at all.

10 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: I wonder, Mr. Wiesemann, if you
11 find it crowded there, if you want to sit back at the table
12 with Mr. Cahill, and if some concern comes up for your inter-
13 rogation, you will be able to come forward. Will you be
14 able to do that? I think sometimes we get into a conference
15 and it may interfere with a witness in answering the question.
16 I think it might be better if Mr. Wiesemann sat down at the
17 table and then the conferences won't be so interfering for the
18 answer.

19 MR. TROSTEN: It is agreeable to me, Mr. Chairman.

20 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Will you step down with Mr.
21 Cahill, Mr. Wiesemann.

22 Proceed with your interrogation, please.

23 DR. FORD: Could you tell me, if I had the general
24 question as a topic for safety water reactor research, if I
25 had the general question, what is the possibility that

1 propagating fuel element failure modes would significantly
2 degrade emergency core cooling system performance? If I had
3 that general question, could you describe to me the kind of
4 experimental data that would be sufficient to resolve that
5 matter in your judgment?

6 MR. MOORE: I certainly would have to have informa-
7 tion as to how the rods were expected to fail without the
8 propagation factor. That is what are the failure configura-
9 tions.

10 DR. FORD: What specific data do you require on
11 this, about using which variables?

12 MR. MOORE: That determines the geometry of the
13 rod burst and gives me an indication of what possibility I
14 have for expulsion of fuel or collection of fuel.

15 DR. FORD: What variables are these that are
16 relevant to this consideration?

17 MR. MOORE: Geometry of the failure.

18 DR. FORD: There are no other variables relevant
19 to determining what failure rate is without propagation?
20 You don't want to know the relationships, for example, between
21 internal pressure and the phenomenon of swelling and so forth?

22 MR. MOORE: Are we starting from the point that I
23 would have to understand how the rod would fail from internal
24 pressure initially in order to see whether the geometries
25 of the failure would be such that I could get gross

1 dispersal of fuel. For example, if I had large gross splits
2 in a rod with large areas exposed, this would be one situa-
3 tion. The actual situation obtained in the multi-rod burst
4 test shows very small openings associated with the burst.

5 DR. FORD: I am talking in terms of how you would
6 set up an experimental research program to determine whether
7 fuel rod propagations was a phenomenon that would degrade
8 emergency core cooling system performance significantly or
9 not.

10 In terms of your response, I don't get anything
11 that you should do these kinds of tests with these para-
12 meters with such and such a kind of rod, and so forth.
13 That is the kind of answer I am looking for and that which
14 would be responsive to that interest.

15 MR. MOORE: You would have to propose some kind of
16 a test which will simulate the behavior of UO₂. Under the
17 circumstances which simulate the loss of coolant accident,
18 that is. If there were a way to do this out of pile, it
19 would certainly be preferable from the standpoint of the
20 experimental aspects. Short of that, you will do in-pile
21 tests such as the one Oak Ridge has performed.

22 DR. FORD: Was there a kind of in-pile testing do
23 you think would contribute to a resolution of the uncertainties
24 you find in the Oak Ridge office's analysis of the data?

1 MR. MOORE: Well certainly some more tests
2 would be in order. In fact, they had run a subsequent
3 test FRS 2 and I am not sure whether they had any of
4 this situation in that test or not.

5 DR. FORD: Well, are you aware that the maximum
6 blockage in FRS 2 was ninety-one percent as opposed to
7 the forty-eight percent in the report you have in hand?

8 MR. MOORE: No, I am not. Is that reported
9 somewhere?

10 DR. FORD: Yes. I can give you the reference
11 to that.

12 MR. MOORE: I'd appreciate it.

13 DR. FORD: Tell me, the further testing you
14 pinpointed specific speculations in the Oak Ridge authors'
15 analysis of propagating fuel element failure modes.
16 Addressing yourself --

17 MR. MOORE: Excuse me. You pinpointed specific
18 speculations.

19 DR. FORD: I mean in terms of your quoting
20 of their use of the term and so forth, you found those
21 sentences to be significantly speculative. Addressing
22 yourself to those sentences which you were quoting earlier,
23 I believe on page 69 of the Oak Ridge report, can you
24 talk turkey about an experimental program that would
25 resolve that speculation either in favor of the position

1 that you are taking or in further support of the
2 significance of propagating fuel element failures?

3 MR. MOORE: I have no specific test program
4 to propose at this time. I note that the failure of
5 propagation was not one of the conclusions of the authors
6 of this report.

7 DR. FORD: It is not included in the abstract.
8 Isn't there a whole separate section?

9 MR. MOORE: I am looking at the section
10 entitled Conclusions.

11 DR. FORD: So that to sum up your view of the
12 Oak Ridge test, is it correct to say that in your opinion
13 the role of propagating fuel element failure modes is
14 not definitely established in that test, and on the other
15 hand that you can suggest no route to obtain such
16 information?

17 MR. MOORE: Yes. I am not in a position to
18 suggest any alternative test.

19 DR. FORD: Now in terms of the a priori analysis
20 that the authors made, the logical analysis about the
21 significance of propagating fuel element failure modes,
22 do you accept that? I mean logically speaking even if
23 you don't find any basis for the calculation of hoop
24 stress, do you criticize the logic by which they use the
25 calculated hoop stress to relate it to the other data from

1 the experiment and conclude that there was therefore a
2 propagated fuel element failure mode?

3 MR. MOORE: I am not sure I understood the
4 question.

5 DR. FORD: Well, they have made certain factual
6 contentions, for example, that the hoop stress is reliably
7 calculated as a certain value. They have used that
8 calculated value to relate it to other data at times of
9 failure and so forth to conclude that there was a
10 propagating fuel element failure mode.

11 What I am asking you is from a logical point
12 of view is there anything suspect about their reasoning?
13 You mean assume in answering your position that the premise
14 is false. But is the argument false itself? Simply
15 from a logical point of view if the premise were true
16 the conclusion would be true?

17 MR. MOORE: I guess I understand the question.
18 I would say that given data which seems to refute your
19 prediction one then searches for possible alternative
20 situations or mechanisms or what possible alternative
21 mechanism is fuel failure propagation.

22 So I guess I would agree that there could be
23 some logic.

24 DR. FORD: I see. Well, could you suggest to
25 the Oak Ridge authors or to us other hypotheses that they

1 could consider that would explain what they calculate
2 but which would not be the hypothesis that there was a
3 propagated fuel element failure mode?

4 MR. MOORE: I already have. I said that there
5 is a possibility that their stress calculations could
6 be sufficiently in error or uncertain, that they had drawn
7 the wrong conclusion.

8 DR. FORD: But aside from their calculation
9 all errors, I mean simply from a logical point of view
10 interpreting the data that they have, can you disatrophify
11 in our imaginations to show what else besides propagating
12 fuel element failure modes could have been responsible
13 for that behavior?

14 MR. MOORE: I am not sure I understand
15 disatrophify. You would not need to come up with any other
16 solution or postulation if your stress calculations
17 showed you that the rod in fact did not fail prematurely.
18 So the data -- I look at the results of the experiment
19 and I wouldn't conclude anything other than the fact that
20 the total blockage was on the order of forty-eight percent.

21 DR. FORD: I see. But if we accepted, you
22 know, just from in terms of trying to see what the
23 possibilities are for interpreting this data, if we
24 accept it, the calculations that we are talking about, if
25 we accepted them then is there any other phenomenon besides

1 heat propagating fuel element failure modes that could
2 contribute, that would have, you know, degenerated the
3 situation?

4 MR. MOORE: Well one possibility certainly is
5 that a rod burst and just the cladding itself contacted
6 an adjacent rod and caused the adjacent rod to burst.

7 DR. FORD: That's another kind of propagating
8 fuel element failure mode, not via the fuel pellets
9 themselves, but via cladding impingement.

10 MR. MOORE: Yes.

11 DR. FORD: Are there any others?

12 MR. MOORE: I can't think of any others.

13 DR. FORD: So that in terms of a null hypothesis
14 other than just calculational errors you can't provide
15 a plausible alternative to their interpretation simply
16 on logical grounds?

17 MR. MOORE: I just did.

18 DR. FORD: Yes. But that's another kind of --
19 I mean they do mention that and the pressure with which
20 the cladding itself, the one in which the cladding itself,
21 the center rod had touched all other rods, as they
22 explained, with sufficient pressure to have some influence
23 on the swelling of the other rods, so that is part of the --

24 MR. MOORE: Could you give me the reference
25 to that?

1 DR. FORD: I think we will go on. I had just
2 read that during the break, but we will inform you and
3 bring it up.

4 In terms of a further contributing factor to
5 local cladding blockage, this is a phenomenon which
6 both relates to metal-water reactions -- This is
7 specifically to Dr. Roll, -- namely the presence of grid
8 spacers and springs and supporting structures and the
9 influence that they have on fuel element failures. I
10 wonder if you could just get us in this area, whether
11 you could tell us what is the number of supports on the
12 bundles, what their spacing is and what the metals
13 involved are.

14 DR. ROLL: In this particular --

15 MR. TROSTEN: Excuse me, Dr. Roll. I believe
16 you were not here yesterday but I am informed that this
17 question was asked and answered yesterday. We are searching
18 to get the transcript reference.

19 MR. ROISMAN: Mr. Wiesemann was kind enough
20 to show me the modes of contact and so forth, all off the
21 record. I think what we wanted to do was just get it on
22 the record. Let me state what Mr. Wiesemann told me, if
23 that is correct, and we will simply go from that premise.

24 I understood the spring supports are at seven
25 different locations along the length of the rod, that at

1 each location there are six contact points, four springs,
2 two of which have two contact points and two of which
3 have one contact point. So that there is a total of
4 forty-two contact points on each rod of the iconel spring
5 with the rod. Mr. Wiesemann, is that correct?

6 MR. WIESEMANN: I think also you were referred
7 to the safety analysis report for a description of the
8 location of those spacers.

9 MR. TROSTEN: That is correct. I don't have
10 the transcript reference here. I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman.
11 There is a page in the transcript where the reference
12 to the FSAR is contained. I don't have it before me.

13 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: While we have paused a
14 moment, Applicant's Counsel, you stated that witness Roll
15 had some commitments that required his presence when
16 back at the office?

17 MR. TROSTEN: Excuse me. I will have to confer
18 with the Westinghouse representative to find out exactly
19 how soon he has to be back. Will you wait just a moment,
20 please.

21 DR. FORD: While the Applicant is discussing
22 that matter I might report that we found the reference
23 in the ORNL document that I promised earlier.

24 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Just a minute.

25 MR. TROSTEN: Mr. Roll is preparing for work on

1 an entirely unrelated matter, Mr. Chairman, which would
2 make it highly desirable if his examination could be
3 completed today.

4 On the other hand, if it is necessary that he
5 be here tomorrow he could be here tomorrow. We would
6 just hope that his testimony could be completed today.

7 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Can you indicate if you would
8 be able to when you will make complete your interrogation
9 of the witness Roll.

10 DR. FORD: I didn't realize it was so late.
11 I am sure that we will require him tomorrow. I can't
12 go at a great pace. I will try.

13 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: You will require him tomorrow?

14 DR. FORD: I would expect as much.

15 MR. ROISMAN: Yes. This is on the assumption
16 that we are going to recess the hearing today at the usual
17 time.

18 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Five o'clock.

19 MR. TROSTEN: Would it be feasible to extend
20 it for a non unreasonable time to complete the examination
21 of the witness?

22 DR. FORD: The questions I have, the further
23 questions on metal-water reactions I think, are a good
24 bit simpler than the more complicated interpretations
25 of experimental results that we have been concerned with

1 much of the day. So we can decide. I can have some
2 indication from my own idea what I am doing at five o'clock,
3 so I can indicate how much longer I'd require him.

4 MR. TROSTEN: As far as tomorrow is concerned,
5 if we could have some assurance that he could leave by
6 noon this is really what we are after.

7 DR. FORD: Oh, I would definitely expect that
8 that would be possible.

9 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Let's proceed upon that basis.
10 We will go to five o'clock today and try to release
11 Dr. Roll by noon tomorrow. Proceed.

12 DR. FORD: Do you know what the total mass is
13 of iconel in the reactor in the bundle?

14 DR. ROLL: It is known. I don't have the number
15 on the top of my head.

16 DR. FORD: I see. Have you performed calculations
17 to put pounds on the total amount of heat that could be
18 generated if the liquid metal eutectic iconel and zircalloy
19 were formed and reacted with unlimited supplies of water
20 during the transient? Have you performed that kind of
21 calculation?

22 DR. ROLL: We have not performed a calculation
23 to determine the heat given off or absorbed in the event
24 of total iconel reaction with zircalloy.

25 DR. FORD: I see. Do you --

1 DR. ROLL: It's not clear that it's an exothermic
2 reaction.

3 DR. FORD: Do you have data pertaining to this
4 kind of reaction that clarifies whether it releases or
5 absorbs heat?

6 DR. ROLL: I am not prepared right now to quote
7 a reference with the data.

8 DR. FORD: I see. Are you familiar with the
9 BWR-FLECHT report by the Idaho Nuclear Corporation, IN-1453,
10 called A Metallurgical Evaluation of the Simulated BWR
11 Fuel Bundle?

12 DR. ROLL: Not in detail.

13 DR. FORD: The general facts of that test,
14 namely that this unexpected reaction between the springs
15 and the cladding produced a liquid metal eutectic that
16 melted at 1760 degrees, and that liquid metal reacted
17 with water and caused local cladding temperature spikes of
18 up to 2940 degrees, at which point the thermocouples,
19 relevant thermocouples failed.

20 Are you familiar with that general data as
21 being presented by this Idaho Nuclear test?

22 DR. ROLL: Very generally.

23 DR. FORD: Do you have any very general basis
24 for extracting that there is any misanalysis there of
25 this eutectic formation or of its responsibility for the
temperature spikes and gross cladding damage?

T2 Btl

1 DR. ROLL: We have not done a detailed analysis
2 of that report and hence cannot comment on its validity or
3 the validity of the conclusions. Our reasons for rejecting
4 this as a significant contributor to the total energy
5 release in the accident is in fact our own test which shows
6 very little extent of zircalloy iconel reaction.

7 DR. FORD: I see. Can you give us, set forth the
8 test that you have run in this area?

9 DR. ROLL: These are once again summarized in
10 7379, Volume 1. There were eight tests run. Four tests
11 were run by placing iconel springs in direct contact with
12 zirconium cladding and running this test specimen up to
13 temperatures ranging from 1800 to 2390 degrees Fahrenheit.
14 Times were five minutes for three of the tests, three
15 minutes for the test at the 2390. The other four tests were
16 run with pressurized rod specimens in which we wired small
17 pieces of iconel onto the side of the rod and then ran it
18 through our single rod burst procedures at, in two cases,
19 pressures of 100 psi and five degrees F. per second. And
20 in the other two cases 200 psi, the same heating rate.

21 The burst temperatures ranged from 1750 to 2115
22 degrees F. The results of these tests are as follows.

23 The four tests which were run up to high tempera-
24 tures and held showed very small evidence of any bimetallic
25 reaction. The spring pieces, iconel pieces, did not

1 disintegrate or contort or lose their basic configuration,
2 there was no evidence of any penetration into the tubing wall,
3 and hence the degree of iconel formation was extremely slight,
4 and then I believe all but the one or two higher temperature
5 tests, and those two high temperature tests it was noticeable.
6 In the lower temperature tests it was not. And the four tests
7 that are run on pressurized rods they were intentionally run-
8 off at a low heating rate and a low internal pressure to give
9 as high a time as practical, as possible, in the range of
10 above 1760, and the rods burst essentially as expected in
11 terms of a qualitative perusal of the configuration of the
12 break and the time of the break and the location of the break.
13 They did not break underneath the iconel springs.

14 And based on these tests we reached the conclusion
15 that, number one, the presence of the iconel did not
16 prejudice the location of the burst; and, number two, the
17 extent of iconel and zircalloy reaction is indeed very, very
18 slight.

19 DR. FORD: Now iconel is, as I understand it, an
20 alloy of chromium and nickel.

21 DR. ROLL: Nickel primarily.

22 DR. FORD: Is the iconel that you used in your tests
23 the same alloy that is in the reactor?

24 DR. ROLL: That's correct.

25 DR. FORD: You don't have any date on whether it's

T2Bt3

1 the same alloy used in the BWR FLECHT tests?

2 MR. MOORE: I do not personally know if it's the
3 same alloy.

4 DR. FORD: Now can you explain to us what the theory
5 is that governs the eutectic melting formation in terms of the
6 fact that the different crystalline structures of different
7 forms of an alloy have the effect that you may get of melting
8 of the entire alloy at lower temperatures than melting of any
9 of the components? Can you enlighten us on the theory behind
10 this kind of reaction, behind eutectic melting?

11 DR. ROLL: No, I cannot. That's not really my area
12 of competence.

13 DR. FORD: I see. Has Westinghouse, to your knowl-
14 edge, research personnel for whom this is the area of
15 competence?

16 DR. ROLL: I believe the area of why eutectics form
17 and what the phase diagrams look like and why eutectic is
18 formed is basically metallurgy.

19 DR. FORD: Well, I will translate my question. Does
20 Westinghouse have a metallurgist?

21 DR. ROLL: Of course we have a metallurgist.

22 DR. FORD: Then in terms of this particular metal-
23 water reaction you are not--

24 DR. ROLL: You are talking eutectic formation.

25 DR. FORD: Right. And the metal-water reaction

T2Bt4

1 between this liquid metal eutectic which melts at 1760
2 degrees Fahrenheit, according to the General Electric data,
3 in terms of the reaction between this and water or metal-
4 water reaction, that's why the whole area is addressed to you,
5 but are you saying that it's mainly a metallurgical phenomenon,
6 that you are not the cognizant person to discuss this matter
7 with?

8 DR. ROLL: The formation of the eutectic per se
9 given intimate contact and zirconium at 1760 degrees will
10 happen. That's a property of the material combination.
11 Why it didn't happen in this particular test, the source
12 of why it didn't happen in our particular test is twofold.

13 Number one, we had a point contact. That is in
14 our design the spring is in contact with the rod at only a
15 very small total area.

16 And, number two, is during the heat-up of the
17 bimetallic test specimen and also as will happen in the
18 reactor there is a coating of zirconium oxide on the surface
19 of the rod and this would effectively separate the bare
20 zirconium metal and the bare nickel metal from each other
21 and preclude, for the time of interest at least, the forma-
22 tion of more than a very, almost insignificant quantity of
23 eutectic.

24 DR. FORD: I see. Now you mentioned that there is
25 only one point of contact.

Tt5

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

DR. ROLL: I didn't say that.

DR. FORD: Oh, excuse me. What was your point?

DR. ROLL: I said the point of contact between the spring and the rod is very small.

DR. FORD: I see. But for a given rod how many contacts are there that are small?

DR. ROLL: Well, it's six points per grid per rod and there are seven grids along the rod and I believe there are nine grids total on the two on the end, so that nine times six would be fifty-four points of contact per rod. We can carry that on to times approximately 40,000 rods to get the total number of points of contact in the reactor.

DR. FORD: The question is concerning the explanation for eutectic formation as related to the experiments that you performed on eutectic formation and what I'd like to ask is whether or not you have sufficient confidence of the mechanisms of eutectic formation to say, to give us a qualified opinion as to whether or not this particular test was done in cognizance with the whole theory of the eutectic formation, such that it really gave eutectic formation a fair trial?

DR. ROLL: We believe, and this was not a unilateral decision on my part, but we did consult with the metallurgical group at the time, we believe that the test is an adequate demonstration of our set of conditions with our geometries.

TBT6

1 DR. FORD: I see. But this is not something which
2 you are personally testifying to, that you have reviewed the
3 relevant data pertaining to eutectic formation and therefore
4 can say that the tests that were conducted gave sophisticated
5 consideration to this relevant area of eutectic formation,
6 therefore constituted an adequate test. This isn't your own
7 personal affirmation as an expert witness, is it?

8 DR. ROLL: The tests that were conducted gave
9 adequate demonstration for our conditions. The objective was
10 not to learn all there is to know about the formation of
11 eutectics.

12 DR. FORD: But in terms of your own conditions are
13 you sure that there is no phenomenon that would be expected
14 to occur in loss of coolant accident or no interaction
15 between this phenomenon which would encourage eutectic forma-
16 tion, but which was not considered in your test?

17 DR. ROLL: I can think of none now with your con-
18 ditions or relevance which we are not adequately simulating
19 in these tests.

20 DR. FORD: But I'm talking specifically in terms
21 of the fact that you seem to be saying that the basic theory
22 as to why eutectics form and so forth is not something which
23 you will testify to as an expert witness.

24 DR. ROLL: That's correct.

25 DR. FORD: So that if I asked you for example to

Tbt 7

1 set forth all of the conditions postulated for a loss of
2 coolant accident that influence eutectic formation you would
3 decline to answer that question.

4 DR. ROLL: I would decline to answer that question
5 at this very minute.

6 DR. FORD: So that if I follow that question by
7 asking you to explain to me which of those conditions which
8 should be considered were considered in the test that you
9 could not give an expert answer on that, is that correct?

10 DR. ROLL: No, I don't think so. I think you are
11 asking am I prepared to go into a dissertation on eutectic
12 formation and then obtain as a result of this a list of all
13 the variables which might affect the presence or absence of
14 a eutectic and I'm prepared to say that at this time. But
15 you are asking by inference have we missed something of
16 major importance in the test which we ran which had been
17 presented in the reference document. My answer to that is
18 I believe not.

19 DR. FORD: I think my concern here is simply to
20 find out why in one of a recent series of important tests
21 we got eutectic formation which contributed in a very
22 significant way to local cladding damage, and why in another
23 test we didn't get it, and I'm trying to find what is the
24 depth of the analysis that you are prepared to offer to
25 resolve this kind of basic question. And it's in this

1 regard that--well, do you regard the General Electric test
2 result which showed the temperature spikes due to eutectics,
3 is that an anomaly or is your test result that didn't include
4 eutectic melting an anomaly?

5 DR. ROLL: We believe that our tests which did not
6 show eutectic melting is not an anomaly I believe that it's
7 perhaps imprudent of us to conjecture on the details of the
8 GE test, and how one might interpret the results in light of
9 our own set of conditions.

10 DR. FORD: You are called upon to support your
11 position that your result is not an anomaly am I to take it
12 from your previous remarks that you are not able to argue in
13 terms of the theory of eutectic formation and the conditions
14 which influence it, that you are not able to argue on that
15 basis to support your position?

16 DR. ROLL: That's correct.

17 DR. FORD: So that basically your test results
18 pertaining to the lack of eutectic melting, you can offer no
19 theoretical support for that?

20 DR. ROLL: I can offer the fact that we didn't see
21 any eutectic formation. That's not theoretical, that's data.

22 DR. ROLL: Right. I am asking the further question
23 as to whether we should regard that data as exclusive in
24 light of the theory that we have developed, if we have
25 developed any, related to eutectic formation, and do you think

Tbt9

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

you can be responsive to this concern?

DR. ROLL: I believe we have conducted eight tests which adequately cover the conditions of concern. The tests which have been summarized in the document and presented for that purpose.

DR. FORD: Can you give a definition of the term "adequately covered"?

1 DR. ROLL: We have answered to our satisfaction
2 the concern that has been raised and our satisfaction
3 as measured by our willingness to put the data and the
4 interpretation of this data in a document, which is
5 generally available.

6 DR. FORD: When you used the term "our,"
7 you are not relying on your own judgment and analysis?
8 You are relying on the judgment and analysis of somebody
9 back in the shop, that they did this test right and there
10 is no question at all about it?

11 DR. ROLL: And that others that are using
12 the results of this test feel that this provides adequate
13 demonstration of the condition of concern.

14 DR. FORD: Can you tell me who else is using
15 this test?

16 DR. ROLL: Westinghouse Electric is using this
17 test.

18 DR. FORD: They are the ones that developed it?

19 DR. ROLL: That's right.

20 DR. FORD: Is there someone else? Is your test
21 result something relied upon by people who use eutectics
22 in general?

23 DR. ROLL: I'm not a student of loss of coolant
24 analyses in literature. Therefore, I can't comment on
25 whether somebody else is using this or not.

1 DR. FORD: So basically you are saying that you
2 yourself are not prepared as an expert witness to affirm
3 this test as a valid one? You are simply relying on
4 the fact that Westinghouse did it?

5 DR. ROLL: What are you inferring? Maybe you
6 are stating something that I am totally missing.

7 DR. FORD: I am trying to find out whether
8 this is a valid test. You say it is. But when asked to
9 give in terms of what we know about this metallurgical
10 phenomenon in terms that it is a metallurgical question
11 and outside of your sphere of technology -- At any rate,
12 you are saying that you don't have the relevant background
13 and experience. You are still affirming the test. I am
14 trying to figure out how this is at all reasonable.

15 MR. TROSTEN: Mr. Chairman, I suggest what is
16 happening here is that Mr. Ford has asked the question.
17 He has actually asked it several times in several different
18 ways. The witness has answered the question several times
19 in several different ways. Mr. Ford doesn't like the
20 answer that the witness has given and is in a sense arguing
21 with the witness. I think he is going on like this. I
22 would request that you order that it cease at this point.

23 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: I take it your statement is
24 an objection?

25 MR. TROSTEN: Yes, sir.

1 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: I think there is a great deal
2 of repetition in the questioning. I think the witness
3 has indicated the scope of his familiarity. He doesn't
4 know the work in detail. Maybe you are leading up to a
5 request that some other witness be presented. But I
6 think it should be as far as this witness is concerned
7 concerning those tests that have been pretty adequately
8 covered. Do you not think so?

9 DR. FORD: I was just about to conclude.

10 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: We will sustain the objection
11 and make it certain.

12 DR. FORD: Additional metal-water reaction
13 that we are concerned with is the metal-water reaction
14 between uranium dioxide fuel and the steam once the fuel
15 rod has burst. Can you set forth the experimental work,
16 theoretical work that Westinghouse has done in this area?

17 DR. ROLL: Did you say did I or could I?

18 DR. FORD: Would you please.

19 DR. ROLL: I believe I answered earlier that
20 the reaction of UO_2 and water to a higher oxide of UC_2
21 is thermodynamically not what happens at these temperatures,
22 and that we have done no experimental work to confirm
23 the rate, the nature, the extent of this reaction or lack
24 of reaction.

25 DR. FORD: So that you would contest the

1 conclusion of the Idaho Nuclear metallurgical analysts --
2 I am quoting from IN 1453; that another possibility is
3 the two perforations resulting from eutectic melting
4 caused by the lantern springs or resulting from other
5 causes would allow steam to come in contact with the
6 uranium dioxide. The uranium dioxide may be converted to
7 U_3O_8 which would thermodynamically be expected to react
8 with the zircalloy. These possibilities bear further
9 investigation and further work.

10 You disagree with their analysis of the
11 possibilities for this conversion; is that correct?

12 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Hand the document to the
13 witness.

14 DR. FORD: Yes.

15 DR. ROLL: The Idaho people from which you have
16 quoted this statement presumably are saying, gee, there
17 are several materials here which are in contact under
18 certain conditions and which one might be concerned about
19 the degree of heat release or heat evolution in the event
20 they react. That, as a flat statement, I can agree with.
21 However, one might also want to take the next step
22 and review the thermodynamics of some of these reactions
23 without a significant amount of work, and say, number one,
24 has work been done; if not been done explicitly, what are
25 the indications on the extent or rate or heat evolution in

1 the event that these reactions do take place; and reach
2 some early indications of what ought to be done. In
3 developing our calculational procedures which are loss
4 of coolant accident and analysis in toto, these kinds of
5 reactions had been reviewed as potentials and rejected
6 as possible or significant or even notable contributors
7 to the total heat load which the analysis must carry.

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

U2Wt1

1 DR. FORD: Can you provide us with the analysis
2 that was made when this review was made? Did you personally
3 make it?

4 DR. ROLL: I did not.

5 DR. FORD: Are you familiar with what the thermo-
6 dynamic argument was?

7 DR. ROLL: The thermodynamic argument based on
8 free energies of formation of the compounds and thermo-
9 dynamics will tell you whether or not a reaction will go
10 or not under the conditions of interest. It won't tell you,
11 that it definitely will, but it can tell you that it
12 definitely won't or will to a slight extent. It is this
13 type of an approach that was used.

14 DR. FORD: What I am asking you for is whether
15 you are familiar with the actual instance of this approach
16 that was used?

17 DR. ROLL: No, I'm not. This was the approach
18 that was used and this was the approach that is used in
19 reporting the data. Do we have in hand a document that can
20 be brought out that summarizes this calculation and process,
21 no. I wouldn't know where to go to find such a document.

22 DR. FORD: You know that some theoretical analysis was
23 done, although it is not in any form accessible to inspec-
24 tion, and you also--I believe you said before that there was
25 no experimental work done to confirm this?

U2Wt2

1 DR. ROLL: I said that we have no experimental work.

2 DR. FORD: You have no experimental work?

3 DR. ROLL: No. I believe that in some cases there
4 are some experiments which could be partly if not totally
5 germane to the specific conditions.

6 DR. FORD: In terms of the seriousness with which
7 the Idaho Nuclear people take this matter--I looked to see if
8 it says this will happen. I don't find any. Isn't it correct
9 that in this test, what they were responding to is an anomaly
10 occurring in a very late stage, in our experience with nuclear
11 power, that they are responding to metallurgical performance
12 anomalies that were not anticipated at all. Is that the con-
13 text in which you regard them as having made this suggestion
14 for further work?

15 DR. ROLL: Perhaps.

16 DR. FORD: In terms of anomalous metal-water
17 reaction that has been noted in the FLECHT test--for example,
18 the alumina reaction--I presume you are familiar with that?

19 DR. ROLL: Yes, sir.

20 DR. FORD: Prior to the actual observation of this
21 reactor in the FLECHT test, have any analyses that you or
22 Westinghouse had performed, basic general thermodynamic con-
23 siderations, and so forth, had that predicted this kind of
24 reaction?

25 DR. ROLL: Again, I'm unaware of such calculations.

1 DR. FORD: I see. So that the reaction which took
2 place between the alumina, which you use as a filter, and the
3 zircalloy itself, that that was something that was not thought
4 of before and not anticipated, obviously, because it wouldn't
5 have set up such a funny refractory if they expected to use
6 something like this; is that correct?

7 DR. ROLL: Wait one moment. In what context were
8 these alumina zirconium reactors?

9 DR. FORD: The alumina was used as filter rods as
10 they were in your own tests. You had the hollow piece of
11 zircalloy tubing with a molybdenum filament, and that in order
12 to hold the filament in place they packed alumina, Al_2O_3 , into
13 the void in the tube, and what they observed was that in
14 temperatures in the order of 2100, 2200 degrees, that the
15 alumina filter reacted with the zircalloy cladding which
16 melted and reacted with water which caused extensive local
17 cladding damage. That's in answer to your question to me.
18 That's the frame in reference in which I am talking about
19 alumina.

20 I believe it is correct that you used, in your rods
21 involving filaments, nichrome.

22 DR. ROLL: I wonder if I could quote for the record--

23 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Let him finish.

24 DR. FORD: I am correct that in these tests or in
25 all of the tests that you use these filaments, heating

U2Wt4

1 filaments, inside the rod, you do use alumina? That's not
2 correct?

3 DR. ROLL: That's not correct.

4 DR. FORD: Do you use an alternative filter?

5 DR. ROLL: Could I quote from the final report on
6 the FLECHT tests? It is WCAP 7665, page A-3. This may be
7 responsive to your question.

8 "Boron nitride was selected as the insulation material
9 for FLECHT heaters because it has a substantially higher
10 thermo conductivity than alternate materials such as alumina,
11 or magnesia. Thus, for a given clad temperature, the
12 resistance element temperature is lower with Boron nitride
13 than with the other materials which were considered. In
14 addition, concern about zircalloy--ceramic reactions as a
15 possible cause of Group III heater failure at elevated
16 temperature was a factor in the preference for Boron nitride.
17 Subsequent BWR FLECHT experience was shown that reactions
18 between zircalloy and alumina can take place at temperatures
19 as low as 1500 degrees F. and can result in heater rod
20 failure."

21 DR. FORD: Let me repeat an earlier question. You
22 have used alumina in some of the tests.

23 DR. ROLL: Perhaps, but with stainless steel rods.
24 The concern was for the Group III rods in that quote.
25

1 DR. FORD: So you used no alumina with zircalloy
2 rods; is that correct?

3 DR. ROLL: That apparently is correct. That's
4 what it says here.

5 DR. FORD: This is WCAP-7379, Volume II. It
6 says on page 2, "Twenty tests were performed of these
7 irradiated tubes. These are tubes from Yankee Row E."
8 It says, and I quote with reference to the Yankee Row E
9 fuel, "Twenty tests were performed on these irradiated
10 tubes. Sixteen were tested for failure at various internal,
11 pressure and heating rate conditions (these tests were
12 run with Al_2O_3 pellets alumina) --"

13 So that you do, in fact, use alumina contrary
14 to your statement that --

15 DR. ROLL: Not in contrary to the statement.
16 Those weren't FLECHT heater rod tests. Those were burst
17 tests.

18 DR. FORD: My question was not with regard to
19 FLECHT. I simply wanted to know, tests that you conducted
20 with electric filaments, did you use alumina?

21 DR. ROLL: The answer is no. I believe those
22 tests were not filament heated.

23 DR. FORD: It is parenthetical. Filament heated
24 or not, you nevertheless in these tests used alumina?

25 DR. ROLL: As simulated UO_2 pellets inside the

1 rods.

2 DR. FORD: One of the things in the longer
3 statement you read, you footnote the Idaho Nuclear
4 metallurgical evaluation pertaining to alumina. What
5 I'd like you to explain about that is the quotation
6 here says that zircalloy and alumina -- That reactions
7 between zircalloy and alumina can take place at temperatures
8 as low as 1500 degrees Fahrenheit and can result in
9 heater rod failure. This was not known to you before
10 these BWR-FLECHT tests; is that correct?

11 DR. ROLL: On the contrary. The development
12 work certainly took place earlier than February of 1971,
13 if the final report is documented in April of '71.

14 DR. FORD: Let me understand. Before the
15 anomalous reaction occurred in the BWR-FLECHT tests, had
16 you been aware that this type of reaction between
17 alumina and the cladding could take place at temperatures
18 of 1500 degrees?

19 DR. ROLL: I believe that statement is made
20 in the paragraph which we just quoted.

21 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Did you understand that it
22 occurred?

23 DR. ROLL: Yes. The concern about that reaction
24 was the reason for not selecting -- Was the reason for
25 selecting boron nitride for our own heater rods for the

1 zircalloy class.

2 DR. FORD: I am asking you before the reaction
3 was observed in the Idaho test, was this something that
4 you had previously expected?

5 DR. ROLL: Yes.

6 DR. FORD: There seems to me to be some great
7 difference in your understanding of alumina's potential
8 reactions and the Idaho people. Isn't it clear in the
9 statements from Idaho that this is completely unexpected
10 reaction, that they state in their conclusions?

11 DR. ROLL: To answer that question, we would
12 have to go into the context of all the reports that are
13 being referenced here.

14 DR. FORD: You obviously take it into account
15 after it happened.

16 DR. ROLL: No, not obviously. Obviously it
17 was taken into account before it happened, because it was
18 taken into account during the heater rod development for
19 the FLECHT zirc clad heaters.

20 DR. FORD: In your taking account of this,
21 the suggestion that the Idaho people have made subsequent
22 to its occurrence, was that the time at which it was
23 reviewed, or was it decided at some earlier point that
24 uranium transformation to U_3O_8 reaction of the cladding,
25 something that you didn't have to worry about? When did

1 this review take place relative to the BWR-FLECHT results?

2 DR. ROLL: :I'm not completely up to date on
3 all the chronology in our FLECHT tests, the Idaho reviews
4 and the BWR-FLECHT tests. However, the statement that is
5 made here is that the subsequent BWR experience confirmed
6 this concern.

7 DR. FORD: My question really pertained to your
8 analysis of the uranium reaction. What I am trying to
9 ascertain is when was the analysis that you rely upon
10 done with regard to uranium transformation to U_3O_8 ?

11 DR. ROLL: I don't know.

12 DR. FORD: So that in terms of its up-to-dateness
13 and review in terms of these matters, is it a matter of
14 months or years or whenever this was decided?

15 DR. ROLL: It is not a matter of months.

16 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Is this a convenient time
17 for you to interrupt your examination?

18 DR. FORD: I think so.

19 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Is there anything before we
20 recess?

21 MR. TROSTEN: Yes, there is something I would
22 like to offer. Mr. Chairman, as I indicated previously
23 in the hearing, the Applicant and three of the Intervenors
24 have entered into a stipulation generally reflected on
25 the record at the hearing on October 5th concerning the

1 further conduct of proceedings. I refer to the further
2 conduct of the radiological safety proceedings as well
3 as the environmental proceedings. I won't bother
4 summarizing these matters because of what was said on
5 the record on October 5th.

6 Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.7433 and also 2.753, I would
7 like to offer this stipulation among Applicant and
8 Intervenor's Citizen's Committee for the Protection of
9 the Environment, Environmental Defense Fund and Hudson
10 River Fishermen's Association, concerning further conduct
11 of this proceeding, as a joint exhibit in this proceeding
12 on the part of the Applicant and the three named Interveners.
13 Copies will be served at this point on the other parties
14 which are present in the room at this time, and copies
15 will be served in accordance with the regulations on
16 the other parties at the proceeding.

17 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: May we see a copy?

18 MR. TROSTEN: Yes.

19 Although we are prepared to offer it as an
20 exhibit, Mr. Chairman, it is entirely satisfactory to us
21 to have it incorporated in the transcript of the proceeding,
22 if you wish.

23 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: What is the purpose of the offer?

24 MR. TROSTEN: The purpose of the offer, Mr.
25 Chairman, is to set forth the understanding of the Applicant

1 and these three Intervenors as to the further procedure
2 to be followed, and particularly with respect to the timing
3 of procedure for the conduct of the radiological safety
4 hearings, and also for the conduct of the environmental
5 hearings.

6 As contemplated by the Commission's regulations,
7 the Applicant and these three Intervenors have stipulated
8 as to the procedural aspects of this proceeding. We
9 wanted to offer this as an exhibit in this proceeding to
10 set forth and record for the record what our understanding
11 is. It is also our purpose in doing this, Mr. Chairman,
12 to further advise the Board as to the intentions of these
13 parties to the proceedings with respect to actions which
14 we are hopeful can be taken by the Regulatory Staff and
15 also by the Board.

16 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Let us review the matter. I
17 notice on page 7, just scanning the pages, "The stipulating
18 parties agree that the Board should conclude any hearings
19 that the Board considers necessary concerning the issuance
20 of such license and -- " You refer to four days of
21 continuous session. I'm sure the Board will not make any
22 commitment as to how long it should receive evidence in
23 this matter nor exhaust its concerns respecting the matter.
24 I'm sure the Commission is anxious that a full and complete
25

1 record be made.

2 I think time schedules get more limiting so
3 that if any suggestions given to the Board that thou
4 shalt complete in four days, I just feel it might be
5 somewhat beyond even what the Administrative Procedure
6 Act contemplates for a yearing.

7 MR. TROSTEN: No, Mr. Chairman, I certainly
8 hope the Board does not interpret that way. That was
9 not, of course, the intent at all of the stipulating
10 parties to suggest to the Board that the Board is in any
11 sense bound by this stipulation. This represents an
12 agreement among the stipulating parties as to what those
13 parties felt ought to be done. The Board will of course
14 determine the order of the proceedings here.

15 In the event that we wish to make a motion
16 pursuant to the Commission's regulations for an expedited
17 proceeding, we will, of course, submit a motion in
18 accordance with the Commission's regulations.

19 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: We will give consideration to
20 this matter. If there is nothing further at this time --

21 MR. ROISMAN: Mr. Chairman, excuse me. Just
22 to keep the record straight, I would like to say that the
23 participation of the Citizen's Committee for the Protection
24 of the Environment, as reflected in the stipulation, is
25 a statement on their part that they continue to oppose

1 the issuance of any license for this plant. We are
2 included in there because we are willing to have the Board
3 consider the issuance of such license subject to our
4 objections based upon radiological safety matters at the
5 conclusion of these radiological safety hearings.

6 Less there be any confusion -- And I'm not
7 going to be so concerned with the Board being confused,
8 but rather any members of the public who are here at
9 the hearing confusing it, the Citizen's Committee for
10 the Protection of the Environment is unalterably opposed
11 to any kind of a license, testing, operating, limited or
12 otherwise. That stipulation makes clear that we have
13 that opposition.

14 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: Very well.

15 MR. MACBETH: One last matter. As you know,
16 the Hudson River Fishermen's Association have not been
17 cross-examining on the radiological case. I would like to
18 be excused until the end of the radiological case. I have
19 been here for the last two days partially working out this
20 stipulation with other parties. I would prefer if I could
21 return when we reach the environmental matters.

22 CHAIRMAN JENSCH: You could be excused, but you
23 are obligated to ascertain when that aspect of the case
24 comes up. No notice will be given by the Board to you
25 for your time to return.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

At this time we will recess and reconvene in
this room tomorrow morning at nine o'clock.

(Hearing adjourned.)

* * *

REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY

RETURN TO REGULATORY CENTRAL FILES
ROOM 016

REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY

W05 06 100

10