INDIAN POINT UNIT NO. 2 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT BUCHANAN, NEW YORK

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DOCKET NUMBER 50-247

REACTOR CONTAINMENT BUILDING INTEGRATED LEAKAGE RATE TEST

FINAL REPORT

CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC. Prepared for:

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Date of Test Completion: September 21, 1984

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I. INTRODUCTION

^Aperiodic Type **"A"** Integrated Leakage Rate Test (ILRT) was performed on the containment structure of the Consolidated Edison Company, Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant Unit No. 2 pressurized water reactor in September 1984.

This ILRT test was performed using the "Absolute Method" of testing in accordance with the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50, Appendix J, Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water-Cooled Power
Reactors; in accordance with ANSI N45.4, 1972 American National Standard, Leakage-Rate Testing of Containment Structures for Nuclear Reactors; and the calculations for leakage rate were performed as recommended in ANSI/ANS 56.8, Containment System Leakage Testing Requirements. The ILRT was performed at a pressure in excess of the calculated peak containment internal pressure related to the design basis accident as specified in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and the Technical Specifications.

This report describes and presents the results of this periodic Type **"A"** leakage rate test, including the supplemental test method utilized for verification.

In addition, Con Edison performs Types "B" and **"C"** tests in accordance results of the Type "B" and "C" tests performed since the last Type "A" test are provided in this report (Appendix **E).**

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II. SUMMARY

Since conducting the last Integrated Leakage Rate Test (IIRT), three sets of Types "B" and **"C"** Local Leakage Rate Tests (LLRT) for penetrations and isolation valves were performed **by** Consolidated Edison station personnel. The LLRT tests were performed at pressures equal to or greater than the minimum test pressure delineated in the Indian Point Unit No. 2 Technical Specifications.

At the start of the Type **"A"** ILRT test, valves and systems were in their required position for accident conditions with the exception of those valves and systems required to maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition.

Systems which were not in an operable condition for leakage rate testing were isolated for the ILRT. Appropriate corrections to the measured leakage for the isolated systems were made at the end of the ILRT.

The reactor containment building was pressurized to slightly above Pa, the containment design pressure, with dry air supplied **by** industrial air compressors. After allowing for containment air temperature to stabilize, the mass of air in the containment was calculated every **15** minutes during all phases of the leakage rate test. Straight line least squares analysis of the time rate of change of containment air mass was performed on the appropriate data base to determine the measured leakage rate (Lam). An-upper limit of the **⁹⁵**percent confidence level **(UCL)** was calculated using statistical methods to estimate the possible uncertainty in the measured leakage rate, Lam.

lam was calculated to be **0.027** percent of the contained air mass per day during the ILRT. The **UCL** was determined to be **0.028** percent per day. **A** supplementary Verification Controlled Leakage Rate Test (CLRT) was performed to verify the results of the above measurements and was found to be within the allowable limits, and therefore acceptable.

Subsequent to the Type **"A"** ILRT Test, Local Leakage.Rate Tests were performed on the appropriate isolated systems to determine the amount of leakage which must be added to Lam. Also tested were the test penetrations which were in use during the ILRT and not in the required post-accident position. After adding these additional leakages, the total equivalent "as-found" Lam was 0.031 percent of the contained air mass per day, with a UCL of 0.032 percent per day. After maintenance, the equivalent "as-left" Lam was 0.027 percent per day, with a UCL of 0.028 percent per day. The acceptance criteria for the Type "A" ILRT is that the measured leakage, including statistical uncertainties cannot exceed **75** percent of La, the design basis leakage. For Indian Point Unit No. 2, this acceptance criteria is equivalent to **0.075** percent of the contained air mass per day.

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III. TEST DISCUSSION

A. Description of the Containment

The vapor containment building completely encloses the entire reactor and reactor coolant system to ensure no leakage of radioactive materials to the environment, even upon gross failure of the reactor coolant system and provides shielding for both normal and accident situations.

The Vapor Containment Vessel is a reinforced concrete shell in the form of a vertical right cylinder with a hemispherical dome and a generally flat base supported on rock. The inside surface of the structural concrete is lined with 1/4 inch minimum thickness steel plate anchored to the concrete shell. The liner is designed and fabricated to prevent leakage through it due to an accident resulting in the loss of a reactor coolant and release of radioactive material to the containment volume concurrent with an earthquake.

The containment has side walls which are 148 feet from the liner on the horizontal base to the spring line of the dome, and has a 135 foot inside diameter. The containment free volume is 2,610,000 cubic feet. The thickness of the reinforced concrete base is 9 feet, the side walls are 4.5 feet, and the dome is 3.5 feet thick. The bottom horizontal liner plate is covered with three feet of concrete, the top of which forms the floor of containment.

The liner is anchored to the concrete shell by means of Nelson studs so that it becomes part of the entire structure under all loadings in such a manner as to ensure leak tightness. The weld seams required to fabricate the steel liner were considered as potential leak sources and are barriered and pressurized by the Weld Channel and Penetration Pressurization System (WCPPS).

All penetrations through the structure which are considered as potential leakage sources are designed with double barriers and pressurized by the Isolation Valve Seal Water (IVSW) system or the WCPPS system. There are penetrations, one personnel access airlock, one airlock/equipment hatch and one fuel transfer tube penetration.

All high-pressure equipment in the reactor coolant system is surrounded by barriers which will prevent any missile generated in a loss-of-coolant accident from reaching the vapor containment liner.

The design internal pressure transient following a loss-of-coolant accident for the free volume of 2,610,000 cubic feet within the containment is 47 psig.

Thermal expansion stresses due to an internal temperature increase caused by a loss-of-coolant accident are considered. The maximum temperature at the uninsulated section of the liner under accident conditions is 271°F.

The containment vessel, penetrations, and isolation valves are aligned to simulate accident conditions for the performance of the Integrated Leakage Rate Test. An extra degree of conservatism in testing is provided by not using the Isolation Valve Seal Water or the Weld Channel and Penetration Pressurization Systems during the Integrated Leakage Rate Test.

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B. Description of ILRT Test Instrumentation

The containment system was equipped with instrumentation to permit leakage ate determination by the "Absolute Method." Utilizing this method, the ctual mass of dry air within the containment is calculated. The leakage rate becomes the time rate of change of this value. The mass of air (Q) is calculated according to the Perfect Gas Law as follows:

$$
Q = \frac{(P - Pv) V}{RT}
$$

- Where: P Containment Total Absolute Pressure
	- Pv Containment Water Vapor Pressure
	- V Containment Net Free Volume
	- $R Gas Constant$
 $T Contraliment$
	- Containment Absolute Temperature

The primary measurement variables required are containment absolute pressure, containment relative humidity and containment temperature as a function of time. Ancillary measurements include ambient outside air pressure and ambient temperature and temperature inside the instrument panel. During the supplementary verification test, containment bleed-off flow is also recorded. Instrument readings were output at 15-minute intervals via a data logger and RS-232 link to the Ebasco analysis computer.

The Instrument Selection Guide or ISG is used to determine the ability of the instrumentation system to measure the leakage rate. The calculated ISG for this test met all acceptance criteria for all test instrumentation systems.

1. Temperature Instrumentation

Temperature was measured using four wire precision platinun resistance temperature detectors (RTDs) in a constant current loop.

Forty RTDs were located throughout the containment to allow measurement of the weighted average air temperature. The location of the temperature detectors in the containment is depicted in Figure **1.** Each RTD sensor was supplied with calibrated resistance versus temperature data accurate to **+0.5°F.** The repeatability of each RTD sensor is less than +0.01F. The sensitivity of the RTDs is 0.218 ohm/ \degree F. The signal conditioning circuit and readout for the RTD sensors was a Fluke 2280A data logger with a Fluke 2180 RTD digital thermometer as a back-up readout. The signal conditioning circuit and readout operating as a total loop with an RTD in the circuit had an accuracy of $+0.5^{\circ}$ F, repeatability of $+0.015^{\circ}$ F, and sensitivity of $+0.01^{\circ}$ F.

2. Humidity Instrumentation

Ten precision relative humidity detectors (RHDs) were used during the ILRT to measure containment relative humidity. RHDs were located throughout the containment to allow measurement of the weighted average containment vapor pressure. The location of the RHDs in the containment is depicted in Figure 2. The calibrated accuracy of the RHDs is +2.5 percent RH, the repeatability is +0.25 percent RH, and the sensitivity is **+0.1** percent RH. An electronic signal-conditioning module provided an interface between sensors nd the readout devices. The readout device used was a Fluke 2280A data logger, with a Fluke 8810A digital multimeter as a back-up readout.

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3. Pressure Instrumentation

Two precision quartz bourdon tube manometers were used to determine containment absolute pressure. The arrangement of the tubing connections between the containment and the manometers is shown in Figure 3. Either manometer could be used as the primary pressure sensor for leakage rate calculations with the remaining sensor being considered as a backup. The calibrated accuracy of the manometers is $+0.015$ percent of reading or $+0.0098$ psia. The sensitivity, repeatability, and resolution of the manometers is +0.001 psi. The readout device for the manometers was a direct digital link to a Fluke 2280A data logger.

4. Verification Flow Instrumentation

Two variable area float-type rotameters were originally installed to superimpose a leakage during the supplementary verification test. Due to excessive moisture in the rotameter encountered during the test, an additional rotameter and moisture removal filter was added in series with one of the rotameter and moisture removal filter was added in series with one of the
original rotamaters for verification purposes. The piping connection between the containment and the rotameters is shown in Figure 3. The range, accuracy, and repeatability for the rotameters in units of SCFM and converted to equivalent leakage values for actual test conditions is given below:

5. Instrument Selection Guide (ISG) Calculation

The Instrument Selection Guide is a method of compiling the instrumentation sensitivity and resolution for each process measurement variable used during the ILRT and evaluating the total instrumentation systems' ability to detect leakage rates in the range required. The ISG formula is described in American National Standard ANSI/ANS-56.8-1981. Although the ISG is a very conservative measure of sensitivity, the general industry practice as for this test, has been to require sensitivity at least four times better than the containment design leakage or ISG<0.25La.

The ISG for the instrumentation system utilized for the ILRT is tabulated below as a pre-test ISG and post-test ISG. The difference between the two values is due to the failure of ten RTD temperature sensors during the test. Also tabulated is the contribution to the total ISG from the separate measurements of temperature, relative humidity, and pressure.

The ISG calculations given below meet all recommended criteria and demonstrate the ability of the ILRT test instrumentation system to measure containment leakage with a sensitivity exceeding that required by the appropriate industry standards.

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NOTE: The calculated ISG shall be less than or equal to 25% La or .025%/day.

C. Containment Pressurization Equipment

The equipment used to pressurize the containment is shown in Figure 4. The nine on-line oil-free industrial diesel-driven air compressors had a total nominal capacity of 10,000 SCFM. The compressed air was then routed to the ILRT dryer package for processing prior to entering the containment vessel. This dryer package contained two water-cooled aftercoolers, two moisture separators, and two refrigerant air dryers. This package assured that clean and dry air was used to pressurize the containment.

D. Description of the Computer Program

The Ebasco ILRT computer program is an interactive program written specifically for fast, easy utilization during all phases of the ILRT and CLRT. The program is written in a high-level, compiled structured language and is operated on a portable CP/M-based microcomputer. The program has been verified and meets all requirements of the Ebasco Quality Assurance Program. The program was also subject to Con Edison Quality Assurance surveillance.

As necessary, data entry and modifications are readily accomplished by the data acquisition team. In addition to extensive data verification routines, the program calculates, on demand, total time and mass point leak rates as well as the 95 percent Upper Confidence Level for these leakage rate calculations. Calculations and methodology of the program are derived from American National Standard ANSI/ANS-56.8-1981. Containment air mass is determined from mass weighted sensor readings as described in EPRI report NP-2726, November 1982.

Sample rejection based upon the Chauvenet criterion may be utilized in the analysis, if required, due to recording errors, power failures, etc.

Input data may be deleted for a given instrument in the case of a sensor malfunction. This deletion of a given instrument is performed on all samples in the data base. Weighting factors, if applicable, are then recalculated for the remaining instrument sensors of that type.

Data evaluations are enhanced by the flexible display of either sensor variables or various computed values in tabular or graphical form on the computer screen or printer. Data is recorded on magnetic media to prevent loss during the testing. All data is stored on the computer system in use with retrieval capability to any desired data base throughout the testing.

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Ancillary portions of the program assist the user in detection of temperature stabilization, performing ISG calculations, performing in-situ instrument loop performance calculations and detecting acceptable superimposed CLRT leakage verification.

Temperature, pressure and humidity data are transmitted from the ILRT instrumentation system to the computer via an RS-232 link at 15-minute intervals. Computer verification and checking routines supplement data verification by the data acquisition team. Modifications are promptly made when errors are detected. Prior to issuance of this report, further extensive data verification was performed.

E. Description of the Testing Sequence

On September 16, 1984, all necessary type "B" and "C" LLRT tests and all ILRT valve and breaker lineups were deemed complete.

A final cleanup and inspection of the interior and exterior of the containment building and internal components was made to prepare the containment for pressurization. The ILRT test instrumentation calibration verification and response checks were completed to ensure proper operation of all sensors and associated equipment.

Penetration R, the Steam Jet Air Ejector Discharge to Containment exhibited higher than normal ILRT leakage on the containment isolation valves. This leakage of .35 SCFM is well below the ILRT acceptance criteria, but was blanked off for the ILRT for conservatism.

The containment was declared ready for pressurization and the air compressors started at 0700 hours on September 16, 1984. The sequence of pressure testing for the containment is graphically depicted on Figure 5.

At 1016 hours the pressurization was halted at 10.5 psig containment pressure due to the observance of external leakage. Internal and external leakage surveys were conducted to identify and quantify the observed leaks. Leakage was observed on the following system penetrations. Service Water to the Fan Cooler Units; the 80' Airlock Weld Channel System; Nitrogen Supply to the Accumulators; and one Electrical Penetration Weld Channel Rack. Pressurization was restarted at 1830 hours to achieve a higher containment pressure to allow more accurate quantification of the observed leaks and to verifv that no additional leakage was present. At 2120 hours, pressurization was halted at 18.6 psig containment pressure to perform additional external leakage surveys. Pressurization to full test pressure was resumed at 0430 hours on September 17, 1984.

Pressurization was secured at 1800 hours on September 17, 1984, at a containment pressure of 51.8 psig. This pressure was 4.8 psi above the minimum test pressure of 47 psig to account for the expected pressure decrease due to temperature stabilization and leakage during external leak surveys. External leakage surveys quantified the observed leakages and a determination was made to isolate the leakage from the following sources: Service Water to Fan Cooler Unit No. 22; the 80' Airlock Weld Channel System; and the Electrical Penetration H-32 Weld Channel System. In addition, a leak was discovered due to an improperly aligned valve on the Isolation Valve Seal Water System to the Auxiliary Steam Condensate Return Line. This valve was placed in its correct position.

The containment temperature stabilization criteria was met at 2215 hours on September 17, 1984, after analyzing four-and-one-quarter hours of data. The temperature stabilization data is presented in Appendix **A.l.**

After all changes to the containment boundary were completed, leakage rate heasurements for the ILRT were initiated at 0400 hours on September 18, 1984.

During the ILRT, the computer program sensor verification routines determined that periodic digital shifts in temperature were occurring on ten of the 40 RTDs measuring containment temperature. These shifts were occurring on a two to four hour frequency and were determined large enough to cause a bias in the calculated leakage rates. The problem was narrowed down to one of four current loop excitation circuits in the data logger. RTDs Nos. **1,** 3, 4, 9, **11,** 12, 15, 17, 19, and 20 were deleted from leakage calculations and the temperature sensor volume fractions were recalculated. A revised ISG calculation was performed after the deletion, and a check was made to assure that no temperature sensor exhibited a volume fraction in excess of one-tenth of the containment volume. The maximum temperature sensor volume fraction was .063.

Twenty-four hours of ILRT data analysis was completed at 0400 hours on September 19, 1984. The data accumulated displayed the following leakage rates:

> Simple Mass Point Leakage Rate **=** 0.045%/day Fitted Mass Point Leakage Rate $= 0.046\% / day$ 95% Upper Confidence Level (UCL) = 0.047%/day

. The verification controlled leakage rate test was initiated at 0401 hours on September 19, 1984, by superimposing a 7.3 SCFM leakage using one of the variable area rotameters. This superimposed leakage is equivalent to 0.089%/day containment leakage.

It was noted that a wet air flow passing through the rotameter and that the measured containment leakage was below the minimum acceptance criteria for the CLRT. The fitted leakage for the CLRT was 0.0998%/day while the ILRT leakage measured plus the superimposed rotameter flow should have yielded a leakage of 0.1351 +0.025%/day.

Another verification rotameter was placed in series with the initial rotameter and a demonstrated flow difference was observed between the two rotameters which was outside of the calibration tolerance. This difference in readings between the two rotameters was not sufficient to entirely explain the difference between the predicted CLRT leakage rate and the measured CLRT leakage rate. The ILRT data was re-evaluated and a slowly decreasing leakage rate was discovered. Surveys of the containment were made, and it was determined that the 80' elevation airlock was internally slowly pressurizing due to inner door seal leakage. The ILRT/CLRT was terminated and another sequence of testing initiated.

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The ILRT was reinitiated at 1400 hours on September 19, 1984. At 2330 hours, it was noted that a momentary temperature jump was experienced from the data logger. The shift did not occur again during the test, and the leakage rates calculated were not significantly different whether the data point was rejected or not.

Twenty-four additional hours of ILRT data were completed at 1400 hours on September 20, 1984. The measured leakages for the test demonstrated the following values:

> Simple Mass Point Leakage Rate = 0.025% /day Fitted Mass Point Leakage Rate = 0.027% /day 95% Upper Confidence Level (UCL) = 0.028%/day

These values were determined with the sample taken at 2330 hours on September **19,** 1984, rejected from the leakage calculations. The ILRT data and leakage calculations are presented in Appendix A.2. The acceptance criteria for this test is that the measured leakage at a 95 percent UCL is less than 0.075%/day.

To perform the CLRT, an additional rotameter was added in series with one of the original rotameters. In addition, the rotameter sensing line was blown down to remove any water present in the line, and a filter/moisture trap was added to the inlet of the rotameters.

The CLRT was initiated at 1515 hours on September 20, 1984, by imposing a leakage of 6.56 corrected SCFM which is equivalent to a containment leakage of 0.080%/day. During this CLRT, no moisture was evident in the air flow through the rotameters, and no moisture was present in the filter/moisture drain on the inlet to the rotameters. In addition, the two rotameters in series agreed within the accuracy of the meters. After five-and-one-quarter hours of leakage data, the measured CLRT leakage was determined as:

Simple Mass Point Leakage Rate = 0.0995%/day

Fitted Mass Point Leakage Rate = $0.0999\% / day$

The target CLRT leakage for this test was 0.1071 +0.025%/day or within the criteria as measured. The CLRT data and leakage calculations are presented in Appendix A.3. The ILRT and CLRT were declared successful at 2030 hours on September 20, 1984.

Additional local leakage measurements were made on the penetrations isolated for the ILRT and containment depressurization was initiated at 0145 hours on September 21, 1984. The containment depressurization was completed at 1900 hours on September 21, 1984. A post-test internal and external inspection of the containment was made; no anomalies were detected.

Inspections and repairs were made on the penetrations isolated during the ILRT. Description of the findings and corrective actions on the isolated penetrations is given in Appendix D. Of those penetrations isolated, pre- and post-maintenance leakage values for Penetration R, the Steam Jet Air Ejector Discharge to Containment, must be added to the leakage values determined during the ILRT.

The penetrations which were in service during the ILRT and not in the normal post-accident lineup must also be added to the measured ILRT leakage values. These penetrations are Penetration U-U and V-V, the penetrations used for containment pressure sensing, containment verification flow, and containment pressurization/depressurization.

The addition to the measured ILRT leakage rate are tabulated below:

As-Found

The as-found and as-left corrected Upper Confidence Levels are less than the acceptance criteria for the test of 0.75La or 0.075%/day.

Reporting

On September 19, 1984 Con Edison made a four hour report to NRC via dedicated phone line pursuant to $10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i)$ relating to the initial phase of the ILRT and indicating that a follow-up report would be made 90 days following completion of the ILRT as required by 10CFR50 Appendix J. Con Edison believes this report satisfies all applicable reporting requirements/commitments. No Licensee Event Report (LER) was issued pursuant to lOCFR50.73, as the ILRT results were determined to have satisfied the acceptance criteria for the test, hence the preparation and submittal of an LER is not required.

IV. ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

The Type "A" Integrated Leakage Rate Test for the Indian Point Unit No. 2 Nuclear Power Plant was successfully completed on September 21, 1984. The final measured leakage rate was 0.027 percent of the contained mass per day with a 95 percent Upper Confidence Level of 0.028 percent per day. The acceptance criteria for this test (0.75 La) is 0.075 percent per day. The verification test induced a superimposed leak on the containment equivalent to 0.080 percent per day. The measured verification leakage rate was 0.100 percent per day; well within the verification criteria band of 0.082 percent per day and 0.132 percent per day. (Refer to Appendix A.2 and A.3)

During preparations for pressurization and during leakage surveys at pressure, containment penetrations were isolated for the leakage rate test due to observed or suspected leaks. These included one process piping system penetration, one of five Emergency Service Water System trains, and two Weld Channel and Penetration Pressurization System penetrations (WCPPS). Appendix D provides a complete description of the systems, a discussion of the findings, and the repairs made to the systems after the leakage rate test. As noted in Appendix D, the only isolated penetration for which the results of the Type **"A"** ILRT must be corrected is the Steam Jet Air Ejector Discharge to Containment. This correction is presented in Section III.E along with the final calculated As-Found and As-Left ILRT leakage rates. The Emergency Service Water and WCPPS systems are post-accident systems which were not in service for the ILRT. The leakage noted in these systems was identified due to the conservative valve lineup applied to the ILRT, as described in
Appendix D. These leakages would not be expected to occur under accional These leakages would not be expected to occur under accident conditions.

The test instrumentation system performance was established by computer analysis of the test data. Although **10** of the 40 RTD temperature detectors were deleted due to an erratic RTD excitation circuit, ample temperature sensors remained to complete the test. Due to judicious placement of the sensors, the RTDs on a given excitation card were not located in the same area and sensor failures could be easily accommodated. The balance of the temperature sensors demonstrated reliable and stable performance. During the test, the in-situ temperature loop repeatability averaged 0.02 degrees. This was determined by the Ebasco In-Situ Loop Error analysis program and consists of process measurement variations, as well as sensor noise. This value is very close to the instrumentation loop repeatability given in Section III.B.l. At the end of the ILRT, the maximum variation in temperature in the containment was less than 1.5 degrees in 2.6 million cubic feet of volume. The decrease in average containment temperature over the 24-hour ILRT was less than 0.6 degrees. The humidity and pressure sensors demonstrated reliable and repeatable performance during all phases of the leakage test. The in-situ humidity and pressure loop reliabilities were .02 percent RH and .0006 psi, respectively. These values compare well with the sensor only values of repeatability presented in Section III.B.2 and III.B.3 and demonstrate that the containment was very stable during the leakage test phases.

The initial phase of the ILRT/CLRT was analyzed. The measured leakage during the ILRT phase was within the acceptance limits, but was found to be decreasing during the test. The last 12 hours of initial phase data exhibited a leakage rate of .036 perent per day or .010 percent per day below the

24-hour value. This decrease was due to an inboard leakage on the airlock, allowing the airlock to pressurize slowly. As the airlock pressure increased, the "leak" across the bulkhead decreased in rate. This was additionally demonstrated by the lower measured leakage rate determined during the second ILRT. This decrease in measured leakage rate is in the correct direction but This decrease in measured leakage rate is in the correct direction but, by itself, did not explain the difference between the measured and predicted verification CLRT leakages.

The wet air passing through the verification rotameter during the unsuccessful CLRT was first suspected to be condensation due to cooling in the piping outside containment. As this has been experienced on other tests without adverse effects, the condition was not considered important. Analysis of the containment vapor pressure at the time demonstrates that the wet air was due to water in the line and not due to condensation, as the pressure drop and outside ambient conditions were at least 25 degrees above the dewpoint. The rotameters installed for the verification test were small-bore variable area meters with a one-quarter percent repeatability. Previous experience with the use of rotameters was with the larger bore one-half percent repeatable instruments. The lower surface area to volume ratio of the small bore meters made them more susceptible to experiencing an inflated reading when passing wet air. This is demonstrated by the lower flow setting during the final CLRT phases. The same measured CLRT leakage was obtained, while the ILRT leakage had decreased. The inflated rotameter reading in itself does not explain the failure to verify the initial ILRT. The combination of the decreasing ILRT leakage rate and the inflated rotameter reading due to wet air were large enough to preclude controlled leakage verification of the initial ILRT phase.

The final phase ILRT/CLRT progressed smoothly with stable and passing data. As noted in Appendix A.2, one data sample experienced a shift in mass and was rejected from leakage calculations as described in Appendix B. This shift was caused by a momentary increase in most of the temperature sensors, resulting in a .15 degree increase in average temperature. Although smaller in magnitude, a discernable shift of .04% RH was noted in the humidity sensors. The cause of the shift is unknown, but was possibly a power fluctuation in the data logger. Computer analysis of all data during the leakage test demonstrated that this fluctuation was a one-time phenomenon. No bias was observed in the readings of the sensors after the shift. The CLRT verified the ILRT with no problems noted.

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FIGURES

- 3. Flow Diagram for Pressure Sensing and Controlled Leakage
- 4. Flow Diagram for Pressurization System
- 5. Test Sequence

CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF **NEW** YORK INDIAN POINT UNIT **NO.2** RTD **LOCATION/VOLUME**

CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF **NEW** YORK INDIAN POINT UNIT **NO.2 I** RHD LOCATION/VOLUME

FIGURE 2

INDIAN POINT UNIT No. 2

FLOW DIAGRAM

ILRT PRESSURE SENSING & CLRT FLOW INSTRUMENTATION

APPENDIX **A.1**

CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE

STABILIZATION

 $A1$

CONTAINMENT INTEGRATED LEAKAGE RATE

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TEST REPORT

Indian Point $II - 1984$

EBASCO PLANT SERVICES INC.

ILRT Test Services

 $A2$

Indian Point II - 1984

STABILIZATION PERIOD STARTED AT **183** 0 HOURS ON 9/17/84

TEMPERATURE STABILIZATION

NOTES:

- 1) THE ONE HOUR AND FOUR HOUR DELTA TEMPERATURE VALUES ARE NOT VALID UNTIL ONE HOUR AND FOUR HOURS RESPECTIVELY HAVE PASSED IN THE TEST.
- 2) THE STABILIZATION CRITERIA IS MET WHEN THE HOURLY AVERAGE DELTA T FOR THE PRECEDING HOUR DIFFERS FROM THE HOURLY AVERAGE DELTA T FOR THE PRECEDING FOUR HOURS BY LESS THAN 0.5 DEGREES F.
- 3) THE **"*"** INDICATES THAT THE STABILIZATION CRITERIA HAS BEEN MET.

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APPENDIX **A.2.** INTEGRATED LEAKAGE RATE TEST (ILRT)

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CONTAINMENT INTEGRATED LEAKAGE RATE

 $\mathcal{A}^{\text{max}}_{\text{max}}$

 $\sim 10^{-1}$

TEST REPORT

 $\mathcal{L}_{\mathbf{v}}$. $\sim 10^{-11}$ $\mathcal{L}^{\text{max}}_{\text{max}}$ and $\mathcal{L}^{\text{max}}_{\text{max}}$

Indian Point II - 1984

 $\mathcal{L}^{\text{max}}_{\text{max}}$ and $\mathcal{L}^{\text{max}}_{\text{max}}$

 $\sim 10^{-11}$

EBASCO PLANT SERVICES INC.

ILRT Test Services

 $A6$

 $\sim 10^{-1}$

 $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{A}}$

Indian Point II - 1984

CONTAINMENT INTEGRATED LEAKAGE RATE TEST

LEAKAGE RATE IS MEASURED USING THE ABSOLUTE METHOD AND IS COMPUTED USING THE MASS POINT METHOD IN STRICT ACCORDANCE WITH ANSI/ANS 56.8-1981.

TEST PERIOD STARTED AT 14; 0 HOURS ON 9/19/84 TEST CONDUCTED FOR 24.00 HOURS

FREE SPACE VOLUME OF CONTAINMENT IS 2,610,000 CU FT **CONTAINMENT** WAS PRESSURIZED TO **65.58** PSIA

INITIAL CONTAINMENT FITTED AIR WEIGHT WAS FINAL CONTAINMENT FITTED AIR WEIGHT WAS 849,837 LBS 849,609 LBS

FITTED MASS POINT ILRT LEAKAGE RATE Lam .027 **%** PER DAY UPPER LIMIT OF **95%** CONFIDENCE LEVEL UCL .028 % PER DAY \equiv CONTAINMENT DESIGN LEAKAGE RATE La \equiv .100 **%** PER DAY ILRT ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA **75%** La = .075 **%** PER DAY

DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES

NOTE FOR TABULAR **DATA**

- **1.** TABLE **VALUES** OF ZERO **SIGNIFY** THE **DATA** IS **NOT** APPLICABLE TO THE **CALCULATION.**
- 2. **'REJECTED'** SIGNIFIES THE **SAMPLE** WAS **REJECTED.**
- **3. 'DELETED'** SIGNIFIES THE **SENSOR** WAS **DELETED.**

NOTE FOR THE **CURVES**

- **1. NUMBERS CLOSEST** TO LEFT MARGIN **ALONG ABSCISSA** REPRESENT **SAMPLE NUMBERS.**
- 2. **NUMBERS CLOSEST** TO **ABSCISSA** REPRESENT TIME FROM BEGINNING OF MODE IN **MINUTES.**
- **3. 'REJECTED'** SIGNIFIES THE **SAMPLE** WAS **REJECTED.**

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SENSOR VOLUME FRACTIONS

TEMPERATURE SENSORS

HUMIDITY/DP SENSORS

VALUE OF ZERO INDICATES A DELETED SENSOR.

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 α , and an β , β

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APPENDIX A.3.

VERIFICATION CONTROLLED LEAKAGE

RATE TEST (CLRT)

CONTAINMENT INTEGRATED LEAKAGE RATE

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TEST REPORT

Indian Point II - 1984

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EBASCO PLANT SERVICES INC.

ILRT Test Services

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Indian Point II -1984

CONTAINMENT INTEGRATED LEAKAGE RATE TEST SUPPLEMENTAL VERIFICATION TEST

LEAKAGE RATE IS MEASURED USING THE ABSOLUTE METHOD AND IS COMPUTED USING THE MASS POINT METHOD IN STRICT ACCORDANCE WITH ANSI/ANS 56.8-1981.

TEST PERIOD STARTED AT 15:15 HOURS ON 9/20/64 TEST CONDUCTED FOR 5.25 HOURS

FREE SPACE VOLUME OF CONTAINMENT IS 2,610,000 CU FT CONTAINMENT WAS PRESSURIZED TO 65.49 PSIA

INITIAL CONTAINMENT FITTED AIR WEIGHT WAS FINAL CONTAINMENT FITTED AIR WEIGHT WAS 649,616 LBS 849,430 LBS

FITTED MASS POINT ILRT LEAKAGE RATE Lam \equiv .027 % PER DAY CONTAINMENT DESIGN LEAKAGE RATE La .100 % PER DAY \equiv SUPERIMPOSED CLRT LEAKAGE RATE Lo = .080 % PER DAY FITTED CLRT MASS POINT LEAKAGE RATE $Lc =$.100 **%** PER DAY

Lo **+** Lam **-** La/4 $.080 + .027 - .025$ **=<** Lc **=<** Lo **+** Lam **+** La/4 $=$ \lt .100 $=$ \lt .080 + .027 + .025 $.082$ =< $.100$ =< $.132$

DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES

NOTE FOR TABULAR **DATA**

- **1.** TABLE VALUES OF ZERO SIGNIFY THE DATA IS **NOT** APPLICABLE TO THE CALCULATION.
- 2. 'REJECTED' SIGNIFIES THE SAMPLE WAS REJECTED.
- **3.** 'DELETED' SIGNIFIES THE SENSOR WAS DELETED.

NOTE FOR THE CURVES

- **1.** NUMBERS CLOSEST TO LEFT MARGIN ALONG ABSCISSA REPRESENT SAMPLE NUMBERS.
- 2. NUMBERS CLOSEST TO ABSCISSA REPRESENT TIME FROM BEGINNING OF MODE IN **MINUTES.**
- **3.** 'REJECTED' SIGNIFIES'THE SAMPLE WAS REJECTED.

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SENSOR VOLUME FRACTIONS

TEMPERATURE SENSORS

HUMIDITY/DP SENSORS

VALUE OF ZERO INDICATES A DELETED SENSOR.

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APPENDIX B

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SAMPLE REJECTION CRITERIA

AND CALCULATIONS

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SAMPLE REJECTION CRITERIA **AND** CALCULATIONS

The rejection of data points is sometimes necessary when a data point differs widely from the remaining observations in the data base. The plot of air mass versus time in Appendix **A.2** for the ILRT is an example of this behavior. Sample **39** in the ILRT exhibits a mass **260** pounds below other samples taken during that time period. The balance of the mass curve displays a much smaller scatter, the average deviation being less than 12 pounds. Qualitative inspection of this data base of mass values versus time predicts that sample 39- is an extreme outlier and would bias any further analysis of this data base.

To quantitatively reject this sample, the procedure given in **ANSI/ANS 56.8-1981** is used. This method is an application of the methods proposed **by** Chauvenet and was developed **by** Tietjen, Moore, and Bechman (Technometrics, Vol. **15,** No. 4, November **1973).** The following is a table of standardized residuals for the ILRT data base of Appendix **A.2:**

Table of λ_i Values

As expected, sample **39** exhibits the largest deviation, **-8.85.** The sample with the next largest deviation, sample **10,** has a deviation eight times smaller than sample 39. All samples other than sample 39 exhibit small random deviations normal for type type of data base.

For a data base as large as the ILRT, a sample must have a standardized residual larger than the critical residual. The critical residuals for a 97 sample data base at a 95 percent confidence level and at a 99 percent confidence level have been calculated by the methods of Tietjen, et al:

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For a 95 percent level -3.38

For a 99 percent level -3.73

It should be noted that for either level of rejection, one and only one sample in the data base may be rejected, sample 39.

The rejected sample in the ILRT data base is ignored for all further calculations of leakage rate, least squares fit or upper confidence level. It should be noted, however, that the leakage results for the ILRT with or without sample rejection are not significantly different and do not affect the outcome of the verification phase or the acceptance of the test.

No samples in the verification CLRT data base exhibit abnormal deviations or should be rejected.

APPENDIX C

RAW TEST DATA FOR NON-TEST PERIODS

SAMPLE 1 WAS TAKEN AT 2215 HOURS ON 09-17-84 SAMPLE 155 WAS TAKEN AT 1245 HOURS ON 09-19-84

CONTAINMENT INTEGRATED LEAKAGE RATE TEST REPORT

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Indian Point II -1984

EBASCO PLANT SERVICES INC.

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ILRT Test Services

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 $\label{eq:2.1} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\int_{\mathbb{R}^3}\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\right)^2\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\right)^2\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\right)^2\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\right)^2.$

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APPENDIX D

PENETRATIONS ISOLATED

DURING THE ILRT

PENETRATIONS ISOLATED DURING THE ILRT

P $\frac{1}{2}$ **Perfect Air Equation R - Steam Jet Air Equati**

This system is shown on Con Edison Drawing 9321-F-2025.

The Steam Jet Air Ejector (SJAE) serves to divert condenser gases to the containment during normal plant operation. Under accident conditions, the containment isolation valves in the line from the SJAE are signaled to close by the Phase A containment isolation signal.

Local Leakage Rate Testing on this penetration prior to the ILRT measured a leakage of 9890.3 SCCM. Due to the schedule for the ILRT, normal maintenance repairs to this sytem could not be completed. Although this measured leakage was well below ILRT or LLRT limits, the penetration was conservatively isolated for the ILRT by installing a plumber's plug in the open line inside of containment. After the ILRT, the maintenance work request (MWR) on the penetration was completed and an LLRT retest was performed with 27.17 SCCM as a result. The pre-and post-maintenance leakages for this penetration are added to the iLRT measured leakage since the SJAE is not required to function during an accident and the isolation valves are required to close and remain leaktight.

Service Water to Fan Cooler Unit No. 22

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This system is shown on Con Edison Drawings A-209762 and A9321-F-2722.

Five fan cooler units inside containment are supplied from the service water systen. These units are redundant to the containment spray system and serve to remove heat from containment under accident conditions. Each fan cooler unit has its own service water supply and return penetrations. Supply and return lines are headered together outside of containment. The fan cooler units and associated service water piping form a closed system inside containment. Although the system is designed to remain water filled and functioning under accident conditions, a conservative test philosophy dictated venting the closed fan cooler units and service water system piping outside containment for the purpose of identifying.potential leak paths through the boundary.

A vent on the service water piping to Fan Cooler Unit (FCU) 22 was found to be leaking by survey teams during pressurization for the ILRT. An as-found leakge of 4.91 SCFM was measured on this system while the containment was at pressure. After the ILRT, inspection of the system determined that there were two leaking tubes in the FCU. After these tubes were repaired, an as-left leakage rate on the entire service water system to FCU 22 was measured as 0.002 SCFM.

An investigation into the cause of the leakage was made. During the prior operating cycle, no leakage of this magnitude was noted during plant operation. In addition, the 10-year ISI hydrostatic test had been performed on the system prior to the ILRT with no leakage observed. It was noted that MWRs_were_being_worked_on_the_FCUs_just prior-to-the- ILRT_and-thepost-maintenance retest had not been completed since the system had not been

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filled with water. The maintenance performed on the FCUs is believed to have resulted in the leakage. This would have been discovered during
post-maintenance testing prior to operation. Discovery of FCU 22 leakage during the ILRT was not related to the leakage characteristics of the containment system, and therefore no correction to the ILRT measured leakage is necessary for this system.

WCPPS to the 80' Airlock and Electrical Penetration H-32

This system is shown on Con Edison drawing 9321-F-2726.

The Weld Channel and Penetration Pressurization System (WCPPS) provides a means for continuously pressurizing the positive pressure zones incorporated into the containment penetrations and the channels over the welds in the steel inner liner and certain containment isolation valves. The system maintains a pressure in excess of containment design presure continuously during normal operation as well as accident conditions, thereby ensuring that there will be no out-leakage of the containment atmosphere through the penetrations and liner welds duing an accident. Although no credit is taken for system operation in calculation of off-site accident doses, it is designed as an engineered safety feature and does provide assurance that the containment leak rate in the event of an accident is lower than that assumed in the accident analysis. As a practical matter, performing the ILRT with the WCPPS pressurized could interfere with performance of the test due to the potential for in-leakage to containment from the WCPPS during the test. Since no credit is taken for system operation in the calculation of off-site radiological consequences during an accident, the system is conservatively depressurized and vented for the ILRT.

he WCPPS is arranged in four separate zones. Certain zones supply air to penetrations and containment isolation valves from outside containment. Air supply to the weld channels, other penetrations and isolation valves from inside containment is via a dedicated penetration from compressors and air receivers located outside containment.

Two WCPPS vents were found to be leaking. by survey teams during pressurization for the ILRT. One leak was found at the WCPPS vent on the 80' elevation airlock. The second leak was found at the WCPPS vent on electrical The second leak was found at the WCPPS vent on electrical penetration H-32. Measurements on these vents while the containment was pressurized determined leakages of 4.76 SCFM for the 80' airlock and 4.43 SCFM for electrical penetration H-32.

The leak on the 80' airlock was found to be the result of a damaged inner door gasket allowing air to enter the WCPPS. The airlock doors are each provided with a double gasketed seal arrangement with a WCPPS supply serving to pressurize the space between the seals. The WCPPS supply to the inner door is from an outside zone which was vented externally to containment for the ILRT. In the normal system configuration, with the WCPPS pressurized, a leaking door seal would result in WCPPS flow into containment due to the WCPPS being maintained at a pressure in excess of containment design pressure. Such a situation would be readily evident during normal operation as each zone is provided with flow and pressure indication and alarm. A leaking door seal would cause a high flow-low pressure condition to exist in the WCPPS zone supplying the door seal.

By conservatively depressurizing the WCPPS for the ILRT, a path was established that would permit the escape of pressurizing medium from containment in the presence of a damaged door seal. A more appropriate test alignment would have vented the WCPPS supply to the inner door seal inside containment rather than outside. The leak in the airlock door seal was noted due only to the WCPPS line up used for the ILRT. A review of the records for the zone in question was initiated. No evidence of unusual leakage (of the magnitude identified during the ILRT) was identified during the last cycle from that review. It is believed that the damage to the inner door seal occurred during the cycle 6/7 refueling and maintenance outage prior to performing the ILRT, probably due to frequent use of the door during the outage. Following repair of the door gasket, an overall airlock leakage test was performed with a result of 0.6 SCFM.

The leakage attributed to the WCPPS at electrical penetration H-32 was caused by a tubing change associated with the installation of new electrical penetrations during the 1982 refueling outage not considered during preparation for the ILRT. This change resulted in redundant WCPPS supplies to electrical penetration H-32, one supply from a WCPPS zone outside containment, the other from a zone inside containment. As previously noted, these zones were depressurized and vented for the performance of the test. Venting the zone inside containment permitted containment atmosphere to enter penetration H-32. Since the redundant zone outside containment was also vented to the outside atmosphere for the ILRT, the test alignment permitted the escape of pressurizing medium. This condition is directly attributable to the system alignment for the ILRT and would not have occurred during normal operation or accident conditions.

Pressure testing at penetration H-32 showed no leakage at the cannister or penetration itself. As previously noted, during normal operation all WCPPS cones are required to be pressurized by Technical Specification, to at least containment design pressure, thereby preventing any potential out leakage. With the WCPPS pressurized, the effect of providing redundant WCPPS supplies to a single penetration is inconsequential. The WCPPS was subsequently modified prior to start-up to eliminate the redundant supply.

Neither of these leaks noted during the ILRT are an indication of containment systems leakage and no correction to the measured ILRT leakage is necessary.

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APPENDIX E

LOCAL LEAKAGE RATE TEST

(LLRT),

TYPE B **AND** C RESULTS

Sheet **1 of** 12

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LOCAL LE RATE **TEST RESULTS** SING THE LAST ILRT

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Sheet 4 of 12

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Sheet **6 of** 12

LOCAL LEA RATE TEST RESULTS IE LAST ILRT

Sheet **7** of 12

LOCAL LEAK ATE TEST RESULTS SINCD RE LAST ILRT

Sheet **8** of 12

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Sheet **9** of **12**

LOCAL LEA RATE TEST RESULTS LAST ILRT

Sheet 10 of 12

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- NOTES: 1. All leakages are In **SCCM.**
	- 2. * indicates individual valve leakage was not determined.
	- **3. N/A** indicates valve was not a C.I.V. at time of test.

INDIAN POINT UNIT **NO.** 2

W 1984 REFUELING OUTAGE

TYPE "B" AND "C" TEST RESULTS

SUMMARY

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Type "B" and **"C"** testing was performed on the Containment Isolation Valves listed in Table 4.4-1 (attached) between June and October 1984. The following Acceptance Criteria was used:

- **1.** The Combined Leakage Rate for valves listed in Table 4.4-1 subject to gas or nitrogen pressurization testing, air lock testing and portions of the Sensitive Leakage Rate Test which pertain to Containment penetrations and Double Gasketed Seals shall be less than 0.6 LA as per Appendix J to 10CFR50. 0.6 LA is equivalent to 4.56 SCFM.
- 2. The Leakage Rate into Containment for the Isolation Valves sealed with the Service Water System shall nct exceed 0.36 GPM per fan cooler.
- 3. The Leakage Rate for the Isolation Valve Seal Water System shall not exceed 14,700 cc/Hr.
- 4. The Allowable Leakage from the Residual Heat Removal System components located outside of Containment shall not exceed two gallons per hour.

The "As Left" conditions per the above criteria are:

- **1.** The Combined Leakage Rate per criterion **A.1** was 3.266 SCFM.
- 2. The Leakage Rate into Containment for those valves sealed by Service Water was .021 gpm, .015 gpm, .0085 gpm, .028 gpm and .066 gpm for Fan Cooler Units 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25, respectively.
- 3. The Leakage Rate for the Isolation Valve Seal Water System was 2686 cc/hr.
- 4. The leakage rate from RHR system components outside of Containment was considered to be zero since absolutely no physical leakage was observed.

B. DESCRIPTION

Seven tests were used to fulfill the requirements of Appendix J to 10CFR50 and Technical Specifications.

1. PT-R27 Containment Isolation Valves Leakage Rate Determination

2. PT-R27B Service Water Containment Isolation Valve Leak Rate Test

3. PT-R26A Local IVSWS Test Type B&C

- Local IVSWS Test Type B&C (Nitrogen) **4.** PT-R26B
- 5. PT-SA10 Containment Air Lock Test
- 6. PT-Rll Sensitive Leakage Rate Test
- 7. PT-R12 Residual Heat Removal System Test

PT-R27

The combined "As Found" Leakage Rate for two Containment Isolation Valves subject to gas or nitrogen pressurization testing was in excess of 15,100 cc/min. These valves were found to be installed and tested in a manner in which they would unseat under pressure. The valves were rotated 180° and retested. The "As Left" leak was 0 cc/min for valves SOV 3421, and 3423. The combined "As Left" leak rate for the Containment Isolation Valves subject to gas or nitrogen pressurization testing was .038 SCFM. This is considered acceptable.

PT-R27B

The "As Found" leakage rates from 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25 Fan Cooler Unit Containment Isolation Valves sealed by the Service Water System were .3962, .017, .028, .18, and .05 gpm respectively. The drain valve for 21 FCU was found to be leaking excessively nd replaced. Additionally ten Service Wbter Isolation Valves, 41-1-A, 44-1-A, 41-2-A, $44-2-A$, 41-3-A, 44-3-A, 41-4-A, 44-4-A, 41-5-A, and 44-5-A were refurbished. The "As Left" leakage for Containment Isolation Valves seal by Service Water was .021, .015, .0085, .028, and .066 gpm respectively for 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25 FCU. This is considered acceptable.

PT-R26A

The combined "As Found" leakage rate for six Containment Isolation Valves sealed by water injected IVSWS was in excess of 60,000 cc/hr. The leaking valves were either replaced or repaired. A retest was then performed. The "As Left" leakage rate for the six valves combined was 128 cc/hr. Valves SA-24 and SA24-1 were replaced, valves 956C and 956D had their strokes adjusted, the seats for valves UH-43 and UH-44 were renewed and packing replaced. The "As Left" leakage for the entire IVSW was 2686 cc/hr. This is considered acceptable.

PT-R26B

The "As Found" leakage rate for Nitrogen Seal Injected IVSWS valves was .0277 SCFM. Valve 958 was found to leak 320 cc/mn. Its stroke was adjusted and the "As Left" varve 330 was round to reak 320 cc/min. Its stroke was adjusted and the As Left
leakage was 21 cc/min. The "As Left" leakage for the entire IVSWS sealed by Nitrogen was .014 SCFM. This is considered acceptable.

W PT-SA10

The "As Found" Leakage for the **80'** Elevation Air Lock was **0.6 SCFM;** for the **95'** Elev. Air Lock the Leakage Rate was **0.0 SCFM.** This is considered acceptable.

PT-Rll

The combined "As Found" leakage rate for the Containment penetrations and double gasketed seals was 2.0 **SCFM.** This is considered acceptable.

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PT-R12

The leakage rate from RHR system components outside of the containment was considered to be zero since absolutely no physical leakage was observed.

C. CONCLUSION

All Containment Isolation valves which leaked excessively were either replaced or
rebuilt. They were retested using the appropriate leakage measurement determination test.
The "As Left" leakage rate of Containment Isolatio Appendix J to 1OCFR50 and Technical Specifications.

TABLE 4.4-1 (Page **I** of 14) CONTAINMENT **ISOLATION VALVES**

Valve No.	System(1)	Test Fluid (2)	Minimum Test Pressure (PSIG)
549	PRT to Gas Analyzer	Water ⁽⁴⁾	52
548		$W_{\text{after}}(4)$	52
518	PRT N ₂ Supply	Gas	47
3418		Gas	47
3419		Gas	47
4136		Gas	47
552	PRT Makeup Water	$W_{\text{ater}}(4)$	52
519		$\text{Water}^{(4)}$	52
741A	RHR return to RCS	$W_{\texttt{after}}(5)$	$52^{(3)}$
744		Nitrogen ⁽⁴⁾	$47^{(3)}$
888A	RHR to S.I. Pumps	Nitrogen ⁽⁴⁾	47
888B		Nitrogen ⁽⁴⁾	47
958	RHR to Sample System	Nitrogen ⁽⁴⁾	47
959		Nitrogen ⁽⁴⁾	47
99 ₀		Nitrogen ⁽⁴⁾	47
1870	RHR from RCS	Nitrogen ⁽⁴⁾	47
743.		Nitrogen ⁽⁴⁾	47
732		Nitrogen ⁽⁴⁾	$47^{(3)}$
885A	Cont. Sump Recirc. Line Water ⁽⁵⁾		ϵ . 52
885B		$Water$ ⁽⁵⁾	52
201	Letdown Line (CVCS)	$Water$ ⁽⁴⁾	52
202		W_{ater} ⁽⁴⁾	52

TABLE 4.4-1 (Page 2 of 14)
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

			Minimum	
Valve No.	System (1)	Test Fluid (2)	Test Pressure (PSIG)	
205	Charging Line (CVCS)	$W_{\text{ater}}(4)$	52	
226		$W_{\text{ater}}(4)$	52	
227		Water(4)	52	
250A	RCP Seal Water (CVCS)	$Water$ ⁽⁴⁾	52	
4925		$W_{\text{ater}}(4)$	52	
250B		$\text{Water}^{(4)}$	52	
4926		$V_{\text{ater}}(4)$	52	
250C		$Water$ ⁽⁴⁾	52	
4927		$W_{\text{after}}(4)$	\cdot 52	
250D		$\text{Water}^{(4)}$	52	
4928		$W_{\text{ater}}(4)$	52 ₁	
222		$W_{\text{ater}}(4)$	52	
956E	RCS to Sample System	$W_{\text{after}}(4)$	52	
956F		$V_{\text{ater}}(4)$	52	
869A	Cont. Spray System	$W_{\text{ater}}(4)$	52	
867A		Gas	47	
878A		Gas	47	

Amendment No. 82

TABLE 4.4-1 (Page **3 of** 14) CONTAINMEN'T ISOLATION **VALVES**

Amendment No. 82

TABLE 4.4-1 (Page 4 of 14) **CONTAINMENT** ISOLATION **VALVES**

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TABLE 4.4-1 (Page **5 of** 14) **CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES**

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TABLE 4.4-1 (Page 6 of 14) CONTAINUMMT ISOLATION **VALVES**

TABLE 4.4-1 (Page **7** of 14) **CONTAINMENT** ISOLATION VALVES

TABLE 4.4-1 (Page 8 of 14)
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

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TABLE 4.4-1 (Page 9 of 14)
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

TABLE 4.4-1 (Page **10 of** 14) **CONTAINMENT** ISOLATION **VALVES**

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TABLE 4.4-1 (Page **11** of 14) **CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES**

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TABLE 4.4-1 (Page 12 of 14) **CONTAIN.ENT** ISOLATION **VALVES**

TABLE 4.4-1 (Page 13 of 14)
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

TABLE 4.4-1 (Page 14 of 14) **CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES**

Notes:

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System description in which valve is located. $\mathbf{1}$.

Gas Test Fluid indicates either nitrogen or air **as** test medium. $2.$

 $3.$ Testable only vhen at cold shutdown.

Isolation Valve Seal Water System. 4.

Sealed **by** Residual Heat Removal System fluid. $5.$

-Sealed **by** Service Water System.

Sealed **by** Weld Channel and Penetration Pressurization System.

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INDIAN POINT UNIT **NO.** 2

1982 REFUELING **OUTAGE**

TYPE "B" **AND "C" TEST RESULTS**

А. SUMMARY

Type "B" and **"C"** testing was performed on the Containment Isolation Valves listed in Table 4.4-1 (attached) between September and December **1982.** The following Acceptance Criteria was used:

- **1.** The Combined Leakage Rate for valves listed in Table 4.4-1 subject to gas or nitrogen pressurization testing, air lock testing and portions of the Sensitive Leakage Rate Test which pertain to Containment penetrations and Double Gasketed Seals shall be less than 0.6 LA as per Appendix J to 10CFR50. 0.6 LA is equivalent to 4.56 SCFM.
- 2. The Leakage Rate into Containment for the Isolation Valves sealed with the Service Water System shall not exceed 0.36 **GPM** per fan cooler.
- **3.** The Leakage Rate for the Isolation Valve Seal Water System shall not exceed 14,700 cc/Hr.
- 4. The Allowable Leakage from the Residual Heat Removal System components located outside of Containment shall not exceed two gallons per hour.

The "As Left" conditions per the above criteria are:

- **1.** The Combined Leakage Rate per criterion **A.1** was 2.93 SCFM.
- 2. The Leakage Rate into Containment for those valves sealed by Service Water was

40.01 gpm, 40.01 gpm, 40.01 gpm and 40.01 gpm for Fan Cooler Units 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25, respectively.
- 3. The Leakage Rate for the Isolation Valve Seal Water System was 12,760 cc/hr.
- 4. The leakage rate from RHR system components outside of Containment was considered to be zero since absolutely no physical leakage was observed.

Β. DESCRIPTION

Figure tests were used to fulfill the requirements of \mathcal{A}_1 to \mathcal{A}_2 to \mathcal{A}_3 to \mathcal{A}_4 Five tests were used to fulfill the requirements of Appendix J to 10CFR50 and Technical Specifications.

1. PT-R27 Containment Isolation Valves Leakage Rate Determination

. PT-R26 Isolation Valve Seal Water System Test (includes Nitrogen Seal Injected valves)

PT-SA1O Containment Air Locks Test

PT-R11 Sensitive Leakage Rate Test

5. PT-R12 Residual heat Removal System Test

PT-R27

The combined "As Found" leakage rate for four Containment Isolation valves subject to gas or nitrogen pressurization testing was in excess of 25,000 cc/min. The valves were repaired or replaced. A retest was performed. The combined "As Left" leakage rate was 39 cc/min for valves 518, IV-5A, IV-5B and 3423. The combined "As left" leak rate for Containment Isolation Valves subject to gas or nitrogen pressurization testing was .0875 SCFM. This is considered acceptable.

The "As Found" leakage rate from 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25 Fan Cooler Unit Containment Isolation Valves sealed by the Service Water System was < 0.01 GPM per Fan Cooler Unit. This is considered acceptable.

PT-R26

The combined "As Found" leakage rate for three Containment Isolation valves sealed by the water injected IVSWS was in excess of 16,500 cc/hour. The leaking valves were either
replaced or rebuilt. A retest was then performed. The "As Left" leakage rate for the three valves combined was 50 cc/hr. Valves PCV-1216 and PCV-1216A were replaced. The seals of Walve 850B were cleaned and old gasket replaced. The "As Left" leakage rate for the entire **SWS** WAS 12,760 cc/hr. This is considered acceptable.

The "As Found" leakage rate for nitrogen seal injected IVSWS valves was 0.03 SCFM. This is considered acceptable.

PT-SAl0

The "As Found" leakage rate for the **80'** el. Air Lock was 0.28 SCFM; for the 95' **El** Air Lock the leakage rate was 0.23 SCFM. This is considered an acceptable leakage rate.

PT-Rll

The combined "As Found" leakage rate for the Containment penetrations and double gasketed seals was 2.32 SCFM. This is considered acceptable.

PT-R12

The leakage rate from RHR system components outside of the containment was considered to be zero since absolutely no physical leakage was observed.

C. CONCLUSION

All Containment Isolation Valves which leaked excessively were either replaced or rebuilt. They were retested using the appropriate leakage measurement determination test. The "As t" leakage rate of Containment Isolation valves met the requirements of Appendix J to WFR50 and Technical Specifications.

TABLE 4.41-I (Page **I** of 14) CONTAIN.4ENT ISOLATION **VALVES**

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TABLE 4.4-1 (Page 2 of 14) **CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES**

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TABLE 4.4-1 (Page **3 of** 14) CONTAINMENhT **ISOLATION VALVES**

TABLE 4.4-1 (Page 4 of 14) **CONTAINMENT** ISOLATION **VALVES**

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TABLE 4.4-1 (Page 5 of 14)
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

TABLE 4.4-1 (Page **6** of 14) CONTAINMENT ISOLATION **VALVES**

TABLE 4.4-1 (Page **7** of 14) CONTAINMENT ISOLATION **VALVES**

TABLE 4.4-1 (Page 8 of 14)
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

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TABLE 4.4-1 (Page 9 of 14)
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

TABLE 4.4-1 (Page **10** of 14) CONTAINMENT **ISOLATION VALVES**

TABLE 4.4-1 (Page **11 of** 14) **CONTAINMENT** ISOLATION **VALVES**

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TABLE 4.4-1 (Page 12 of 14) **CONTAIM.1ENT** ISOLATION **VALVES**

Amendment No. **82**

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TABLE 4.4-1 (Page **13** of 14) **CONTAflMENT ISOLATION VALVES**

TABLE 4.4-1 (Page 14 of 14) CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

Notes:

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System description in which valve is located. **1.**

Gas Test Fluid indicates either nitrogen or air as test medium. 2.

- Testable only when at cold shutdown. **3.**
- Isolation Valve Seal Water System. 4.

Sealed **by** Residual Heat Removal System fluid. **5.**

Sealed **by** Service Water System. **6.**

Sealed **by** Weld Channel and Penetration Pressurization System. **7.**

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INDIAN POINT UNIT **NO.** 2

1980-81 REFUELING OUTAGE

TYPE "B" AND "C" TEST RESULTS

SUMMARY

Type "B" and "C" testing was performed on the Containment Isolation Valves listed in Table 4.4-1 (attached) between October 1980 and May 1981. The following Acceptance Criteria was used:

- **1.** The Combined Leakage Rate for valves listed in Table 4.4-1 subject to gas or nitrogen pressurization testing, air lock testing and portions of the Sensitive Leakage Rate Test which pertain to Containment penetrations and Double Gasketed Seals shall be less than 0.6 LA as per Appendix J to 10CFR50. 0.6 LA is equivalent to 4.56 SCFM.
- 2. The Leakage Rate into Containment for the Isolation Valves sealed with the Service Water System shall not exceed 0.36 GPM per fan cooler.
- 3. The Leakage Rate for the Isolation Valve Seal Water System shall not exceed 14,700 cc/Hr.
- 4. The Allowable Leakage from the Residual Heat Removal System components located cc/Hr.
4. The Allowable Leakage from the Residual Heat Removal System contains of Containment shall not exceed two gallons per hour.

The "As Left" conditions per the above criteria are:

- **1.** The Combined Leakage Rate per criterion **A.1** was 3.92 SCFM.
- 2. The Leakage Rate into Containment for those valves sealed by Service Water was 40.015 gpm, 40.01 gpm, 40.015 gpm, 40.01 gpm and 0.01 gpm for Fan Cooler Units 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, respectively.
- 3. The Leakage Rate for the Isolation Valve Seal Water System was 5,500 cc/hr.
- 4. The leakage rate from RHR system components outside of Containment was considered to be zero since absolutely no physical leakage was observed.

B. DESCRIPTION

Five tests were used to fulfill the requirements of Appendix J to 10CFR50 and Technical Specifications.

1. PT-R27 Containment Isolation Valves Leakage Rate Determination

- PT-R26 Isolation Valve Seal Water System Test (includes Nitrogen Seal Injected Valves)
- 3. **PT-SA10** Containment Air Locks Test
- 4. PT-Rll Sensitive Leak Rate Test
- 5. PT-R12 Residual Heat Removal System Test

PT-R27

The "As Found" leak rate for Containment Isolation Valve 1875K subject to gas or Nitrogen Pressurization testing was in excess of 180 cc/min. The valve was repaired by resurfacing its seat. A retest was performed, the "As

The "As Found" leakage rate from Fan Cooler Unit Containment Isolation valves sealed by Service Water could not be determined due to degraded cooler coils. During the outage
the cooling coils as well as the Isolation Valve were replaced. The "As Left" leakage
rate upon completion of a 165 pound hydrostatic

PT-R26

combined "As Found" leakage rate for all Containment Isolation Valves sealed by water ected IVSWS was 5,500 cc/hr. This was also the "As Left" leak rate. This is considered acceptable.

The "As Found" leakage rate for nitrogen seal injected IVSWS valves was .005 SCFM. This is considered acceptable.

PT-SAl 0

The "As Found" leakage rate for the 80' El. Air Lock was 0.0 SCFM; for the 95' El. Air Lock the leakage rate was 0.0 SCFM. This is considered an acceptable leakage rate.

PT-Rll

The combined "As Found" leakage rate for the containment penetrations and double gasketed seals was 3.73 SCFM. This is considered acceptable.

PT-R12

The leakage rate from RHR system components outside of the containment was considered to be zero since absolutely no pnysical leakage was observed.

C. CONCLUSION

Containment Isolation Valves which leaked excessively were either replaced or rebuilt.
y were retested using the appropriate leakage measurement determination test. The "As Left" leakage rate of Containment Isolation Valves met the requirements of Appendix J to 10CFR50 and Technical Specifications.

TABLE 4.4-1(Page **1** of **9)**

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CONTAINMENT ISOLATION **VALVES**

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TABLE 4.4-1 (Page 2 of 9)

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CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

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TABLE 4.4-1 (Page **3** of 9 **)**

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

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TABLE 4.4-1 (Page 4 of **9)**

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION **VALVES**

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TABLE 4.4-1 (Page **5 of 9)**

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CONTAINMENT ISOLATION **VALVES**

TABLE $4.4-1$ (Page 6 of 9)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

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TABLE 4.4-1 (Page **7 of 9)**

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CONTAINMENT ISOLATION **VALVES**

TABLE $4.4-1$ (Page R of 9)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION **VALVES**

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