Stephen E. Quinn
Vice President

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March 6, 1995

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2
Docket No. 50-247
LER 95-04-00

Document Control Desk
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mail Station P1-137
Washington, DC 20555

The attached Licensee Event Report LER 95-04-00 is hereby submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.

Very truly yours,

Stephen E. Quinn

Attachment

cc: Mr. Thomas T. Martin
Regional Administrator - Region I
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Mr. Francis J. Williams, Jr., Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects I/II
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mail Stop 14B-2
Washington, DC 20555

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NRC FORM 366 (6-89)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 4/30/92

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Indian Point Unit No. 2	0 5 0 0 0 2 4 7	1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4)

Residual Heat Removal Pump Failure to Start

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 2	0 4	9 5	9 5	0 0 4	0 0	0 3	0 6	9 5		0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 1 0 0		20.402(b)		20.405(c)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)		
			20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)		
			20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)		
			20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)				
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)				
			20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)				

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Michael A. Whitney, Sr. Engineer	AREA CODE 9 1 4 7 3 4 - 5 1 3 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	
X	E B	B K R	W 1 2 0	N							

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On February 4, 1995 with the reactor in the Hot Shutdown Condition, a Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump failed to start when called upon manually to do so by the reactor operator. The pump switch was then placed in the "pull-out" position while the breaker was inspected. The breaker was placed back in service and the pump was then successfully started.

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

Westinghouse 4-Loop Pressurized Water Reactor

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Residual Heat Removal Pump Failure to Start

EVENT DATE:

February 4, 1995

REPORT DUE DATE:

March 6, 1995

REFERENCES:

Significant Occurrence Report (SOR) 95-73

PAST SIMILAR EVENT:

None

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On February 4, 1995 with the reactor in the Hot Shutdown Condition, the operators were attempting to swap from Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump No. 22 to RHR pump No. 21 in preparation for a test. When the operator attempted to start RHR pump No. 21, it did not start. The pump switch in the Central Control Room (CCR) was then placed in the "pull-out" position while the breaker (Westinghouse DB-50) was inspected.

The inspection of the breaker was performed with the breaker "racked in" and revealed that it was intact with the exception of the impact spring which was in the captured position. The impact spring was restored to its normal position and the breaker was placed back in service. The pump was then successfully started.

RHR pump No. 21 had successfully passed its surveillance test on January 25, 1995. There was no maintenance performed on either the pump or the breaker for the pump between January 25, 1995 and the date of this event. Furthermore the last work that was performed on this breaker was during the 1993 Refueling Outage and the pump has been successfully started at least ten times since then.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

This event involved the unexpected failure of an Engineered Safety Features (ESF) component to manually actuate as part of a preplanned sequence. Since the actuation did not occur as expected, the event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv). There were no adverse safety implications associated with this event.

CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The cause of the failure of the RHR pump to start is unknown at this time. An inspection of the breaker after the unsuccessful start revealed that the impact spring which initiates a trip of the breaker was not in its normal position. The amber light which should indicate that the impact spring had tripped the breaker did not light. This impact spring is designed to trip upon actuation of the breaker amtector and actuates switch contacts on the breaker which prevent the breaker from closing and provide trip indication by means of an amber light in the CCR. A work order has been written to investigate the event and appropriate corrective actions will be taken during the current refueling outage. This failure has not recurred since or been observed before.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

An inspection of the breaker was conducted. The impact spring was restored to its normal position and a successful manual start of the pump was made. The pump was placed in service and subsequently passed two tests successfully. Nevertheless, as part of our corrective action program, a work order was written to further investigate the cause of the event. This investigation will evaluate the circuit from the switch to the breaker including the breaker itself. Appropriate corrective actions resulting from this investigation will be taken during the current refueling outage.

During the current refueling outage, a previously planned modification is being made to the RHR pump DB-50 breakers and other DB-50 breakers to improve breaker operation and reliability. The post-maintenance testing associated with this modification will provide an additional opportunity to observe the operation of the breaker for any reoccurences similar to this event.