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
July 20, 1992

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2  
Docket No. 50-247  
LER 92-15-00

Document Control Desk  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Mail Station P1-137  
Washington, DC 20555

The attached Licensee Event Report LER 92-15-00 is hereby  
submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.

Very truly yours,



Attachment

cc: Mr. Thomas T. Martin  
Regional Administrator - Region I  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
475 Allendale Road  
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Mr. Francis J. Williams, Jr., Project Manager  
Project Directorate I-1  
Division of Reactor Projects I/II  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Mail Stop 14B-2  
Washington, DC 20555

Senior Resident Inspector  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
PO Box 38  
Buchanan, NY 10511

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 60.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-630), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

PAGE (3)

Indian Point Unit No. 2

050002471 OF 03

TITLE (4)

Offsite Power Grid System Disturbance

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)	
06	19	92	92	0115	010	07	20	92		05000	
OPERATING MODE (9)			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)								
POWER LEVEL (10)			20.402(b)			20.406(c)			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)		
11010			20.406(a)(1)(i)			50.36(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)		
			20.406(a)(1)(ii)			50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)		
			20.406(a)(1)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		
			20.406(a)(1)(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		
			20.406(a)(1)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(ix)		
									73.71(b)		
									73.71(c)		
									OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
James Maylath, Senior Engineer	AREA CODE 914 526-5356

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On June 19, 1992, during normal power operation with the reactor at 100% power, there was a significant drop in system voltage on the offsite power grid. This disturbance resulted in the tripping of one of the two main generator 345 KV output breakers, various plant motor loads and the plant vent radiation monitor. The spent fuel pool cooling pump was lost for approximately 10 minutes, but no rise in spent fuel pool temperature was detected. At the time, containment pressure relief was being performed. The pressure relief line was automatically isolated, and the weld channel penetration pressurization system, an engineered safety feature, was actuated for the pressure relief line as designed. The 345 KV breaker was reclosed and the motors were restarted within approximately 15 minutes. No other plant equipment was affected, and the plant remained at 100% power. All plant affected systems functioned as designed, and the health and safety of the public were not impacted by this event.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION**

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

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Indian Point Unit No. 2

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YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION

NUMBER NUMBER

9 2 - 0 1 1 5 - 0 0 0 2 OF 0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

**PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:**

Westinghouse 4-Loop Pressurized Water Reactor

**IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:**

Various plant equipment tripped by offsite power grid system disturbance.

**EVENT DATE:**

June 19, 1992

**REPORT DUE DATE:**

July 20, 1992

**REFERENCES:**

Significant Occurrence Report (SOR) 92-305, 92-305a

**PAST SIMILAR OCCURRENCE:**

None

**DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:**

On June 19, 1992 at 0814 hours, with the unit operating at 100% power, there was a disturbance on the offsite power grid which resulted in the tripping of the following equipment:

Pressure Relief Fan  
Primary Auxiliary Building Supply Ventilation Fan  
Fuel Storage Building Supply Ventilation Fan  
Control Rod Drive Cooling Fans  
Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps 22  
Hot Penetration Blowers  
Radiation Monitor R43/44 (Plant Vent Monitor)

The spent fuel pool (SFP) cooling pump was started within approximately 10 minutes, and no rise in fuel pool temperature was detected. Containment pressure relief was being performed at the time of the disturbance. The tripping of the pressure relief fan and the radiation monitor actuated the isolation of the pressure relief line as designed. This line was subsequently automatically pressurized by the Weld Channel Penetration Pressurization System, an engineered safety feature.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

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Indian Point Unit No. 2

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

## DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: (Continued)

The offsite electric system disturbance also resulted in the tripping of one of the two 345 KV generator output breakers on the Buchanan Substation ring bus along with a 345 KV feeder between Buchanan and Sprain Brook Substations. The unit continued to supply 100% power through the remaining 345 KV output breaker. The 345 KV breaker was reclosed and all affected equipment was restarted within approximately 15 minutes.

## ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

This report is being made because actuation of an Engineered Safety Features System (ESF) occurred. Any manual or automatic Actuation of an ESF is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(A)(2)(iv). There were no adverse safety implications as a result of this event. There was no detectable increase in SFP temperature, and the pressure relief line was isolated and pressurized as designed. This event did not cause any injury to personnel or damage to equipment at the plant.

## CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The offsite electric system disturbance was caused by a 345 KV disconnect switch at Sprain Brook Substation being inadvertently opened under load. This resulted in a phase to phase fault which caused a significant dip in system voltage (about a 50% reduction for 5 cycles or about 0.08 sec.). The plant motor loads which were tripped are supplied by 480 V motor control centers through contactors. These contactors are energized through a control circuit which is supplied through a 480/120 volt control transformer connected to the 480 V motor supply. The voltage dip caused the contactors to de-energize, thus tripping the motors. The control circuit design required manual restarting. The voltage dip also resulted in tripping Radiation Monitor R43/44. This monitor was restarted after the thermal overloads were checked, and containment pressure relief was resumed after the monitor was back in service. The generator 345 KV output breaker tripped due to protective relay actuations associated with the feeders between Buchanan and Sprain Brook Substations.

## CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The tripped motor loads were restored, and the generator 345 KV output breaker was reclosed within approximately 15 minutes. Pressure relief was resumed following restart of the radiation monitor.