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
June 18, 1992

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2
Docket No. 50-247
LER 92-13-00

Document Control Desk
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mail Station P1-137
Washington, DC 20555

The attached Licensee Event Report LER 92-13-00 is hereby
submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.

Very truly yours,



Attachment


cc: Mr. Thomas T. Martin
Regional Administrator - Region I
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Mr. Francis J. Williams, Jr., Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects I/II
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mail Stop 14B-2
Washington, DC 20555

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Indian Point Unit No. 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 4 7	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 4
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TITLE (4)
Potential Loss of Ability to Remotely Operate Valves

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 5	1 9	9 2	9 2	0 1 3	0 0	0 6	1 8	9 2		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9) **N**

POWER LEVEL (10) **1 0 0**

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.36(c)(2)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Joan F. Etzweiler	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE: 9 1 4 NUMBER: 5 2 6 - 5 3 6 5

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On May 19, 1992, an engineering review of the control circuits for two motor operated valves (MOV) inside containment indicated that their failure could prevent remote actuation of four other MOVs if required. MOVs 730 and 731 are opened only for normal shutdown cooling, are not required to operate following a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), and are not qualified for the postulated LOCA environment. However, they are interlocked with MOVs 885A and 888A, and 885B and 888B, respectively, which the operator must open in order to establish various modes of recirculation for LOCA mitigation. A short between the contacts of the limit switch in MOVs 730 or 731 would prevent the remote opening of the affected 885 and 888 valves. The corrective action taken was to hang caution tags to prevent the energization of the normally de-energized MOV 730 and 731 circuits except when putting their system (Residual Heat Removal) into normal operation. The safety significance was minimal because the operators would open the 885 and 888 valves locally, when required, if they could not be operated remotely.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION**

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FACILITY NAME (1) Indian Point Unit No. 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 4 7 9 2 - 0 1 3 - 0 0 0 2 OF d 4	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

Westinghouse 4-Loop Pressurized Water Reactor

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Potential loss of ability to remotely operate valves after a loss of coolant accident (LOCA).

EVENT DATE:

May 19, 1992

REPORT DUE DATE:

June 18, 1992

REFERENCES:

None

PAST SIMILAR OCCURRENCE:

None

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On May 19, 1992, an engineering review of the control circuits for motor operated valves (MOVs) 730 and 731 indicated that their failure could prevent remote actuation of MOVs 885A and B and 888A and B. The engineering review was part of the ongoing evaluation of the results of the cable separation walkdown program. It was noticed that a false open indication of valves 730 and 731 could prevent the remote actuation of valves 885A and 888A, and 885B and 888B, respectively, to open positions. A false open indication could result from a short between the limit switch contacts. Because MOVs 730 and 731 are not environmentally qualified, such a common mode failure is possible. The interlock between MOVs 730 and 731 and the 885 and 888 MOVs was part of the original plant design.

MOVs 730 and 731 are part of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system. Located inside containment and in series with each other, the two MOVs are opened when the plant is shutdown to allow RHR pump suction from the hot leg of the Reactor Coolant System loop 2. These valves are not required for LOCA mitigation and therefore are not environmentally qualified. They are closed and de-energized during normal power operation. However, the EOPs instruct the operator to energize these circuits, along with all the others on MCCs 26A and B, shortly after the initiation of a LOCA.

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		9 2	0 1 3	0 0	0 3	OF	0 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: (Continued)

Valves 888A and 885A are interlocked with valve 730, and valves 888B and 885B are interlocked with 731. When the circuits for 730 and 731 are energized, a permissive consisting of indication (from their limit switches) that 730 and 731 are closed is required in order for the respective 888 and 885 valves to respond to remote actuation in the open direction.

The interlocks with valves 885A and B are intended to prevent an inadvertent valve line-up during shutdown cooling which could drain the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) water to the containment sump. The interlocks with valves 888A and B are intended to prevent inadvertent draining of the RCS water to the refueling water storage tank.

Valves 888A and B are located in parallel with each other and are closed during normal operation. At least one is required to be opened in order for this path to be used to the safety injection pumps to take suction from the discharge of the RHR heat exchangers, to provide high head recirculation.

Valves 885A and B are located in series with each other and are closed during normal operation. Both are required to be opened in order for the RHR pumps to take suction from the containment sump in case internal recirculation through the recirculation pumps becomes inoperable following a LOCA.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The postulated short between energized contacts in the limit switch for valve 730 or 731 would be equivalent to a false open indication. However, this is not the only possible failure mode. Another failure mode, with no adverse consequences, would be a short or ground to other points within the actuator, causing an interrupting device to de-energize the valve actuator. De-energization would eliminate the interlock and allow the plant operator to remotely actuate the 885 and 888 valves as desired.

If the 885 and 888 valves are not capable of remote opening, the plant operators would open them locally. Such operator action is permitted in the Indian Point Unit 2 design basis in the recirculation phase of LOCA response. The plant Emergency Operating Procedures clearly indicate this alternative. Therefore, the safety significance of loss of remote opening capability is minimal.

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		YEAR 9 2	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER - 0 1 3	REVISION NUMBER - 0 0	0 4	OF 0 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The potential loss of remote opening capability for MOVs 885A and B and 888A and B would be due to the correct operation of interlocks acting on false (open) position indication for MOVs 730 and 731. The false indication could result from a selected environmentally induced failure of only the limit switches after the MOV 730 and 731 circuits are energized post accident.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

On May 21, 1992, caution tags were securely affixed to the disconnect switches for MOVs 730 and 731 in MCCs 26A and B. These caution tags warn against closing the switches except when the RHR system is being put into normal operation for shutdown cooling. The operators will therefore not energize these valves following a LOCA, and the possibility of false open indication locking out remote opening of the 885 and 888 valves has been eliminated. In addition, changes will be made in the emergency operating procedures and/or the valves' control circuits to permanently resolve this situation. These changes will be made prior to the end of the 1993 refueling outage.