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
August 20, 1991

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2  
Docket No. 50-247  
LER 91-12-00

Document Control Desk  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Mail Station P1-137  
Washington, DC 20555

The attached Licensee Event Report LER 91-12-00 is hereby  
submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.

Very truly yours,



Attachment

cc: Mr. Thomas T. Martin  
Regional Administrator - Region I  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
475 Allendale Road  
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Mr. Francis J. Williams, Jr., Project Manager  
Project Directorate I-1  
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Washington, DC 20555

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US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 60.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

Indian Point Unit No. 2

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

0 5 0 0 0 2 4 7

PAGE (3)

1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4)

Service Water System Leakage into Containment

EVENT DATE (5)

LER NUMBER (6)

REPORT DATE (7)

OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)														
0	7	2	1	9	1	9	1	0	1	2	0	0	0	8	2	0	9	1		0	5	0	0	0

OPERATING MODE (9)

N

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

20.402(b)

20.405(c)

50.73(a)(2)(iv)

73.71(b)

POWER LEVEL (10)

0 9 0

20.405(a)(1)(i)

50.36(c)(1)

50.73(a)(2)(v)

73.71(c)

20.405(a)(1)(ii)

50.36(c)(2)

50.73(a)(2)(vii)

☒ OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)

20.405(a)(1)(iii)

50.73(a)(2)(i)

50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

20.405(a)(1)(iv)

50.73(a)(2)(ii)

50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

20.405(a)(1)(v)

50.73(a)(2)(iii)

50.73(a)(2)(ix)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

John R. Ellwanger, Principal Engineer

TELEPHONE NUMBER

AREA CODE

9 1 4 5 2 6 - 5 1 8 2

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

☒ NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH DAY YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On July 22, 1991 a pinhole leak was detected in the 2" Service Water System piping (90% Cu; 10% Ni) supplying cooling water to the motor of fan cooler unit (FCU) #23. On August 1, 1991 a pinhole leak was detected in the return line from FCU #24. The location of the leak in both cases was approximately 1/8" from a weld. The cause has yet to be ascertained.

In the earlier event the plant was at 90% power. Due to extenuating summer weather conditions it was not possible to isolate the FCU, effect a Code repair and also maintain containment temperatures below the limiting temperature of 130°F. Therefore a "housekeeping" repair (patch) was applied to the leak in FCU #23 and the line maintained "functional" although not "operable" in view of the Technical Specifications. An Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) was entered and a code repair effected within the time limit for the LCO.

In the later event the plant was at 80% power. Cooler weather permitted isolation of the affected FCU and a code repair was accomplished within the applicable 7 day LCO. There was no impact upon the health and safety of the public since minimum safeguards equipment was always available.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)  Indian Point Unit No. 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5 0 0 0 2 4 7 9 1 - 0 1 2 - 0 0 0 2 OF 0 3	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

## PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

Westinghouse 4-Loop Pressurized Water Reactor

## IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Service Water System Leakage into Containment

## EVENT DATE:

July 21, 1991 and August 1, 1991

## REPORT DUE DATE:

August 20, 1991

## REFERENCES:

Significant Occurrence Report (SOR) 91-366

## PAST SIMILAR OCCURRENCE:

December 11, 1980

## DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On July 22, 1991 a pinhole leak was detected in the 2" Service Water (SW) piping (90% Cu; 10% Ni) supplying cooling water to the motor of fan cooler unit (FCU) #23. The leak rate was estimated to be 4.5 gpm. Action was taken to isolate the fan cooler line by closure of containment isolation valves (CIVs). However, the leak occurred under extenuating summer conditions. With only 4 of the 5 fan coolers operating, containment temperatures exceeded 120°F; the maximum permissible containment ambient temperature limit is 130°F. In order to maintain containment temperatures within acceptable limits, the CIVs were opened and a "Housekeeping" patch was placed over the pinhole. This restored the FCU piping to functional status. However since the patch did not qualify as a code acceptable repair, FCU #23 was considered to remain inoperable with a 7 day limiting condition of operation (LCO) in effect. Prior to expiration of the 7 day LCO a code compliant repair was in place.

On August 1, 1991 a work crew entered containment for maintenance on a solenoid. A water spray was observed coming from a pipe serving FCU #24 (originally erroneously identified as FCU #23). The leak, located on the return line from FCU #24, was less than 0.25 gpm. Cooler weather conditions prevailed and the line could be isolated without adverse impact upon containment temperatures. As previously, a 7 day LCO was entered and a code compliant repair was effected prior to expiration of the LCO.

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TEXT CONTINUATION

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FACILITY NAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (6)

PAGE (3)

Indian Point Unit No. 2

0 5 0 0 0 2 4 7

YEAR

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NUMBERREVISION  
NUMBER

9 1

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OF

0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

## ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

This report is being filed pursuant to the requirements of Bulletin 80-24. Normally, isolation of the appropriate CIVs and entrance into the LCO applicable to a FCU being inoperable would have satisfied nuclear safety requirements. However, the summer conditions which required all five FCUs to be functional in order to maintain containment temperature within acceptable limits did introduce a unique aspect in that a "Housekeeping" patch was utilized. The use of a "Housekeeping" patch is permitted by NRC guidance (NRC memorandum, J.A. Richardson to S.A. Varga and D.M. Crutchfield, dated 9/6/90).

The temporary patch consisted of a rubber sleeve held in place by a C-Clamp. The patch was totally reversible and left no residual effects upon the piping when removed. The patch was not relied upon for maintaining the structural integrity of the piping. The affected piping was a moderate energy safety class C line.

A safety evaluation was prepared which addressed the interface with containment integrity. This was felt necessary as the patch, being non-code compliant, could not be relied upon during an accident. The safety evaluation concluded that there was no impact upon containment integrity.

## CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

In both instances the pinholes were located within 1/8" of a weld. An evaluation of the first failed pipe section indicates that microbiological induced corrosion (MIC) may be the cause. The second failed section has been sent to an independent laboratory for evaluation and possible confirmation of a common cause. The piping material is 90% copper - 10% nickel.

## CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Like-in-kind replacement of a section of pipe was installed in each case. All chlorination systems were placed in operation.