Stephen B. Bram
Vice President

Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
Indian Point Station
Broadway & Bleakley Avenue
Buchanan, NY 10511
Telephone (914) 737-8116

May 30, 1989

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2
Docket No. 50-247
LER 89-07-00

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mail Station P1-137
Washington, DC 20555

The attached Licensee Event Report LER 89-07-00 is hereby submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.

Very truly yours,

Stl B Bram

Attachment

cc: Mr. William Russell
Regional Administrator - Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Mr. Donald S. Brinkman, Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects I/II
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mail Stop 14B-2
Washington, DC 20555

Senior Resident Inspector
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
P.O. Box 38
Buchanan, NY 10511

IE22
1/1

NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1): Indian Point Unit No. 2

DOCKET NUMBER (2): 0 5 0 0 0 2 4 7

PAGE (3): 1 OF 0 4

TITLE (4): Subcooling Margin Monitor Missed Calibration

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 4	2 8	8 9	8 9	- 0 0 7	- 0 0	0 5	3 0	8 9		0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9): N

POWER LEVEL (10): 0 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME: George Dahl, Engineer

TELEPHONE NUMBER: AREA CODE 9 1 4 5 2 6 - 5 1 8 6

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

[ ] YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

[X] NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15): MONTH | DAY | YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

LER 89-07

During the Maintenance Program Team Inspection conducted from April 24 through May 5, 1989, while the plant was at cold shutdown for refueling, it was discovered that the calibration interval for the Subcooling Margin Monitor instrument loop had been exceeded because two components in the circuitry for the monitor were not calibrated. The Technical Specifications require calibration of the monitor at each refueling outage. There was a period spanning two refueling outages during which the two loop components, and therefore the monitor also, were not appropriately calibrated. The health and safety of the public were not affected during that period as the settings for the components were found to be within acceptable limits when they were calibrated.

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

Westinghouse 4-Loop Pressurized Water Reactor

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

The calibration interval for the Subcooling Margin Monitor required by Technical Specification Table 4.1-1 was exceeded.

EVENT DATE:

April 28, 1989

REPORTABILITY DETERMINATION DATE:

May 8, 1989

REPORT DUE DATE:

May 27, 1989

REFERENCES:

Significant Occurrence Report (SOR) 89-269

PAST SIMILAR OCCURRENCE:

None

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

During the Maintenance Program Team Inspection conducted during the period April 24 through May 5, 1989, it was discovered that two current-to-current (I/I) convertors in the two independent pressure input loops to the Subcooling Margin Monitor (SMM) had not been calibrated at the same frequency as the SMM itself. At the time of this determination that plant was at cold shutdown and the 1989 refueling outage was ongoing.

Table 4.1-1 of the Technical Specifications requires the SMM be calibrated each refueling outage, at a minimum. The SMM has two temperature inputs, one from a reactor coolant system (RCS) cold leg and one from a RCS hot leg. Two pressure inputs from the RCS wide-range pressure transmitters are also part of the SMM circuitry. The SMM itself

is calibrated by one surveillance test (PC-R24), the temperature input circuitry is calibrated by a second surveillance test (PC-R1C), and the two pressure transmitters are calibrated by a third surveillance test (PC-V1A). Each I/I convertor between each pressure transmitter and the SMM is calibrated by a separate preventive maintenance procedure (ICPM-59 and ICPM-326).

All of the required surveillance tests were performed at the requisite intervals. However, the preventive maintenance procedures for the pressure transmitter I/I convertors were not performed during each refueling outage, since the ICPMs had no requirement to do so. Since these I/I convertors are part of the SMM circuitry, their lack of calibration means the SMM has not been calibrated each refueling outage as required by Technical Specifications. The preventive maintenance procedure (ICPM-326) for the I/I convertor for one pressure transmitter (PT-402) was performed on October 13, 1982 and was not performed again until November 2, 1987. Therefore, it wasn't calibrated for two refueling outages. The preventive maintenance procedure (ICPM-59) for the second pressure transmitter (PT-403) was performed on July 23, 1984 and was not performed again until October 23, 1987. It was not calibrated for one refueling outage.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Because the Technical Specifications require the SMM to be calibrated at every refueling outage, the instrument loop components require calibration at the same frequency. Since the pressure transmitter I/I convertors were not calibrated at each refueling outage, the SMM is considered not to have been calibrated and the Technical Specification frequency requirement not satisfied.

Although the I/I convertors were not calibrated at the required frequency, the settings for both components were found to be within acceptable limits each time the calibrations were performed. No adjustments of the components were ever required. Therefore, there were no impacts on the operability of the SMM during the periods between calibrations.

CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The calibration of the two pressure transmitter I/I convertors is currently included in the preventive maintenance program. This program did not include requirements to calibrate all of the SMM loop components at each refueling outage.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The two I/I convertors were calibrated during the 1987 refueling outage and were again calibrated during the current refueling outage using the existing preventive maintenance procedures. To prevent future occurrences, the calibration of these components will be included in the surveillance procedure for calibration of the pressure transmitters (PC-V1A). Inclusion in the surveillance program will ensure the components are calibrated when required since the specified interval for the surveillance procedure is every refueling outage.