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On October 8, 1987 while the plant was at cold shutdown for a refueling outage, two service water pumps (P) failed an ASME Section XI surveillance test. The discharge head developed by the pumps (P) was below the minimum specified in ASME Section XI. The cause of the test failure is attributable in one instance to pump (P) damage caused by vortexing. The performance of the second pump (P) is under evaluation. Its slight decline in performance is not believed to be significant.

There are a total of six service water pumps (P) supplying two headers (3 pumps per header). The two failed pumps (P) were on one header. A third pump (P) supplying the second header could not be tested due to malfunction of a valve operator. The delayed test of the third pump (P) is a condition permitted by the Technical Specification when the plant is in cold shutdown. At no time was there any impact upon plant safety.

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The health and safety of the public were not affected.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT	(LER) TEXT CONTINUATION
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APPROVED DM8 NO 3150-0104

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Plant and System Description:

Westinghouse 4-loop pressurized water reactor

Identification of Occurrence:

Two Service Water System intake pumps fail an ASME Section XI Inservice Test.

Event Date:

October 8, 1987

Report Due Date:

November 7, 1987

Reference:

Significant Occurrence Report (SOR) 87-476

Past Similar Events:

None

Description of Occurrence:

On October 8, 1987 it was determined that two Service Water Pumps (P) failed a routine ASME Section XI inservice test. Both pumps (P) failed to develop sufficient discharge head to meet the minimum requirement of ASME Section XI.

In one case the developed head was less than 50% of that required while in the other case the developed head was just below the minimum required. In the latter instance, the design discharge head is 230 feet of water, the minimum test value is 269 feet of water and the measured value was 263 feet of water.

LICENSEE EVENT R	EPORT (LER) TEXT CONTIN	JUATION	APPROVED DM8 NC 3150-0104 ExPIRES & 31/85					
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The design of the Service Water System provides two separate headers with three supply pumps (P) for each header for a total of six pumps (P). One header is designated the essential header while the remaining header is identified as the non-essential header. The headers are interchangeable.

The two pumps (P) which failed the test were located on one header. At the same time a third pump (P) supplying the second header could not be tested due to a malfunctioning valve operator. The delayed test of the third pump (P) is a condition permitted by the Technical Specifications when the plant is in cold shutdown.

Analysis of Occurrence:

This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(vii).

It should be noted that one pump had a discharge head slightly less than the minimum test requirement allowable. However, the developed head was still greater than the value required by design. Thus, although the pump failed the test it still would have fulfilled its design function.

There was no impact on plant safety. On one header (A) two pumps were known to be operable with the third pump indeterminate due to the lack of test data. On the alternate header (B), one pump was clearly inoperable while the second pump, although it failed the Section XI test criteria and was administratively declared inoperable, developed more than sufficient discharge head to perform its safety function. The third pump on header (B) passed the test successfully and thus was operable. Since at cold shutdown, only two service water pumps are required to support decay heat removal, a single failure could be postulated on either header and two pumps on the alternate header would have been available to perform the required safety function.

Similarly, if the status of the service water pumps described above existed during normal operation there would have been no impact upon plant safety. Regardless of any assumption as to which header suffered a single failure two pumps have remained available on one header and one pump would have remained available on the alternate header in satisfaction of the Service Water System design requirement for hypothetical accident scenarios.

Cause of Occurrence:

The service water pumps are subject to vibrations, erosion and wear, requiring maintenance and replacement of parts. These effects have resulted in a pump life of 18 to 24 months which is the subject of a current engineering study.

LICENSEE EVENT	REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINU		US NUCLEAN ALUULATURT COMMISSION APPROVED DWB NO DISC-DIGA EXFIRES 6:31:85						
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Corrective Action:

As a result of this program several changes to pump materials and methods and frequency of repair are being evaluated to determine what changes need to be made to improve pump life. Murray Selman Vice President



Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. Indian Point Station Broadway & Bleakley Avenue Buchanan, NY 10511 Telephone (914) 737-8116

November 9, 1987

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-247 LER-87-11-00

Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

The attached Licensee Event Report LER-87-11-00 is hereby submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.

Very truly yours,

Murray Selman

25.190.11.9.3 Attachment

cc: Mr. William Russell Regional Administrator - Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406

> Senior Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 38 Buchanan, NY 10511