

John D. O'Toole
Vice President

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May 7, 1982

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2
Docket No. 50-247

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

ATTN: Mr. Steven A. Varga, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch No. 1
Division of Licensing



Dear Mr. Varga:

The purpose of this letter is to advise you of revisions in our plans for installing ATWS instrument modifications at Indian Point Unit No. 2 after careful consideration of presently available information.

Our original commitment in connection with an ATWS modification schedule is contained in our March 11, 1980 response to Item C.4 of the NRR Director's February 11, 1980 Confirmatory Order for Indian Point Unit No. 2. That item required that design criteria for the proposed modifications be based on Westinghouse analytical results contained in Westinghouse letter NS-TMA-2182 to the NRC, from Mr. T. M. Anderson to Dr. S. H. Hanauer dated December 30, 1979.

Recently an NRC letter, applicable to Indian Point Unit No. 3, made reference to two different sets of criteria. In the NRC letter dated November 2, 1981 from Mr. Thomas Novak to Mr. George Berry (PASNY) regarding the proposed Indian Point Unit No. 3 ATWS modification, NUREG-0460 Volume 3 Appendix C and a proposed rulemaking to amend 10CFR Part 50 were cited as sources for ATWS mitigating system design requirements. These criteria differ significantly from those contained in the Westinghouse letter of December 30, 1979, referenced above. Subsequently, PASNY revised its implementation schedule for ATWS modifications until mid-1985 based on these revised criteria (PASNY letter, J. P. Bayne to Thomas Novak (NRC) dated January 15, 1982).

The attached Figure I presents a single line logic diagram of the Indian Point Unit No. 2 ATWS mitigating system as presently envisioned, based on the criteria of the Westinghouse letter cited above. In view of the different criteria recently applied to the proposed Indian Point Unit No. 3 ATWS modifications, we have revised implementation plans for the ATWS mitigating system for Indian Point Unit No. 2. If the staff requires that we proceed further with this modification on Indian Point Unit No. 2 in advance of issuance of final NRC ATWS rules, we respectfully request that staff approval action be taken prior to required implementation.

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
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Con Edison and PASNY recently submitted to the NRC an Indian Point Probabilistic Safety Study (letter from J. D. O'Toole and J. P. Bayne (PASNY) to NRC dated March 5, 1982) which presented the results of a detailed probabilistic analysis of the risk associated with the operation of Indian Point Units No. 2 and No. 3. The results of the study indicated that ATWS events are negligible contributors to risk with or without an ATWS mitigating system.

On the basis of the results of the Probabilistic Safety Study and in view of the recently revised criteria for Indian Point Unit No. 3, it is our judgment that further consideration of installation of an ATWS mitigating system at Indian Point Unit No. 2 in advance of generic resolution of the ATWS issue is unwarranted and undesirable.

We have discussed this position with members of the regulatory staff and are, of course, available for any further discussion you or your staff may desire on this matter.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "John D. O'Toole", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

John D. O'Toole
Vice President

attach.

