

Indian Point 3
Nuclear Power Plant
P.O. Box 215
Buchanan, New York 10511
914 736.8001



**New York Power
Authority**

William A. Josiger
Resident Manager

February 21, 1989
IP3-89-013
MFP-89-023B

Docket No. 50-286
License No. DPR-64

Mr. Edward C. Wenzinger, Chief
Projects Branch No. 2
Division of Reactor Projects
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region 1
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406

SUBJECT: Inspection No. 50-286/88-22


Dear Mr. Wenzinger:

This letter provides the Authority's response to your
Inspection Report No. 50-286/88-22 dated February 3, 1989 and
received at this office February 10, 1989.

Attachment I to this letter addresses the concerns cited in
Appendix A, Notice of Violation, Of the Inspection Report.

Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this
matter, please contact Mr. M. Peckham of my staff.

Sincerely,


William A. Josiger
Resident Manager
Indian Point Unit 3
Nuclear Power Plant

WAJ:MFP

Attachment

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ATTACHMENT I

VIOLATION:

10CFR 73, requires that the licensee implement a Physical Security Plan. Chapter IV of the Indian Point 3 Physical Security Plan requires security force personnel to control access to the protected area.

Contrary to the above, on December 15, 1988, security force personnel failed to control access to the protected area in that an individual who was not badged, entered the protected area.

RESPONSE:

The Authority agrees with this violation and believes it was an isolated incident of inattentiveness by the security guard on duty at the access point. In this case two contract personnel, one badged, one not, had entered the protected area. The individual who was not badged entered the plant when the authorized individual's badge was entered twice in succession in a security card reader. The failure to control access was noted by the security staff upon exit of the contractor personnel. The security staff verified that these contractor personnel had not entered the vital area of the plant and a one hour report to the NRC in accordance with 10CFR 73.71 was made. LER 286/88-010 was written as the followup to this report. The Authority believes implementation of the following corrective actions will preclude recurrence:

- 1) The security officer at fault was retrained and disciplined.
- 2) Entry was denied to the two contract personnel involved and will continue to be denied until trustworthiness is re-established. The contractor's employer was notified of this incident.
- 3) All Security personnel were reinstructed concerning their responsibilities associated with access control and the consequences of this event.
- 4) Security coordinators and sergeants were reinstructed to be more aware of post conditions and other activities that effect security force performance.
- 5) The General Employee Training program was reviewed to assure it adequately explains security requirements and defines the security responsibilities for all site personnel.

- 6) A memorandum was issued to all station personnel reaffirming personnel responsibility to the security program.
- 7) The security computer software was modified to prevent double entry transactions into the protected area.

These programs and corrective actions have been fully implemented.