

Indian Point 3  
Nuclear Power Plant  
P.O. Box 215  
Buchanan, New York 10511  
914 739.8200



April 10, 1985  
IP3-WDH-799

Docket No. 50-286  
License No. DPR-64

Mr. Samuel J. Collins, Chief  
Projects Branch No. 2  
Division of Project and Resident Programs  
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region I  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, PA 19406

SUBJECT: INSPECTION NO. 50-286/85-03


Dear Mr. Collins:

This letter provides the Authority's response to your Inspection Report No. 50-286/85-03 dated March 11, 1985 and received at this office on March 15, 1985.

Attachment I to this letter addresses the concerns cited in Appendix A, Notice of Violation, of the Inspection Report.

Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Mr. W. D. Hamlin of my staff.

Very truly yours,

  
John C. Brons  
Resident Manager  
Indian Point Unit 3  
Nuclear Power Plant

WDH:jmd

Attachment

cc: IP3 Resident Inspector's Office

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## ATTACHMENT I

### Violation

Paragraph 6.8.1 of Technical Specifications requires that written procedures be implemented covering the applicable procedures recommended in Appendix "A" of Regulatory Guide 1.33, November 1972. Appendix "A" of Regulatory Guide 1.33 lists procedures for offnormal conditions and procedures for combating emergencies and other significant events.

Offnormal Operating Procedure. ONOP-EL-3, Revision 1, "Loss of an Instrument Bus", lists immediate operator actions in Section 4.0 and subsequent actions in Section 5.0 to be taken upon loss of power on an instrument bus.

Contrary to the above, on January 21, 1985, an attempt was made to transfer instrument bus 32 to its backup power supply (a subsequent action in ONOP-EL-3) before performing the immediate operator actions in ONOP-EL-3.

### Response

The details of this incident were reviewed and discussed with all reactor operators. The need for adherence to procedures during normal, offnormal and emergency events was stressed. In addition, this will be stressed during future requalification training.

A contributing factor in this event was a lack of human factors engineering with regard to which protection channel is supplied by which instrument bus. As a corrective measure, new highly visible identification tags have been installed that clearly identify the reactor protection channel, instrument bus, and normal and alternate power supplies for the instrument bus.