

U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATIONS
REGION I

RO Inspection Report No.: 50-286/72-06

Docket No.: 50-286

Licensee: Consolidated Edison Company (Indian Point 3)

License No.: CPPR-62

4 Irving Place

Priority: _____

New York, New York 10003

Category: A

Location: Buchanan, New York

Type of Licensee: PWR 1025 MWe (W)

Type of Inspection: Announced, Special

Dates of Inspection: December 8, 1972

Dates of Previous Inspection: November 22, 1972

Principal Inspector: *R. F. Heishman*

for J. Allentuck, Reactor Inspector

1/2/73
Date

Reporting Inspectors: *Ross L. Brown*

Ross L. Brown, Reactor Inspector

1/2/73
Date

W. F. Sanders

W. F. Sanders, Reactor Inspector

1/2/73
Date

Other Accompanying Personnel: None

Reviewed By: *R. F. Heishman*

R. F. Heishman, Senior Reactor Inspector

1/2/72
Date

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PDR ADCK 05000286
Q PDR

Summary of Findings

Enforcement Action

None

Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Items

Not inspected

Design Changes

None

Unusual Occurrences

None

Other Significant Findings

Current Findings

The inspectors examined the Con Ed audit and selected quality control documentation for the Safety Injection, Reactor Coolant, and Service Water Systems. No deficiencies were noted. (See Report Details paragraph 2)

Status of Previously Reported Unresolved Items

Not inspected

Management Interview

Persons Present

Consolidated Edison Company (Con Edison)

Mr. A. D. Kohler, Resident Construction Manager
Mr. E. J. Dadson, Manager, Examination and Evaluation Sub-Section
Mr. J. P. Deane, QA, Supervisor

At the conclusion of the inspection a meeting was conducted by Messrs. Brown and Sanders to discuss the results of the finding. The items discussed are as follows:

- A. The inspectors stated that the Consolidated Edison Audits and records did not reveal any open deficiencies.

Report Details

1. Persons Contacted

Consolidated Edison Company (Con Edison)

Mr. A. D. Kohler, Resident Construction Manager
Mr. E. J. Dadson, Manager, Examination and Evaluation Sub-Section
Mr. J. P. Deane, QA Supervisor

Wedco

Mr. W. Diebler, Manager, Quality Control
Mr. J. M. McLaughlin, Welding Engineer

2. The RO:I Inspectors reviewed the following documents and reports. No deficiencies were noted.

a. Consolidated Edison Audit Reports

The Con Ed audits of the inspection and construction activities on the Safety Injection, Service Water and Reactor Coolant Systems.

b. Weld History Reports

The weld history report for the safety injection system weld joints, which indicate acceptable results of joint fit-up, welding parameters, welder identification, liquid penetrant and radiographic examination acceptance, and signature of the responsible inspector.

c. Specification for Erection of Mechanical Equipment and Power Piping (9321-05-248-32)

This specification defines random radiography as a 10% sample of the completed welds made by each welder working on the system. The weld records of the portion of the auxiliary coolant system which requires random radiography, indicates 52 welds have been completed, 30 of which have been radiographed. These records also indicate that each welders work has been radiographically examined in excess of the 10% as specified.

d. Open Items Reports

The Open Items Reports, relative to fit-up discrepancies in

the Main Coolant System piping were inspected. These reports define the discrepancy, corrective action and examination. In addition, the reports were reviewed and approved by the Wedco welding engineer and quality control supervisor. The welds have been completed and examined by radiography and liquid penetrant for final acceptance.

e. Pipe Hanger Inspection

Consolidated Edison has established a task force to perform hanger inspection. This task force consisted of Con Edison Engineering personnel qualified in piping and thermal expansion technology. As part of this inspection program, Wedco quality control was required to assign one inspector knowledgeable in the physical layout of the plant, to each Con Edison representative. The function of the Wedco inspector was to act as a guide for the Con Edison personnel in tracing systems. A selected review of the hanger inspection reports indicates that the evaluation of the acceptability of the hangers on systems was made by a Con Edison Engineer.

f. Welder Qualification

The welder performance qualification for those welds made in the Service Water System (non safeguard) appeared to be satisfactory. These were partial penetration welds, made in accordance with Procedure No. 51, Rev. "A".

The inspector reviewed a deficiency which was documented in nonconformance Report No. 3-122 relative to weld procedures to be used on this system. The disposition authorized the use of Weld Procedure No. 51 and was approved by Engineering, Construction and Quality Control.

APR 13 1973

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NOTE TO R. H. ENGELKEN

INDIAN POINT 3 CABLE SPLICING

In accordance with our discussions of this morning, attached is correspondence between Region I and Consolidated Edison regarding cable splices at the Indian Point 3 facility.

Since this will involve decisions from the Directorate of Licensing, we are requesting that you take lead responsibility on this item.

15
D. F. Knuth


Enclosure:
As Stated

*50-286
map*

OFFICE ▶	RO					
SURNAME ▶	<i>DFK</i> DFKnuth:mm					
DATE ▶	4/13/73					

FO#1

UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATIONS
REGION 1
970 BROAD STREET
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY 07102



APR 10 1973

Donald F. Knuth, Deputy Director for Field Operations,
Directorate of Regulatory Operations, HQ


INDIAN POINT NO. 3, DOCKET NO. 50-286
INADEQUATE RESPONSE TO ENFORCEMENT LETTER

Enclosed is our letter of January 5, 1973 containing a list of viola-
tions and Consolidated Edison's responses dated February 7, 1973 and
April 3, 1973.

We feel that Consolidated Edison's corrective action is appropriate
and will be verified during subsequent inspections, except for "Splice
Insulation", referred to in the Enclosure 2, Item 1 of our letter of
January 5, 1973. Consolidated Edison's reply contained in their letter
of February 7, 1973 and supplemented by their letter of April 3, 1973
is of questionable adequacy in that the splice insulating material is
admittedly of a lesser fire resistant characteristic than the cable
insulation. All splices at the penetrations use the same material and
while a failure at the splice location which would affect more than a
single channel cannot be predicted, a common mode of failure has been
generated in each of the three channels, since, as indicated in the
Quad Cities fire, a faulty splice can generate a fire.

We are of the opinion that fire resistant characteristics should be
at a high level where a real fire probability exists. We are also
of the opinion that no single channel should be knowingly installed
with a recognized failure potential. Notwithstanding this view, the
acceptability of these type splices is, in our view, a licensing
decision due to built in system redundancy and separation. We rec-
ommend that a decision on this matter be obtained from Directorate of
Licensing.

It is further recommended that this matter be handled on a priority
basis in that we are aware that this problem is applicable to Con Ed 2
and, most likely, to many other reactor facilities.


James P. O'Reilly
Director

Enclosures:
As stated

cc: R. H. Engelken, RO
J. B. Henderson, RO
J. G. Keppler, RO