

Docket No: 50-286

Applicant: Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.

Facility: Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3

SUMMARY OF ACRS FULL COMMITTEE MEETING

The ACRS full committee meeting on Indian Point 3 was held on November 9, 1973, in Washington, D. C. The agenda furnished by the ACRS is attached. Also attached is the resulting ACRS letter on Indian Point 3.

The following are comments made by the Committee of which the staff should take note as they will relate to future projects.

(1) Low Pressure Systems Connected to the Primary System

The ACRS has requested that where check valves are utilized to isolate low pressure systems from the primary system that suitable equipment and tests be used to periodically determine the valve position.

(2) Technical Specifications

A considerable time was spent during the full committee review and during a previous subcommittee review on the technical specifications. The ACRS felt that further development of the technical specifications was necessary to include:

- a. Heatup and cooldown curves as conservative as practical.
(Exceeding the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G)
- b. Baseline and in-service inspection of the steam generator shell.
- c. Startup of an idle loop at power.
- d. Acceptable cumulative limits on downtime of protection systems and engineered safety features.
- e. Availability of core outlet thermocouples.

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- f. Augmented use of moveable in-core detectors:
- g. In-service inspection of nozzles in the primary head of the steam generator.
- h. Administrative controls to prevent overpressurization of the reactor vessel when there is no bubble in the pressurizer.

The staff indicated that two items remain outstanding: assuring adequate diesel cooling following a break in the nuclear service water header and turbine overspeed. Resolution of the diesel cooling problem requires additional information. The turbine overspeed problem will require design modifications and the technical specifications will limit the electrical output of Indian Point 3 until such time as this redesign is reviewed, approved, installed, and tested.

H. Specter, Project Manager
Pressurized Water Reactors
Branch No. 1
Directorate of Licensing

Attachments:

- 1. Full Committee Agenda
- 2. ACRS Ltr. to Chairman Ray

Distribution:
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DATE	11/16/73	11/16/73			



UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

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AGENDA

INDIAN POINT UNIT 3 FULL ACRS MEETING

1. Site Description and Introductory Statement
2. Brief Project Status
3. Core Power Capability Analysis
 - a. Compliance with Interim Acceptance Criteria
 - b. Comparison with Zion and Indian Point 2
 - c. ECCS review and independent analysis
 - d. Sensitivity Analysis (ECCS)
4. Technical Specifications
 - a. Administrative requirements for maintaining peaking factors, e.g., part length rod limitations, rod rate of motion limits
 - b. Core Surveillance Requirements
 - c. Alternative or Additional requirements to account for unanticipated effects, e.g., reductions in F_q to provide for LOCA combined with steam tube rupture
 - d. Peaking Factor Monitoring - Fixed In-Cores vs Other Methods, Use of Thermocouples
 - e. Inservice Inspection (Fracture Toughness) - Inservice Inspection of Steam Generators
5. Emergency Plan/Post Accident Monitoring
 - a. What actions are specified beyond LPZ?
 - b. Instruments provided to follow the course of an accident - Discuss adequacy as to instrument range, type of read out, facility of the operator to interpret.
 - c. Does the stack monitor have a high enough range to detect a fuel element failure?
6. Generic Items
 - a. Reactor Coolant Pump Overspeed
 - b. ATWS
 - c. Turbine Overspeed/Missiles
 - d. Failure of Non Class I Components
 - flooding
 - electrical cable overheating
 - e. Isolation of low pressure and high pressure systems

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7. Transportation Hazards - Barge Damage
8. Security Plan - Access to site from Hudson River