

50-286

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REFUELING ACCIDENT ASSUMPTIONS

The refueling accident assumptions came into question at the time of the Indian Point-3 review. On the basis of some preliminary work, RT recommended that arguments with applicants concerning the number of pin failures be circumvented by taking the following position:

- (1) Containment shall be "closed" during all fuel handling operations within containment.
- (2) The air in the structure housing the irradiated fuel storage pool shall be vented through appropriate iodine filters.
- (3) Radiological doses will be calculated based on the failure of all pins within one bundle. This will generally be 49 pins for a BWR and 200 for a PWR. These doses will be used for reference purposes in establishing the maximum number of pins which could fail without exceeding 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines.

Following the Indian Point-3 review, Reactor Projects accepted the responsibility for further work on the problem. It is our understanding that the position reached by RP is in accord with the RT position described above. We are performing dose calculations for the fuel handling accident on the basis of this understanding. Please inform us if our understanding is incorrect.

Dug. signed by

P. W. Howe, Chief, Environmental & Radiation Safety Technology Branch
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RT-328A
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