POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
INDIAN POINT NO. 3 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

P. O. BOX 215 BUCHANAN, N. Y. 10511

TELEPHONE: 914-739-8200



December 14, 1979 IP-FWG-6745

Docket No. 50-286 License No. DPR-64

Boyce H. Grier, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region 1 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

The attached Licensee Event Update Report 79-016/01T-1 is hereby submitted in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification 6.9.1. The purpose of this update is to correct a clerical error given in the first paragraph of Attachment I to Licensee Event Report 79-016/01T-0, in which reference to "hot shutdown" should be "cold shutdown". Three copies of this letter and attachment are enclosed as required.

Very truly yours,

J. P. Bayne
Resident Manager

FWG/bam

cc: Director Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attn: William McDonald, Director (3 Copies)
Office of Management Information & Program Control
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Office of Inspection and Enforcement (30 Copies) c/o Distribution Services Branch, DDC, ADM U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. George T. Berry Power Authority of the State of New York 10 Columbus Circle New York, New York 10019

Resident Inspector T. Rebelowski George Wilverding, NYO P. W. Lyon, NYO James Davis, (SRC), NYO 100×11

## ATTACHMENT I

LER 79-016/01T-1 of Docket No. 50-286

The Power Authority of The State of New York

The plant was in the cold shutdown condition for a refueling outage.

On November 27, 1979, the Power Authority was notified by our Nuclear Steam Supplier, the Westinghouse Electric Corporation, that a detailed evaluation of the current LOCA/ECCS (October 1975) evaluation model indicates that a non-conservative feature could exist in the Appendix K LOCA analysis with respect to the portion of the calculation related to fuel rod burst. The potential non-conservative feature of the Westinghouse large break ECCS evaluation model is as follows. The model uses a curve which represents fuel clad burst conditions for clad heatup rates of 25°F/ second and greater. The evaluation discussed above revealed that heatup rates could be less than 25°F/second. During the LOCA transient, the fuel clad burst curve is dependent on the clad heatup rate prior to burst and a reduction in heatup rate causes earlier clad burst. A shift in clad burst time can affect the peak clad temperature (PCT) calculated for the LOCA transient.

As determined from the most recent LOCA analysis, Indian Point 3 has heatup rates less than 25° F/second. However, Westinghouse believes that reanalysis with the most current Westinghouse LOCA/ECCS evaluation model (February 1978) would show that no change to  $F_{\bf q}$  is necessary. That is, they believe margins available in this model will more than compensate for any effect associated with the change in the fuel clad burst curve. An analysis with the current model using the appropriate heatup rate dependent burst curves is currently being performed. The results of this analysis will be available before the unit comes back on line after the current refueling outage.

No similar events have been recorded to date.