

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
INDIAN POINT NO. 3 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

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June 6, 1979
IP-KRC-5033

Docket No. 50-286
License No. DPR-64

Mr. S. Varga
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mail Stop 116C
Washington, D. C. 20555

Revised Responses to I.E. Bulletin 79-06A
Rev. 1, as a Result of a Meeting Held in
Bethesda, Maryland May 30, 1979 with
Westinghouse Utilities and NRC

Dear Mr. Varga:

- 2.a.b.c. We have reviewed the actions required by our operating procedures for coping with transients and accidents, and have written and issued a new procedure which deals with:
- a. Recognition of the possibility of forming voids in the primary coolant system large enough to compromise the core cooling capability, especially natural circulation capability.
 - b. Operator action required to prevent the formation of such voids.
 - c. Operator action required to enhance core cooling in the event such voids are formed.

This was originally scheduled to be completed on May 15, 1979. Permission was received from the Resident NRC Inspector to extend the date to May 18, 1979, at which time the procedure was issued.

- 6.) We did not address our LTOP valves separately in our original response because they are the PORV's. However, we have revised our procedure which deals with the operation of the OPS, which requires the operator to manually close the power operated relief block valves when reactor coolant system pressure is reduced below the setpoint for normal automatic closure of the LTOP valves and the valve(s) remain stuck open. The indications of an LTOP valve being open is the same for a PORV, which was discussed in our original response.

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- 7.a.) The procedure which deals with identifying the cause of a safety injection actuation signal has been revised to clarify to the operator when the signal was inadvertently actuated and not as a result of a real SI condition. The operators are directed by procedures to override the safeguard signal when it is determined that it was spuriously actuated.
- 7.b.+ c.) We have written a new procedure to deal with the conditions similar to the TMI incident. In it, we have incorporated some of the recommendations of our NSSS vendor to guide the operator as to when the safety injection system can be safely shut down. Also, the procedure states that the reactor coolant pumps are to remain in service unless previously established operating limits are exceeded and would require the removal of the reactor coolant pump from service.
- 7.d.) When we stated in our original response that "the emergency procedures contain a section indicating many additional indications which should be considered before taking appropriate operator action," we meant this in a general sense and not as a response to any particular condition. We will assume you want it for conditions similar to what occurred at TMI.

They are:

Pressurizer Pressure
Containment Activity
Containment Sump Level
Containment Pressure

PRT Pressure
PRT Level
PRT Temperature
The PORV's downstream temperature indicator
PORV PCV 455C and/or PORC PCV 456 line indications

The individual safety valve downstream temperature indicators

- 8.a.) When we are returning from cold shutdown, we perform a checkoff list on the systems inside the containment building prior to startup to insure the safety systems are properly aligned. Access into the containment building is restricted during subsequent operations.

Additionally, there is positive indication in the Control Room of the position of the safety related valves which insures that the flow paths for injection into the core can be verified and determined to exist. The drain and vents on these lines, which were verified shut on the check off list, can be determined to be in their correct position via a lack of leakage in the Containment Building in conjunction with pressure being maintained in the safety related systems.


Thus, we have complied with the Bulletin in checking the alignment of the valves not accessible during normal operation.

- 8.b.) We have completed our procedure review as stated in our original response.
- 10.b.) We remove equipment from service which does not necessarily remove the system from service. Since prior to removing the equipment from service the system was operable as per our technical specification requirements, only testing the equipment removed when it is returned insures that the system is operable.

In those cases where the removal of the equipment from service (allowed by the Technical Specifications) removes the system from service, of which I know of no example, we would test the system upon return of the equipment for operability.

- 10.c.i.) We have revised our procedure to state that the authority for removing and returning a safety system to service is delegated to the senior operator on duty.
- 10.c.ii.) We did not address the relay of system status information from one shift to the next in our original response. We have reviewed our Administrative Procedure on Watch Relief and it adequately deals with the relay of system status information from one shift to the next.

Very truly yours,



J. P. Bayne
Resident Manager