


POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
10 COLUMBUS CIRCLE NEW YORK, N. Y. 10019
(212) 397-6200



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March 31, 1978
IPO-76

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Attention: Mr. Victor Stello, Jr., Director
Division of Operating Reactors

Subject: Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant
Reactor Cavity Seal Ring
Docket No. 50-286

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Dear Sir:

In amplification of the Consolidated Edison response dated February 22, 1978, to your letter of February 2, 1978, the Power Authority intends to remove the reactor cavity seal ring following the completion of each refueling outage and prior to bringing the facility above cold shutdown.

Very truly yours,

Lewis R. Bennett
Lewis R. Bennett
Acting General Manager

Subscribed and sworn to before me
this 31st day of March, 1978

Maureen A. Morris
Notary Public

MAUREEN A. MORRIS
Notary Public, State of New York
No. 4528251
Qualified in Kings County
Commission Expires March 30, 1980

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William J. Cahill, Jr.
Vice President


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Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
4 Irving Place, New York, N Y 10003
Telephone (212) 460-3819

February 23, 1978

Re: Indian Point Unit Nos. 2&3
Docket Nos. 50-247 & 50-286

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
ATTN: Mr. Robert W. Reid, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch No. 4
Division of Operating Reactors
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555



Dear Mr. Reid:

As requested by your letter of September 14, 1977, we hereby provide additional information concerning the potential for and consequences of boron dilution incidents at Indian Point Units 2 and 3.

Boron dilution incidents resulting from a malfunction of the makeup and purification system (Chemical and Volume Control System) were considered in Section 14.1.5 of the Final Safety Analysis Reports for both Units. These analyses were reviewed and the conclusions stated therein are still valid. The plant design and the procedures involved in the dilution process, assure against an erroneous dilution. Nevertheless, even if an unintentional dilution were to somehow occur, the plant operator has sufficient information (alarms and indicators) and time to determine the cause and take corrective action before the excess shutdown margin is exceeded.

A boron dilution incident of the type described in your September 14, 1977 letter was also examined. This type of incident could not take place at Indian Point Units 2 and 3 because the plants are designed with two sets of normally closed valves located between the Spray Additive Tank (SAT) and the RHR System. Therefore, a misaligned valve or a single failure would not permit the sodium hydroxide to drain into the RCS via the RHR System. Furthermore, even if both of these sets of valves were postulated to be misaligned, the difference in elevation between the SAT and the connections with the RHR System would preclude draining the SAT into the RHR System.

Further reviews were conducted to determine the potential for any boron dilution incident not previously analyzed. A survey of each plant was performed to identify all sources of unborated water which could be connected to the Reactor Coolant System. No unanalyzed boron dilution incident was found to exist under normal conditions by which the plants are operated.


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In addition, the potential for leakage from the secondary side of a steam generator to the RCS during a secondary side hydrostatic test of the steam generator was reviewed. This potential would exist only if a steam generator tube leaked or failed during the test. Considering existing plant procedures and the extreme case of a full double-ended tube rupture at maximum hydrotest pressure, the potential consequences resulting from such a dilution incident would still be less severe than any previously analyzed in the FSAR.

In conclusion, based on our review of current plant design and operating procedures, no corrective actions (design or procedural) are required to preclude the occurrence or mitigate the consequences of postulated boron dilution incidents at Indian Point Units 2 and 3.

Very truly yours,



William J. Cahill, Jr.
Vice President

cc: Mr. George T. Berry
General Manager and Chief Engineer
Power Authority of the State of New York
10 Columbus Circle
New York, N. Y. 10019