

William J. Cahill, Jr.  
Vice-President

CENTRAL FILES

Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.  
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
Re: Indian Point 3  
Docket No. 50-286

Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Region I  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

Attached is a supplemental response for Indian Point 3 to IE  
Circular No. 76-06 concerning stress-corrosion cracking  
experienced in safety - related piping at several PWR plants.

Very truly yours,



William J. Cahill, Jr.  
Vice President

cc: Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Division of Reactor Inspection Programs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. George T. Berry  
General Manager and Chief Engineer  
Power Authority of the State of New York  
10 Columbus Circle  
New York, N. Y. 10019

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ATTACHMENT 1

Indian Point 3

Supplemental Response to IE Circular No. 76-06

As indicated in our original response to IE Circular No. 76-06 dated December 30, 1976, the only piping which could potentially be susceptible to the type of stress corrosion cracking discussed in the Circular is that portion of the containment spray injection piping which can not be isolated from the containment spray rings.

Since initial plant operation, strict chemical control has been maintained over the source of supply for the containment spray system (i.e., the (RWST) Refueling Water Storage Tank). A review of our chemical sampling records indicates that chlorides in the supply have consistently been less than 0.05 ppm.

Nevertheless, as committed to in our December 30, 1976 letter, a representative sample of welds in the appropriate portions of the containment spray injection piping was volumetrically (ultrasonics) examined during the recently completed turbine maintenance outage. This examination yielded no indications of pipe degradation and demonstrates that the containment spray injection piping has never been exposed to conditions which can cause stress corrosion cracking. Furthermore, it also confirms the acceptability of the present chemical sampling program. Continued chemical sampling of the RWST water will assure that no significant amounts of chlorides are introduced into this portion of the containment spray piping.

It is, therefore, concluded that no unusual conditions exist that could potentially affect the integrity of the containment spray injection piping, and no further action beyond continued chemical sampling of the RWST water is contemplated.