

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 1

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 NYIPS3 200-00000-00 341111 4 5
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58
 LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT 58

CON'T 01 REPORT SOURCE L 605000286 7032779 8042679 9
7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80
 DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10

02 | While plant was in hot shutdown, the condensate storage tank level
03 | dropped below the limit designated by Technical Specification 3.4.A(3).
04 | Demineralized water was being supplied from the external support facility,
05 | but since the tank water level sank more quickly than had been anticipated,
06 | the external supply was temporarily unable to compensate. Similar events
07 | were reported on September 2, 1978 (LER 78-026/03L-0) and September 7, 1978
08 | (LER-78-028/03L-0). 80

09 WF 11 X 12 Z 13 ZZZZZZ 14 Z 15 Z 16
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20
 SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE
17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 79 — 004 — 03 L — 0
21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
 EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE REVISION NO.
 ACTION TAKEN X 18 X 19 Z 20 Z 21 0000 Y 23 N 24 N 25 Z9999 26
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47
 ACTION FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPD-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27

10 | Maximum steam generator blowdown was being maintained at the time in
11 | order to eliminate chlorides forming in the steam generator due to reverse
12 | hideout. The proper water level in the condensate storage tank was
13 | restored within two hours. To prevent repetition of this event in the
14 | future, an on-site demineralization plant is to be installed. 80

15 G 28 001 29 NA A 31 Operator Observation 32
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80
 FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
16 Z 33 Z 34 NA NA NA 36
7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80
 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE

17 000 37 Z 38 NA 39
7 8 9 11 12 13 80
 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION

18 000 40 NA 41
7 8 9 11 12 80
 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION

19 Z 42 NA 43
7 8 9 11 12 80
 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION

20 N 44 NA 45 7905010527 914-739-8200 X217
7 8 9 10 68 69 80
 PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER Floyd W. Gumble

PHONE: 914-739-8200 X217

ATTACHMENT 1

Docket No. 50-286
LER-79-004/03L-0

The Power Authority of the
State of New York

The plant was in hot shutdown, in preparation for full power ascension.

On march 27, 1979, the condensate storage tank level dropped below the 360,000 gallon limit designated by Technical Specification 3.4.A(3) to a level of 355,000 gallons. The incident was caused by the use of the steam generator blowdown system which was being held at maximum. This was to eliminate chlorides forming in the steam generators due to the reverse hideout occurring in power ascension. Water from the condensate storage tank is used to make up for the water lost due to steam generator blowdown. As the tank level began to drop, demineralized water was supplied from the external support facility. The water level sank more quickly than had been anticipated, and by the time the flow rate was increased, the tank level dropped below Technical Specification lower limit.

This incident occurred at 0440 hours. By 0615 hours enough water had been supplied to bring the condensate storage tank level above 360,000 gallons.

In the future, special attention to the condensate storage tank water level will be emphasized during periods of excessive blowdown. Furthermore, to augment this water supply, a demineralization plant is to be installed on site.

Performance of the reactor was not affected by this incident. Similar events were reported on September 2, 1978 (LER 78-026/03L-0) and September 7, 1978 (LER 78-028/03L-0).

100 West 42nd Street, New York, N.Y. 10018
New York, N.Y. 10018
Telephone (212) 460-3819

April 18, 1979

RE: Indian Point Units 1,2&3
Docket Nos. 50-03, 50-247 & 50-286
LER 79-002/04X-1

Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region I
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pa. 19406

Dear Mr. Grier

The attached Licensee Event Report 79-002/04X-1
"Anomalous Measurement Report", is hereby submitted
in accordance with the requirements of Section 5.6.2.2
of the Environmental Technical Specification Require-
ments (ETSR). The event is of the type described in
ETSR Section 5.6.2.2a. A more detailed report on this
event is included as an attachment to this LER.

Three copies of this letter and attachment are enclosed
as required.

Very truly yours

William J. Cahill, Jr.

attachment
enc.

CC: Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
c/o Distribution Services Branch, DDC, ADM
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Mr. T. Rebelowski, Resident Inspector
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
P.O. Box 38
Buchanan, N.Y. 10511

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ES
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(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

PHONE: (212) 460-3384

NRC USE ONLY

Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc.

Indian Point Nos. 1, 2&3

Docket Nos. 50-03, 50-247 & 50-286

Attachment to LER 79-002/04X-1

Update Report - Previous Report 2/06/79

This report of an anomalous measurement at one of our environmental sampling locations in the vicinity of Indian Point Station is being made as a "followup" to the telephone report made by Mr. Steven Masciulli on January 8, 1979 to the Region I Office of Inspection and Enforcement. These actions were taken in accordance with the Environmental Technical Specification Requirements (ETSR), for Indian Point Units Nos. 1, 2&3, Section 5.6.2.2.

On January 8, 1979 Teledyne Isotopes, our contracting laboratory, reported a tritium level in a precipitation sample which exceeded ten times the control station value. The sample obtained at Eastview, located 15 miles southeast of Indian Point, was found to contain $7.31 \pm 0.44 \times 10^{-6}$ uCi/ml of tritium as determined by gas analysis. The sample obtained from Roseton, the control station, located 20 miles north of Indian Point, had a tritium activity of $1.20 \pm 0.7 \times 10^{-7}$ uCi/ml. Both samples were continuously collected over the entire month of November and were retrieved from the field on November 30, 1978. All precipitation samples were sent to Teledyne Isotopes for analysis on December 1, 1978. Upon Receipt of these results Teledyne Isotopes was asked to perform a confirmatory reanalysis of the Eastview sample. The result of the reanalysis was $7.04 \pm 0.42 \times 10^{-6}$ uCi/ml of tritium, thus confirming the original result. An investigation was performed to determine the cause of this anomalous measurement.

A review of precipitation analyses for the past few years shows tritium levels consistently at the 10^{-7} uCi/ml level at all locations, with no increasing trends noted. There are three other precipitation sampling points almost in a direct line, between Indian Point and Eastview; Air Monitor House onsite, Furnace Dock 3.5 miles southeast, and Croton Point 7.5 miles south southeast. Although each of these stations is closer to Indian Point, none indicated tritium levels in excess of 6.0×10^{-7} uCi/ml, which is a factor of twelve less than that observed at Eastview. This indicates that the source of tritium at Eastview is not related to plant operation at Indian Point and instead may be caused by some local activity, since the effect was not observed at other stations.

Releases at Indian Point Station during the period of concern were consistent with those which have been observed in the past and exhibited no abnormalities which would account for the anomalous measurements. Since typically many isotopes are released from the plant we would expect to see several of them in the Eastview sample in quantities comparable to their releases. However, only tritium was observed in the sample, indicating that its source was something other than plant operations at Indian Point.

From the above investigation it is concluded that the tritium observed at Eastview was not due to plant operations at Indian Point. The evidence indicates that it is due to some other source probably in the vicinity of Eastview judging from the localized effects. Con Edison has been advised that the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation has identified the source as a local manufacturer, which has since added dessicant filters to their installation to prevent any further recurrence of this problem.