



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**
REGION III
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LISLE, IL 60532-4352

January 21, 2010

Mr. Larry Meyer
Senior Vice President
NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC
6610 Nuclear Road
Two Rivers, WI 54241

**SUBJECT: POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2
EVALUATION OF CHANGES, TESTS, OR EXPERIMENTS AND PERMANENT
PLANT MODIFICATIONS BASELINE INSPECTION REPORT
05000266/2009007(DRS); 05000301/2009007(DRS)**

Dear Mr. Meyer:

On December 18, 2009, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments and Permanent Plant Modifications Inspection at your Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on December 18, 2009, with you and other members of your staff.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and to compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, one NRC-identified finding of very low safety-significance was identified. The finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of its very low safety-significance, and because the issue was entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating the issue as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the subject or severity of a Non-Cited Violation, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region III, 2443 Warrenville Road, Suite 210, Lisle, IL 60532-4352; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the Resident Inspector Office at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant. In addition, if you disagree with the characterization of any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region III, and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant. The information that you provide will be considered in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0305.

L. Meyer

-2-

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any), will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Robert Daley, Chief
Engineering Branch 3
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301
License Nos. DPR-24; DPR-27

Enclosure: Inspection Report No. 05000266/2009007(DRS); 05000301/2009007 (DRS)
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III

Docket No: 05000266; 05000301

License No: DPR-24; DPR-27

Report No: 05000266/2009007(DRS); 05000301/2009007(DRS)

Licensee: NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC

Facility: Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2

Location: Two Rivers, WI

Dates: November 30, 2009 through December 18, 2009

Inspectors: A. Dahbur, Senior Reactor Inspector (Lead)
J. Neurauter, Senior Reactor Inspector
N. Feliz-Adorno, Reactor Inspector

Observers: S. Edmonds, NSPDP
M. Benson, General Engineer, NSPDP

Approved by: R. Daley, Chief
Engineering Branch 3
Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000266/2009007 (DRS); 05000301/2009007 (DRS); 11/30/2009 – 12/18/2009; Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments and Permanent Plant Modifications.

This report covers a two-week announced baseline inspection on Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments and Permanent Plant Modifications. The inspection was conducted by Region III based engineering inspectors. Based on the results of this inspection, one finding of very low safety-significance (Green) was identified. The finding was considered a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of NRC regulations. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.

A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

- Green. A finding of very low safety-significance (Green) and associated Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control" was identified by the inspectors for the licensee's failure to adequately calculate the maximum room temperature for G-01 and G-02. Specifically, the licensee's calculation 2005-0054 failed to incorporate the design basis described in Technical Specification (TS) bases 3.8.1 related to the numbers of fire dampers associated with G-01 and G-02 exhaust fans that must be opened to maintain room temperature. The calculation also failed to demonstrate that the temperature stratification close to the combustion air intake filter was acceptable. Instead, the calculation only considered the bulk air temperature in the room. The licensee subsequently entered these concerns into their corrective action program as AR 01162599 and AR 01162759.

The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding was similar to IMC 0612, Appendix E, Example (3.J). The calculation errors were significant in that there was reasonable doubt that the maximum room temperature would not exceed the value of the Vendor Technical manual. The finding impacted the Mitigating System cornerstone of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee did not ensure that the maximum room temperature of EDG-1 and EDG-2 would not exceed 115 degrees (°) Fahrenheit (F), which is required to be maintained to ensure that the EDGs will perform their safety function during a design basis accident when the outside air temperature was 95° F. The finding was of very low safety-significance based on a Phase 1 screening in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations." This finding was not associated with a cross-cutting aspect because the finding was not indicative of the licensee's current performance. (Section 1R17.1.b(1))

B. Licensee-Identified Violations

No findings of significance were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstone: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R17 Evaluation of Changes, Tests, or Experiments and Permanent Plant Modifications (71111.17)

.1 Evaluation of Changes, Tests, or Experiments

a. Inspection Scope

From November 30, 2009 through December 18, 2009, the inspectors reviewed 13 safety evaluations (SEs) performed pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 to determine if the evaluations were adequate and that prior NRC approval was obtained as appropriate. The inspectors also reviewed 13 screenings and one calculation where licensee personnel had determined that a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was not necessary. The inspectors reviewed these documents to determine if:

- the changes, tests, or experiments performed were evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 and that sufficient documentation existed to confirm that a license amendment was not required;
- the safety issue requiring the change, tests or experiment was resolved;
- the licensee conclusions for evaluations of changes, tests, or experiments were correct and consistent with 10 CFR 50.59; and
- the design and licensing basis documentation was updated to reflect the change.

The inspectors used, in part, Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 96-07, "Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Implementation," Revision 1, to determine acceptability of the completed evaluations, and screenings. The NEI document was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.187, "Guidance for Implementation of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments," dated November 2000. The inspectors also consulted Part 9900 of the NRC Inspection Manual, "10 CFR Guidance for 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments."

This inspection constituted 13 samples of evaluations and 13 samples of changes as defined in IP 71111.17-04.

b. Findings

(1) Errors Found in the Room Ventilation Calculation for G-01 and G-02

Introduction: A finding of very low safety-significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control" was identified by the inspectors for the licensee's failure to adequately calculate the maximum room temperature for the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) G-01 and G-02 during post-accident scenarios and assuming an outside temperature of 95° F. Specifically, the licensee's calculation for the EDG rooms'

ventilation did not incorporate the design basis described in TS Bases 3.8.1, which indicated that three out of four dampers were required to be open to maintain room temperature for the emergency diesel generators G-01 and G-02. In addition, the calculation also failed to demonstrate that the temperature stratification close to the combustion air intake filter was adequate, instead, the calculation only considered the bulk air temperature in the room.

Description: Emergency Diesel Generators G-01 and G-02 draw combustion intake air from their respective rooms; therefore, the room temperature directly affected temperature limitations on the diesel. Design basis calculation for EDG ventilation, 2005-0054 "Control Building GOTHIC Temperature Calculation" was prepared to demonstrate the adequacy of the ventilation systems for the rooms housing the G-01 and G-02 in order to maintain an environment of $\leq 115^{\circ}\text{F}$ for post-accident scenarios assuming a maximum outside air temperature of 95°F . The temperature limitation of $\leq 115^{\circ}\text{F}$ was based on the diesel Vendor Technical Manual (VTM 00367) which stated that when the combustion air temperature exceeded 115°F , the diesel must be derated from its design load. Per calculation 2005-0054, the calculated maximum room temperature value inside the EDG rooms during an accident was 113.3°F . Based on this result, the licensee determined that the ventilation system for the EDG rooms were adequate to support the design basis loads of the diesels.

The licensee completed a 10 CFR 50.59 Screening 2009-010 "Technical Specification 3.8.1 Bases Changes," to revise the stated allowable room temperature in the G01 and G02 room from $\leq 120^{\circ}\text{F}$ to $\leq 115^{\circ}\text{F}$. The change was made to be consistent with the design basis calculation and the diesel Vendor Technical Manual.

The inspectors reviewed the Technical Specification Bases 3.8.1 and noted that a specific statement was not considered in the above calculation. Specifically, TS Basis 3.8.1 stated that for G-01 and G-02, three of four fire dampers associated with the diesel room exhaust fans must be open to maintain room temperature. The inspectors were concerned that calculation 2005-0054 was not conservative, in that the air flow measured values used by the calculation were obtained with all dampers open. These measurements were taken per PBTP 157 "Diesel Room Exhaust Flow Measurement."

During a walkdown in the G-01 and G-02 rooms, the inspectors also noted that the combustion air intake was close to the un-insulated portion of the exhaust manifold which could have a temperature of 800°F during diesel operation. The inspectors were also concerned that calculation 2005-0054 was again not conservative in that the calculation only addressed the bulk temperature in the rooms and did not account for temperature stratification close to the combustion air intake filter. This may result in an increase of the combustion air temperature for the diesel that may require a decrease of the diesel loading.

On December 4, 2009, the licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as AR 01162599 "TS Bases 3.8.1 not supported by calculation," and AR 01162759 "DG Room Temperature Calculation has Low Margin." Following the inspectors' identification of these concerns, the licensee revised calculation 2005-0054 using the actual diesel design basis loading, 2820 KW for G-01 and 2818 KW for G-02, which was less than the 2000 hour rating of the diesels (2850 KW). By calculating the temperature using actual loading, the licensee was able to produce more margin when addressing the inspectors' concerns. The licensee demonstrated that using the actual design basis loading resulted in an increase of the maximum allowable G-01 and G-02 room temperatures, 118.8°F for G-01 and 119°F for G-02, and thus an increase in the available margin. However, the results of the revised

calculation also showed that when assuming both fans running and one of the four fire dampers closed for each diesel as indicated in the TS bases, the maximum predicted temperature of the diesel rooms would increase from the previous calculation. However, even though the results of the new calculation reduced margin due to higher calculated temperatures relative to the previous calculation, margin was still available such that the increased temperature was not enough to affect the operability of the diesels.

The licensee also performed a walkdown in the G-01 room to determine a temperature distribution throughout the room when the EDG and fans were operating. The specific purpose was to determine whether there was a difference between the bulk heatup temperature of the room and the combustion air inlet. Based on several readings that were taken, the licensee determined that although there were variations in the air temperature in the room, there was no evidence of a temperature differential between the bulk air temperature of the ventilation flow and the temperature at the combustion air inlet.

Analysis: The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to adequately calculate the maximum room temperature for emergency diesel rooms for pos-accident was contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III and was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee did not ensure that the TS basis and the variation of the air temperature were accounted for when calculating the maximum room temperature for G-01 and G-02. The licensee failed to ensure that the maximum room temperature would not exceed 115° F, which is required to be maintained to ensure that the EDGs will perform their safety function during a design basis accident when the outside air temperature was 95° F.

The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding was similar to IMC 0612, Appendix E, Example (3.J). Specifically, the errors in the calculation were significant in that although, at the end of the inspection, the licensee was able to demonstrate operability and adequate margin existed; at the time of discovery there was reasonable doubt that the maximum room temperature for G-01 and G-02 would not exceed the value specified in the Vendor Technical Manual which ensure the availability and reliability of the diesel during post design basis accident. The performance deficiency also impacted the Mitigating System cornerstone of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.

The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Attachment 0609.04, "Phase 1 – Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," Tables 3b and 4a for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety-significance (Green) because the finding did not involve a design or qualification deficiency there was no actual loss of safety function, no single train loss of safety function for greater than the TS allowed outage time, and no risk due to external events.

The inspectors did not identify a cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because the finding was not indicative of the licensee's current performance. The licensee change to the Technical Specification bases did not require revision to the existed calculation 2005-0054.

Enforcement: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions.

Contrary to the above, on December 2, 2009, the inspectors identified that the licensee failed to assure that the design basis for the emergency diesel generators were correctly translated into instructions. Specifically, the licensee's calculation 2005-0054 failed to account for the Technical Specification 3.8.1 requirement related to the numbers of fire dampers associated with G-01 and G-02 exhaust fans that must be opened to maintain room temperature. The date of origination for the TS requirement that led to this violation could not be determined. The calculation also failed to demonstrate that the temperature stratification close to the combustion air intake filter was acceptable. Instead, the licensee only calculated the bulk air temperature in the room. Because this violation was of a very low safety-significance and because it was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as AR 01162599 and AR 01162759, this violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC enforcement policy. (NCV 05000266/2009007-01; 05000301/2009007-01)

.2 Permanent Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

From November 30, 2009 through December 18, 2009, the inspectors reviewed nine permanent plant modifications that had been installed in the plant during the last three years and two calculations that had been also revised during the last three years. This review included in-plant walkdowns for the Component Cooling Water (CCW) heat exchangers; PAB battery and inverter rooms; façade flood barriers; and EDG-1 and EDG-2 rooms and their associated damper areas. The modifications were selected based upon risk significance, safety-significance, and complexity. The modifications selected also included two modifications that were installed to facilitate the extended power uprate (EPU) project. The inspectors reviewed the modifications selected to determine if:

- the supporting design and licensing basis documentation was updated;
- the changes were in accordance with the specified design requirements;
- the procedures and training plans affected by the modification have been adequately updated;
- the test documentation as required by the applicable test programs has been updated; and
- post-modification testing adequately verified system operability and/or functionality.

The inspectors also used applicable industry standards to evaluate acceptability of the modifications. The list of modifications and other documents reviewed by the inspectors is included as an attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted 11 permanent plant modification samples as defined in IP 71111.17-04.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

.1 Routine Review of Condition Reports

a. Inspection Scope

From November 30, 2009 through December 18, 2009, the inspectors reviewed Corrective Action Process documents that identified or were related to 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations and permanent plant modifications. The inspectors reviewed these documents to evaluate the effectiveness of corrective actions related to permanent plant modifications and evaluations for changes, tests, or experiments issues. In addition, corrective action documents written on issues identified during the inspection were reviewed to verify adequate problem identification and incorporation of the problems into the corrective action system. The specific corrective action documents that were sampled and reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA5 Other Activities

.1 Plant Modifications in Support of Extended Power Uprate (EPU)

a. Inspection Scope

From November 30, 2009 through December 18, 2009, the inspectors reviewed the following completed plant modifications that supported EPU:

- Unit 2 replacement motor driven auxiliary feedwater mechanical tie-ins to the service water and auxiliary feedwater systems. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed a sample of the associated engineering change documentation including the 10 CFR 50.59 screening, design calculations, work orders, engineering change requests, and corrective action requests to assure the installed plant change was consistent with the design and licensing bases. The inspectors also walked down the mechanical tie-ins to the service water and feedwater systems to verify the installed piping configurations were consistent with the design and installation documentation.
- Replacement of motor driven auxiliary feedwater electrical and instrumentations tie-ins modification installed during Unit 2 refueling per EC-13401. The inspectors also walked down changes, installed per EC-13401, to the Unit 2 control room panels with the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) engineer.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Meetings

.1 Exit Meeting Summary

On December 18, 2009, the inspectors presented the inspection results to you, and other members of your staff. The licensee personnel acknowledged the inspection results presented and did not identify any proprietary content. The inspectors confirmed that all proprietary material reviewed during the inspection were returned to the licensee staff.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

L. Meyer, Site Vice President
J. Costedio, Licensing Manager
M. Durbin, Training Supervisor
R. Harrsch, Operations Manager
V. Kanal, Engineering Supervisor (Electrical)
K. Locke, Licensing Engineering Analyst
S. Pfaff, PI Supervisor
A. Mitchell, System Engineering Manager
C. Trsziss, Engineering Director
S. Ruesch, NOS Manager
B. Woyak, Design Engineering Supervisor (Mechanical)
P. Wild, Design Engineering Manager

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

S. Burton, Senior Resident Inspector
A. Sanchez, Reactor Inspector (Trainee)

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed

05000266/2009007-01;	NCV	Errors Found in the Room Ventilation Calculation for G-01
05000301/2009007-01		and G-02 (Section 1R17.1.b.(1))

Discussed

None

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list does not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather, that selected sections or portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.

10 CFR 50.59 EVALUATIONS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
07-005	Façade Flooding and Grout Removal	December 06, 2007
08-003	Installation to Replace Portions of Power Cables from 2X-04 to 2A-03 and 2A-04	April 04, 2008
08-005	Revised Procedure 2-SOP-480V-001	April 24, 2008
08-008	Remove Requirement to Backseat Normally Open Valves	September 15, 2008
08-016	Replacement of Unit 1 FW Heaters to Support EPU	October 03, 2008
08-018	Impact of Revised Containment Heat Sink Paint Thicknesses on Containment Integrity Analysis	November 01, 2008
08-019	Revised Containment Heat Sink for SLB Containment Integrity Analysis	November 01, 2008
08-020	Feedwater Temperature and Volume Increases with Replacement of FW Heaters on SLB Containment Response	November 02, 2008
08-021	Creation of Procedures for Supplemental Ventilation	April 03, 2009
08-022	Evaluation of Increased Delay Time for Bus A-01/A02 Undervoltage Reactor Trip	February 26, 2009
09-003	UFSAR 01141895 Changes to FSAR A.7, "Plant Internal Flooding"	May 14, 2009
09-005	PAB Superstructure – Use of Existing Craneway Bolts	June 11, 2009
09-010	T.S. Bases B 3.6.5 Revision to Westinghouse Letter WEP-06-64, Containment Integrity Evaluation for Increased Paint Thickness on Containment Structures	July 31, 2009

10 CFR 50.59 SCREENINGS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
05-172	Setpoint Changes for EDG HX	June 06, 2007
06-099	Minimum Voltage Requirements for MCC	June 14, 2006
06-132	DG SW Flow Loop Uncertainty Calculation	August 01, 2006
06-257	Revised Calculation RWST Level Setpoint	July 18, 2007
07-120	Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Low Suction Pressure Trip	September 27, 2007

10 CFR 50.59 SCREENINGS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
07-183	Revised Calculation Service Water Flow vs. Temperature Requirements	December 13, 2007
08-020	Revised Technical Specifications Bases 3.8.1 and 3.8.2 to Include Offsite Power Back Fed Through X-01	January 20, 2008
08-132	Temporary Cooling of PAB Battery and Inverter Rooms	August 06, 2008
08-139	Revised Parametric Values in Technical Specifications Bases	October 01, 2008
08-190	Replacement of Unit 1 FW Heater to Support EPU	November 5, 2008
08-198	Calculation – SI Accumulator Level Instrument Uncertainty Setpoint	October 01, 2008
09-010	Technical Specification 3.8.1 Bases Change	January 28, 2009
09-014	EC-13400: U2R30 Replacement MDAFW Mechanical Tie-Ins	August 24, 2009
09-016	TRM 4.12 Diesel Fuel Oil Change	February 02, 2009
09-174	Procedure Change – TDAFW Pump Overspeed Trip Test Using Air	September 18, 2009

MODIFICATIONS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
EC-08321	Design Documentation in Support of GSI-191 Resolution	Revision 0
EC-08744	Replacement of Obsolete Westinghouse Breaker	Revision 0
EC-10280	Replacement of 1SW-402 with Different Model Valve	Revision 0
EC-10633	Equivalency Evaluation of a Machined ½" Threaded Coupling for Use on 1SI-301R-3	Revision 0
EC-11936	0P-032B-M, SW Pump Motor Equivalency	Revision 0
EC-12000	Evaluation of Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity Analysis (EE 2008-0004)	Revision 0
EC-12111	Change EDG Frequency Setpoint values	Revision 0
EC-13002	AFW Room Flood Analysis	Revision 1
EC-13163	Fatigue Pro Analysis for Point Beach Units 1 and 2	Revision 0
EC-13400	U2R30 Replacement MDAFW Mechanical Tie-Ins	Revision 0
EC-13401	U2R30 Replacement MDAFW Electrical and I&C Tie-INS	Revision 0

CALCULATIONS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
2005-0054	Control Building GOTHIC Temperature Calculation	Revision 001
2006-0035	Parametric Values	Revision 1

CALCULATIONS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
2007-0002	Emergency Diesel Generator Frequency Uncertainty Calculation	Revision 0
2008-024	AFWP Room Flood Basis Calculation	Revision 0
2009-0012	PAB Craneway Lateral Connection to Column Lines 10 and 13, Rows G to U, Bolting Analysis	Revision 0
PNPB-305336-S01	Structural Analysis of Central PAB with Crane Load of 125 Tons	Revision 001-A
PBNP-994-18-M01	Determine Flood Water Volume in the U-1 & U-2 Façade Areas Based on Flood Barrier Height of 3'-0"	Revision 2
PBNP-994-18-M03	Determine Maximum Water Flow Rate from 8 Inch Service Water Break in U-2 Façade	Revision 0
PBNP-994-18-S01	Calculation for Design of Barriers for Façade Flooding	Revision 2
PBCH-05Q-302	FatiguePro Baseline for PBNP ½ through August 2003	Revision 4
FP-PBCH-306	FatiguePro Analysis of Plant Data for Point Beach Units 1 and 2 – 2003 and 2004	Revision 2
FP-PBCH-307	FatiguePro Analysis of Plant Data for Point Beach Units 1 and 2 – 2005 through 2008	Revision 1
TDI-6007-07	Vortex, Air Ingestion and Void Fraction	Revision 4

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS ISSUED DURING INSPECTION

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
AR-1162483	Reconcile Differences between FSAR A.1 and 2005-0053 FSAR Appendix A.1	December 02, 2009
AR-1162487	Reconcile Differences between FSAR Spray PP Levels FSAR Section 6.4	December 02, 2009
AR-1162465	G-01 and G-02 Fire Dampers are not Classified during Investigation into NRC Questions	December 02, 2009
AR-1162468	Structural Drawing not Updated	December 02, 2009
AR-1162494	Drawing C-360 not updated for damaged beam	December 02, 2009
AR-1162582	EC-10633 Minimum Wall Discussions	December 03, 2009
AR-1162577	Evaluation 2008-022 Insufficient Detail	December 03, 2009
AR-1162599	T. S. Bases 3.8.1 not supported by calculation	December 04, 2009
AR-1162611	Black/Yellow Tape on Floor in NV KV Switchgear During an NRC Walkdown	December 04, 2009
AR-1162654	FSAR 14.3.4 Temperature Curves Outdated	December 03, 2009
AR-1162632	Current Interrupting Rating Errors on QF-0422 Form	December 04, 2009
AR-1162615	Inappropriately Pre-Screening of TRM 2.2 Revision 2	December 04, 2009

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS ISSUED DURING INSPECTION

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
AR-1162604	STPT 2.3 Revision 4, Containment Pressure and LTOP, is Inconsistent with the Current Pressure Temperature Limits Report as Documented in TRM 2.2	December 04, 2009
AR-1162759	DG Room Temperature Calculation has Low Margin	December 07, 2009
AR-1163042	Clarify FSAR 6.4 Description of Spray Duration	December 11, 2009
AR-1163234	FSAR Table 6.4-9 is Outdated	December 15, 2009
AR-1163243	50.59 Evaluation 2008-018 Incomplete	December 15, 2009
AR-1163278	Code Case Calculation N-392-3	December 16, 2009
AR-1163306	Scaffold Review not Thoroughly Documented	December 16, 2009
AR-1163310	ICPs Reference Outdated CTS T.S. Values	December 16, 2009
AR-1163353	PBF-9114 Improvements (Scaffolding)	December 17, 2009

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
AR 01134889	Field Condition Does Not Match Piping Isometric Drawing	September 2, 2008
AR 01143683	Fatigue Analysis of Nuclear Power Plant Components – NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2008-30	February 6, 2009

PROCEDURES

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
TS 83	Emergency Diesel Generator G-03 Monthly	Revision 24
2-SOP-480-001	480V System Normal Operations	Revision 10

OTHER DOCUMENTS/REFERENCES

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
	Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1 Cycle 32 Reload Safety Evaluation	Revision 2

DOCUMENTS RELATED TO EXTENDED POWER UPRATE MODIFICATIONS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
EC 13400	Design Description Form: U2R30 Replacement MDAFW Mechanical Tie-Ins	Revision 0
SCR 2009-0014	10 CFR 50.59 Screening: EC 13400 - U2R30 Replacement MDAFW Mechanical Tie-Ins	August 24, 2009

DOCUMENTS RELATED TO EXTENDED POWER UPRATE MODIFICATIONS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
ECN-14628	ECN 13400-02 Rotate 2" Service Water Tie-In	Revision 0
ECN-14704	ECN 13400-04 3" AFW Pipe Supports Do Not Meet Original Drawings	Revision 0
ECN-14716	ECN 13400-05 3" AFW Anchor EB-10-AFU-01 Hilti Bolt Location	Revision 0
ECN 14856	EC for Evaluating Cut Reinforcing Steel	Revision 0
AR 01160194	Rebar Cut in Floor in PAB at 26' Elevation	November 2, 2009
AR 01161009	Failure Investigation Process Established for Repetitive Weld Failure	November 11, 2009
AR 01161630	Cut Reinforcing Bar in AFW Pump Room Wall	November 18, 2009
AR 01161636	New AFW Line in Contact with SW Pipe	November 19, 2009
AR 01161983	Auxiliary Feedwater Weld Installed in Inaccessible Location	November 24, 2009
S-11165-116-04	Auxiliary Building Floor Slab Evaluation for Rebar Cut at Elevation 26'-0"	Revision 0
S-11165-134-01	Evaluation of AFW Pump Room Wall F for Rebar Cut Per AR 01161630	Revision 0
WE-300044	Service Water Return from Unit 2 Containment Penetrations Up to and Including the 20"-JB-2 Discharge Header	Revision 01-B
WE-200051	2EB10A-3" Auxiliary Feedwater System from Structural Anchors DB3-H11 and DB3-2H2 to Containment Penetration P6 (EB10-A12)	Revision 00-B
WE-200052	Auxiliary Feedwater System from Structural Anchors DB3-2H7 and DB3-2H4 to Containment Penetration P5 (EB10-A13)	Revision 00-C
WE-200051S	Emergency FW from Penetrations P-5 and P-6 to Anchors H-11, 2H2, 2H4 and 2H7	Revision 00-C
WO-370105-01	MDAFW Mechanical Tie-Ins to Service Water Per EC 13400, 6" Service Water Supply Line	October 19, 2009
WO-370105-02	MDAFW Mechanical Tie-Ins to Service Water Per EC 13400, 2" Service Water Return Line	October 17, 2009
WO-370105-09	MDAFW Mechanical Tie-Ins to Service Water Per EC 13400, Pre-Fabricate 6" Service Water Supply Tie-In	October 16, 2009
WO-370131-17	Mechanical AFW Tie-In Per EC 13400, Pre-	October 20, 2009

DOCUMENTS RELATED TO EXTENDED POWER UPRATE MODIFICATIONS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
	Fabricate 2FE094036 / AFW Supply to 2HX1A, 3" Tee	
N/A	Weld Failure Causal Evaluation	November 14, 2009

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ADAMS	Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
AR	Action Request
CCW	Component Cooling Water
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CNO	Chief Nuclear Officer
DRS	Division of Reactor Safety
EC	Engineering Change
EDG	Emergency Diesel Generator
EPU	Extended Power Uprate
F	Degrees Fahrenheit
IMC	Inspection Manual Chapter
IR	Inspection Report
LOCA	Loss of Coolant Accident
NCV	Non-Cited Violation
NEI	Nuclear Energy Institute
NRC	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PAB	Primary Auxiliary Building
PARS	Public Available Records System
SDP	Significance Determination Process
SE	Safety Evaluation
SQUG	Seismic Qualification Utility Group
TS	Technical Specifications
TRM	Technical Requirement Manual

L. Meyer

-2-

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Sincerely,

/RA/

Robert Daley, Chief
Engineering Branch 3
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301
License Nos. DPR-24; DPR-27

Enclosure: Inspection Report No. 05000266/2009007(DRS); 05000301/2009007 (DRS)
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